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ABSTRACT 
The conceptualist view of property is based on the conceptual system or 
hierarchy of rights conceived by Grotius and developed by the pandectists. It 
rests on the assumptions that ownership is neutral and timeless. As such it 
has a number of abstract, timeless and universal characteristics, namely 
absoluteness, uniformity and exclusivity. Combined with liberalism, this 
concept of property becomes the guarantee of liberty and equality. 
The first part of this study shows that not only are the assumptions historically 
unfounded, but this conceptualist view of property made liberty and equality 
for women, in particular, impossible. The liberal, conceptualist property 
concept is a modernist construct that cannot guarantee either liberty or 
equality. The question then becomes whether constitutionalism can do what 
conceptualism cannot - can die constitutional protection of property guarantee 
liberty and equality. 
The second part of this study suggests that the answer to this is an "it 
depends" kind of answer. It depends on the structure of a constitution, 
underlying philosophical, political and, above all, hermeneutics theories 
employed by courts. In the South African context courts need to reject the 
private-law conceptualist view of ownership in favour of a constitutional 
property concept. This last-mentioned concept should be based on the values 
and normative context of the 1996 constitution. As such it involves value 
choices and making a political stand. Courts need to abandon conceptualist 
frameworks and decide on the proportionality of limitations on property. 
The conclusion to this study suggests that a feminist understanding of human 
beings as socially constructed and constrained, so that democracy alone 
cannot provide an answer to the counter-majoritarian dilemma, is necessary 
for an understanding of property. The creative tension provided by the 
feminist conflict between a political agenda and a respect for contexts may 
provide a framework for adjudicating on property issues. 
Key terms: 
Property; conceptualism; constitutionalism; feminism; Grotius; Kant; 
contextualism; constitutional hermeneutics; post-modernist; ownership. 
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INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1: MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESES 
"{B)y political laws we acquire liberty and by civil law 
property, and ... we must not apply the principles of one 
to the other''' 
"{T)he last word on law comes from judges, who, like 
lawyers, are for the most part trained in private rather 
than in public law ... "2 
"Our understanding is often muddied, however, by the 
patriarchal propensity to erect artificial boundaries ... 
and then to 'violate' these as 'enemy' territory .... Our 
sane surviving requires seeing through male-made, 
maddening artificial boundaries, as well as deriding 
male 'violation' of these false boundaries. "3 
1.1 Motivation and hypotheses 
The seminal article by Morris Cohen, quoted above, starts with the familiar 
statement that" ... as every student knows ... " property and sovereignty/liberty 
belong to completely different branches of law. Whereas private law 
regulates the acquisition, protection and transfer of property, public law is 
concerned with the liberty and equality of citizens. Although property, as a 
concept, is found in both branches of law, it is assumed that property has 
fundamentally different functions in each of these branches of law. It is this 
common assumption that provided the impetus for this study. In broad terms 
it is an analysis of the classical liberalist private/public dichotomy from the 
perspective provided by the private-law concept of property and the 
constitutional protection of private property. 
To a large extent, it is the constitutional protection of private property that 
makes the private/public dichotomy problematic. On the one hand 
Cohen M "'Property and sovereignty'' in Macpherson CB Property: mainstream and critical 
positions (Toronto 1978) 155-175155. (Cohen is here quoting Montesquieu.) 
2 Cohen "'Property and sovereignty"' 168. 
3 Daly M Gyn/Ecology-the metaethics of radical feminism (London 1991) 71. 
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constitutional protection of private property is viewed as an "invasion" of 
private-law territory by public law and it is resisted as such by civilists. The 
private-property regime is regarded as inherently just (and therefore not in 
need of "correction") and as basically a-political (and it should therefore 
remain uncontaminated by the "political" considerations of public law).4 This 
explains why " ... traditional conceptions of property prevail over obvious 
national interests such as the freedom of labourers to organise."5 
On the other hand the constitutional protection of private property also 
exacerbates the liberal dilemma in public law. Liberalism is committed to both 
equality and liberty, and property is seen as the means to attain liberty_ 
However, unequal distribution of property results in inequality both in the 
political and the economic sense,6 and the constitutional protection of private 
property, at least superficially, seems to confirm and "freeze" the existing 
unequal distribution of property. 
The constitutional protection of property thus raises three primary questions. 
In the first place it strains the traditional understanding of the limits of state 
interference in "private" matters. In this respect traditional boundaries 
between private and public, state and citizen, owners and non-owners need to 
be explored. This mostly deals with the traditional property concept and the 
way in which these relations are traditionally understood. The second 
question goes to the heart of the equality/liberty dichotomy. If property is 
seen as the guarantee for liberty, then a state-enforced equality might 
threaten that liberty especially if this liberty is understood absolutely. An 
4 Van der Walt AJ "'Tradition on trial: a critical analysis of the civil-law tradition in South African 
property law" 1995 SAJHR 169-206 180: .. ___ some supporters think that the problem with 
apartheid was that politics was allowed to enter into what should be 'pure' private-law relations, 
and that the solution is to keep not only apartheid but all politics out of private law." 
5 Cohen "Property and sovereignty"' 168. 
6 Cohen "Property and sovereignty" 159: "'But we must not overlook the actual fact that dominion 
over things is also imperium over our fellow human beings." On the classical liberalist dilemma 
see Levy MB "'Illiberal liberalism: the new property as strategy" 1983 Rev of Pol 576-594; Gill ER 
"Property and liberal goals" 1983 J of Pol 675-695; Waldron J The right to private property 
(Oxford 1988) 412ff. 
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absolute protection of liberty, on the other hand, might result in substantial 
inequality, at least economically. Constitutional protection of property thus 
seems to make the simultaneous protection of both equality and liberty 
impossible. The third question is, however, the crucial one. If it is assumed 
that the private-law property concept raises many problems and anomalies 
(and the first part of this study suggests that it does), the question then arises 
whether constitutional protection can solve these problems. This question 
then raises the further question regarding the differences, if any, between the 
private-law and constitutional property concepts. 
One key to the solution of these problems lies in the property concept. In the 
case of the private law/public law controversy, the question then becomes 
whether the property concept is determined by private law or by public law. 
Within private law, the question is whether the "private-law character'' of the 
property concept is affected by the public-law nature of the constitutional 
framework within which fundamental rights are guaranteed. Within public law, 
the question is whether constitutional law can recognise and utilise the 
"private-law character" of the property concept.7 To explore this key to the 
solution, this study will focus on the property concept and the effect, if any, of 
constitutional entrenchment on this concept. 
However, the concept can never be neutral or objective and is subject to 
interpretation. Consequently, the study of the concept also implies a study of 
the interpretation of that concept. This depends on the context and it is, in 
turn, dependent on some very basic points of departure. Robert Cover stated 
that "(l)egal interpretation takes place on a field of pain and death"8 which 
means that law and legal rules can only be understood within the context of 
its narratives. Legal rules and concepts do not exist in the abstract, but are 
7 See Van der Walt AJ "Reflections on the teaching of property law in future" 1993 Stell LR 88-99 
97, 99 on the public law/private law dichotomy in South African property law. 
8 Cover RM "Violence and the word" in Minow M, Ryan M and Sarat A (Eds) Narrative, violence 
and the law - the essays of Robert Cover (Ann Arbor 1992) 203-238 203. 
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affected by and affect peoples' lives. In a footnote Cover states: "I would be 
prepared to argue that all law which concerns property, its use and its 
protection, has a ... violent base."9 The first, general point of departure of this 
study is, therefore, that property, in particular, is determined not by abstract 
conceptual schemes alone but also by the underlying narratives and that 
these narratives always contain an element of violence and power. For this 
reason the study is not a "purely legal" one and, even more so, not a "purely 
private-law'' one. It attempts to place legal rules pertaining to property and 
the property concept within the narratives that give it meaning. It would 
deprive the property concept of all meaning if it were studied as if the political, 
philosophical, social, moral and religious narratives did not exist. 
The first, general point of departure must be specified further. One of the 
narratives within which property needs to be placed is the radical feminist 
one. This narrative denies the privilege accorded to the male pattern of 
thinking and knowing; it seeks to subvert male and female stereotyping that is 
seen as the basis for autonomous individualism; and it argues against the use 
of men as the primary reference point. 10 This second point of departure 
implies a different methodology that de-privileges trad.itional modes of 
analysis in favour of what Mary Daly calls spinning. 11 In short, the claims that 
link property, liberty and equality (which underlie the conceptualism and 
constitutionalism that is studied here) need to be re-examined against the 
background of the patriarchal State of Possession: 
''The courage to be logical - the courage to name - would 
require that we admit to ourselves that males and males 
only are the originators, planners, controllers, and 
legitimators of patriarchy .... The fact is that we live in a 
9 Cover "Violence and the word" 210. 
10 Minow M Making all the difference - inclusion, exclusion and American law (Ithaca 1990) 56, 
230, 238. 
11 This aspect will be dealt with below at 1.2. 
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profoundly anti-female society, ... (therefore) this book 
is an act of Dis-possession; and hence, in a sense 
beyond the limitations of the label anti-male, it is 
absolutely Anti-andocrat, A-mazingly Anti-male, 
Furiously and Finally Female."12 
5 
The property concept exists on a field of pain and death and it is " ... part of 
the same system of patriarchal possession, whose primary property is female 
life."13 
1.2 Methodology 
In order to study the problem set out above on the basis of the stated 
hypotheses, the study is divided into two main parts. In the first part the 
historical roots and development of the traditional private-law property 
concept is studied. In particular, the assumptions about this concept are 
tested against the historical data and narratives. This part concentrates not 
only on the history of positive law, but also on the philosophical development 
of the private-law property concept in a comparative context. The historical 
development is then offset against the background of the social realities of the 
various periods. 
In the second part the property concept is studied from a constitutional 
perspective. This is mainly a comparative study that attempts to bring into 
focus both the socio-political backgrounds and the impact of the various 
constitutions on both society and the property concept itself within a variety of 
legal systems. 
In this regard the comparative study compares dissimilar legal systems. It is 
argued that this approach will indicate similarities and/or anomalies that do 
12 Daly Gyn/Ecology 28, 29. 
13 Daly Gyn/Ecology 33. 
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not usually surface from a comparative study of legal systems within the same 
legal "family". 
The methodological approach of this study is determined by both the 
traditional method of analysis14 and the points of departure stated above. To 
a large extent analysis of the traditional private-law property concept 
necessitates the use of the traditional methodology. At the same time a 
radical feminist analysis implies a different method, one which Mary Daly calls 
spinning.15 This amounts to a focusing on the female background to male-
dominated legal rules and the analytical methodologies that sustain them. 
This implies both knowledge of the rules and an aware-ness of its inherent 
violence and gynocidal character. 
In this study the question of the vertical and horizontal application of 
constitutional provisions will not be addressed, except incidentally. Since 
constitutional protection (and provisions relating to expropriation and 
regulation) directly affects the relationship between state and citizen, that will 
be the main issue. For much the same reason this study does not deal with 
public or state property, but the focus is on private property and, in many 
cases, on landownership in particular. Consequently, when the term property 
is used, this will refer to private property unless the context indicates 
otherwise. Because of the focus on the property concept the question of the 
difference, if any, between real and personal rights will not be addressed, 
except where relevant in the historical context 
Finally, this study will be limited to an analysis of national constitutions. 
Although the jurisprudence of international and, especially, regional courts 
are interesting, they deal with the problem of property on a different basis. 
The problems confronting regional courts (such as the European commission 
14 See, on the traditional method, Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 169ff. 
15 Daly Gyn/ecology 320. 
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on human rights and the European court of human rights) are unique in that 
they involve questions of inter-state relations as well as conflicts between 
states and citizens. For this reason, these decisions will not be studied here. 
1.3 Terminology 
Some of the terminology used in this study will, at first, probably be strange to 
civil lawyers in particular. The difficulty stems from the fact that different 
languages use different terms and that different systems of law employ 
different concepts. In Afrikaans, for instance, a real right to a corporeal object 
is termed eiendomsreg (which is usually translated as ownership), while the 
object itself is termed eiendom or saak (usually translated as property). 
These terms are found in most civil law systems, albeit in different languages. 
In Anglo-American law, on the other hand, property is used to indicate both 
the right and the object of that right. Apart from this the term property rights is 
also sometimes used. Furthermore, the use of the term rights in property 
(regte in eiendom) in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa16 made it 
necessary to distinguish between property and rights in property. 17 
To avoid confusion the term property will be used throughout where 
appropriate. Although this term is not the one usually employed in civil law, it 
is the one most commonly used in constitutional property clauses. For this 
reason it seems the most appropriate, especially in the discussion on 
constitutional law. In all cases, however, the meaning of the term needs to be 
deduced from the context. As was the case with concepts, it is assumed for 
purposes of this study that this term (like most others) has no 
absolute/abstracUetemal meaning, but its meaning is determined in each 
case by the socio-political context. In discussions on Roman and Roman-
16 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the 1993-
constitution). 
17 See 12. 4 below. 
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Dutch law, the Latin term dominium will mostly be used. In all other cases, 
terms will be defined where they are first used. 
PART I: A PRIVATE-LAW PERSPECTIVE 
CHAPTER 2: INTRODUCTION 
"Property ... has varied infinitely in character and 
content from century to century and from place to 
place .... (E)ven as regards things recognised for seven 
centuries as property, the rights in them recognised by 
law have been forever changing."1 
The private-law discourse regarding property is usually conducted on the 
basis of a number of shared assumptions. These assumptions determine the 
content and structure of this discourse. In that respect they both make this 
discourse possible and limit it rhetorically. The first, and most basic, of these 
assumptions are that property is supposed to be a neutral concept.2 This 
assumption is based, in turn, on the view that property, and private property in 
particular, is somehow regarded as a "natural" attribute of humans. Because 
it is supposed to be natural for people to lay claim to things for their own use, 
private property should also be regarded as natural and therefore neutral and 
not defined or justified by political, philosophical or social considerations. 3 
Consequently, property is regarded as a technical or a-philosophical concept 
and term and therefore its content and structure are neutral. 
1 Philbrick FS "Changing conceptions of property in law'' 1938 U Penn LR 691-732 691-692. 
2 "Neutral" here means that it is a concept that neither justifies nor necessitates a particular social, 
political or legal system. Zwalve WJ Hoofdstukken uit de geschiedenis van het Europese 
privaatrecht Deel 1: lnleiding en zakenrecht (Groningen 1993) 53: "He! begrip eigendom is zo 
voor de jurist een filosofisch neutraal begrip ... " For criticism of this assumption, see Van der 
Walt AJ "Marginal notes on powerful(!) legends: critical perspectives on property theory" 1995 
JCRDL 396-420 396; Alexander GS "The concept of property in private and constitutional law: the 
Ideology of the scientific turn in legal analysis" 1982 Col LR 1545-1599 1647ff. 
3 Underkuffler L "On property" 1990 Yale LJ 127-148 128: " ... they are based on the same 
unarticulated assumptions: that property is objectively definable or identifiable, apart from social 
context ... " 
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Based on this first assumption, a second assumption is made. Because 
property is neutral (or natural), it is assumed that the contemporary civil-law 
concept of property is essentially the same as the roman concept of 
dominium.4 This means that it is assumed that property has and has always 
had a number of abstract, timeless and universal characteristics. In 
particular, it is assumed that property is characterised by (and always has 
been characterised by) absoluteness, uniformity and exclusivity and that its 
scope and structure are not determined by the objects thereof. 5 In the same 
way it is assumed that the definition of, justification for and objects of property 
have always been the same. 
Based on these assumptions, it is assumed, in the third place, that property 
has (and always has had) a profound influence on political, economic, social 
and legal systems, but without in turn being basically changed or influenced 
by these systems. 6 Because property is neutral and therefore always the 
same, it is not susceptible to influences of a social, economic, political or 
even legal nature. Its abstract nature, however, is supposed to allow property 
to influence these systems in a fundamental way. In this way, for instance, it 
is often argued that an absolute property concept implies an individualist, 
capitalist economic and political system. It is seldom argued that this political 
system implies an absolute property concept. 
This triad of assumptions has had two major consequences. In the first place 
it has tended to distort historical facts to fit the assumptions. For instance, 
4 Van der Merwe GC Sakereg 2nd ed (Durban 1989) 171; Van Zyl DH Geskiedenis en beginsels 
van die Romeinse privaatreg (Durban 1977) 127; Donahue C "The future of the concept of 
property predicted from its past" in Pennock JR and Chapman JW (eds) Property NOMOS XXll 
(New York 1980) 28-68 36; Zwalve Geschiedenis 86. But compare Van der Walt AJ "Ownership 
and personal freedom: subjectivism in Bernard Windscheid's theory of ownership" 1993 JCRDL 
569-589 570; Tuck R Natural rights theories -their origin and development (Cambridge 1979) 
13. 
5 See discussion below for definitions of these terms. 
6 This is what is meant by the abstract concept of ownership - see Underkuffler 1990 Yale LJ 127 
128; Van der Walt AJ "Developments that may change the institution of private ownership so as 
to meet the needs of a non-racial society in South Africa" 1990 Stell LR 26-48 43: " ... ownership 
is autonomous or independent from societal processes ... " 
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commentators have attempted to describe the roman view of ownership as if it 
differed only slightly and superficially from contemporary views. The 
absurdity of this view becomes clear when the socio-political context is kept in 
mind. In the second place it has tended to block all attempts at change. The 
argument here is that, since property is a neutral and unchanging concept, 
there can be no compelling reason or justification for change. Recently, 
however, the second and third assumptions in particular, have been 
challenged on historical grounds.7 This represents an attempt to destabilise 
the triad of assumptions. 
It should be kept in mind that these three basic assumptions about property 
rest on a certain approach to history in general. This approach focuses on 
abstract and universal "truths" and concepts, including property. These 
eternal truths are then read back into the historical data. The newer, more 
critical approach focuses on context and discontinuity and is the one that will 
be followed here.8 The intention is not to provide a complete history of 
property, 9 but to examine the property concept from very specific historical 
perspectives. These perspectives deal with the origin and development of 
property and the presence or absence of specific characteristics usually 
ascribed to property in a particular period. For this purpose the study will not 
7 See, in general, Derine R Grenzen van het eigendomsrecht in de negentiende eeuw (Antwerp 
1955) IX-XIV; Van Maanen GE Eigendomschijnbewegingen - juridische, historische en 
politiek-filosofische opmerkingen over eigendom in huidig en komend recht (Nijmegen 
1987) 16-22; Van den Bergh GCJJ Eigendom - grepen uit de geschiedenis van een 
omstreden begrip (Deventer 1988) 31-47; Van den Bergh GCJJ "Schijnbewegingen" 1987 R & K 
327-341 328-340. The same argument has been made regarding Anglo-American law by 
Kennedy D "The structure of Blackstone's Commentaries" 1979 Buffalo LR 205-382 205; Horwitz 
MJ ''The transformation of the conception of property in American law, 1780-1860" 1973 U 
Chicago LR 248-290; Mensch EV "The colonial origins of liberal property rights" 1982 Buffalo LR 
635-735; Nedelsky J Private property and the limits of American constitutionalism (Chicago 
1990). 
8 See Van der Walt 1995 JCRDL 396; Van der Walt AJ 1995 SAJHR 169-206 for examples of this 
method. 
9 This has been done very thoroughly in a number of works, see for example Coing H 
Europaisches Privatrecht 1500 bis 1800. Band 1 Alteres Gemeines Recht (Munich 1985) 
291-309; Feenstra R "Historiche aspecten van de private eigendom als rechtsinstituut" 1976 RMT 
248-275. 
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be conducted with reference to historical periods, but with reference to certain 
themes. These themes are the following: 
(a) The definition of property. The question here is whether property 
or a specific property right such as ownership was defined in a 
certain period and, if so, how it was defined. The answer to this 
question depends, first of all, on the basic approach to and view of 
law in a certain period. It also depends on philosophical ideas in 
general and the philosophical basis of law in a particular system. 
(b) Systematic position/importance of property. The way in which 
property is defined, is based on and determines how property, and 
particularly ownership, is distinguished from other rights and 
entitlements. That is why not only the distinction between property 
and other rights will be important, but also the relationship between 
various property and non-property rights. In particular, the 
importance of property is determined by whether there is a 
hierarchy of rights in a particular system and what the position of 
each specific property right is within that hierarchy. 
(c) Origin of/justification for property. The question of where 
property (and private property in particular) comes from and how it 
can therefore be justified has always intrigued philosophers and, 
sometimes, jurists as well. In fact, the assumption about the 
"naturalness" of property refers to its supposed origin. To a large 
extent the definition (dealt with above) necessitates a certain 
justification while the justification might lead to a certain definition. 
(d) Characteristics/elements of property. As was pointed out above, 
it is often assumed that property has (and has always had) a 
number of elements or characteristics. These characteristics will 
each be studied in turn. They are the following: 
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Absoluteness of property. The idea of the absoluteness 
of property involves the assumption that property is 
conceptually unlimited and illimitable. 10 Although limitations 
can and do occur they are regarded as temporary and 
unusual. In principle, therefore, property is unlimited. 
(ii) Uniformity of property. The term uniformity refers to the 
idea that only one kind of property exists and can exist and 
that this right is typically a private right. 11 
(iii) Exclusivity of property. This refers, in the first place, to 
the idea that only one person can be the owner of an object 
at a certain time. This is sometimes referred to as the 
individuality of property. In the second place, and based on 
the first, it refers to the idea that this right to exclude others 
(excludability) is somehow typical of property. 12 
(iv) Objects of property. In some legal systems only corporeal 
property can be owned. In others, property of incorporeals 
is also possible. 13 This aspect therefore involves the 
10 See Birks P "The Roman concept of dominium and the idea of absolute ownership" 1985 AJ 1-37 
1; Visser DP ''The 'absoluteness' of ownership: the South African common law in perspective" 
1986 AJ 39-52; Van derWalt 1993 JCRDL 569-589. 
11 lmminck PAW "'Eigendom' en 'Heerlijkheid' exponenten van tweeerlei maatschappelijk structuur" 
1959 TR 36-74 44. 
12 Gray K "Property in thin air'' 1991 Cambridge LJ 252-307 269: "The notion of excludability thus 
imports a hidden structure of rules which critically define the legal phenomenon of private 
property." See also Underkuffler 1990 Yale LJ 127 135. In South Africa this idea is supported by 
Lewis C "The right to private property in a new political dispensation in South Africa" 1992 SAJHR 
389-430. 
13 See, for SA law, Cooper v Boyes NO and Another 1994 4 SA 521 (C). See also, Olivier NJJ, 
Pienaar GJ and Van der Walt AJ Law of property students' handbook 2nd ed (Cape Town 
1992) 29-31; Kleyn DG and Boraine A Silberberg and Schoeman's the law of property 3rd ed 
(Durban 1992) 9-15. On American law, see Underkuffler 1990 Yale LJ 127 137 " ... property 
includes not only material objects but also rights and privileges, particularly those of office." 
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question whether property is restricted to corporeals or 
whether incorporeals can also be regarded as property. 
Once again it must be stressed that the characteristics might 
influence the definition and justification and vice versa. In 
much the same way, the characteristics influence each other 
and are dependent on one another. These sub-divisions must 
therefore not be seen as absolute but as divisions for the sake 
of simplification. 
It should be clear that this is not a study of "purely'' legal developments. In 
order to determine if other developments influenced the property concept (and 
if so, how), it is necessary to place these developments within their social, 
political and philosophical contexts. Consequently, this is not a study of the 
history of property in "pure" private law, but a contextual approach to the 
history of property as a social, political, economic and legal phenomenon. 
This has implications for the way in which the legal "families" will be studied. 
It must also be kept in mind that not all the themes, problems and 
characteristics are equally important or comparable in civil and common law 
or in the various periods. The study will therefore focus on those issues that 
are important in the particular period under discussion. Moreover, some 
problems will be basically the same in both the common and the civil-law 
systems, while others will differ substantially. These similarities and 
differences will be clear from the context. 
In this historical study a broad classification of periods is used. In the first 
place the roman and medieval roots of the themes are studied. This covers 
roman thinking on and law pertaining to the various subjects, as well as 
medieval (primarily scholastic) thinking and legal development - a period 
extending roughly from 400 BC to 1400 AD. The second period is the early 
modern era, that is the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This period 
covers the renaissance, reformation and some of the great political 
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revolutions. The third period is the late modern era, extending from the 
eighteenth century to the nineteenth century. This is the period of the so-
called enlightenment that includes the French and American revolutions. 14 
However, the influence of modernist thinking continued into the twentieth 
century. The historical section will be concluded with a chapter that seeks to 
subvert the apparent certainties represented by traditional analyses. 
14 This section will not deal with developments in the second half of the twentieth century. These 
will be discussed in the comparative chapter. The early twentieth century is regarded as a 
continuation of the nineteenth century and is therefore discussed in the sections on the nineteenth 
century. 

CHAPTER 3: A QUESTION OF DEFINITION 
(A HISTORY OF CONCEPTUALISM) 
3.1 Introduction 
"In short, the concept of property never has been, is 
not, and never can be of definite content." 1 
The questions of whether and how property is defined are important for a 
number of reasons. Most obviously, the fact that a definition existed in a 
particular period of history or within a certain legal system provides the 
simplest point of entry into that legal system. It is also a potentially 
dangerous way of dealing with a concept, because the definition is always 
theory-dependent and can, consequently, not be abstracted from that theory. 2 
Keeping this in mind, however, the history of the definition of (private) 
property can supply important clues to the general approach to law, the 
approach to property and the view of the nature of property in a specific 
period. More importantly, the traditional view of property is typically definition 
related, so that a history of definitions is, at the same time, a history of the 
development of the traditional, conceptualist view. 
Consequently, this section will focus on some of the critical moments in the 
establishment of the private-law property concept. The definitions provide an 
insight into both the development of this concept and its underlying 
assumptions. These definitions have, in the course of history, taken on a 
variety of forms. 
1 Philbrick 1938 U Penn LR 691 696. 
2 See Tuck Natural rights 2. 
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In the first place property can be defined as either natural or conventional. A 
definition of property as natural implies, as a bare minimum, the acceptance 
of the existence of a system of natural law or at least an objective, eternal and 
identifiable moral order underpinning society and the law. A conventional 
definition assumes, as point of departure that human convention or 
agreement creates property and thus that property is subject to change. 
However, this does not necessarily imply a denial of either natural law or of 
the state of nature. 3 
In the second place a definition can be either active or passive. A definition of 
property as an active (or positive) right implies that the owner can do 
something with the property himself and this is closely aligned with the idea of 
sovereignty. 4 A definition of property as a passive right implies that the owner 
has less control over the object and that the emphasis is on the duties others 
owe to the holder of the right. In this way, of course, a passive definition can 
also imply sovereignty. These duties are usually, but not necessarily, 
abstracted from higher moral principles.5 The passive definition is usually 
also negative, in that it emphasises the right to exclude. 
In the third place definitions of property can be either objective or subjective. 6 
The term "objective" can be used in two different ways. An objective definition 
can imply the existence of an objective legal and moral order. 
3 Property can be seen as conventional even if it is assumed that the state of nature and natural 
law (or an objective moral order) exists or existed. Natural law and the state of nature then 
provide the justification for the way in which property is conventionally defined and justified. See 
eg Haakonssen K "Hugo Grotius and the history of political thoughf' 1985 Pol T 239-265 242. 
4 Property is thus a delegation of sovereign power - a power that gives owners the right to make 
others do what the owner wants them to do - see Singer JW "Sovereignty and property" 1991 
Legal T 1-56 51. 
5 If that is the case, the passive definition implies the assumption of an objective moral order. See 
Tuck Natural rights 6. Haakonssen K "From natural law to the rights of man: a European 
perspective on American debates" in Lacey MJ and Haakonssen K (eds) A culture of rights 
(Cambridge 1991) 19-61 20 shows that an emphasis on duties owed by others tend to assume 
that an independent moral order exist which determine these duties. 
6 Haakonssen "From natural law'' 1911 shows that the difference between the American and British 
approaches to rights in general, can be traced to this distinction between an objective and 
subjective view of law. 
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But an objective definition can also mean a definition in which the objects of 
property determine the definition. A subjective definition implies a definition in 
terms of the rights of the owner (subject) and his powers.7 This is closely 
aligned with an active definition and the idea of sovereignty. 
3.2 Roman and medieval roots 
The traditional civil-law discourse regards the roman and medieval periods as 
the intellectual basis for South African law in general and property law in 
particular. The views of writers of these periods and of legal rules in these 
periods are seen as providing the background and point of departure for later 
discussions. This assumption will be examined here. When the term 
medieval law is used, it stands to reason that no single system of law is 
envisaged. Roman law in the middle ages developed over four centuries and 
is characterised by consecutive schools that differed regarding methodology 
and approach. 8 Apart from that, the different germanic systems also remained 
in force and influenced roman law and were influenced in turn. 
In roman law the distinction between the procedures of interdictum and actio 
led to a distinction between possessio and dominium. 9 This was a very basic 
distinction in the whole of roman law and is still found today in most civil-law 
systems. It also formed the basis for the first definition of dominium in the 
middle ages and for the rights-approach thereafter. However, a definition in 
the technical sense was never developed in roman law. 10 In the first place 
7 For this reason subjective definitions are sometimes referred to a voluntarist definitions. The term 
voluntarism is used to indicate an approach that takes as point of departure the power and/or will 
(in Latin vofuntas) of the individual person. The definition is therefore determined by the primary 
role of the human will and this is, in turn, closely aligned with the idea of property as Hemchaft. 
8 See Van den Bergh Eigendom 28; Van Zyl DH Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hollandse reg 
(Durban 1983) 81-184. 
9 Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 259. 
10 Ankum H and Pool E "Traces of the development of Roman double property" in Birks P ( ed) New 
perspectives in the Roman law of property - essays for Barry Nicholas (Oxford 1989) 5-41 
37 have shown conclusively that the terms dominium and dominus were never technical terms in 
the ius civl7e. 
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this was the result of the roman law system of actions. 11 Roman law did not 
operate with the concept of the "law in subjective sense" and consequently a 
system of rights was foreign to roman thinking. 12 Within the system of 
actions, however, the actio known as meum esse (or the rei vindicatio) 
provided the greatest protection imaginable to roman minds and further 
elaboration was regarded as unnecessary. 13 In the second place it was the 
result of the practical approach of the roman jurists. 14 Because they dealt with 
practical situations, they had no need for philosophical distinctions and 
abstractions. 
The emphasis on actions and remedies did, however, lead to an approach in 
which the remedies that could be used depended on the objects involved. 
For instance, the way in which objects were classified as res corpora/es/res 
incorporales or res mancipilres nee mancipi determined which rules were 
applicable. Similarly, rules pertaining to dominium of land depended on and 
were determined by the nature and location of that land.15 Furthermore, the 
emphasis on the rei vindicatio tended to make this a negative approach. It 
seems to have focused on the right of owners to exclude. This object-
determined approach, the exclusionary effect of the rei vindicatio and the 
distinction between dominium and possessio are the crucial elements in the 
roman approach. 
The basic characteristic of feudal property law was the inseparable 
connection between land tenure and personal service. In a nutshell 
"(o)wnership of the land and local political sovereignty were inseparable."16 
11 Van der Walt AJ and Kleyn DG "Duplex dominium: the history and significance of the concept of 
divided property'' in Visser DP (ed) Essays on the history of law (Cape Town 1989) 213-260 
218-219; Van den Bergh Eigendom 22; Jolowicz HF Roman foundations of modern law 
(Oxford 1957) 77; Birks 1985 AJ 1 3. 
12 See Schrage EJ Actio en subjectief recht (1977 Public lecture delivered at the Vrije Universiteit 
in Amsterdam on 1977-03-31 ). 
13 Watson A The law of property in the late Roman republic (Oxford 1968) 92. 
14 Kelly JM A short history of Western legal theory {Oxford 1992) 49-51. 
15 See 6.3.1 and 6.5.1 below and sources cited there. 
16 Cohen "Property and sovereignty" 156. 
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This was the result of the fact that feudal law was both a political and an 
agrarian system.17 It was an integrated social system and this makes the 
study of a definition of dominium abstracted from the social context 
impossible. This indicates that the medieval approach was also objective, 
since it was determined by the context. 
In the romanist tradition the glossators did not attempt a definition, but instead 
commented on the roman distinction between dominium and possessio and 
on the rei vindicatio. Bartolus' definition of dominium is often regarded as 
typical of medieval thought on the subject. He used the term dominium in 
several different meanings. 
(a) In the first place he distinguished between a wider and 
narrower meaning of dominium. In a wider sense it referred to 
dominium of corporeal and incorporeal objects.18 In the 
narrower sense it referred to dominium of corporeals only. 19 
This is the basic romanist distinction that was later used by 
other commentators. 
(b) In the second place he distinguished between dominium 
plenum and dominium as nuda proprietas. This distinction will 
be discussed later.20 
Bartolus defined dominium as: /us de re corporali perfecte disponendi nisi 
/ege prohibeatur. 21 It is important to understand that the right to control the 
object (disponend1) played a central role in this definition. This indicates an 
active approach. 
17 Philbrick 1938 U Penn LR 691 707. 
18 This, in particular, included ususfructus. 
19 Bartolus on D.41.1; Coing H "Zur Eigentumslehre des Bartolus" 1953 ZSS (Rom Abst) 348-371 
349. 
20 See 6.2.2 below. 
21 Bartolus on D.41.2.1. 7.1 nr 4. 
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Bartolus' exposition provided the first technical concept or definition of 
dominium. It became the basis for the early modern concept of ownership 
and determined the debates and definitions that followed.22 Therefore, the 
important point is that Bartolus provided the first formal or technical definition 
of dominium. The definition remained within the romanist tradition since it 
was based on and attempted to explain the roman distinction between 
dominium and possessio. It was also new in that it incorporated feudal 
relations and thus was made relevant to medieval law. Bartolus' definition 
would later be interpreted to provide a justification for regarding the absolute 
right of disposal as the essential characteristic of dominium. This was never 
his intention, as is clear from his wider concept and the inclusion in his 
definition of the phrase nisi lege prohibeatur. 
In the theological and scholastic thought of the high middle ages the problem 
of dominium also attracted attention, albeit in a different context. Within this 
tradition the influences of both natural law and of the poverty-doctrine can be 
seen.23 However, the emphasis in scholastic thinking was on the conflict 
between the justification of the church's wealth and the Franciscan insistence 
on a life of poverty for Christ's followers. This conflict was due, in no small 
part, to the power struggles between the franciscans and dominicans. 24 
Almost accidentally, it also influenced the concept of ownership. 
Aquinas (1225-1274) discussed dominium (in typical scholastic style) within 
the context of an answer to the question whether possession of "exterior" 
22 Kroeschell K "Zur lehre vom 'Germanischen' Eigentumsbegriff' in Rechtshistorische studien 
(Cologne 1977) 34-71; Van der Walt AJ "Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die 
interpretasie daarvan sedert die vyftiende eeu" 1986 JCRDL 305-321 318; Van der Walt AJ 
"Gedagtes oor die herkoms en ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip" 1988 DJ 
16-35, 306-325 316. 
23 See 4.2.5.2 and 6.2.3 below. 
24 See Kriechbaum M Actio, ius und dominium in den Rechtslehren des 13. Und 14. 
Jahrhunderts (Ebelsbach 1996) and Van der Walt JWG The twilight of legal subjectivity: 
towards a deconstructive republican theory of law (Unpublished doctoral thesis Rand 
Afrikaans University, Johannesburg 1995) 67-85. For an entertaining, fictional, but remarkably 
accurate description of these medieval power struggles see Eco U The name of the rose 
(London 1983 Tr W Weaver). 
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things constituted natural dominium or not. In answer to the question, 
naturale dominium was described as per rationem et voluntatem potest uti 
rebus exterioribus ad suam utilitatem, quasi propter se factis. 25 Although this 
was not a technical or legal definition, it was important in that dominium was 
not defined as natural but in terms of human potestas. 26 Aquinas saw the 
power to procure and dispose of property as the central element. This power 
was based on the human will and intellect. Therefore he emphasised the 
rational and subjective nature of dominium.27 He emphasised disposition as 
the central idea (much like Bartolus). but he linked this with the voluntarist 
and rationalist view of natural law so prevalent in the medieval period. 
However, Aquinas never used dominium in the technical, legal sense and, for 
instance, never distinguished dominium from possessio. 
William Occam (1290-1349) also defined dominium as potestas humana and, 
in this way, continued the subjective approach to property.28 This 
subjectivism was a result of Occam's nominalism29 and his emphasis on 
individual potestas regarding dominium. 30 This was echoed by Jean Quiddort 
of Paris (c1302). He distinguished between private dominium and 
ecclesiastical dominium (that is, property held by the church). Private 
dominium was defined as ius et potestam et verum dominium.31 
25 Aquinas Summa Theologica (Die deutsche Thomas-Ausgabe Graz 1934-) q 66 a1. 
26 Aquinas Summa Theologica q 66 a2: " ... potestas procurandi et dispensandl'. See also 
Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 268-269; Feenstra R "Der Eigentumsbegriff bei Hugo Grotius im Licht 
einiger mittelaltlicher und spatscholastischer Quel\en" in Behrends 0 ea (eds) Festschrift Franz 
Wieacker (GOttingen 1978) 209-234 215. 
27 Van der Walt AJ Die ontwikkeling van houerskap (Unpublished doctoral thesis, Potchefstroom 
University for CHE, Potchefstroom 1985) 266-267. 
28 Van der Walt 1986 JCRDL 305 311-312. 
29 Nominalism, in this context, can be defined as: "(T}he belief that concepts at only a very low level 
of generality and abstractness are operative. Thus general concepts, such as 'law' or 'property' or 
'rights', are seen merely as convenient categorisations of experience." Singer JW "The legal 
rights debate in analytical jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld" 1982 Wis LR 975-1059 1016. 
30 Coleman J "Dominium in thirteenth and fourteenth-century political thought and its seventeenth 
century heirs: John of Paris and Locke" 1985 Pol S 73-100 93-94. 
31 Coleman 1985 Pol S 73 82. 
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To a certain extent the poverty debate reinforced the idea that the definition of 
dominium is dependent on the objects thereof. The different kinds of property 
required different justifications for use and ownership. On the other hand the 
eventual emphasis on usus iuris and usus facti and on vo/untaslanimus did 
tend to reinforce later voluntarist (and thus subjective) views. However, these 
writers were involved in a very specific moral-theological discourse and their 
definitions were never meant to be applied in a legal or technical sense. 
Their contribution was, therefore, incidental and indirect. 
The theological ideas of the scholastics were developed further by the late 
scholastics (also known as the Spanish moral philosophers). These 
philosophers tried to reconcile the thinking of Aquinas with that of the secular 
jurists of their time.32 They provided the link between medieval views and 
those of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In particular they 
influenced Grotius and through him roman-dutch law and legal thinking. 33 
It should, however, not be assumed that the late scholastics agreed on a 
definition of dominium. De Soto (1494-1560) retained the definition of 
dominium as facultas humana."" In much the same vein De Molina (1536-
1600) used Bartolus' definition as point of departure. However, he took it one 
step further. In his hands the definition was changed so that the unlimited 
capacity of the owner to use his property as he saw fit became the essential 
characteristic of dominium. 35 Vasquez de Menchaca (1512-1566) also used 
Bartolus' definition, but defined dominium in terms of the owner's absolute 
right to dispose of his property.36 At the opposite end of the scale De Vitoria 
(1492-1546) denied that dominium could be defined in terms of human will 
and, instead, defined it as the result of an agreement between members of a 
32 Van der Walt Houerskap 269. 
33 Feenstra "Eigentumsbegriff' 211, 226 ff; Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 268-270; Van der Walt 
Houerskap 271. 
34 Feenstra "Eigentumsbegriff' 220; Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 270. 
35 Van der Walt 1986 JCRDL 305 313; Van der Walt Houerskap 279. 
36 See Van der Walt 1986 JCRDL 305 314; Van der Walt Houerskap 279. 
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community. 37 This is one of the earliest definitions indicating a view of 
property as conventional, and might indicate a continuation of Aristotelian 
ideas.38 
· The medieval debate on dominium took place on three levels. In the first 
place the romanists, and Bartolus in particular, were interested in explaining 
and solving the apparent contradictions in the glossae regarding the 
differences between dominium and possessio. It therefore revolved around 
the interpretation of texts and concepts within the romanist tradition. In the 
second place developments in feudal law made it necessary for post-
glossators to attempt to reconcile roman law with the feudal system, 
especially in order to explain the relationship between lord and vassal.39 In 
the third place the theological power struggles referred to above almost 
incidentally influenced the broader issue. These three developments took 
place side-by-side and only later converged. What they do illustrate is the 
fact that dominium could not and did not develop in a vacuum. Societal 
influences, such as feudalism, catholicism and power struggles played a 
definite role in its development. The reference to an objective order is also 
characteristic of this period. The late scholastics did, however, start the trend 
towards a more subjective and voluntarist approach. 
3.3 Grotius and the early modem period 
This period was characterised by a moral scepticism, which eventually led to 
the replacement of scholasticism with juridical humanism.40 The first theme of 
this period was the humanist (and consequently conceptual/scientific) 
37 Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 269. 
38 See Tuck Natural law theories 44-45 for an explanation of the influence of Aristotle on medieval 
and, especially late scholastic, thinking. 
39 See Van der Walt 1986 JCRDL 305 308. 
40 Tuck Natural rights theories 33: "(H)umanist lawyers found it virtually impossible to talk about 
natural rights, and extremely difficult to talk about rights tout court. What was important to them 
was not natural law but humanly constructed law; not natural rights. but civil remedies." 
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definition of ownership. The second theme was provided by the glorious 
revolution in the form of the social contract theory. Although the themes have 
a number of characteristics in common, they also diverge at certain points. 
3.3.1 The humanist definition 
The early humanists defined dominium and in this respect did the groundwork 
for later writers such as Grotius. Leonard Leys (1554-1625), for example, 
defined dominium in terms strongly reminiscent of Bartolus with emphasis on 
the right to disposition.41 In the same vein Hotman (1524-1590) defined 
dominium in terms of the potestas of the owner to use the property. 42 The 
innovation of these writers lay in the way in which they defined dominium in 
terms of human facultaslpotestas. This was a further development of ideas 
that originated with Aquinas and which paved the way for the later 
subjectivism,43 and for the views of Hugo Grotius (1584-1645). 
Grotius' view on ownership is of particular importance as it has been 
enormously influential.44 His view represented a synthesis between roman 
law, scholasticism, canon law and humanism.45 Much like Bartolus before 
him, Grotius determined the direction of the debate on ownership in the 
following centuries, especially within the roman-dutch tradition. The most 
important and innovative aspect of his work is the fact that ownership became 
41 Leys L De iustitia et iure actionum humanarum (Venice 1608) 2.3.1 (21): "Dominium 
proprietas est ius disponendi de re aliqua tanquam sua in suum commodatum". 
42 Holman F Commentarius de verbis iuris antiquitatum romanarum elementis amplificatus 
(Lyons 1569) 86: " ... jus ac potestas, re quapiam tum utendi, tum abutendi, quatenus iure civile 
permittitu~·. 
43 Feenstra 1976 RMT 268-275; Van der Walt AJ "Der Eigentumsbegriff' in Feenstra R and 
Zimmerman R (eds) Das romisch-hollandische Recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17. 
und 18. Jahrhundert (Berlin 1992) 485-520 485. 
44 Feenstra "Eigentumsbegriff' 234; Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 248-256, 270-275; Van der Walt 
Houerskap 393; Van der Walt "Eigentumsbegriff' 485 486-487. Grotius' thought also influenced 
the German Pandectists - see Van der Walt 1993 JCRDL 569 583-585; Tuck Natural rights 58; 
Haakonssen 1985 Pol T 239 239; Van der Walt Legal subjectivity 93. 
45 Feenstra "Eigentumsbegriff' 229; Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 268-270; Van der Walt Houerskap 
271. 
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part of a conceptual system that was presented as being abstract and 
universal. 
Grotius did not define dominium in either De iure praedae or De iure belli ac 
pacis. In both these works the influence of scholasticism can be seen and 
Grotius concerned himself primarily with the justification of ownership.46 In his 
lnleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid Grotius' system of 
property rights can be found most clearly. The idea of a system of rights is 
crucial in Grotius' work. Ownership became part of a conceptual system that 
had pretensions of abstractness and universality.47 New (Dutch} terms were 
used.48 Grotius used beheering instead of dominium49 and inschuld instead of 
creditum. 50 Beheering was sub-divided into bezit-recht (possession) and 
eigendom (ownership). 51 Eigendom was defined as: 
"(H)et toebehooren van een zaeck waer door iemand, 
schoon het bezit niet hebben, 'tzelve vermag rechtelick 
te bekomen."52 
46 Feenstra "Eigentumsbegriff' 226-228. 
47 See Van der Walt 1993 JCRDL 569 584; Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 169 175-177; Van der Walt 
AJ ''Towards a theory of rights in property: exploratory observations on the paradigm of post-
apartheid property law" 1995 SAPL 298-345 335. 
48 The fact that a system of rights was developed and that Dutch terms were used, is significant. 
The idea of a system of law is typical of modemist thinking and in this respect Grotius was ahead 
of his time. The fact that Latin was no longer used points to the employment of national 
languages as a result of the rise of national states and nationalism in this period - see Kelly 
History 159, 160 n 7; Van den Bergh Eigendom 19. Van der Merwe D "Ramus, mental habits 
and legal science" in Visser DP (ed) Essays on the history of law (Cape Town 1989) 32-59 52 
n103 states that this "vernacular movemenf' in Europe is attributable to the work of Petrus 
Ramus. 
49 Beheering means more or less the same as dominiumhus in re. 
50 Creditum is the term used in earlier works for all rights that are not property rights (or real rights in 
modern terms). See Grotius H De iure belli ac pacis (Leiden 1939 Ed BJA de Kanter-van 
Hettinga Tromp) 1.1.5 p 32; Van der Walt Houerskap 399. 
51 Grotius H lnleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleertheid (Leiden 1952 Ed F Dovring, HFWD 
Fischer, EM Meijers) 11.1.60. See also Feenstra "Eigentumsbegriff' 230; Van der Walt Houerskap 
402. 
52 Grotius lnleidinge 11.3.4. This can be translated as: "The belonging of a thing whereby 
someone, who doesn~ have the possession thereof, can legally acquire if'. 
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The implication of this definition is that Grotius saw the right to restore lost 
possession as the essential, defining element of ownership.53 The effect of 
making the right to reclaim property the central feature of the definition was to 
stress the exclusivity of ownership. This was closely related to the idea of 
dominium as facultas humana in scholasticism.54 but the way Grotius used it 
relates to the proprium-aspect of ownership.55 Another important, and 
innovative, aspect of Grotius' definition is that he used the definition of the 
moral theologians and early humanists, but this definition was now only 
applicable to full ownership as opposed to what is now known as "limited" real 
rights. This is the origin of the modem view of a hierarchy of rights. 56 This 
meant that ownership was regarded as the highest right in a hierarchy of 
rights and that it was regarded as an absolute and individual right. This idea 
only became possible with the demise of the feudal system and is therefore 
linked to feudal remnants in dominium directum and dominium utile. 
Moreover, the idea of a hierarchy was reinforced by the scientific system of 
concepts and methods which, in tum, led to a new kind of emphasis on 
exclusivity. 
The result of Grotius' definition is that ownership was regarded as an 
expression of individual power. The next logical step in an individualist 
system was to make that power as exclusive as possible. This was, in fact, 
the logical result of the importance that sixteenth and seventeenth century 
modernism and humanism attached to individuality, rationality and moral 
freedom. 57 Thus it represents a shift from objectivism (defining ownership in 
terms of its object) to subjectivism (defining ownership in terms of its subject, 
53 Grotius lnleidinge 11.33.1. See also Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 271; Van derWalt Houerskap 404. 
54 Van der Walt "Eigentumsbegriff' 489. 
55 Grotius H De iure praedae (The Hague 1868 Ed HG Hamaker) 214. See also Van der Walt 
"Eigentumsbegriff' 485 488. 
56 Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 340; Van derWalt 1995 JCRDL 396 405 
57 Van der Walt AJ "The South African law of ownership: a historical and philosophical perspective" 
1992 DJ 446-457 452; Van den Bergh GCJJ Geleerd recht - een geschiedenis van de 
Europese rechtswetenschap in vogelvlucht (Deventer 1980) 44. 
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that is, the owner). But it would also contribute to the roman-dutch 
perspective of ownership as exclusive, although this remained close to the 
romanist tradition as it was based on the idea and practice of the rei 
vindicatio.58 What was different, was that exclusivity now had a moral and 
political content. Therefore the first theme of this period, namely juridical 
humanism, resulted in a definition that was subjectivist rather than objectivist -
a trend which would be continued by the pandectists. The divine natural law 
of the medieval period was rejected, but the embryonic subjectivism was 
retained and expanded. This was the direct result of the scientification of law 
that began with the hierarchy of concepts advocated by Ramus. 
3.3.2 The social contract 
If the first important theme of this period can be described as the 
conceptualisation/scientification of property, the second theme of the early 
modern period was the social contract, which primarily dealt with the 
justification of ownership. The ideas of natural law and feudalism combined 
to lay the groundwork for this theory. 59 It was, however, the "glorious 
revolution" that provided the stimulus for the full development of the theory. 
In fact, Locke probably developed his social contract theory in order to justify 
this revolution. Within the broad characterisation of the theory, however, 
widely divergent views were held regarding both the nature of the state and 
the nature of property. Only the last-mentioned will be studied here. 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), because of his views on the state, defined 
property as something created by the state.60 Property was, therefore, 
conventional. Because it was created by the state, it could also be limited or 
abrogated by the state. Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) thought that 
58 Van der Walt 1992 DJ 446 453; Van der Walt "Eigentumsbegriff' 508-509, 515; Van der Walt AJ 
"Roman-Dutch land and environmental land-use control" 1992 SAPL 1-11 4-5. 
59 The social contract theory and ~s origins will be discussed at 5.3 below. 
60 Hobbes T Elementa philosophica de cive (Amsterdam 1669) 90/198: "Dominium ergo et 
proprietas tua tanta est, et tamdiu durat, quanta et quamdiu ipsa vulf'. 
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ownership was the result of natural law.61 However, he did not necessarily 
understand natural law in the same way as his predecessors had. For him 
natural law was the equivalent of our rational convictions regarding what is 
right for humanity, based on certain universal conditions in human society.62 
In this way ownership was regarded as basically conventional, although it was 
protected by natural law and the Decalogue.63 Montesquieu {1689-1755) too 
defined ownership as created by statute and explicitly linked ownership and 
freedom to the civil state.64 
On the other hand, John Locke {1632-1704) defined private property in the 
civil state as a natural right. Property was a natural right in the state of nature 
and, therefore, this right continued to exist in the civil state. In fact, the civil 
state came into being, through a social contract, 65 for the express purpose of 
protecting property on the basis of natural law.66 Therefore Locke defined 
property as a natural right, created by labour and regarded it as the basis for 
the civil state. 
3.3.3 Conclusion 
It is interesting how views and definitions began to diverge from the 
seventeenth century. This is probably a result of the renaissance and 
reformation that led to a more critical attitude towards roman-catholic doctrine 
in particular and the authority of texts in general. As a result of these 
61 Pufendorf S De jure naturae et gentium (Amsterdam 1704) IV.4.14: proprietatem et 
dominium esse juris naturalis proprie dicti, quodque mentibus hominum est inscriptum". 
62 Pufendorf De jure naturae et gentium IV.4.14: " ... sanam rationem suadare id inter homines 
constitui et recipi ... " In this respect Pufendorf followed the views of Grotius - see Tuck Natural 
rights 156ff. 
63 Pufendorf De jure naturae et gentium V.3.9 and V.5. 7. 
64 Montesquieu L"Esprit des lois in Oeuvres completes (Paris 1949) 01.11.767 ff: "Comme les 
hommes on! renonce a leur independance naturelle pour vivre sous des lois politiques, ils on! 
renonce a la communaute naturelle de biens pour vivre sous des lois civiles. Ces premieres lois 
leur acquierent la liberte; les secondes la propriete." 
65 Locke J Two treatises on civil government (London 1947) 2.99, 2. 129-130, 2.222. 
66 Locke Two treatises 2.221; Mitchell NJ "John Locke and the rise of capitalism" 1986 Hist Pol Ee 
291-305 297; Van Maanen Eigendomschijnbewegingen 101. 
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developments the trends started in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
would continue for some time. These trends include the following: 
(a) The most important trend involved what Alexander calls (in 
another context) the scientific turn in legal analysis. 07 This 
conceptualisation was Grotius' most important contribution and 
it contributed to the abstract, universal and timeless 
pretensions inherent in the property concept. 
(b) The pretension of abstractness meant that property rules could 
no longer be justified by appeals to an objective moral order. 
Therefore it represents the beginning of a movement away 
from objectivism to the subjectivism of Grotius and Locke. 
(c) This subjectivism, along with individualism, tended to present 
property as an absolute right that could not be limited. The 
justification of limitations on property therefore becomes 
important. Exclusivity was provided with a new content that 
had important social and moral underpinnings. 
What is already clear is that the definition of property was amended to 
accommodate both the social contract theory,68 and the demands of early 
capitalism.69 This seems to indicate that property is not a neutral concept but 
is, instead, a concept made possible by existing political and moral ideas and 
constructs. The differences between natural and conventional definitions 
would continue to influence the justificatory debate. At the same time the 
67 Alexander 1982 Col LR 15451545. 
68 Locke Two treatises 2.4, 2.36, 2.37. See also Mitchell 1986 Hist Pol Ee 291 293. One of the 
great weaknesses of Locke's theory is that he thought in terms of a real, existing contract - see 
Ryan A Property and political theory (Oxford 1984) 26. 
69 It has been argued that Locke "discovered" the primary institutions of capitalism in the state of 
nature and so legitimised them. Private property was seen as an institution of natural law and 
therefore imbued with moral authority - see Macpherson CB "Natural rights in Hobbes and Locke" 
in Raphael DD (ed) Political theory and the rights of man (London 1967) 1-15 11; Mitchell 
1986 Hist Pol Ee 291 296; Gill ER "Property and liberal goals" 1983 J of Pol 675-695 677. 
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introduction of a scientific system of terms and concepts would serve to 
strengthen the abstract concept of property. 
3.4 Late modem developments 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Developments and trends that began in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries were continued and accelerated from the eighteenth century till the 
early part of the twentieth century. One of these was the development of 
various strands of national law and legal theory. This was the result of a 
complex set of factors, which included the influence of idealism and the move 
to codification. 70 This section will therefore deal with developments within 
national contexts. For this purpose, two national systems in the common-law 
tradition (namely the United Kingdom and the United States of America) and 
two in the civil-law tradition (namely the Netherlands and Germany) will be 
studied. This should also indicate the difference, if any, between codified and 
uncodified systems. 
3.4.2 German property law 
3.4.2.1 Introduction 
The roman law received in the german areas in this period was the learned 
law (ge/eerd recht) as taught by the post-glossators and which resulted in the 
school of the usus modernus pandectarum.71 This school used the Bartolist 
method in study and adjudication. Consequently the usus modernus 
pandectarum can be characterised as basically mos italicus72 tempered by 
70 Zwalve Geschiedenis 50. 
71 Van Caenegem RC An historical introduction to private law (Cambridge 1988) 69; Zwatve 
Geschiedenis 20-21; Cohn EJ Manual of German law vol I (London 1968) 23. 
72 Zwalve Geschiedenis 21. 
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German morals and other ideas. 73 Because various systems of law prevailed 
in different areas and as a result of the influence of humanism and natural 
law, a desire for and a debate about the need for codification characterised 
the nineteenth century. 74 In this regard Grotius' conceptualisation of 
ownership and of law in general was enormously influential. 
The historical school eventually achieved a systematisation of roman law, 
which eventually resulted in the Begriffsjurisprudenz and pandectism. This 
school, based on rule formalism and the view of law as a system, precipitated 
a number of developments. Private law was seen as the sum of rules, which 
governed the co-existence of free persons, and a subjective right was 
regarded as that which guaranteed an area of freedom.75 As a result a 
comprehensive system of law was developed that could be used as the basis 
for codification.76 
3.4.2.2 The pandectists 
Much of German thought pertaining to ownership was influenced by the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant saw laws as the rules, which 
determined how the free wills of individuals could co-exist. 77 Ownership is 
acquired by the transcendental directing of an individual will upon a given 
object. 78 In this way personality is associated with having a legal persona and 
73 Cohn Manual 23. 
74 Zwalve Geschiedenis 22; Van Caenegem Introduction 156; Cohn Manual 23. 
75 Going H "German 'Pandektistik' in its relationship to the former 'ius commune"' 1989 Am J Comp 
L 9 13; Van Caenegem Introduction 140; Zwalve Geschiedenis 22. This idea is basically 
derived from Kant. 
76 Zwalve Geschiedenis 22; Van Caenegem Introduction 157; Going 1989 Am J Comp L 9 10. 
77 Kant I The philosophy of law (Edinburgh 1887 Tr W Hastie) 45: "Right, therefore, comprehends 
the whole of the conditions under which the voluntary actions of any one Person can be 
harmonized in reality with the voluntary actions of every other person, according to a universal 
Law of Freedom." See also Smith AA "Kant's political philosophy: Rechtstaat or council 
democracy'' 1985 Rev of Pol 253-280 255-256; Scheltens OF "Eigendom en staat bij I Kanf' 1980 
R & R 67-77 67. 
78 Kant Philosophy of law 63. This is the result of the dualism in Kant's thought between the Ding 
an Sich (reality) and the denkenden /ch (rational subject) - see Negro F Das Eigentum: 
Geschichte und Zukunft (Munich 1963) 137. 
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for this, ownership is required.79 Through the union of wills this acquisition is 
recognised as a right so that others will respect it.80 Kant's definition was 
therefore essentially a continuation of the subjectivist trend started in the 
medieval period. 
It is furthermore important to place Kant's definition in the context of his 
philosophy and, in particular, his epistemology. Kant postulated the existence 
of a rational, scientific and moral system of which ownership was one element 
(or atom). This system was based on a "simple, all-purpose moral precept" 
innate in human nature and known as the "categorical imperative".81 This 
meant that the elements of the system could be reduced to abstract concepts 
that were timeless and universal precisely because they were rational and 
scientific. Apart from this, these concepts were also justified by a rational and 
scientific morality that ensured their universal and timeless character. In this 
way Kant contributed to the conceptualism of the pandectists. 82 
This was also the starting point of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-
1830). Ownership was defined as the directing of one's will on an object.83 
However, there are two basic and important differences between Hegel and 
Kant. In the first place Hegel saw no basic dualism between subject and 
object. He thought that man created his own world and this led to the idea of 
ownership as Herrschaft. 84 Therefore ownership is one of the most important 
ways in which the individual will objectifies and realises itself. For this reason 
ownership is necessary for liberty.85 In the second place man is always part 
79 Ryan Property 74. 
80 This idea requires a view of society in which individual freedom and individual property is linked 
and both are regarded as desirable: see Van der Walt 1993 JCRDL 569 588-589; Grey TC "The 
disintegration of property" in Pennock JR and Chapman JW Property NOMOS XXll (New York 
1980) 69-85 73. 
81 See Kelly History 261. 
82 On Kanfs philosophy, see Russell B History of Western philosophy (London 1961) 677-684. 
83 Hegel GWF Philosophy of right (Oxford 1952 Tr TM Knox) par 41-44. 
84 Negro Eigentum 140. 
85 Hegel Philosophy of right 42 par 45: " ... from the standpoint of freedom, property is the first 
embodiment of freedom and so is in itself a substantive end." 
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of a community that recognises him as a person, and for this reason Hegel's 
view of ownership is more communal and less individualist than Kant's.86 
One of the most important contributions of Hegel was his denial of the 
existence of an independent, rational moral order that could provide the basis 
for evaluating ownership. He denied that people could step outside their own 
contexts to be able to see this objective order for their own lives. Human 
beings can only see " ... our lives faithfully depicted ... " and then " ... we shall 
simply go on living them, perhaps more at peace with ourselves, but not as a 
result of any moral conversation. "87 
These writers, and Kant in particular, had a far-reaching effect on German 
thinking. The historical school adopted Kant's critique of reason to begin the 
transformation of law into a science. They in turn influenced the pandectists 
and Windscheid in particular, which changed German thinking in two ways. 
In the first place their insistence on a scientific approach to law which would 
later result in a rule formalism in which certain rules were part of institutions 
and determined by them. In the second place they echoed the humanist call 
for return to the sources - in this case Justinian's code. 88 This resulted in the 
view of private law as the sum of rules that govern the co-existence of free 
persons and of subjective rights (including ownership) as the area in which 
freedom is guaranteed.89 
86 Ryan Property 121, 133. 
87 See Ryan Property 140. 
88 Coing 1989 Am J Comp L 9 12-13. 
89 Both these ideas can be traced to Kant - see Coing 1989 Am J Comp L 9 13. 
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This abstract, systematic view of law was in conflict with German idealism, 
which insisted on the view of law as the product of an organic, national 
tradition or custom.90 Based on voluntarism and idealism, ownership was now 
also defined as conventional. It was denied that there was only one kind of 
ownership appropriate for all times and places. The best definition of 
ownership was therefore the one that evolved within each national system 
and, consequently, rule formalism would be impossible.91 It is only at the 
height of liberalist thinking, during the second half of the nineteenth century, 
that German pandectists rejected this view and created an ownership concept 
that was abstract and formal.92 This then provided the rule certainty that 
idealism couldn't. 
Karl Friedrich von Savigny (1779-1861) used Kant's moral imperative (as 
applied to law) as his point of departure. The purpose of the law is to 
harmonise the free will of everyone in terms of a general law.93 On this basis 
he defined Eigentum as: 
"Da namlich das Eigentum die rechtliche Moglichkeit ist, 
auf eine Sache nach Willkuhr einzuwirken ... "94 
Within the Begriffsjurisprudenz (in which the legitimacy of a rule could only be 
determined by its logical and systematic consistency) this eventually led to 
the abstract definition of ownership. It was now defined as the totality of 
90 Schlatter RB Private property: the history of an idea (London 1951) 261. Karl Friedrich von 
Savigny accepted that law is the product of the Vo/ksgeist and therefore has no inherent 
rationality as natural lawyers thought: Van Zyl Romeins-Hollandse reg 251-253; Van der Walt 
1993 JCRDL 569; Kiefner H "Der Einfluss Kanis auf Theorie und Praxis des Zivilrechts im 19. 
Jahrhundert" in BIOhdorn J and Ritter J (eds) Philosophie und Rechtswissenschaft: zum 
Probleme ihrer Bezicherung im 19. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt-am-Main 1969) 3-27. 
91 Schlatter Private property 262. 
92 See Van den Bergh Eigendom 29. 
93 Von Savigny FC System des heutigen romischen Rechts (Berlin 1840-1849) vol I p 331, 338-
339, vol II p 2, vol Ip 7, 334, vol Ill p 103. See also Kiefner "Der Einfluss Kants" 3 7, 10, 21 23; 
Van der Walt 1993 JCRDL 569 587. 
94 Von Savigny FC Das Recht des Besitzes: eine civilistische Abhandlung (Darmstadt 1803) 27. 
A question of definition 37 
po~sible rights regarding objects.95 Bernhard Windscheid (1817-1892) used 
the same system. Windscheid's definition of ownership represents a critical 
moment in the development of the civil-law concept of ownership. 
Windscheid's essential contribution lies in the way in which he combined the 
romanist idea of exclusivity with the Kantian conceptualism and emphasis on 
the right to free disposal. The Kantian insistence was translated into a view of 
ownership as a moral totality. For Windscheid a subjective right was defined 
in terms of will-power granted by law.96 Real rights (as sub-category of 
subjective rights) were rights that allowed the holder to determine the actions 
of everyone in respect of a specific object. 97 Based on this ownership was 
defined as an abstract, exclusive and unlimited right. 98 
Ownership is, therefore, an abstract concept that is based on a moral order 
that acquires universality through its abstractness and rationality. In this way 
ownership becomes the perfect right in an abstract system of rights.99 
3.4.2.3 Codification 
The codification of German private law which commenced on 1 January 1900, 
the BOrgerliches Gesetzbuch, 100 was one of the most successful European 
codifications. It influenced the codifications of Japan, Switzerland, Austria, 
Turkey, Brazil, Greece and China (until 1940). It was a basically pandectist, 
nineteenth century codification. 101 Ownership is dealt with in Book 3 of the 
95 Puchta GF Cursus der lnstitutionen (Leipzig 1851) 579-581; Puchta GF Pandekten (Leipzig 
1848) 207. See also Van der Walt 1986 JCRDL 305 315; Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex 
dominium" 247. 
96 Windscheid B Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts (DOsseldorf 1900) vol I, book 2, par 37, p 131 -
the voluntarism and Kantianism is obvious. 
97 Windscheid Lehrbuch 1,2,41,149. This follows Kant's view that a right is a relation between 
persons and not between persons and things. 
98 Windscheid Lehrbuch 1,3,137,603; 1,3,167, 756-757; 1,3,168,759. 
99 Van der Walt 1993 JCRDL 569 579-580. 
100 Hereinafter referred to as the BGB. 
101 Cohn Manual 25; Coing 1989 Am J Comp L 9 10; Zwalve Geschiedenis 22; Van Caenegem 
Introduction 69. 
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BGB, which deals with rights to corporeal things. Eigentum is defined in 
section 903: 
"Der Eigentomer einer Sache kann, soweit nicht das 
Gesetz oder Rechte Dritter entgegenstehen, mit der 
Sache nach Belieben verfahren und ander von jeder 
Einwirkung ausschliessen." 
If this can be called a definition, 102 it is a typically nineteenth century one. It 
defines Eigentum as Herrschaftsrecht. 103 It combines the basic elements of 
exclusivity, free disposal and abstractness to provide the paradigmatic 
definition of ownership in the civil-law tradition. Because of the influence of 
this codification, the definition of ownership was also particularly influential. 
However, in much the same way as in other systems of this era, ownership is 
defined to fit capitalist economy and political liberalism.104 Apart from this 
private-law codification, property was also included as a basic right in the 
German constitution of the post-war period. The content and history of this 
concept will be discussed elsewhere.105 
3.4.2.4 Conclusion 
The developments in the German law of property followed much the same 
path as in other systems. Although it started out as a natural law definition, 
political developments and philosophical ideas resulted in a denial of natural 
law. Although the definition in the BGB seems neutral, it was in fact designed 
102 Baur F Lehrbuch des Sachenrechts (Munich 1987) par 24 states that this is an explanation of 
the powers of owners and not a definition. 
103 Baur Lehrbuch par 24 p 212: "Das Eigentum sollte also ... als 'das umfassendste 
Herrschaftsrecht, das die Rechtsordnung an einer Sache zulasst', begriffen warden." 
104 Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 248. 
105 See 11.1 below for the constitutional perspective. 
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to fit nineteenth-century German ideas on the state and economy. 106 
Consequently the definition was never entirely conventional, but based on an 
objective moral and political order. This order was regarded as just as natural 
as the one implied by the old natural law. 
3.4.3 Dutch property law 
In the case of the definition of ownership in Dutch law, the influence of Grotius 
was both pervasive and long lasting. This influence is not restricted to fhe 
definition itself, but the system Grotius devised was equally influential. The 
Dutch writers also adopted his view of ownership as a scientific and abstract 
concept within a conceptual system. 107 Although earlier writers had used the 
definition of Bartolus as point of departure, 108 writers of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries seemed to be doing little more than echoing Grotius. 
In this vein Ulrich Huber (1636-1694) defined ownership as the "entire power" 
over things. This implied, for him, both the full control of and the right to 
alienate the property. This was combined with the power to demand the 
property from whoever held it to characterise ownership.109 This definition 
stressed the facultas aspect in the medieval tradition. 
The underlying individualism that had characterised Grotius' definition was 
made explicit in the eighteenth century by Van der Linden when he defined 
eigendom as" ... dat regt, waar door enige zaak aan iemand, met uitsluiting 
van alle anderen, toekomt." This kind of property could only be limited by 
106 See Van der Walt 1993 JCRDL 569 585-586. 
107 See 3.3 above on Grotius' contribution. 
108 See De Smidt J Th ea Compendium van de geschiedenis van het Nederlands privaatrecht 
2nd ed (Deventer 1972) 69. 
109 Huber U The jurisprudence of my time (Durban 1939 Tr P Gane) 2.2.7, 2.2.10. 
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statute and by the (limited real) rights of others. 110 This was also basically the 
definition used by Van der Keessel. 111 
These natural law definitions were, except for their very natural law basis, 
ideally suited to the definition of the Code Civil. Section 544 of the Code Civil 
formed the basis for section 625 of the Dutch codification, known as the 
Burgerlijk Wetboek. 112 The definition reads as follows: 
"(H)et recht om van eene zaak vrij genot te hebben en 
daarover op de volstrekste wijze te beschikken, mils 
men er geen gebruik van make, strijdende tegen de 
wetten of de openbare verordeningen, ... en mits men 
aan de regten van anderen geen hinder toebrengen." 
The interesting point is that this definition is closer to that of Bartolus than the 
German one. Pothier and Holman's definitions, which were, in turn, based on 
the Bartolist tradition, influenced the Dutch definition. 113 There is, however, 
less emphasis on exclusivity as characteristic. The German definition, on the 
other hand, was based on the Grotian definition, reinforced by Kantian 
influences. 
3.4.4 English property law 
3.4.4.1 Introduction 
English law has had a distinctly national character since the twelfth century. 114 
It developed within the existing feudal framework and this feudalism was, to a 
110 Van der Linden J Rechtsgeleerd, practicaal and koopmans handboek (Amsterdam 1806) 
I. 7.1. See also Van der Walt "Eigentumsbegriff' 507; Van der Walt Houerskap 419-420. 
111 Van der Keessel DG Dictata ad Justiniani - lnstitutionum libri quattuor (Amsterdam 1965) ad 
01.1.148-149. 
112 Hereinafter referred to as the BW. 
113 Van den Bergh Eigendom 43ff. 
114 Van Caenegem RC The birth of the English common law (Cambridge 1988) 87. 
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substantial extent, maintained until the nineteenth century. Consequently the 
feudal idea of relation was central to English law in general,115 and English 
property law in particular.116 Therefore the essence of English property law in 
this period is the fact that it was not an abstract system, but was embedded in 
social structures and particularly in practice as a decidedly non-scientific, 
non-conceptualist enterprise. In order to understand the modern 
developments in English law, one therefore heeds to understand the feudal 
basis thereof. 
3.4.4.2 Definition 
It will already be apparent that the basic structure of English law made a 
definition of property, in the abstract sense, highly unlikely. Where definitions 
did occur, they were formulated by the few legal theorists active during this 
period. For instance, Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780) used as his point of 
departure in defining property the traditional, descending view that the King is 
the fountain of all property and the owner of all land.117 On this basis he 
defined property as that " ... which consists in the free use, enjoyment and 
disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by 
the laws of the land."118 These rights have their origin in natural law, although 
the specific rules are conventional. 
This definition was strangely ambiguous. Although the feudal nature of 
English property law was acknowledged, the definition corresponded to those 
provided by contemporary continental lawyers. This was probably the result 
of Blackstone's attempt to make English law more continental, that is more 
115 Van Caenegem Common law 89. 
116 Megarry Rand Wade HWR The law of real property (London 1984) 12. 
117 Blackstone W Commentaries on the laws of England 4th ed (Oxford 1770) Book II, chapter 4, 
page 51 (11.4.51). See Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 205 318-320 on Blackstone's confusing use of 
the term property. 
118 Blackstone Commentaries 1.1.138.3. In 11.1.2 this is echoed by the definition of property as" ... 
the sole and despotic dominium which one man exercises over the external things of the world." 
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scientific and more conceptual. Although limited in nature, property seems 
unlimited in practice. Likewise his definition was both natural and 
conventional, possibly indicating a transition of some kind. In the first book of 
the Commentaries he stated that all rights have their origin in natural law, 119 
but in the second book it is qualified, indicating that" ... the permanent right of 
property ... was no natural but merely a civil right. "120 It should also be noted 
that Blackstone emphasised the powers of owners, which is reminiscent of the 
medieval idea of potestas. This tends to make his definition seem subjective. 
It is also a passive definition, since emphasis is placed on the protection of 
the exercise of powers. This might be the result of English law in general, 
with its emphasis on the system of writs. 
While Blackstone's definition is, on the surface, a subjective one, analysis 
shows it to be ultimately objectivist. Kennedy has shown that Blackstone's 
definition was developed to fit and legitimate an objective moral, social and 
political order.121 By concentrating on the powers of the individual, 
Blackstone obscured the underlying social and moral order, so that they seem 
a natural part of the individual's power. In this way the dichotomy is resolved 
- the convention, which is the basis for property, is based in turn on a natural 
moral order which determines the content of the convention. 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) specifically rejected natural law as the basis for 
law in general. 122 He saw property rights as the creation of positive law, 123 
based on labour. 124 On this basis he defined property as a right that " ... gives 
119 Blackstone Commentaries 1.1.124. 
120 Blackstone Commentaries 11.10.11. 
121 Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 205 328. 
122 Bentham J The limits of jurisprudence defined (New York 1945) 84: "All this talk about nature, 
natural rights, natural justice and injustice proves two things and two things only, the heat of the 
passions, and the darkness of the understanding." 
123 Bentham J A comment on the Commentaries and a fragment on government (London 1977) 
1.2.16; Bentham Limits 85: "Property and law were born and die together." It is typical of 
utilitarian views to deny that law has a moral basis. This results in Bentham's assertion that 
slavery cannot be condemned on moral grounds - "(a)nything in which the law creates a title can 
be owned, and that is that." See Ryan Property 108, 96. 
124 Bentham J Economic writings (London 1952) Vol II 312: "All wealth is the fruit of labour." 
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you alone a power over the land ... it gives you ... the property of the land, the 
estate of the land ... "125 
This definition is firstly an explicitly conventional one. His emphasis on power 
and labour also indicates an active definition. However, although it seems 
subjective, in much the same way as is the case with Black.stone, Bentham's 
definition implied a certain social and moral order. 126 .. Bentham was strongly in 
favour of law reform and codification. He had a very clear idea of what the 
law should look like. His definition of property was part and parcel of his 
broader reformist principles and was meant to legitimate that new order. 127 
David Hume, whose scepticism regarding philosophy and knowledge resulted 
in a new theory of morality, was extremely influential. He influenced not only 
contemporaries like Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, but provided the basis 
for nineteenth century utilitarianism as well.128 His point of departure was his 
denial of morality as the basis for property. Hume thought that law was 
essentially conventional, by which he meant that the citizens shared a 
common interest based on public utility.129 In this sense Hume defined 
property as a set of conventions which men obey because it is in their own 
best interest to do so. 130 His definition was therefore conventional, but not in 
a contractarian sense, rather in the sense of public utility. On this basis 
property should be upheld, but the particular rules pertaining to property 
depended on the underlying legal system. 131 For Hume, therefore, property 
125 Bentham limits 61 - my emphasis on power. 
126 This is probably part of the what Haakonssen calls the objective approach to rights in English law 
in general. which he contrasts with the subjective approach in American law - see Haakonssen 
"From natural law" 20-21. 
127 See Manchester AH A modern legal history of England and Wales 1750-1950 (London 1980) 
13 for Bentham's approach to law reform. 
128 Hendel CW "The philosophy of Hume" in Hume selections (New York 1927) v-xxii xix. 
129 Hume D "An inquiry concerning the principles of morals" in Hendel CW (ed) Hume selections 
(New York 1927) 194-252 250: "But if by convention be meant a sense of common interest; . 
which tends to public utility; it must be owned. that, in this sense, justice arises from human 
conventions." 
130 Hume "Morals" 208. 
131 Hume "Morals" 208: "Thus, the rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state 
and condition in which men are placed ... " 
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was always defined in such a way as to fit current legal, moral and political 
ideas. In this sense then, his definition is objective, depending on the 
underlying system. 
This conventional approach was also adopted by Adam Smith. He 
recognised that the definition of property depended on the kind of government 
in force. 132 Nevertheless, he defined dominium as the "full right of property" 
and as " ... the sole claim to a subject, exclusive of all others, but can use it as 
he thinks fit, and if he pleases abuse or destroy it."133 In this definition, 
therefore, property is inextricably linked to capitalist economy. In fact, Smith 
thought that the state of nature (as ideal) required an absolutely free market 
and a free exchange of goods.134 This was why Smith criticised estates entail, 
stating that they were " ... disadvantageous to the improvement of the 
country ... "135 
Smith therefore paid only lip service to Hume's conventionalism. For him, 
public utility was the same as the efficient production of goods, which, in turn, 
required the accumulation of wealth and unequal property. In this way Smith 
constructed an objective theory of property - one that fits the objective moral 
and political order of capitalism. 136 
3.4.4.3 Conclusion 
An interesting question arises when a comparison is attempted between 
English and continental developments. The question is whether, and if so to 
what extent, the conceptualisation of property (and the view of law as a 
132 Smith A Lectures on jurisprudence (Oxford 1978) 401: "Property and civil government very 
much depend on one another ... and the state of property must always vary with the form of 
government." 
133 Sm~h Lectures 10. The use of the term subject is confusing - it should probably read object. 
134 Smith A An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (Oxford 1976) Vol I 
57. 
135 Smith Lectures 469. This improvement is meant in an economic sense. 
136 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 639. 
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scientific and abstract system) also occurred in the English system. To what 
extent did the reforms and the views of Blackstone or Bentham result in an 
abstract, conceptual system as was the case in Germany or the Netherlands? 
As Kennedy pointed out, the effect of Blackstone's approach was the creation 
of such a system.137 Singer characterises Bentham's approach as a 
nominalist one, to contrast it with the conceptualism of Austin and Mill. 138 
However, Bentham's commitment to a particular moral and social order139 (as 
evinced in his reformist ideas) and his insistence on empirical knowledge, 
indicate that his approach eventually strengthened the abstract and 
conceptualist view. To a large extent, therefore, English property law by the 
beginning of the modern era exhibited many of the same characteristics as 
the continental systems. However, Bentham's dream of codification was 
never realised and the feudal basis of English law prohibited the high level of 
abstractness that characterises continental systems. 
3.4.5 American property law 
3.4.5.1 Introduction 
Mensch has shown that, in the colonial period in New York, there were at 
least two conflicting views of property, based on conflicting views of society. 140 
The first of these conceptions of property was a basically voluntarist one, 
known as title by occupation, in contrast with the hierarchical one, known as 
title by grant. 141 The hierarchical approach was, in essence, a natural rights 
approach based on a contractarian view of law and society. In this respect it 
137 Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 205 382. 
138 Singer 1982 Wisconsin LR 975 1016. 
139 See Kroeze IJ "Re-evaluating legal positivism - or positivism and fundamental rights: a comedy of 
errors" 1993 SAPL 230-237 235-237. 
140 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 635. This is a particularly interesting choice of venue. New York 
started out as a Dutch colony and was later taken over by the English. One could, therefore. 
expect a conflict between continental (or at least Dutch) and English views on property. 
141 The views of society that these definitions were based on wlll be discussed below at 5.4.2, 
because they deal with theories on the origin/justification of property. 
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more or less followed the ideas of Hobbes. 142 Therefore the origin of property 
was natural, but its protection was the result of convention. It was a passive 
and objective approach, since it depended on an objective moral, political and 
legal order that conferred rights on owners.143 
The voluntarist approach at first glance seems to indicate a continuation of 
the medieval idea of property as potestas humana.144 It was a conventional 
approach, but of a very specific kind. It saw property as a right based on use 
and occupancy, but this right was conferred and controlled by democratic 
means within the community.145 It was not, however, anti-monarchical. It 
simply identified the king with the will of the community. 146 It thus represented 
a curious blend of feudal and early democratic ideas. It was also an active 
approach, since failure by the owner to settle and use the land himself led to 
forfeiture of the land. For the same reason (use and occupancy) unimproved 
land could not be sold. 147 Therefore, not only was the right to settle and use 
the land central to the approach, but the owner was also actually compelled to 
use the land. 
These two approaches were in conflict not only in theory, but also in practice, 
where the possession of large pieces of land based on grants were disputed 
by those who actually settled and used the land. Mostly, titles based on use 
and occupancy were upheld against grants, in order to promote settlement. 148 
However, neither of the two views could provide the economic growth 
necessary and their conflicting contexts made them irreconcilable. 149 What 
was needed, therefore, was a new approach abstracted from these two 
142 See 3.3 above for Hobbes' views. See also Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 642. The theory also 
derived, more indirectly, from Blackstone. 
143 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 645. 
144 See 3.2 above. 
145 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 644. 
146 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 662. 
147 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 646. 
148 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 661. 
149 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 660. 
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extremes. This led to the liberal definition of property that saw property as 
free from hierarchical controls (an idea taken from the voluntarist approach) 
but which retained the idea of formally valid titles to land (an idea taken from 
the hierarchical view). 150 
3.4.5.2 The framing of the Constitution 151 
The American Constitution was drafted in an era when there were two general 
theories on offer about the nature of citizenship, the state and law, namely the 
liberal tradition and the republican tradition. 152 Both these traditions agreed, 
among other things, that government should protect private property, but in 
different ways. The conflict between these two theories shaped the 
arguments at the Convention.153 
In the liberal tradition property played a central role. The acquisition thereof 
was regarded as the goal of human activity and, consequently, the reason 
why liberty was desirable. Private property limited the power of a landlord 
and gave owners a stake in maintaining the current order. 154 The republican 
view of people as social beings also saw private property as important. 155 
Private property provided a secure foundation so that they could be "civic-
minded", that is, concerned about the public interest. 156 
150 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 690-694. 
151 In this section only the problem of the definition of property in the framing of the American 
constitution will be discussed. The various political influences and development will be discussed 
more fully in 9.2 below. 
152 Tushnet M Red, white and blue - a critical analysis of constitutional law (Cambridge Mass 
1988) 4-5. 
153 Tushnet Red, white, and blue 7. 
154 Tushnet Red, white, and blue 9. 
155 See Nedelsky Private property 16-66 on the view of Madison as representative of the republican 
view of government in general and property in particular. 
156 Tushnet Red, white, and blue 10-11; Pickens DK and Seligmann GL "'Unworthy motives'· 
property, the historian and the federal constitution - a historiographical speculation" 1987 Soc Sc 
Q 847 849. 
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Eighteenth-century republicanism aimed at creating better citizens by 
protecting property that created economic independence.157 This classical 
republicanism stressed property's role as a way of anchoring an individual in 
a community. On the other hand, the agrarian republicanism attempted to 
realise the ideal through institutions that protected land.158 This 
republicanism was inspired by the Scottish moral philosophers Hurne and 
Srnith159 and was a major factor in the settlement of the West. 160 This 
republicanism emphasised the use of land for "natural", that is agrarian, 
purposes. 161 
In the end the liberal definition prevailed. Private property was seen as an 
abstract constitutional right that was based on and perpetuated the distinction 
between public and private spheres. Its abstract nature could be deduced 
from its neutrality, since it supposedly severed the ties between an objective 
moral and religious order (on the one hand) and law (on the other hand). 162 
However, this abstract and instrumental definition also emphasised 
production in terms of economic efficiency.163 Although the relation between 
property and moral power had ostensibly been severed, the relation between 
property and economic power would become ever more apparent. 164 
Although the teachings of Locke were appealed to, very little remained of the 
Lockean definition. For instance, the Jeffersonians differentiated between 
inherent or natural rights, (life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness) and 
157 Pickens and Seligmann 1987 Soc Sc Q 847 849. 
158 Pickens and Seligmann 1987 Soc Sc Q 847 850. 
159 See 3.4.4.2 above. 
160 Pickens and Seligmann 1987 Soc Sc Q 847 852. 
161 Horwitz 1973 U Chicago LR 248-290 249. 
162 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 735. 
163 Horwitz 1973 U Chicago LR 248 250, 278: " ... men had come to regard property as an 
instrumental value in the service of the paramount goal of promoting economic growth." 
164 Nedelsky Private property 2-3 states that the goal of the framers of the Constitution was to 
insulate property and inequality from democratic transformation and that this has distorted the 
application of the Constitution. 
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conventional rights (such as property). 165 The liberal definition was therefore 
a conventional one in which the state both created property rights and set 
limits to its own interference.166 
Developments in the nineteenth century entrenched this liberal, abstract 
definition. This is the result of three factors. In the first place the Marshall 
court's liberal interpretation of the commerce and contract clauses was based 
on and strengthened the liberal definition.167 The Supreme Court protected 
property rights against all state intervention168 by making use of the dual 
federalism of commerce clause and the substantive due process guaranteed 
by the 14th Amendment.169 In the second place it was the definition best 
suited to achieve production on the basis of economic efficiency.170 In this 
way property became an instrumental right. 
Thirdly, the influence of CC Langdell in die nineteenth century led to the 
conceptualisation of law in general and property in particular. 171 In the 
Langdellian jurisprudence a new methodology is used to establish law as a 
science based on the view that law is "a complete, formal and conceptually 
ordered system that satisfies the legal norms of objectivity and 
consistency". 172 This view is, of course, reminiscent of that of Grotius and 
Windscheid and, in this way a conceptualism was established that shared 
165 Post DM "Jeffersonian revisions of Locke: education, property-rights and liberty" in Shuffelton F 
(ed) The American Enlightenment (Rochester 1993) 295-305 300. 
166 Nedelsky Private property 8: "In property, the state sets its own limits." 
167 McCann MW "Resurrection and reform: perspectives on property in the American constitutional 
tradition" 1987 Pol & Soc 143-176 146. 
168 Except in the case of Indians - see Singer 1991 Legal T 1 3. 
169 Mccann 1987 Pol & Soc 143 146. 
170 Horwitz 1973 U Chicago LR 248 250, 278. 
171 See Schlag P "The problem of the subject" 1991 Texas LR 1627-1743 1632-1634 where he 
quotes Langdell as saying: "Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or 
doctrines ... " See also Schlag P '"Le hors de texte, c'est moi' - the politics of form and the 
domestication of deconstruction" 1990 Cardozo LR 1631-1674 1638 where he points out that the 
Langdellian emphasis on "instrumentally useful" knowledge led to a view of law where the 
desirability of the instrumentalist paradigm cannot be questioned. 
172 Minda G Postmodern legal movements - law and jurisprudence at century's end (New York 
1995) 13. See also Schlag P "Law and phrenology'' 1997 Harvard LR 877-921 896-914 on the 
view of law as science and the role of Langdell in this development. 
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much of the characteristics of the continental conceptualism discussed 
above. 173 This conceptual or scientific approach strengthened the idea of 
property as an abstract right. 174 
By the end of the nineteenth century, property was defined as an abstract and 
absolute right that had to be protected against all forms of interference. 175 It 
was still an active definition that stressed the owner's right to make certain 
choices. 176 Above all it was a subjective definition that emphasised the role of 
the owner as holder of the right. 177 
3.4.5.3 Conclusion 
The liberal definition was supposed to be a neutral and subjective one that 
served to sever the connection between property and an objective moral and 
political order. 178 In reality, however, it served to promote a very specific 
worldview. Not only did it accept inequality and class differences as natural 
and inevitable, 179 but it was also actively intended to protect the propertied 
from democratic levelling. 180 Economic and political power was therefore 
173 See 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 above. See also Schlag 1990 Cardozo LR 1631 1637: "One result of this 
rhetorical economy is that, at least since the time of Langdell ... traditional legal discourse has 
systematically rejected any serious consideration of the social, the psychological, and the 
rhetorical context of its own productions." This move is also characterised by Schlag as a 
typically male production. 
174 Alexander 1982 Col LR 1545 1549ff. 
175 Frug GE "Tortious interference with contractual relations in the nineteenth century: the 
transformation of property, contracts and tort'' 1980 Harvard LR 1510-1539 1511; Vandevelde KJ 
"The new property of the nineteenth century: the development of the modern concept of property" 
1980 Buffalo LR 325-367 350; Horwitz 1973 U Chicago LR 248 248. 
176 Allen DW "Homesteading and property rights; or, 'how the West was really won"' 1991 J Law & 
Econ 1-23 2: "Property rights are defined as one's ability to exercise one's choice over the use of 
a good." 
177 See Haakonssen "From natural law" 42-<>1 for the history of the shift from objectivism to 
subjectivism in American thinking. 
178 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 735. 
179 Nedelsky Private property 2; Underkuffler LS "The perfidy of property" 1991 Texas LR 293-316 
296-297. 
180 Ryder J "Private property and the US Constitution" in Gray CB (ed) Philosophical reflections on 
the United States Constitution (Lewiston 1989) 16-28 21, 24. 
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closely aligned with property and, consequently, the definition was never 
neutral. 181 
This is nowhere more apparent than in the treatment of the property rights of 
Indians. From the eighteenth century many rights of Indians based on 
treaties were not regarded as property. Consequently, they were not 
protected by the Constitution and infringement was not regarded as 
unconstitutional.182 In this way the rights of tribes were sometimes regarded 
as sovereignty issues (so that their property could be infringed upon without 
compensation) and sometimes as property issues (to deny them sovereignty 
over those whites living on reservations). In this way the neutral pretensions 
of the liberal definition served to mask its racist and colonialist 
assumptions.183 
One of the most interesting aspects of the American development is the 
similarity with continental, civil-law developments. This is most obvious in the 
civilist approach followed by the Lochner court. 184 Although there are obvious 
dissimilarities, the similarities are startling. Not only is the definition in both 
cases premised on the existence of a liberal, capitalist state, but both also 
define property in terms of absoluteness, exclusivity and abstractness. 
Especially the last-mentioned indicate a fairly widespread acceptance of the 
conceptualist assumptions underlying modernist legal thought: 
"Legal modernism symbolises the progressive union of 
scientific objectivity and instrumental rationality in 
pursuit of the intellectual project of twentieth-century 
Enlightenment - the century-old quest for universal truth 
181 Nedelsky Private property 143; Underkuffler 1991 Texas LR 293 299. 
182 Singer 1991 Legal T 1 2. 
183 Singer 1991 Legal T 1 7: "If property is a form of political power, and political power is a source 
of property, than responsibility for poverty and inequality rests, to a large extent with the legal 
system itself." 
184 See Alexander 1982 Col LR 1545 1598-1599 on the civilist attitude of American courts as an 
indication of conceptualism. 
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based on faith in the 'omnipotence and liberating 
potential of reason and science . . . to penetrate to the 
essential truth of physical and social conditions, making 
them amenable to rational control. "'185 
This abstract, neutral and subjective definition would be used by the courts to 
interpret the property clause in the Constitution. 186 
3.5 Conclusion 
The history of the development of the definition of property is a curious and 
convoluted one. At first glance there seems to be no pattern to the kinds of 
definitions presented. However, closer analysis reveals a number of 
interesting themes. The first of these themes is the development of a truly 
conventional view of property. Until the early modern period most definitions 
of property were based on natural law. Even the conventional definitions 
were not truly conventional. These conventions were regarded as part of an 
objective moral and social order that was based, in turn, on a secularised 
natural law. In this way the scope of the convention was limited. 
It was only during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century that truly 
conventional definitions began to appear. Rousseau was an early precursor, 
but the idea was fully developed by Hobbes, Hume and Bentham. In fact, a 
conventional definition could only come about once the idea of a social 
contract had taken hold. The idea of fully rational humans contracting to 
create a state and rights was a prerequisite for the idea of property as the 
result of convention. By the end of the nineteenth century, a clear distinction 
had emerged between property in practice and the property concept. 
Practically speaking property was regarded as contingent and contextual, its 
185 Minda Postmodern legal movements 5. 
186 See 9.2 below. 
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content and structure determined by the underlying social, political and 
economic order. Conceptually, however, it was seen as universal, abstract 
and absolute. In this way particularities, concrete differences and limitations 
could be explained as exceptional and temporary. 
In the second place it seems fairly clear that the definition of property was 
never neutral. It was always determined by the context in which it was 
defined. Consequently it was defined as active or passive, subjectively or 
objectively, depending on the context. Although a general trend can be 
discerned from passive to active and from objective to subjective, this is 
sometimes misleading and, at any rate, not the important point. What is 
important is the context. For instance, a truly subjective definition only 
became possible once the voluntarist idea of medieval thought had been 
recast in an individualist mould. Such a definition would be unthinkable in a 
feudal community with its emphasis on status in and dependence on the 
moral order of the community. In this respect therefore, it represents an 
example of the movement away from feudalism with its accompanying 
economic development and towards the goal of making property available for 
business purposes. 
It should also be emphasised that the definition of property has always played 
an important role in the legitimisation of the status quo. This will be 
discussed more comprehensively when dealing with the justification of 
property.187 For now it needs to be stated that the way in which property was 
defined almost always reflected the political and philosophical "mood" of a 
certain period. In this way the definition of property was not only determined 
by the context, but also determined the context in turn. 
Finally, developments regarding the definition reflect the rise of scientific 
method as applied to law. This is probably the most important development in 
187 See 5.5 below. 
54 Private-law perspective 
this regard. The conceptualisation of law made the conceptualisation of 
property possible. The definition became abstract and technical and with this 
went the pretensions of universality and timelessness. Although practical, 
concrete exceptions could and did exist, the concept itself was abstract. It is 
this conceptual paradigm that is read back into the history of the property 
concept. The result of conceptualism is that the property concept is basically 
abstract (the right), while the concrete right (my right) is regarded as 
contextual. As such it is a typically modernist construct, that is found in both 
common-law and civil-law systems. In both cases it is the result of the 
scientific and neutral pretensions that led to rights talk. In this way property 
could be and was represented as an equitable institution, while its abstract 
pretensions masked individual suffering and abuse. 
CHAPTER 4: THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPERTY 
(CONSTRUCTING A HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS) 
4.1 Introduction 
"This distinction has sustained a 
mythic quality of property as not 
merely a social construct, but a basic 
right, linked in powerful ways to 
cherished values of freedom and 
autonomy."1 
The way in which property was traditionally defined was based on how 
property was seen in relation to other rights. In fact, it was only when 
property was regarded as something different from other rights that it could be 
defined. Thus the relationship between property and other rights determined 
or co-determined its definition. This tradition was all but destroyed by the rise 
of conceptualism discussed above. 
In discussing the importance of property, it is necessary to remember that the 
term can be used to indicate different things. In the first place it can refer to 
the systematic position of property within a scientific and abstract system of 
rights. This implies that this kind of importance only becomes relevant once 
such a system is proposed or implemented. Consequently, it would be 
absurd to speak of thH importance of property in this sense before the early 
modern period (and Grotius and Blackstone in particular). 2 Of course, the 
importance of ownership in this sense is dealt with by earlier writers, but then 
not as part of an abstract, scientific system of rights. This aspect will be 
referred to as the systematic importance of property. 
1 Nedelsky Private property 9. 
2 See 3.4 above on the development of a scientific, abstract concept of property. 
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In the second place importance can also indicate the socio-political and 
philosophical importance of property as a social institution. As such this 
refers, to a certain extent, to the justificatory debate, but it also involves basic 
questions regarding the nature of society and of man. This aspect will be 
referred to as the philosophical importance of property. The interesting 
question regarding these two aspects is what the connection between them is. 
Does the philosophical importance determine or influence the systematic 
importance or vice versa and, if so, how is this to be understood? 
Part of the question on the systematic importance of property deals with the 
relationship between property and other rights. In this regard two separate 
issues are sometimes confused. On the one hand the distinction between 
dominium and possessio in roman law is only important in terms of the way in 
which romanist lawyers and Bartolus used it. In fact, it would be anachronistic 
to speak of a systematic importance, since no conceptual system existed at 
the time. On the other hand, the distinction between real and personal rights, 
and the structural importance of the former, has to do with the way in which 
the system of rights is structured and perceived. In this regard there is a 
definite connection between the systematic importance and the philosophical 
basis underlying the system. 
The introduction of fundamental (human) rights adds a further dimension to 
this problem. Once property is protected as a fundamental right, the 
relationship between (or hierarchy of) fundamental rights come into play. Not 
only is the hierarchical position of property in this scheme determined by its 
philosophical importance, but it is also strengthened by the systematic 
importance of property in other fields of law. On the other hand constitutional 
protection tends to strengthen the systematic position of property further. In 
this way the systematic and philosophical importance are inter-dependent. 
For this reason the two kinds of importance will be studied together. 
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4.2 Roman and medieval roots 
Roman law was a practical science and this can be seen in the way in which 
dominium was developed and distinguished.3 In pre-classical roman law two 
kinds of procedures existed, namely the interdictum and the actio. The 
interdictum was used to protect the user of state land and this claim would 
later become known as possessio. 4 The actiones were used to protect "own" 
land, that is land allocated to the paterfamilias. One of these actiones was the 
actio ex iure Quiritium and this interest was protected by the rei vindicatio and 
the interest would later be known as dominium. The eventual distinction 
between dominium and possessio therefore has its roots in procedural 
differences.5 Dominium was not systematically contrasted with "limited real 
rights", nor did it have any superior position in law.6 Furthermore, dominium 
included rights, which would be regarded as limited real rights in later 
developments. The greatest accomplishment of the classical period of 
Roman law was the beginning of the later distinction between dominium and 
possessio. This would form the basis for Bartolus' distinction. Bartolus 
defined dominium as ius perfecte disponendi and based this characteristic on 
an exposition of the lex in re mandata.7 He used the term perfecte disponendi 
in order to distinguish between dominium and possessio. In contrast with 
dominium, possessio was defined as ius insistendi rei. 8 
3 It should be mentioned at the outset that terms and concepts such as real and personal rights and 
indeed rights itself (in the technical sense) were unknown to Roman law: Van Warmelo P 'n 
lnleidlng tot die studie van die Romeinse reg (Cape Town 1965) 118 par 339; Schrage Actio 
en subjectief recht 10-11, 17. 
4 Buckland WW A manual of Roman private law (Cambridge 1939) 115-117; Kaser M Roman 
private law 2nd ed (Durban 1968 Tr R Dannenbring) 89; Van Warmelo lnleiding 155 par 450. 
5 Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 259. 
6 Feenstra R "Dominium and ius in re aliena: the origins of a civil law distinction" in Birks P (ed) 
New perspectives in the Roman law of property: essays for Barry Nicholas (Oxford 1989) 
111-122. 
7 C.4.35.21 -this lex dealt with the liability of a mandatory. See also Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 251-
252. 
8 Bartolus on D.41.2.1 pr nr 6. See also Coing 1953 ZSS 348 352; Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 252. 
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However, the bulk of the debate regarding dominium in the middle ages was 
devoted to discussions on the definition of and justification for property, while 
the distinction between dominium and other rights was mostly ignored. Within 
catholic doctrine and as a result of the poverty debate, a distinction was made 
between ownership (proprietas) and the use of things (usus),9 along with a 
further distinction between usus iuris and usus facti. 10 
This trend to distinguish dominium from possessio/usus was still found with 
the Spanish late scholastics. Vitoria, 11 De Soto12 and De Molina13 continued 
the romanist tradition of distinguishing between dominium and possessio. 
However, it is impossible to speak of a "system" of law in the middle ages -
that is typical of the modern era. Consequently, it would be ridiculous to 
discuss the systematic position of dominium if there was no system. 
While keeping in mind what was said above, it should not be forgotten that 
dominium played a central role within the feudal relations of the Middle Ages. 
It is typical of feudalism that dominium and political power went hand-in-
hand.14 Dominium, in whatever form, was the basis for participation in 
political decision-making and the exercise of power. In this respect, therefore, 
dominium played a crucial role. 
4.3 Early modem developments 
This period represents the beginning of the great systems of law in European 
thought. The rise of rationalism and the successes of the natural sciences in 
9 Pope Gregorius IX in the bull Quo elongati (1230). See also Schrage Actio en subjectief recht 
40-43; Van der Walt Houerskap 212. 
10 Pope Nicholas Ill in the bull Exiit qui seminat (1279). See also Schrage Actio en subjectief 
recht 50-54; Van der Walt Houerskap 213. 
11 See Tuck Natural rights 47. 
12 Feenstra "Eigentumsbegritr' 220; Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 270; Tuck Natural rights 47. 
13 Feenstra "Eigentumsbegritr' 221. 
14 See, in this regard, Van den Bergh Eigendom 8: "De kern van het Middeleeuwse of 'feodale' 
maatschappelijk bestel was juist dat eigendomsverhoudingen en politieke structuur ... vrijwel 
identiek waren"; Van Maanen Eigendomsschijnbewegingen 23; Tuck Natural rights 17. 
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the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries contributed to this phenomenon. 
The period is therefore characterised by the prevalence of systems that 
purported to explain the law in a coherent and all-encompassing manner. 15 
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also represent the beginning of 
capitalism and liberalism, which would result in the French and American 
revolutions. 
Grotius was one of the first and most successful of the system builders of his 
time and the first to base his explanation of law on rights rather than on laws. 
Already in the De iure belli ac pacis Grotius dealt with the division of rights. 
The term dominium was used for all real rights, whilst creditum was used for 
all other rights. 16 The term dominium utile was still used, but this term now 
referred to limited real rights and not to a kind of dominium.17 In his 
lnleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid, Grotius' system of rights 
is set out. He distinguished between beheering and inschu/d. Beheering is 
sub-divided into possession (bezit-recht) and ownership (eigendom). 18 
Grotius made a first distinction between full ownership (where the owner has 
both the dominium and the use) and limited ownership (where the dominium 
and the use is split up). The innovative aspect of this is that he reserves the 
term owner for the person who has the dominium, whilst the term holder is 
reserved for the person who has the use. 19 The traditional romanist definition 
is then reserved for the former. This explanation is one of Grotius' most 
important contributions to modern legal thought, although the distinction itself 
15 This was due, in no small part, to the dialectic method of Petrus Ramus. See, in this regard, Van 
der Merwe "Ramus, mental habits and legal science" 32 49-56; Van der Walt 1995 JCRDL 396 
402. 
16 Grotius De lure belli ac pacis 1.1.5 p 32; Van der Walt Houerskap 399. 
17 Grotius De iure belli ac pacis 1.2.3.19.2 p 217. This distinction between dominium directum and 
dominium utile is not the same as Grotius' distinction between voile and gebreckelicke eigendom 
-these distinctions are discussed at 6.3.2 below. 
18 Grotius lnleidinge 2.1.60. See also Feenstra "Eigentumsbegriff' 230; Van der Walt Houerskap 
402. 
19 Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 176-177; Van der Walt 1995 JCRDL 404-405. For the other 
distinctions found in Grotius' thought, see 6.3.2 below. 
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it based on romanist ideas.20 What is also innovative is that ownership was 
made the norm or standard by which all the other real rights was measured, 
and traditional definition of dominium is reserved for one set of rights. 21 In 
fact, "(o)wnership becomes the original example of a right conceived as a 
sphere of absolute and exclusive individual autonomy."22 Grotius therefore 
created a system in which patrimonial rights were divided into real and 
personal rights and real rights into ownership and possession. 23 The 
important point is that both personal and real rights were defined in terms of 
how they fell short of ownership. 24 
The other writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not 
concentrate so much on the distinctions and systematisation as Grotius did. 
In fact, it wasn't necessary for them to do so, since they simply accepted the 
system and the definition and worked from there. However, their work was 
important because of the philosophical importance they attached to ownership 
within civil society. These early contractarians, whether they thought 
ownership was a natural right or not, gave it a position of paramount 
importance. Locke, for instance, saw property as one of the natural rights 
which men retained on entering civil society. 25 In fact, Locke argued that civil 
society (or the state) and positive law exist in order to safeguard property. 26 
Therefore the goal of the state is to safeguard property. More importantly, 
this protection is sanctioned by natural law and therefore imbued with moral 
authority.27 This idea of private property as the goal of the state which is 
20 Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 273; Van der Walt Houerskap 400; Feenstra "Eigentumsbegriff' 273; 
Feenstra R lus in re: het begrip zakelijk recht in historiseh perspectief (Thorbecke-colleges 
no 4 Leiden 1979) 25; Van der Walt en Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 246. 
21 Van der Walt 1993 JCRDL 569 579. 
22 Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 178. 
23 Van der Walt 1995 JCRDL 404. 
24 Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 177. 
25 Locke Two treatises 2.99, 2.129-130, 2.222. 
26 Locke Two treatises 2.221; Mitchell 1986 Hist Pol Ee 297; Van Maanen Eigendomssehijnbe-
wegingen 101; Ryan Property 15. 
27 Mitchell 1986 Hist Pol Ee 299-304; Gill 1983 J of Pol 677; Van Maanen Eigendomssehijnbe-
wegingen 104. 
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furthermore sanctioned by natural law, would have an enormous impact on 
liberal thinking in most systems and is still one of the fundamental tenets of 
contemporary liberalism. 
One of the more confusing aspects of Locke's work is the way in which he 
used the term property. In a wide sense he used the term to refer to all rights 
- what he terms "life, liberty and estate" - but in a narrower sense it referred to 
"estate" only. As Waldron has pointed out, Locke used this same term in two 
different meanings. It refers to limited real and personal rights when Locke 
writes about "property in" something. 28 This is the wider meaning. The 
narrower meaning becomes clear from the term "the property of' - this refers 
to ownership only.29 The difference between the two kinds of property lies in 
the more exclusive usage ascribed to "property of'.30 
4.4 Late modem developments 
By the eighteenth century the distinction between ownership and other rights 
was very much part of most legal systems in the civil and common-law 
traditions. The tendency, already noticeable from the sixteenth century, to 
define all rights in terms of the norm or standard of ownership, was well 
established. The more unique cha.racteristic of this period is the increasingly 
central role that property began to play in the political and economic spheres. 
This is the essence of the discussion that follows. 
4.4.1 German property law31 
As is the case in most other systems, the importance of ownership in German 
law needs to be dealt with in two ways. Regarding the systematic importance 
28 Locke Two treatises 11.194, 1.29, 11.46. 
29 Locke Two treatises 11.27 where Locke refers to the "property of the labourer." 
30 Locke Two treatises 11.28. See, in general, Waldron Private property 157-159. 
31 For a general introduction to German property law, see 3.4.5.1 above. 
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German thinking followed the trend of other continental systems. Writers of 
the usus modemus pandectarum still used the distinction between ownership 
and possession, and between ownership and limited real rights that was 
developed in the early modern period. 32 The change came with the 
innovations introduced by Von Savigny and Windscheid on the basis of Kant's 
moral theory.33 
Von Savigny's application of Kantian philosophy to law meant that rights were 
now seen not as an entitlement to use things, but as power over other 
persons. This is represented not as a moral theory (which it really was), but 
as a logically coherent system of conceptual relations.34 Windscheid took this 
conceptual system further. His distinction between real rights and personal 
rights is based on the question of will. Real rights allow the holder thereof to 
determine the actions of everyone with regard to the object of the right. 35 
These real rights are characterised by their exclusivity and negativity.36 On 
this basis ownership is distinguished from limited real rights and the main 
point of the distinction has to do with the scope of the power afforded each.37 
Ownership is therefore characterised by its totality, abstractness and 
exclusivity, characteristics which limited real rights do not share. 
What is important in this analysis is that ownership dominates the whole 
paradigm. It determines the categories and distinctions. It is the perfect right 
and all other rights are defined with reference to the way in which they fall 
short of this ideal: 
32 Van der Walt Houerskap 299, 302. 
33 Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 177. 
34 Van der Walt AJ "Unity and pluralism in property theory - a review of property theories and 
debates in recent literature: part I" 1995 TSAR 15-42 23-24 .. 
35 Van derWalt 1993 JCRDL 569 587. 
36 Van derWalt 1993 JCRDL 569 588; Van derWalt 1995 JCRDL406. 
37 Van der Walt 1993 JCRDL 569 584; Van der Walt 1995 JCRDL 406. 
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"Ownership is presented as the ideal and normal perfect 
example of a real right, while the limited real rights are 
defined according to the ways in which they appear as 
limited exceptions to this rule."38 
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The Kantian ideal of absolute individual autonomy in this way became the 
basis for defining ownership as the perfect vehicle for interpersonal power. 39 
Although not nearly as important conceptually, Windscheid's distinction 
between real and personal rights tends to strengthen the point made above. 
Once again real rights can be enforced absolutely and universally, while 
personal rights can only be enforced relatively and specifically. Once again, 
however, ownership provides the paradigm for the distinction between real 
and personal rights40 and it becomes " ... the very model of right generally."41 
It was therefore typical of nineteenth century German thought to see 
ownership as the real right in terms of which all other rights need to be 
defined.42 This distinction was also enshrined in the BGB.43 
In German law the philosophical importance of ownership coincided with its 
systematic importance. The Kantian theory was used to define rights as the 
guarantee of a negative moral space in which individuals could develop their 
autonomy.44 This continuation of the medieval idea of ownership as facultas, 
together with the Kantian emphasis on individual freedom45 strengthened the 
systematic position of ownership as the paradigmatic right.46 In Germany, as 
38 Van der Walt 1993 JCRDL 569 580. See also Van der Walt 1995 JCRDL 407. 
39 Van der Walt 1995 JCRDL 406. 
40 Van der Walt 1993 JCRDL 569 580. 
41 Unger RM "The critical legal studies movemenf' 1983 Harvard LR 564-675 598. 
42 Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 16. 
43 Cohn Manual 171, 207. 
44 Van derWalt 1995 SAJHR 177. 
45 See Ryan Property 83. 
46 Van der Walt Houerskap 323; Kroeschell "Eigentumsbegriff' 39. 
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in the United States, this led to an association of ownership with freedom. 
Ownership was seen as important, because it guaranteed freedom. 47 
Another factor that should be borne in mind, is a phenomenon that can be 
characterised as the privatisation of law. The spirit of laissez-faire, which was 
central to early liberalism, led to a view of the state as a minimum state. The 
night-watchman state should not only not interfere in private affairs, but 
should also be as small as possible. This resulted in a public/private split in 
which the private sphere should be protected against state interference. 
Because the public sphere should be kept as small as possible, this resulted 
in an emphasis on the private sphere and consequently private law. Private 
law began to play a much larger role in the legal system as a whole than 
before. Because ownership was the paradigmatic right within private law, it 
also became the paradigmatic right for the whole legal system. 
4.4.2 Dutch property law 
The relative importance of ownership in a legal system depends on the 
position it occupies within the system of rights and especially on the way it is 
contrasted with other real rights. Most writers of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries followed the Grotian model.48 The roman-dutch authors 
took Grotius' exposition to its natural conclusion. Although two types of real 
rights were still recognised, ownership was seen as the most important real 
right. 49 The introduction of the BW took this further. Limited real rights were 
seen as fragments of ownership. These had to be limited to a bare minimum 
and this led to a closed system of real rights. In this way the position of 
ownership as a" ... parental right, an original right..." was entrenched.50 
47 Van der Walt Houerskap 360; Van der Walt 1993 JCRDL 569 585. 
48 See Van derWalt "Eigentumsbegriff' 510; Van der Walt Houerskap 411. 
49 Van der Walt "Eigentumsbegriff' 510-511. 
50 Chorus JMJ ea Introduction to Dutch law for foreign lawyers 2nd ed (Deventer 1993) 64. 
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It is interesting to note that the connection between ownership and freedom 
(which was a feature of the Anglo-American and German systems) was not 
made nearly as often or as insistently in Dutch law. Opzoomer does link 
freedom to an absolute view of property,51 but he is one of very few. This 
trend in Dutch law is probably the result of, on the one hand, the fact that the 
Netherlands has never had a rigid, Grundnorm constitution. On the other 
hand, the basic understanding even in the nineteenth century was that 
ownership was limited by the common good.52 
4.4.3 English property law 
4.4.3.1 Realty and personalty 
In early English law a distinction was made between realty/real property 
(which could be recovered specifically) and personalty/personal property {for 
which compensation could be claimed). 53 The distinction was therefore 
originally based on procedure. Later, however, the distinction referred to the 
object of the right. All interests in land were regarded as realty, except 
leasehold.54 This emphasised the pronounced feudal nature of English 
property law. This distinction between real and personal rights remained 
basic to English property law, and was sometimes referred to as rights in rem 
and rights in personam. Blackstone's treatment of the distinction is typically 
obscure. In the first place he distinguished between jura personam, which 
were rights and duties closely connected with a person, and jura rerum, which 
51 Opzoomer CW Het Burgerlijk Wetboek, verklaard 2nd ed vol Ill (Amsterdam 1876) 310. 
52 See Van Maanen Eigendomsschijnbewegingen 37-45. 
53 Megarry and Wade Private property 10; Smith K and Keenan DJ English law 5th ed (London 
1975) 324. 
54 Leasehold was based on contract and not on feudal relations and could, therefore, not be 
regarded as realty. Later, although it was regarded as an interest in land, it was still regarded 
only as real personalty. See Megarry and Wade Private property 11; Smith and Keenan English 
law 323; Walker RJ and Walker MG The English legal system 2nd ed (London 1970) 50. 
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were rights to things external to man.55 These jura rerum, however, could 
exist in respect of certain objects only: 
"The objects of dominion or property are things, as 
contradistinguished from persons: and things are by the 
law of England distributed into two kinds; things real and 
things personal. "56 
These kinds of objects correspond with the contemporary distinction between 
immovable and movable property respectively.57 Although his terminology is, 
therefore, ambiguous and confusing, he maintained the well-known distinction 
between real and personal property. 
Neither Bentham nor Hume dealt specifically with the distinction between real 
and personal property, probably because they regarded it as unproblematic. 
Adam Smith, however, gave an exposition on the difference based on the 
underlying causa of each. For him real rights were those that could be 
vindicated (dominium, servitus, pignus and haereditas), while personal rights 
were based on contract or loan and could, presumably, not be vindicated. 58 
Thus the distinction was, once again, based on procedure. 
4.4.3.2 Property and limited real rights 
The history of this distinction is neither as simple nor a straightforward as the 
previous one. The multiple forms of property made this kind of distinction 
unnecessary - as long as all the relevant parties had property rights and 
these rights could be explained as such, the distinction need not be made. In 
this regard two developments played a role. 
55 Blackstone Commentaries 11.1.1. 
56 Blackstone Commentaries 11.2.16. 
57 See 6.3.5 below. 
58 Smith Lectures 9. 
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In the first place the idea of seisin played a crucial role. Seisin indicated 
whether a tenant was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the 
property.59 In the feudal system both the landlord and the tenant were seised. 
The tenant had seisin of the soil and fruit, while the landlord had seisin of the 
service(s).60 Later, with the introduction of leasehold, both the freeholder and 
the leaseholder had seisin. However, since the fifteenth century only those 
who had an estate in freehold could be seised. The leaseholder had 
possession.61 In effect " ... it was the person seised - and he alone - who 
could exercise an owner's rights over the land.'.si In this way seisin 
contributed to the distinction between owners (who were seised) and holders 
of other rights (who were not). 
In the second place, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as a result of 
the activities of the courts of equity, a new division arose between legal and 
equitable interests in land.63 Every legal estate could and did have an 
equitable counterpart. The person who had a legal interest was protected 
against all parties, while the equitable owner was protected against all except 
the holder of the legal interest. This equitable interest was more than a 
personal right, but fell short of seisin.64 In this way a distinction was created 
between absolute and relative rights. 
Blackstone also distinguished between property and limited real rights. In 
fact, he stipulated that four types of real rights could occur: 
59 Megarry and Wade Private property 45. 
60 Kempin FG Historical introduction to Anglo-American law in a nutshell (St Paul Minn 1973) 
123. 
61 Megarry and Wade Private property 45; Smith and Keenan English law 323; Walker and 
Walker Legal system 87. 
62 Megarry and Wade Private property 47. 
63 James PS Introduction to English law 12th ed (London 1989) 427. 
64 James Introduction 427. There is an interesting parallel here with Quiritary and bonitary 
property - see 6.2.2 below. 
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(a) Naked possession is the actual occupation of land without any 
apparent right 65 
(b) The right of possession consisting of the right to restore lost 
possession if the property is in the actual possession of 
another.66 
(c) The right of property Uus proprietas) which is property in itself 
without possession or the right of possession.67 
(d) The complete title to lands, tenements and hereditaments, which 
was the right of possession and the right of property together -
also known asjus duplicatum. 68 
In this way Blackstone distinguished between complete and incomplete title, 
which was tied to property and different kinds of possession or limited rights. 
The important element here is the fact that, due to Blackstone's conceptual 
system, property can be regarded as systematically important in Blackstone's 
scheme. This was a result of his philosophical position on property, dealt with 
below. 
Bentham made the same kind of distinction but in a slightly different way. He 
distinguished between de jure possession and de facto possession. Of these 
two only the first resulted in title. 69 Therefore the one was definitely a limited 
right and the other not. 
65 Blackstone Commentaries 11.13.195 saw this as" .. the most imperfect degree of title." 
66 Blackstone Commentaries 11.13.196. 
67 Blackstone Commentaries 11.13.197-199. 
68 Blackstone Commentaries 11.13.199. 
69 Bentham Limits 321. 
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Adam Smith was, once again, the writer who attempted the greatest 
systematisation. He distinguished between jura perfecta and jura imperfecta -
a distinction he claimed came from Pufendorf.70 The jura perfecta referred to 
title and thus to a right, while the jura imperfecta referred to duties that ought 
to be performed. In this way Smith made all rights jura perfecta, while 
reducing the rest to duties that ought to be performed. Furthermore, 
dominium was the " ... full right of property ... " while the others were, 
presumably, limited.71 
As a result of this development, English law since the second half of the 
nineteenth century has distinguished between ownership and limited real 
rights. Both were regarded as real titles to property, with ownership as the" ... 
better right to possession.''n However, the above-mentioned distinctions 
should not be understood in the same way as the distinctions in civil law. 
These English distinctions were fairly ad hoc until the introduction of a 
conceptual system to English law. This started with Blackstone, but was only 
really in place in the nineteenth century. Even then the hierarchy was never 
as pronounced as in the civil-law systems. 
4.4.3.3 Philosophical importance 
From the discussion above it appears that the development in English 
property law tended to follow the trend of defining all rights (and real rights in 
particular) in terms of ownership, or rather, in terms of how they differed from 
ownership. This is most obvious in the work of Adam Smith who almost 
defines rights in the way they are not dominium. From a system that knew 
multiple interests in property, it developed into a system in which one type 
was regarded as the perfect right. 
70 Smith Lectures 9. 
71 Smith Lectures 10. 
72 Megarry and Wade Private property 105-106. 
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This fit in with early capitalist developments that required absolute and 
exclusive private property for the sake of efficient production. This would, in 
turn, lead to the enclosing of the commons in England73 and the Highland 
clearances in Scotland.74 Both these destroyed age-old feudal relations. 
Because of land speculation, many small farmers found themselves without 
land and the resultant move to the cities provided the cheap labour required 
by the industrial revolution. The agricultural reform was therefore a 
precondition for the industrial revolution. 75 While the tenures, which 
underscored these relations, were increasingly under attack, 76 their eventual 
removal caused a revolution in social and economic relations. This insistence 
on the relation between property and liberty in effect marked the end of the 
feudal arrangement. With the end of feudalism came the beginning of 
conceptualism and within a conceptual scheme property was the perfect real 
right and the basis for liberty and justicen 
4.4.4 American property law78 
In the civil-law systems, as well as in English property law, one of the 
characteristics of this period was the development of the distinction between 
ownership and other rights (that is personal and/or limited real rights) based 
on the conceptualisation of law. A similar development can be traced in 
American law, and, according to Minda, the process of conceptualisation in 
American law started with the work of CC Langdell.79 
The creation of a conceptual approach to law is a prerequisite for the creation 
of a hierarchy of rights. In this way the systematic importance of property and 
73 Schlatter Private property 163. See Negro Eigentum 51-55 on the history of these enclosures. 
from the 'three fields system" to the commercial exploitation of these fields. 
74 Van den Bergh Eigendom 23. 
75 Negro Eigentum 55. 
76 See Blackstone Commentaries 11.5.76; Smith Lectures 468-469. 
77 See 3.4.4.3 and 5.4.3 on English conceptualism. 
78 For a general introduction to American property law, see 3.4.4.1 above. 
79 Minda Postmodern legal movements 13-23. 
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the conceptualism is linked. However, in American law an interesting and 
important development took place regarding the philosophical importance of 
property. This section will concentrate on the last-mentioned development. 
About the systematic distinction between real and personal rights or between 
real and personal property, little need to be said. The development in 
American law followed that of English law. 80 It seems, however, that the same 
cannot be said regarding the distinction between ownership and limited real 
rights. Indeed, such a distinction would be strange in the light of the nature of 
American property law. 
Property in American law is mostly defined as a conceptual entity which " ... 
can be carved up in various useful and convenient ways"81 and which consists 
of a " ... bundle of legal relations."82 Property .can be carved into different 
estates or interests, and all of these are regarded as property. The various 
estates might confer more absolute or relative claims, but all of these are 
regarded as property. The result of this is that a category of limited real rights 
is both unnecessary and unthinkable. Although some kinds of property can 
be more or less absolute and undivided (such as the estate fee simple 
absolute} it is still only one kind of property of several possibilities. The 
distinctions, however, only became conceptually important with the 
development of a scientific system of law along the lines of the civil-law 
tradition. This started with Langdell and was reinforced in court decisions.83 
It is in respect of the philosophical importance of property as a constitutional 
right, however, that the interesting development took place. American law, on 
the basis of its feudal heritage, made a connection between property and 
80 Browder OL, Cunningham RA and Julin JP Basic property law (St Paul Minn 1966) 3-5; Cribbet 
Principles 9. 
81 Browder, Cunningham and Julin Basic property law 8. 
82 Moynihan CJ Introduction to the law of real property (St Paul Minn 1962) 88. 
83 Minda Postmodern legal movements 13-23. See 9.2 on the American case law. 
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sovereignty and, later on, also between property and democracy.84 Even in 
the seventeenth century both the hierarchical and the voluntarist models saw 
property as the basis of and prerequisite for freedom,85 both in the political 
and in the economic sense.86 
The liberal definition of property that was enshrined in the Constitution quickly 
became the paradigm and conceptual framework for the protection of all 
individual rights. 87 Property was made a civil right that was elevated above 
the mere political rights, rights that were seen as the means to the end of 
protecting civil rights. 88 In this way, property was seen as the most important 
right in a hierarchy of rights. This was strengthened by the view of property 
as a barrier between private and public, which was based on the idea of the 
minimum or night watchman state.89 Underkuffler characterises this position 
of private property in the following way: 
"Focus on property as the paradigmatic right to be 
insulated from the democratic process also created a 
general notion of rights as natural and uncontested in 
nature."90 
Consequently, property acquired a "mythic quality ... as not merely a social 
construct, but a basic right, linked ... to cherished values of freedom and 
84 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 649-650; Singer 1991 Legal T 1 7, 51. 
85 McCann 1987 Pol & Soc 143 145 quotes John Adams as having said: "Property must be secure 
or liberty cannot exist." 
86 Pickens and Seligmann 1987 Soc Sc Q 847 849. See also Allen 1991 J Law & Econ 1 22 on the 
use of homesteading in order that the government might establish "federal property (in an 
economic sense) ... " and Mccann 1987 Pol & Soc 143 145. 
87 Nedelsky Private property 1-3. 
88 Nedelsky Private property 5; Underkuffler 1991 Texas LR 293 299. 
89 Nedelsky Private property 203 calls it limited government. See also Underkuffler 1991 Texas 
LR 293 306-307. 
90 Underkuffler 1991 Texas LR 293 300. See also Nedelsky Private property 184-185. Of course, 
it is also possible that the Lockean idea of property as natural caused the view thereof as 
paradigmatic and not the other way around - see Post "Jeffersonian revisions" 295 297-298. 
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autonomy."91 Nedelsky has shown that this preoccupation with private 
property resulted in an acceptance of inequality and a strong relationship 
between economic and political power.92 The primacy given to property and 
the protection thereof in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment "due process" 
also hampered the New Deal program and made redistribution of land in 
America impossible.93 Moreover, Singer has shown that this position on 
property could be and was manipulated by the courts in order to deprive 
Indians of sovereignty.94 In this regard he agrees with Hamilton: 
"It is incorrect to say that the judiciary protected 
property: rather they called that property to which they 
accorded protection. "95 
4.5 Conclusion 
The history of the role or importance of property is interesting for a number of 
reasons. It is, however, often more important in what it doesn't say than in 
what it does. More interesting too, than the actual history, is that which the 
history made possible. In one sense this was a fairly straightforward 
development. First there was an almost universal recognition of the 
distinction between real and personal rights. In civil law this was followed by 
a systematic distinction between limited real rights and ownership. Finally 
ownership became the paradigmatic right. In civil-law systems this was 
mostly achieved through the systematic position which ownership had in the 
conceptual scheme. In common-law systems this paradigmatic status was the 
result of ownership's philosophical importance as a barrier between private 
91 Nedelsky Private property 9. Mccann 1987 Pol & Soc 3 146 quotes Lincoln as saying in 1864: 
" .... property is desirable; is a positive good in the world." 
92 Nedelsky Private property 1, 79-80; Underkuffler 1991 Texas LR 293 297. 
93 Schlatter Private property 194. 
94 Singer 1991 Legal T 1 6-7. 
95 Hamilton W Encyclopaedia of the social sciences (New York 1930-1935). 
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and public. However, behind this apparently simple development lies a 
complex set of meanings. 
In the medieval period there was no distinction between ownership and 
limited real rights, because all rights were tied to the feudal structure and that 
determined its relative importance. Similarly, it would be ludicrous to speak of 
a systematic position, since there was no system of law. The advent of the 
early modern period, however, made this possible. Moreover, there was no 
conceptualism and no scientific ideal. Consequently rights were determined 
by social relations and not by concepts. 
Once law was seen as a scientific system based on concepts, definitions and 
logical relations, the embryonic idea of a distinction between property and 
other rights could come to life. In this way the conceptualism contributed to 
the creation of a hierarchy of rights and thus also to an abstract, universal 
concept. Once property was contrasted with other rights in this way, a 
number of factors served to make it the paradigmatic right. Although 
feudalism had been based on a relationship between property and power and 
the end of feudalism was supposed to have severed this tie, it was really only 
continued in another guise. Liberalism, combined with capitalism, maintained 
the link between property and power. 
Liberalism, with its emphasis on individual power and sovereignty, demanded 
an autonomous sphere that could transcend equality and liberty. Property 
became the means of guaranteeing liberty and equality and in this way 
became the supreme right. This idea combined with capitalism to make 
property the paradigmatic commodity - the standard by which all rights were 
to be measured and protected in a capitalist state. If one should add to this 
the movement toward "privatisation" in law (that is, to make private law the 
paradigmatic discipline in law), the end result is to elevate private property 
above all criticism. The result of this development was therefore to make 
private property the standard or norm for all rights. It was regarded as the 
fundamental basis and highest goal of Western society. It had become the 
perfect right. 
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Seen against this background, the conceptualism discussed above both made 
the construction of a hierarchy of rights possible and maintained it. Not only 
did conceptualist thinking result in a system of concepts, but those concepts 
were of a very specific nature in that they were regarded as neutral, objective, 
a-political and, consequently morally incontestable. As the primary concept 
within this hierarchy, property was assumed to have all of these 
characteristics. Consequently the property concept that was regarded as the 
most important right, was also the perfect example of conceptualist thinking. 
One should, however, not be misled by the pretensions of legal science. A 
number of legal scholars have pointed out that it is neither abstract and 
neutral nor a-political. Some point to the hidden political agenda or ideology 
of liberalism underlying conceptualism.96 Others find in the scientific 
pretensions an underlying metaphysics or pseudo-science.97 All agree that 
the scientific pretension amount to little more than a political choice, a politics 
of interpretation.98 As such, these pretensions of scientific abstractness and 
neutrality should be seen for what they are - pretensions designed to deceive 
and to mask real injustice. 
96 See Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 209-382 on the hidden political agenda and Alexander 1982 Col 
LR 1545-1599 on the ideology underlying the "scientific turn in legal analysis". 
97 See Peller G "The metaphysics of American law" 1985 California LR 1151-1290 and Schlag P 
"Law and phrenology" 1977 Harvard LR 877-921. 
98 Van der Walt AJ "Un-doing things with words: the colonization of the public sphere by private-
property discourse" (Unpublished paper delivered at a conference on "Doing things with words -
meaning in legal interpretation" at RAU 1-4 September 1997) on file with author. 

CHAPTER 5: THE JUSTIFICATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(FROM NATURAL LAW TO LIBERALISM) 
5.1 Introduction 
''There is nothing which so generally strikes the 
imagination, and engages the affections of mankind as 
the right of property."1 
"Pourquoi done a cette autre demande: Qu'est-ce la 
propriete? ne puis-je repondre de meme: C'est la 
vol .. .''2 
The justification of private property has always fascinated philosophers. 
Because property is such a basic and important concept in Western liberal 
society, justifying it seems to some to be equally important and necessary on 
a basic level. For this reason, philosophers have tried to justify property in a 
variety of ways since the time of the Greeks. The legal debate about the 
justification of property did not, however, really pick up steam before the 
seventeenth century. But, by the end of the eighteenth century, the debate, 
as far as lawyers were concerned, was over. Although philosophical and 
political justificatory theories could still be found, lawyers were no longer 
interested in these kinds of theories. The reasons for this are many and 
varied, but a historical perspective will explain much. 
The history of the debate on justification is a curious one. During the roman 
and medieval periods, very little was done to try to justify dominium. There 
was, in fact, no need for justification, because it rested on a widely accepted 
and authoritative moral order. However, once the authority of the church had 
been challenged, the process of secularisation was started. This undermined 
1 Blackstone Commentaries 1.1.16. 
2 Proudhon J Oeuvres completes (1926 Eds c Bougie and H Moysset) 131. 
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the objective moral order that had underpinned the idea of private ownership 
and of its social limits. Once the certainty had been undermined, the search 
for a justificatory theory became important. 
It should, however, be pointed out that justificatory theories did not attempt 
merely to justify the existence of private property, but also, and perhaps ore 
importantly, attempted to justify the existing patterns of distribution. Therefore 
from a very early period, the justificatory debate was really a distributory 
debate. Once the moral order that justified certain patterns of distribution fell 
away, modern theories needed to justify those patterns on other grounds. In 
the twentieth century this took on another form, as the redistribution of 
property became the focus of justificatory theories. 
5.2 Roman and medieval roots 
Greek thinkers did not concern themselves overmuch with theories on the 
origin of property, nor did they try to justify it. Since both Plato and Aristotle 
saw property as conventional (even if the convention seems to have been 
determined by natural law) and both recognised common and private 
property, it would in fact have been surprising to find such theories in their 
work.3 The most important roman philosopher, Cicero, based his views on 
dominium on the distinction between the ius naturale and the ius gentium. 4 
Cicero was ambivalent about whether dominium originated from natural law, 
but thought that the state was founded primarily to protect it.5 This would 
seem to indicate that property existed before the creation of the state and it 
was therefore natural. Cicero's statement on natural law is echoed by 
3 Although Plato, in his utopian vision of the state, thought that the ruling class should have 
common property, this is by no means an attack on private property or a justification for common 
property. 
4 Cicero MT De republica (London 1951 Tr CW Keyes) IV.5. 
5 Cicero De republica 11.xxi. 73: "In primis autem videndum erit ei, qui rem publicam administrabit, 
ut suum quisque teneat neque de bonis privatorum publice deminutio fiat. ... Nam, etsi duce 
natura congegabantur hamines, tamen spe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidia 
quaerebant." See also Cicero MT De officiis (London 1913 Tr W Miller) 11.xxii. 79. 
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Seneca, except that he thought that it was not private property that was 
natural, but common property.6 From this it should be clear that the question 
of the justification of property was not a big issue in roman thinking. 
The romanists of the middle ages did not concern themselves with the 
justification of property either. Bartolus, who provided the first definition of 
dominium in the romanist tradition, did distinguish between natural dominium 
and civil dominium. For Bartolus, however, this simply meant that natural 
dominium was that which was common to all people, while civil dominium was 
that which had been unique to Rome.7 
Unlike the romanists, the canonists (or scholastics) were forced by 
circumstances to concern themselves with the justification of dominium. The 
first truly justificatory theories are found here. The need for this kind of 
justification arose from the fact that a number of Biblical texts could be read to 
indicate a distrust of wealth and of private property.8 In fact, Augustine, for 
instance, thought that dominium was a creation of the state and the result of 
sin. Consequently Christians should not be allowed to own things 
individually. 9 
But the debate really picked up steam as a result of the poverty debate that 
raged in the church in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Francis of 
Assisi's insistence on a life of poverty for his followers (which included a 
prohibition of private property)10 threatened the Dominicans' extensive 
ownership of land in particular, and, consequently, their power-base 
6 Seneca LA 17 Letters (Warminster 1988 Tr CON Costa) Letter 90-38:"1n commune rerum natura 
fruebantur; sufficiebat ilia ut parens in tutelam omnium; haec erat publicarum opum secura 
possessio." 
7 Bartolus on D.13.6. See also Tuck Natural rights 35. 
8 See, for instance, the Gospels according to Matthew 19:16-30; Mark 10:17-31 and Luke 18:18-30. 
9 Augustine A Homilies on the Gospel according to St John and his first epistle (Oxford 1848-
1849 Tr unknown) Vl.25. Augustine was reacting to the Donatists' labour theory of property - an 
idea that would later resurface - see Schlatter Private property 38; Van den Bergh Eigendom 
26. 
10 Van der Walt Houerskap 211; Coleman 1985 Pol S 73 77; Tuck Natural rights 20. 
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generally. As a result, the Dominicans needed to justify their ownership and 
in this way a general justificatory theory was developed. 
The Franciscans, on the basis of the apostolic poverty doctrine, wanted to be 
able to use objects without acquiring dominium in them. 11 For them, the ius 
natura/e was not neutral regarding ownership but was, in fact, against it.12 
What natural law sanctioned was common use, not common ownership. In 
reaction to this the Dominicans postulated dominium as something sanctioned 
by natural law. On the basis of continuity between God and man, ownership 
was justified on the basis of God's dominium over the earth. 13 For the 
Dominicans, therefore, private ownership was natural, good and justified by 
divine law.14 It should, however, be remembered that these debates were not 
only theological, but were the result of the power games between the 
Dominicans and the Franciscans. 
In response to this, William Occam pointed out that dominium was tied to 
human juridical institutions (the rei vindicatio in particular) and, therefore, 
natural man could not have had it, as it was conventional. 15 The ius naturale 
justified only the ius utendi and this was not dominium. Both groups therefore 
acknowledged the existence of natural law, but the papists thought it justified 
ownership, while the Franciscans thought it only justified use. 
11 The problem w~h this was that, in terms of Roman law, the use of consumable property was a 
method of acquiring property. Consequently the Franciscans did acquire property if they used the 
objects, and this was in conflict with the prescriptions of the founder of the order. See, in general, 
Van der Walt 1995 JCRDL 396 399. 
12 Tuck Natural rights 21. 
13 Pope John XXll Quia vir reprobus (1329). 
14 Tuck Natural rights 22. 
15 Occam Opus Nonaginta Dierum in Sikes JG (ed) Guillelmi de Occam opera politica I 
(Manchester 1940) 287-374. This was probably the result of Occam's nominalism - see 3.2 
above. See also Tuck Natural rights 22-23. 
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For Aquinas, however, natural law was irrelevant in the context of ownership. 
Following Aristotle, he thought that natural law was, in fact, neutral regarding 
ownership.16 However, one Of the purposes of the state was to protect private 
ownership and to regulate it for the common good. 17 Aquinas' justification of 
ownership in terms of potestas, 18 however, tended to justify it on the basis of 
power. This power was part of the natural order created by God and was 
therefore both natural and good.19 Aquinas' justification therefore was based 
on the continuity between God and man and the existence Of an objective 
moral order that justified property relations and the exercise of power. 
The late scholastics (or neo-Thomists), interestingly, were not very concerned 
with the justification of ownership. They tried to restore Thomism and 
reconcile it with catholic doctrine. In their work the influence of humanism can 
be seen. It is probably this humanism that led De Soto to reject the idea of 
the continuity between God and man that had been fundamental to the 
Dominicans' view. 20 In this way the late scholastics contributed to the 
secularisation of the justificatory theories. 
This medieval debate on the nature of ownership is a curious precursor of the 
very intense debate that would follow in the eighteenth century. Ownership 
had been justified in a number of ways. It was sometimes justified as the 
result of God's grace and His natural law (in which case it was justified by an 
appeal to faith). In other cases it was justified as entirely conventional (in 
which case the justification was not based on faith, although the underpinning 
religious order in a sense pre-determined the conventions). The process of 
secularisation that was initiated by the late scholastics would gain momentum 
in the early modern era and necessitate other theories of justification. 
16 Aquinas Summa Theologiae 1a 2ae 94.5. See also Tuck Natural rights 19-20; Schlatter 
Private property 48. 
17 Aquinas Summa Theologiae 1-11105.2. 
18 See 3.2 above. 
19 Van der Walt 1995 JCRDL 396 399. 
20 Tuck Natural rights 49. 
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5.3 Early modern developments 
This period saw the beginning of the debate regarding the justification of 
property that would continue until the nineteenth century and was 
characterised by two important factors that would determine the nature and 
extent of the debate. In the first place it represents the beginning of the 
process of secularisation which would change the view of society and of law. 
The justificatory theories of the Middle Ages had been based on the 
assumption of continuity between God and man, but the neo-Thomists had 
begun the process of denying that continuity. 21 The Reformation, too, had as 
one of its basic points of departure the denial of this continuity between God 
and man.22 They stressed the discontinuity and differences between God and 
man. In their view, therefore, ownership could not be based on the idea that 
man's dominium was essentially the same as God's dominium. They saw 
political life (and therefore also ownership) as a gift from God and not as a 
natural right. 23 
Once the idea of continuity between God and man had been destroyed, 
however, a new basis for justification had to be found. This led to the second 
important factor in this period, namely the rise of the phenomenon of legal 
science. Because of the successes that had been achieved in the natural 
sciences, the view in this period was that "the legitimacy of law is built not 
upon metaphysical and cosmological but upon scientific pretensions ... :"24 
The point of departure was that the law should be a system of rules, principles 
and concepts from which logical deductions could be made by the application 
of legal reasoning. 25 The idea was to create a scientific system of law that 
21 See 5.2 above. 
22 Kelly History ; Tuck Natural rights 42-43. 
23 Tuck Natural rights 43-45. 
24 Van derWalt 1995 JCRDL 396 402. 
25 See Van der Walt 1995 JCRDL 396 403 and Van der Merwe "Ramus, mental habits and legal 
science" 32ff on the influence of Petrus Ramus in this regard. 
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would make all metaphysical speculation obsolete. In such a system, 
speculation on the origin and/or justification of ownership would be a waste of 
time. This kind of system is not only self-referential, but also self-justifying. 
The conceptual scheme was complete in the sense that it needed no 
justification from outside the system. In this process Grotius would play a 
crucial role. 26 
Grotius, a lawyer who was also a Protestant, attempted to justify ownership in 
a modern way. He was the first writer to try to explain the legal system in 
terms of rights rather than in terms of laws. 27 His theory was an attempt to 
give a natural law justification that did not rely on natural law as a result of 
God's divine grace, but on natural law as part of legal reasoning. However, 
this does not mean that Grotius denied the divine origin of natural law, but 
simply that he denied that scientific knowledge of this divine component was 
possible.28 Consequently, natural law was divorced from divine law and 
given a humanist and rationalist foundation. 
Grotius' theory on the origin and justification of ownership was mentioned 
generally in Mare liberum, 29 but in De iure praedae his theory on the state of 
nature can be found. In the state of nature, man could make use of the 
common property by occupying it and expending labour on it. 30 This 
dominium was not yet civil dominium, but became dominium in the civil 
state. 31 Thus ownership started out originally as a natural, common right to 
26 Van der Walt 1995 JCRDL 396 402: "Hugo Grotius and his intellectual heirs among the German 
theorists of the nineteenth century are the original authors of the kind of scientific, non-
metaphysical property legend we are used to and comfortable with today." 
27 Tuck Natural rights 66. 
28 Haakonssen 1985 Political theory 239 249-251. 
29 Feenstra R "Hugo de Groot's eerste beschouwingen over dominium en over de oorsprong van 
private eigendom: mare liberum en zijn bronnen" 1986 AJ 269-282 275. 
30 Grotius De iure praedae {Leiden 1934 Tr by O Oamste) 217. 
31 Tuck Natural rights 61. 
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use things, but this was extended by agreement to recognise certain other 
relationships as dominium.32 
The contract theory is developed further in the second book of the De iure 
belli ac pacis. He assumed, first of all, that a nation (imperium) could not 
exist without acquiring a supreme right of ownership (ius eminens) in the land 
it occupied. This was known as the privatum plenumque dominium that was 
then distributed amongst the individual citizens.33 This meant that the 
individual's dominium was dependent on the nation's dominium. 34 It was, 
however, not the same as the feudal relationship of emphyteusis,35 but 
originated in the pactum taciturn entered into between members of the 
nation.36 This whole idea of the origin and justification of ownership was 
grounded in rational natural law. In this way, Grotius provided a new theory 
on the origin of ownership37 and, at the same time, secularised natural law 
and ownership.38 Therefore Grotius provided a modern, rationalist 
explanation of ownership that determined the debate within the context of 
rights, and of scientific conceptualism.39 
It is important to note that Grotius' justificatory theory was developed in his 
earlier works. In his last (and probably most influential) work, the lnleidinge 
tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleerdheid, no such theory can be found. 
Instead, this is a systematic and scientific explanation of property rules 
32 Grotius De iure belli ac pacis 11.2.2.5. See also Haakonssen 1985 Political theory 239 242. 
33 Feenstra "Eigentumsbegriff' 229. 
34 Feenstra 1986 AJ 269 275. 
35 Grotius De iure belli ac pacis 11.3.19.3. 
36 Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 271; Van der Walt 1992 SAPL 1 2. Admittedly, Grotius had some 
problems with the contract theory, primarily because, if the contract was part of positive law, it 
could also be abrogated by positive law - see also Schlatter Private property 130; Tuck Natural 
rights 77. 
37 Tuck Natural rights 77. 
38 This is in fact a logical result of the importance that sixteenth and seventeenth century modernism 
and humanism had attached to individuality, rationality and moral freedom - see Van der Walt 
1992 OJ 446 452; Van den Bergh Geleerd recht 44. 
39 Tuck Natural rights 80. 
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actually in force in the Netherlands. 40 However, the justificatory theory served 
as the basis for the explanation of law as a system of concepts and relations 
based on convention. 
Grotius' social contract theory was just the first of many such theories in this 
period. The modern view of natural law (based on human rationality and 
subjectivity} combined with certain feudal ideas (such as the contractual 
nature of the feudal relationship) would provide fertile ground for the concept 
of a social contract.41 Within this theory ownership would become 
increasingly important due to the rise of early capitalism. In fact, the works of 
Locke and Hobbes are often seen to be providing the justification and basis 
for capitalism. 42 
Like Grotius, Hobbes43 distinguished between a state of nature and a civil 
state. In this state of nature, everyone had a right to everything.44 This, 
inevitably, led to war. 45 In order to achieve security, men transferred their 
rights to a sovereign who distributed them.46 Natural rights (if they existed) 
were therefore irrelevant, since the sovereign created these rights in a civil 
state.47 Unlike Grotius, who had based the social contract on man's innate 
sociability, Hobbes saw man as driven to creating this contract against his 
will. For Hobbes natural law and the state of nature were not desirable, but 
were seen as measures of subjection because it tended to place certain 
40 Van derWalt 1995 JCRDL 396 404. 
41 Barker E "Introduction" in Social contract - essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau (London 
1947) v-lxi viii-ix; Coleman 1985 Pol S 73 90. 
42 Macpherson "Natural rights" 1-15. 
43 See, in general, on Hobbes, Polin R ''The rights of man in Hobbes and Locke" in Raphael DD ( ed) 
Political theory and the rights of man (London 1967) 16-26. 
44 Hobbes Leviathan (Oxford 1946 Ed M Oakeshott) Part 1 ch XIV page 85 (l.XIV.85): " ... every 
man has a right to every thing ... " This is the idea of "positive" communality - that is that 
everything belonged to everyone. 
45 Hobbes Leviathan l.Xlll.81; l.XIV.85. 
46 Hobbes Leviathan ll.XVll.112. 
47 Hobbes Leviathan 11.XVlll.7. 
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things beyond criticism.48 Therefore Hobbes took the next logical step, 
namely to make the secularised natural law of Grotius totally irrelevant. 
Pufendorf attempted a rescue of Grotius by distinguishing between positive 
and negative community. Positive community (such as Hobbes assumed in 
the state of nature) implied co-ownership. Negative community, on the other 
hand, implied that nothing belonged to anyone and this was the position in the 
state of nature.49 The first men had neither joint rights (as Grotius claimed) 
nor did each have a right to everything (as Hobbes postulated). Through a 
tacit agreement, however, most things were eventually transferred to private 
ownership.50 Therefore ownership was created by convention, but was 
protected by natural law and the Decalogue. 51 However, ownership was 
created first and then government was created to protect antecedent 
contracts, including contracts dealing with ownership.52 
The most famous of the seventeenth century contractarians was probably 
John Locke. He developed his theory as a direct result of the constitutional 
crisis in England in the seventeenth century. 53 Locke, like Grotius, used a 
state of nature as point of departure. This state of nature is described as one 
in which men lived in "peace, goodwill, mutual assistance and preservation".54 
In the state of nature all people were politically equal55 with an equal claim to 
life, liberty and property.56 The right to liberty included not only "freedom to 
48 See Melzer AM "Rousseau's moral realism: replacing natural law w~h the general will" 1983 Am 
Pol Sc R 633-651 635. 
49 Pufendorf De jure naturae et gentium IV.iv.ii. 
50 Tuck Natural rights 160-161. 
51 Pufendorf De jure naturae et gentium V.iii.ix, V.v.vii. 
52 Pufendorf De jure naturae et gentium Books VII and VIII. 
53 Van der Vyver JD Die beskerming van menseregte in Suid-Afrika (Cape Town 1975) 1; Levy 
MB "Illiberal liberalism: the new property as strategy'' 1983 Rev of Pol 576--594 590; Schlatter 
Private property 151; Russell History of Western philosophy 584; Schwarzenbach S "Locke's 
two conception of proprty" 1988 Soc T & P 141-172 142; Van den Bergh Eigendom 21-22. 
54 Locke Two treatises 11.3.19. 
55 Locke Two treatises 11.6.54. 
56 Locke Two treatises 11.5.26; 11.2.4. See also Yolton JW Locke (Oxford 1985) 67. It must be 
noted that Locke used the term "property" to include both "life, liberty and equal political 
jurisdiction" and property: Locke Two treatises 11.2.57; 11.2.28. 
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order their actions", but also freedom to dispose of possessions.57 Originally 
the earth was the common property of all mankind58 and everyone had the 
equal right to acquire property through his own labour. 59 These rights were 
originally subject to limitations, but later these limitations fell away and this led 
to conflicts.60 In these disputes everyone was a judge in his own cause due to 
the natural equality of everyone. The civil state came into being, through a 
social contract,61 solely to settle these disputes on the basis of natural law.62 
It has become trite to say that Locke provided early capitalism with a moral 
basis63 by "discovering" the primary institutions of capitalism in the state of 
nature and so providing them with legitimacy.64 This implied that the 
institution of private property was justified as an institution of natural law and 
therefore imbued with moral authority.65 Because this fit the rise of capitalism 
so well, later writers (especially in the Anglo-American tradition) would simply 
either quote or criticise Locke in order to ground their own justifications of 
property. 
The contractarian theories of justification offered by Locke, Hobbes, 
Pufendorf and Grotius represent the last of the great natural law theories until 
the revival of natural law in the twentieth century. However, it should be 
57 See, in general, Mekkes JPA "John Locke" in Zuidema SU ( ed) Baanbrekers van het 
humanisme (Franeker undated) 61-121 106-109. See also Polin "Rights of man" 22: "Property is 
the external manifestation ... of a liberty which has become effective and of a right which is 
capable of being exercised on things." 
58 This must be understood in terms of negative community, in the way Pufendorf used the term - in 
other words nothing belonged to anyone. 
59 Locke Two treatises 11.2.4; 11.2.27. 
60 See Locke Two treatises 11.36, 11.37; Mitchell 1986 Hist Pol Econ 291-305 293. 
61 Locke Two treatises 11.2.99; 11.2.129-130; 11.2.222. 
62 Locke Two treatises 11.2.221. See also Mitchell 1986 Hist Pol Econ 291 297; Van Maanen 
Eigendomsschijnbewegingen 101. 
63 Macpherson "Natural rights" 11; Mitchell 1986 Hist Pol Econ 291 291; Van Maanen 
Eigendomsshijnbewegingen 104; Schlatter Private property 154. 
64 Macpherson "Natural rights" 11; Mitchell 1986 Hist Pol Econ 291 296. 
65 Mitchell 1986 Hist Pol Econ 291 299-304; Gill 1983 J of Pol 675 677. 
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remembered that all these theories did not justify private property in the 
abstract, but also justified existing distributory patterns. 
5.4 Late modem developments 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the debate on justification had lost 
much of its impetus. The few theories still on offer were vague restatements 
of earlier theories and were not that important. The groundwork laid by 
Grotius, coupled with the influence of Immanuel Kant and the criticism of the 
utilitarians, resulted in a view of law as a scientific discipline in which 
metaphysical speculation on the origin or justification of property had no 
place. Emphasis was placed on a description of legal rules actually in force 
and property relations that actually existed. 
Justificatory theories still played a role in one respect and that was in dealing 
with the question of the limits of state interference in private property. 
Usually, the theory was offered not so much to justify property (it had been 
accepted that the role of legal science was simply to describe existing 
property relations) but to provide a basis for either justifying or criticising state 
intervention in property relations. This development coincided with the rise of 
the modern state. 
5.4.1 German property law 
Because writers of the usus modernus pandectarum had based their 
definitions on that of Bartolus, it is to be expected that they would also take 
over the Medieval justifications. The natural law thinkers of this period (Wolff, 
Pufendorf6 and Thomasius) based their justificatory theories on the 
secularised natural law proposed by the late scholastics and Grotius. 
66 See 5.3 above. 
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Therefore property was justified, not by reference to divine law, but on the 
basis of human rationality.67 
Once again the theories of Kant and Hegel played an important role. Kant 
rejected labour as a justification for ownership, because it was too 
mechanical. 68 Although he used a fictional state of nature, communal 
ownership of land69 and a fictional social contract as point of departure, these 
could not justify ownership.70 Ownership was justified by the principle of first 
occupancy,71 so that the intent to occupy became central to ownership. 72 
However, the state was necessary in order to protect the directing of one's will 
upon an object and therefore necessary to convert the principle of first 
occupancy into a right. Because the state was necessary for the existence of 
ownership, it could regulate it.73 This meant that, for Kant, ownership could 
not be violated by other citizens, but it could be violated by a legitimate 
state.74 
Like other liberals, Kant was concerned about the relationship between 
ownership and freedom and between ownership and equality.75 To solve this 
classic liberal dilemma, he justified ownership on the basis of first occupancy 
and legitimate transfer.76 In this way ownership was made more valuable than 
freedom, and this provided the justification for capitalism. 77 Furthermore, Kant 
explicitly made a connection between ownership and citizenship (political 
67 Van der Walt Houerskap 305; Tuck Natural rights 68, 72. 
68 Kant Philosophy of law 69. 
69 Used here in the sense of Pufendorfs negative community. 
70 Kant Philosophy of law 94. See also Scheltens 1980 R & R 67 68. 
71 Kant Philosophy of law 92, 97. 
72 Ryan Property 81. 
73 Kant Philosophy of law 76-77. 
74 Ryan Property 82-83. 
75 Vogel U 'When the earth belonged to all: the land question in eighteenth-century justifications of 
private property" 1988 Pol S 102-122 107. 
76 Vogel 1988 Pol S 102 111. 
77 Smith 1985 Rev of Pol 253 163, 167. Scheltens 1980 R&R 67 70, 74 shows that the protection 
of property was, for Kant the justification for the existence of the state and only owners were 
allowed to vote and take part in the state • an idea typical of early capitalism. Consequently the 
state was both justified by property and existed to promote property. 
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activity was limited to owners) and, in this way, Kant became the " ... defender 
of the bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie."78 Kant's distributory theory 
therefore had pretensions of neutrality, because it was based on rationality 
and logic, but in reality it was another justification of liberalism. 
For Hegel the connection between ownership and liberty was less strong. 
Ownership, to him, was justified because it provided a way for people to 
anchor themselves and their purposes in a community and in the world. 79 He 
explicitly rejected the social contract theory,80 but saw the protection of 
ownership as one of the primary tasks of any state.81 While the state was not 
based on contract, ownership was based on contract and on legal 
formalities. 82 One should note, however, that for Hegel justice was not 
concerned with the equal distribution of resources,83 but he accepted 
inequality as necessarily entailed in ownership. For Kant, therefore, freedom 
and moral autonomy justified ownership, but this did not necessarily imply 
equality. For Hegel ownership was justified because it anchored people in 
the world. However, this did not guarantee equality either. 
This idea of ownership as justified by freedom was also found in the theories 
of Von Savigny64 and Windscheid.85 In both these theories ownership was 
regarded as the guarantee of personhood and this, in turn, provided the 
justification for private ownership.86 Windscheid, in particular, used Kant's 
view on morality combined with Grotius' scientific conceptualism to justify 
ownership in the modern civil state. In this way it assumed an aura of 
objectivity and neutrality. However, closer analysis reveals that these 
78 Ryan Property 73, 87. 
79 Hegel Philosophy of right 35-36. See also Ryan Property 124. 
80 Hegel Philosophy of right 242 par 75. 
81 Hegel Philosophy of right 126 par 188, 134 par 208. 
82 Hegel Philosophy of right 139 par 217. 
83 Hegel Philosophy of right 44 par 49, 130 par 200. 
84 Van der Walt Houerskap 232; Kroeschell "Eigentumsbegriff' 39. 
85 Van der Walt 1993 JCROL 569 587. 
86 Van der Walt 1995 JCROL 396 407. 
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assumptions were developed (like those of Locke) to justify the existence of 
the nineteenth century liberal state. 87 
The almost mechanical repetitions in these writings indicate the end of the 
justificatory debate in Germany as well. The rise of legal science and the 
purely formal system of law combined with codification brought the debate to 
an end. From this time lawyers are concerned with interpreting and applying 
the code and metaphysical questions, such as those pertaining to the 
justification of ownership, were no longer regarded as relevant.88 However, 
these codifications laid down the existing law and justificatory theories as if 
they had no context. While the moral justification of Kant and Hegel are 
presented as neutral and transcendental, they actually justified the status 
quo. In this way the nineteenth century justifications became part of the 
codified law. 
5.4.2 Dutch property law 
As in the case of other systems, the justificatory debate had lost most of its 
impetus by the eighteenth century. This is even truer in the case of the 
Netherlands. Because it was one of the systems in which codification took 
place earliest, the trend was visible earlier. None of the commentators really 
mention justification of property and it seems to have become a non-
question. 89 This was the result of three basic factors. In the first place 
Grotius ended the debate with his scientific and conceptual model. The 
justificatory question was no longer an issue since ownership was now 
defined in a neutral and abstract way. The result of this was that theories no 
longer justified the existence of ownership per se, but justified the existing 
87 Van derWalt 1993 JCRDL 569 587. 
88 See Kop PC Legisme en privaatrechtswetenschap 2nd ed (Oeventer 1992) 12; Cohn Manual 
26. 
89 Van der Walt "Eigentumsbegriff' 506. 
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distribution of property. These distributive questions were all answered 
mechanically within the boundaries of the conceptual system. 
In the second place, even in those cases where it didn't satisfy, codification 
tended to end the debate on justification of ownership. Lawyers were 
interested in explaining and expounding the BW and not in what was 
regarded as metaphysical speculation. This led to the third factor, namely the 
rise of the view of law as a science like the natural sciences. This 
legalism/positivism tended to focus attention on the law as a system of terms 
and rights rather than on the justification thereof. 90 
The debate on the origin/justification of property would re-surface in the 
twentieth century, but then in a very different guise. Twentieth-century 
questions revolve around the justification of redistribution of property by the 
state. In this way the relationship between property and equality would 
become the focal point. 
5.4.3 English property law 
Justificatory theories were never as important in English property law as they 
were on the continent. This is largely due to the fact that, until the second 
half of the nineteenth century, there were few law faculties in England and 
those that did exist had little or no influence. 91 This factor, coupled with a 
view of law as a largely technical enterprise, resulted in a legal atmosphere 
that was hostile to what was seen as metaphysical speculation. Those 
justificatory theories that were on offer were mostly uncritical restatements or 
extensions of Locke's theory. 
Locke's theory was intended, at least in part, to protect private landholdings 
from interference by the King. In eighteenth century England, however, the 
90 Kop Legisme 58. 
91 Van Caenegem Introduction 159. 
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government was in the hands of a parliament with the King's powers 
substantially reduced. This parliament consisted of landowners elected by 
and representing the interests of landowners. They did not need protection 
from themselves92 and, consequently, justificatory theories in this period 
tended to justify the status quo. Thus not only the existence of private 
property, but also the unequal distribution thereof were justified. For this 
reason too, these theories tended to justify the enclosures and clearances as 
well.93 
Blackstone's theory is a point in case. He reiterated Locke's idea that all 
rights have their origin in natural law, but realised that they required human 
intervention in order to be maintained. In fact, that is the main purpose of 
human laws.94 In the state of nature property was common, but the civil state 
came into being by means of a social contract to protect all rights.95 These 
civil advantages (a result of the social contract) include liberty, security and 
private property. Consequently, the origin of property is natural, but its 
protection is the result of convention.96 This theory of Blackstone's is, like 
most of his Commentaries, an uncritical reflection of the law and legal thinking 
at that time. It is also a curious blend of Lockean and Hobbesian thinking 
which leaves most of the questions unanswered. 
By the eighteenth century the natural law justifications were no longer in 
vogue. This is due, on the one hand, to the general decline in natural law 
thinking (at least in its medieval form). 97 On the other hand, unexpected 
interpretations of Locke's theories had begun to surface.98 For both these 
92 Schlatter Private property 162. 
93 Schlatter Private property 163. See 4.4.1.3 on the clearances and enclosures. 
94 Blackstone Commentaries 1.1.124. 
95 Blackstone Commentaries 1.1.1; ll.1.3ff; 11.1.117-118. 
96 Blackstone Commentaries 1.1.16. 
97 Van den Bergh Geleerd recht 47; Kelly History 258-262. 
98 See Ellis RJ "Radical Lockeanism in American pomical culture" 1992 W Pol Q 825-849 825 for an 
explanation of how Locke's " ... potentially subversive labour theory ... " could be used and was 
used to justify both liberal individualism and radical egalitarianism. 
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reasons, large concentrations of property in a few people's hands uustified by 
natural law} were increasingly under attack99 and the existing naturalist 
justifications were no longer acceptable. In their place utilitarian theories 
were advanced. 100 
This shift to utilitarianism is of particular importance regarding property. 
Utilitarianism, in the first place, rejected natural law, the idea of natural rights 
and, consequently, natural law justifications of property. 101 It insisted on a 
separation of law and morals, a view of law as being essentially a command 
of a sovereign and that " ... a purely analytical study of legal concepts . . . was 
as vital to our understanding of the law as historical or sociological studies."102 
With this approach the English version of the Begriffsjurisprudenz had finally 
arrived. 
Utilitarianism emphasised that what was important was not the theory and 
justification of property, but the study of the real and existing property rules 
within the legal system. If it had to be measured against anything, it should 
be measured against the standard of utility. Therefore Bentham thought 
property should be justified by utility and labour. 103 This was also the basis 
for the theories of the Scottish moral philosophers. Both Hume and Smith 
knew Grotius' work and their theories represent reactions to his. 104 However, 
they both rejected his natural law basis for justifying property and emphasised 
99 Schlatter Private property 173. 
100 Schlatter Private property 181. 
101 Bentham J "Anarchical fallacies" in Browning J (ed) Works (Edinburgh 1938-1943) ii.501: 
"'Natural rights' is simple nonsense; 'natural and imprescriptible rights' rhetorical nonsense -
nonsense upon stilts."; Bentham Limits 84: "All this talk about nature, natural rights, natural 
justice and injustice proves two things and two things only, the heat of the passions and the 
darkness of the understanding." 
102 Hart HLA "Positivism and the separation of law and morals" 1958 Harvard LR 593-629 601. 
103 Bentham Limits 85; Bentham Economic writings vol II 312. 
104 Haakonssen 1985 Pol T 239 251. 
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practical reason and purely formal rules regarding property.105 Of course, that 
is exactly what Grotius did too, except that he called it natural law. 
Hume rejected the natural law basis of property and saw property as a 
product of civil society.106 However, he realised that if property had no moral 
foundation, there would be no logical foundation for its continued 
protection. 107 Therefore he created an artificial virtue, called justice, that was 
in tum based on utility. This justice was property.108 Property was therefore 
the ultimate utility and could, on this moral basis, be defended against any 
threat of egalitarianism.109 In other words, Hume replaced the natural law 
justification with one based on utility, which was just as capitalist as its 
predecessor had been. 
Adam Smith did not reject natural law outright. For him the labour theory 
(derived from Locke) and the limitations on property held true in a state of 
nature. 110 The introduction of civil society, however, destroyed this 
relationship so that the accumulation of wealth became possible.111 Private 
property was thus necessary for wealth and it was, therefore, the primary goal 
of government to preserve it.112 This development from the state of nature to 
unlimited private property was a healthy historical one, because it led to 
capitalism. The function of the state is merely one of promoting negative 
justice that prohibits interference.113 
It seems clear that all the writers discussed above added little to the 
justificatory theories of Grotius and Locke. The basis for the protection of 
105 Haakonssen 1985 Pol T 239 253. 
106 Hume "Morals" 208. 
107 Hume "Morals" 44. 
108 Hume "Morals" 420-421. 
109 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 638 n8. 
110 Smith Wealth of nations vol I 57: "In that original state of things ... the whole produce of labour 
belongs to the labourer." 
111 Smith Wealth of nations vol I 58: "As soon as land becomes private property, the landlord 
demands a share of almost all produce." 
112 Smith Lectures 1. 
113 Haakonssen 1985 Pol T 239 257, 264 n49. 
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property may have changed, but the goal (protecting private property) 
remained the same. This strengthens the assumption that the theories of 
Locke and Grotius were the last of the influential justificatory theories. From 
the nineteenth century in particular, English legal thinking was concerned with 
formal rules and practice and not with "metaphysical speculation". Those 
theories still on offer were political or moral theories. 
5.4.4 American property law 
As in the case of the other jurisdictions studied, justificatory theories played a 
role in American legal thinking until the eighteenth century. As was the case 
in Europe, the aim was to justify private property in contrast with feudal 
property relations. As long as this remained the aim, these theories 
continued to be important. In seventeenth century America, there were two 
justificatory theories on offer, based on conflicting views of society. 
The hierarchical view sought to justify property on the basis of the sovereign's 
right to property. Based on a traditional state of nature and contractarian 
ideas, it attempted an Americanisation of Blackstone. Like Blackstone they 
thought the use and possession possible in the state of nature could not 
guarantee security and order. Consequently, a social contract was concluded 
which vested all rights in the sovereign, who then distributed it. 114 On this 
semi-feudal basis property was justified as basically unequal.115 Property 
could only be based on title by grant from the King and this was associated 
with moral and political order and harmony. 116 
This view in particular fit the property regimes found in the English colonies. 
Land in these colonies were held in tenure (mostly free and common socage) 
and some colonists even had the power to sub-infeudate, since they held 
114 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 642. See 5.4.1 above on Blackstone's ideas. 
115 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 636. 
116 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 645. 
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tenure directly from the King. 117 After the revolution land was held in tenure 
from the state in some states, while others abolished it completely. 118 
The voluntarist view in the eighteenth century, on the other hand, justified 
property by reference to the use and occupation of land.119 Rights to land 
were based on title by occupation, based in turn on a view of the community 
as the source of morality, authority and property. 120 The modern version of 
this view, called republicanism, attempted to create better citizens by means 
of institutions that protected land. In this way it tended to emphasise the 
private realm.121 This modern republicanism was based on the ideas of the 
Scottish moral philosophers (like Hume, Smith and Ferguson) and based 
property on self-interest which, if expressed in a free market, would benefit 
public interest and welfare. 122 
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the debate on the justification of 
property was losing steam. Both the liberals and republicans at the 
Constitutional Convention agreed that property should be protected. Uberals 
argued that property was the barrier protecting individuals against state 
interference.123 Property was therefore justified by an appeal to liberty. 
Republicans saw property as the way in which an individual could be bound to 
the community, 124 thus ensuring that individual acts will be in the public 
interest.125 Property was thus justified by an appeal to communitarianism and 
117 This was the case with William Penn - see Moynihan Introduction 25. 
118 Moynihan Introduction 26. 
119 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 636. This is what Michelman refers to as the strong version of 
republicanism - see Michelman F "Law's republic" 1988 Yale LJ 1493-1537 1495. 
120 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 645. 
121 Pickens and Seligman 1987 Soc Sc Q 847 849. 
122 Pickens and Seligman 1987 Soc Sc Q 847 850-851; Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 636 n 1 & 2. 
See 5. 4. 1 above on the Scottish moral philosophers. 
123 Nedelsky Private property 2, 79-80; Underkuffler 1991 Texas LR 293 296-297. 
124 Pickens and Seligman 1987 Soc Sc Q 847 849. 
125 Post "Jeffersonian revisions" 295 300, 305. 
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democracy. In the end, however, " ... the liberal and republican traditions 
converged in supporting the institution of private property ... "126 
If the differences between the justificatory theories seem more illusionary than 
real, the division in the distributory debate was sharp and real. This debate 
on the distribution (or redistribution) of property was a heated one. On the 
one hand Jefferson and his followers argued that property was not a natural 
right (like life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness}, but a civil right. Because 
societal definitions and conventions justified property, it was also subject to 
revision and redistribution on the same basis.127 This is basically the same 
argument as the one used by Paine. He used Locke's labour theory to 
distinguish between productive and unproductive labour. Property derived 
from "real work" (productive labour) should be protected against 
redistribution, but property based on speculation should not. 128 This was also 
the argument used by the Jacksonians to argue for a radical, egalitarian 
social reconstruction by means of a redistribution of property. 129 
The Madisonian view, on the other hand, was based on property as a natural 
right. Because property was regarded as natural, it could not be subject to 
revision and government's primary goal was to protect it. 130 However. the 
Madisonians accepted that conflicts regarding property could and would 
occur. In the first place there would be a conflict between the propertied and 
the unpropertied if the majority of unpropertied sought to invade those 
126 Tushnet Red, white, and blue 15. 
127 Post "Jeffersonian revisions" 295 300, 305. Ryder "Private property" 16 25 quotes Jefferson as 
having said: 'Whenever there is in any country, uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is 
clear that the laws of property have been so far extended as to violate natural right." 
128 Ellis 1992 W Pol Q 825 828-829. 
129 Ellis 1992 W Pol Q 825 831-835. This idea was also used in the Reconstruction after the Civil 
war to give slaves property rights. 
130 Ryder "Private property'' 16 19. This argument is justified by an appeal to Locke. Since the 
previous argument was also based on Lockean theory, this is an indication of the ambiguity of 
this theory. 
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property rights. In this conflict between democracy and property, property 
should always win. 131 
This meant that the Madisonian view was based on the acceptance of 
inequality and unequal property and of the natural inevitability of classes of 
rich and poor. 132 This basic inequality should also be protected and 
preserved. 133 In this way the foundation for the strong relation between 
liberty, property and economic power would be laid. 134 
In the second place there would be conflicts between various property rights, 
for example between agrarian and mercantile interests in property. This 
conflict was meant to be resolved by the doctrine of the separation of powers 
and other constitutional checks and balances. 135 The resultant weighing of 
interests would apply to property rights only, not to conflicts between property 
and other rights or interests. 
In the end the republican and liberal traditions also converged in this respect 
by agreeing that the Constitution should encourage rapid economic growth so 
that property could be distributed widely. 136 Neither the hierarchical nor the 
voluntarist models could ensure this rapid economic growth.137 The view 
enshrined in the Constitution was one that was abstracted from the two views 
and which contained elements of both. 138 The interesting feature was the 
131 Ryder "Private property" 16 21-23. This was the fear of what Tushnet Red, white, and blue 10 
calls the "tyranny by the legislators." 
132 Nedelsky Private property 2; Underkuffler 1991 Texas LR 293 296-297; Ryder "Private property" 
1620. 
133 Ryder "Private property" 16 20 quotes Hamilton as having said: " ... nothing like an equality of 
property existed: that an inequality would exist as long as liberty existed, and that it would 
unavoidably result from that very liberty itself." 
134 Nedelsky Private property 79-80; Underkuffler 1991 Texas LR 293 297. 
135 Ryder "Private property" 16 24. 
136 Tushnet Red, white, and blue 15. 
137 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 660 indicates that republicanism led to a diffusion of resources and 
the feudal nature of the hierarchical view destroyed initiative. Horwil2 1973 U Chicago LR 248 
271, 278: " ... men had come to regard property as an instrumental value in the service of the 
paramount goal of promoting economic growth." 
138 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 690, 694. 
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introduction of the familiar liberal private-public split. 139 Private property was 
no longer justified by its origin, but by its liberal function of limiting 
governmental interference and guaranteeing liberty. 140 
On this basis laid in the eighteenth century, nineteenth century developments 
tended to emphasise the protection of property rights against all forms of 
interference. 141 The appeal to liberty also resulted in an expansion of the 
category of property rights to include other rights (such as contractual rights) 
which could be protected in the same way.142 The Supreme Court became 
instrumental in protecting property rights against state intervention by making 
use of the dual federalism of commerce clause and the substantive due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 143 Note, however, that this is 
no longer a justificatory debate, but a distributory debate. Parties no longer 
seek to justify property but to justify certain patterns of distribution. 
This last point is illustrated by the advent of radically egalitarian ideas in 
nineteenth century American thinking. Henry George, in reaction to the papal 
encyclical Rerum Novarum,144 took Locke's ideas to their logical extreme and 
saw property as justified only if it applied to the fruit of one's labour. 145 This 
could then be the basis for a redistribution of property. This idea was not 
developed further and never became dominant in the nineteenth century. It 
would, however, become one of the central issues in the twentieth century 
redistribution debate. 
139 Mensch 1982 Buffalo LR 635 733-735; Nedelsky Private property 3; Underkufller 1991 Texas 
LR 293 303. 
140 Nedelsky Private property 8; Underkufller 1991 Texas LR 293 294; Mccann 1987 Pol & Soc 
143 145 quotes John Adams having said: "Property must be secure or liberty cannot exist" 
141 Frug 1980 Harvard LR 1510 1511. 
142 Frug 1980 Harvard LR 1510 1511. 
143 Mccann 1987 Pol & Soc 143 146. 
144 Pope Leo XIII Rerum Novarum (1891). 
145 Benestad JB "Henry George and the Catholic view of morality and the common good, I: George's 
overall critique of Pope Leo Xlll's classical encyclical, 'Rerum Novarum"' 1985 Am J Econ Soc 
365-378 365. 
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The basic justification of property in the American tradition therefore 
developed from one based on an external hierarchy or an external (objective) 
set of communitarian values to a subjective justification based on the liberty of 
the individual. This justification would remain central to American property 
theory in the twentieth century. Increasingly, however, the emphasis is on the 
question whether and to what extent governmental interference (based on 
democracy) can be justified without destroying the liberty of the individual. 
The debate has therefore shifted from one about the justification of property to 
one dealing with the distribution of property and the powers of owners. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The history of justificatory theories illustrates one point very well and that is 
that property is inextricably tied to morality. At the start there was no need for 
justificatory theories because the legal order was underpinned by an external 
and objective moral order. This moral order was, in turn, tied to some form of 
authority in the religious sense. Whether the authority was derived from gods 
(in the Greek sense) or from God (in the roman catholic sense), its authority 
gave natural law its moral authority. The legal order was seen as a natural 
consequence of the religious order and therefore needed no justification. 
Ownership and property relations were part of this "natural" order and, for the 
same reason, needed no justification. The best example of this is the feudal 
arrangements of the medieval period. 
The process started by the poverty debate was accelerated by the work of the 
late scholastics and Grotius' theory and ended with the advent of the 
Aufk/arung. Once natural law had been divorced from its religious 
underpinnings, natural law was no longer the only possibility for a moral 
basis. Moreover, once natural law no longer had a religious basis, 146 its moral 
146 Haakonssen 1985 Pol T 239 247: 'What is clear is that natural law theories during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries lost more and more of their theological appearance, ... " 
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authority was under attack. Although most of the theorists of this period still 
worked from an implicit or explicit Christian foundation, the possibility of 
scientific knowledge of this natural law was increasingly denied and this, 
together with the humanist influence, tended to secularise natural law. 147 The 
end result was that property could no longer be justified in an objective 
manner, that is, with reference to an external moral order abstracted from 
humanity. For this reason the justificatory theories of the nineteenth century 
focused attention on the subject of property relations, that is the human 
individual, or on society (contractarians), or on legal science (Grotius, 
Langdell) or on transcendental morality (Kant). The collapse of the perceived 
objective moral order, or, as Winter would have it, the proliferation of 
moralities, therefore necessitated a different kind of justificatory theory. 148 If 
the moral order was no longer constant at least the moral subject still was. 
This movement from an objective to a subjective justificatory theory had two 
interesting consequences. In the first place the debate on the origins of 
property became increasingly irrelevant. This is understandable, since the 
origin in an external, objective moral order became absurd once the 
perception no longer existed that such an order could be known rationally. 
Instead the focus was on real, existing property relations. This led to the 
second consequence, namely that the justificatory theories from the 
nineteenth century onwards justified existing property relations. 149 It is 
important to note that new justificatory theories did not lead to new property 
relations - the patterns of property remained the same, only the theories 
justifying it changed. In this respect very little had changed - old and new 
theories have as their purpose the justification of existing property relations 
147 Haakonssen 1985 Pol T 239 250ff. 
148 See Winter SL "Human values in a post-modern world" 1994 Yale JLH 233-248 238 on the 
relativism brought about by the eighteenth century Enlightenment due to the " ... loss of 
foundations (and) the expansion of moral sources ... " 
149 See, for instance, Nedelsky Private property 205-207; Van den Bergh Eigendom 66: "De 
vermaatschappelijking van de eigendom die rond 1900 zou hebben ingezet, heeft nauwelijks 
invloed gehad op de voortgaanse consentratie van economische macht." 
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and of the status quo. As was pointed out above, 150 the justificatory theories 
never postulated a new order of distributory patterns, but simply tried to justify 
why things were the way they were. This rests on the assumption that the 
status quo is basically just and equitable and this view was incorporated into 
the conceptualist view of law in general and property law in particular. 
The second important shift in this debate was from a focus on justification to a 
focus on distribution. Once the theories ceased to justify private property per 
se and started justifying existing patterns of property, the emphasis shifted. 
The emphasis was now on justifying the way in which property was distributed 
and no theory was offered to transform this basic pattern of distribution. This 
would provide the impetus for late nineteenth and, especially, twentieth 
century criticism Of private property.151 The central idea was that, if these 
theories justified existing distributory patterns, property no longer guaranteed 
equality or equal liberty. 
In the end the debate on the justification of property did not have a very long 
life. It was very important in an era when metaphysical questions were 
regarded as part of law. Once the view of law as a science (in the sense of 
natural science) was adopted, however, such questions were either ignored 
or regarded with suspicion. Lawyers, increasingly, were concerned with the 
law as a system of rules that could be understood in an abstract and formally 
logical way. Especially if the law was codified, questions dealing with the 
justification of property fell outside the lawyer's field and became the study 
field of philosophers and political theorists. Law (and property) was seen as 
abstract, neutral and divorced from politics, while enforcing and maintaining a 
system with real political and moral underpinnings and implications. 
150 See 3.5 above. 
151 See chapter 8 below. 

CHAPTER 6: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF OWNERSHIP 
(FROM OBJECTIVISM TO SUBJECTIVISM) 
6.1 Introduction 
''To the extent that these things are necessary to the 
life of my neighbour, the law thus confers on me a 
power, limited but real, to make him do what I want. If 
Laban has the sole disposal of his daughters and his 
cattle, (sic) Jacob must serve him if he desires to 
possess them.''1 
As was pointed out above, 2 it is often assumed that ownership has (and has 
always had) certain elements or characteristics. This is closely aligned with 
the view that ownership is a neutral concept unaffected by historical change. 
If the concept is neutral, the characteristics implied by that concept must also 
be "neutral" in the sense that they remain the same. On this basis it is 
assumed that ownership is, and has always been, absolute, uniform, 
exclusive and a real right. These terms will be defined briefly. 
The absoluteness of ownership refers to the idea that ownership is basically 
unlimited. This view does not deny that ownership can be limited and that 
limitations actually do occur in law, but these limitations are seen as 
temporary and abnormal. Two kinds of limitations can occur. 
In the first place statutory restrictions (laws as the result of political will) are 
regarded as unnatural and unacceptable, because it involves public-law 
interference in private law. In the second place limitations may be 
1 Cohen "Property and sovereignty'' 159. 
2 See chapter 2 above. 
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the result of rights (based on freedom of contract) of others. In this case too it 
is regarded as unusual and temporary. In common-law systems particularly, 
this type of restriction is seen as a remnant of feudalism and as such is 
regarded as unacceptable. Once the limitations are removed, ownership 
reverts to its basic unlimited nature. All limitations are therefore seen as 
unnatural, while ownership (in its unlimited form) is seen as natural. This is 
referred to as the elasticity of ownership in civil law - as soon as the 
restrictions are removed, ownership resumes its previous form. 
In much the same way, the uniformity of ownership refers to the idea that only 
one kind of ownership (namely private, individual ownership) exists (and has 
always existed) and that this is typically a private right. The first part of the 
assumption is based on the idea that private ownership is natural and that all 
other kinds of ownership are somehow unnatural and indefensible. This is 
closely aligned with the second part of the assumption, namely that ownership 
is typically a private right governed by the rules and conceptual scheme of 
private law. 
The exclusivity of ownership refers to the idea that there can be only one 
owner of the ownership at a specific time and that the right to exclude others 
is the essence of private ownership. These two assumptions have a lot in 
common. The first is known as the individuality of ownership and reflects the 
liberalist emphasis on the individual. In much the same way, once the 
emphasis is placed on the individual and his private sphere,3 the right to 
exclude others from this sphere becomes important. Therefore, the emphasis 
on the exclusivity of ownership can only be understood in the context of the 
individuality and uniformity of ownership. This idea is in direct opposition to 
3 The liberalist point of departure is that every individual has an equal right to develop his full 
potential within a private sphere insulated from government interference. Private ownership is 
seen as the guarantee for the development of this equality and freedom - see Levy 1983 Rev of 
Pol 578; Underkuffler 1990 Yale LJ 128; Barton SE "Ownership rights and human rights: 
efficiency and democracy as criteria for regulatory reform" 1983 J Econ I 915-930 916; Bethell T 
"Ownership and justice" 1991 Am enterprise 23-26. 
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the view of ownership as communal/common characterised by the right.not to 
be excluded, which is a very old idea that never quite died out. 
The characterisation of ownership as a right to corporeals deals with the 
question of the objects of ownership. The question is whether ownership of 
various kinds of objects is possible. The traditional assumption in South 
African (and most civil-law systems) has been that ownership of corporeal 
objects is possible, but that incorporeals cannot be owned.4 This assumption 
has been challenged on various grounds in the past few years and has seen 
a number of changes. More important, however, is the question whether the 
objects of ownership determine its definition or not. The answer to this 
question will indicate whether ownership is defined abstractly or not. As such 
it is linked to the previous characteristic. 
This chapter will examine these assumptions from a historical perspective. It 
seeks to determine whether and to what extent these characteristics were 
present during the various periods under discussion and how they were 
created. It must be emphasised that these characteristics are related. To a 
very large extent the absoluteness of ownership implies its exclusionary 
nature (since restrictions limit the right to exclude and are seen as temporary 
and unusual), and both imply the existence of only one kind of ownership. 
The role that the objects of ownership play is also related to the abstract 
nature of the other characteristics. 
4 See Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (Durban 1979) 29. 
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6.2 The absoluteness of ownership 
6.2.1 Roman and medieval roots 
To a large extent it is anachronistic to speak of absoluteness with reference to 
roman and medieval law. Recent historical studies have indicated that 
dominium in roman law was never absolute.5 Restrictions and limitations 
could and did occur. Two kinds of restrictions were mentioned above.6 
Public-law restrictions only became a problem with the rise of the modern 
state and were therefore never an issue in roman law. Restrictions based on 
the rights of others only arose as a result of the move away from feudalism. 
Once again, they were simply not an issue in roman law. 
It is clear that medieval law, too, cannot be regarded as absolute. Public-law 
restrictions only became an issue with the rise of the modern state. Because 
the idea of an absolute ownership was unknown, restrictions were simply 
regarded as part of the feudal structure. Medieval thinking on the 
absoluteness of ownership can be illustrated with reference to Bartolus' 
definition and, in particular, the phrase nisi /ege prohibeatur.7 The phrase nisi 
lege prohibeatur indicated that there were legal limitations on the owner's 
right of disposition.8 Therefore, Bartolus never regarded dominium as a right 
that was, in principle, unlimited.9 Indeed, such a perception would have been 
impossible in the light of medieval society and thought. 10 However, post-
glossators like Jason de Mayno replaced the phrase perfecte disponendi in 
5 
6 
Visser 1986 AJ 39 48 n7. See also Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 217 n28 and 
sources cited there. 
See 6.1 above. 
7 SeeBartolus on D.41.2.1.7.1 nr4. 
8 Coing 1953 ZSS 348 354; Van der Walt 1986 JCRDL 305 310. 
9 Van der Walt Houerskap 193-194. 
10 Van der Walt 1992 DJ 446 451. 
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Bartolus' definition with the phrase libere disponendi, thus emphasising the 
owner's complete right of disposition regarding the object. 11 This was the 
start of the move away from the feudal view of ownership and which was 
continued by the writers of the mos italicus and later the usus modernus 
pandectarum. 12 
The works of the scholastics in particular emphasised the voluntarist 
approach to law in general and ownership in particular.13 Ownership was 
defined as the potestas humana, which indicated that ownership presupposed 
the individual's power regarding his ownership.14 lhis represented the start of 
a shift away from the feudal, socially restricted concept of ownership toward a 
free right of individual disposition within the limits imposed by law. But 
ownership was still regarded as limited by natural law.15 Because of the 
inherent limitation placed on law by the supremacy of natural law, ownership 
was always limited in principle. This precluded an absolute view of 
ownership. 
Gradually, however, the emphasis on human individuality and control over the 
external world began to replace the idea of a basically limited ownership. 16 
This was the result, on the one hand, of the gradual abandonment of natural 
law as the supreme law that was already apparent in the works of the late 
scholastics. On the other hand, the ascendancy of the views of the social 
contractarians also played a role. De Vitoria saw law as the result of an 
agreement between members of a community17 and the degree of 
absoluteness of ownership would therefore depend on the content of this 
11 Van derWalt 1986JCRDL 305 312-312. 
12 Van den Bergh Eigendom 39-50; Van der Walt 1986 JCRDL 305 314-316; Van der Walt 1988 
DJ 16 316. 
13 Van der Walt Houerskap 216-217; Schrage Subjectief recht 68; Feenstra "Eigentumsbegriff' 
215-216. 
14 Coleman 1985 Pol S 73 93-94. 
15 Van der Walt Houerskap 216. 
16 Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 247; Tuck Natural rights 28. 
17 Feenstra 1976 RMT248 269. 
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agreement. It was however, presumably still limited by the terms of that 
agreement. De Molina, who denied that the owner had to use the ownership 
in his own best interest, took this process one step further. 18 Presumably this 
was a form of limitation that De Molina thought no longer applied. Vasquez 
de Menchaca explicitly stated that Bartolus' phrase perfecte disponendi meant 
that the owner had an absolute right to dispose of his ownership. 19 This 
illustrates the influence of humanism, with its revolt against feudalism and the 
emphasis on individual freedom. 
6.2.2 Early modem developments 
In a very real sense it is ridiculous to speak of absolute ownership in this 
period. Not only is this the pinnacle of natural law thinking (which saw all law 
- including ownership - as limited by natural law), but the idea of unlimited 
personal freedom was not yet conceivable. On the other hand the 
developments in this period would provide the stimulus for the social 
revolutions of the modern era. Therefore, it provided the bridge between the 
medieval and modern period. 20 
The beginning of the break with the idea of ownership as limited by natural 
law occurred with the Spanish moral philosophers and Grotius. 21 In the Mare 
liberum Grotius still stated that individual ownership was derived from the 
nation's dominium eminens and was therefore limited thereby. 22 
He was, however, careful to state that this was not the same as feudalism, but 
the result of a pactum taciturn between citizens.23 In contrast with feudalism, 
this represented a right to contract, which was associated with freedom. In 
18 Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 270. 
19 Van der Walt 1986 JCRDL 305 314; Van der Walt Houerskap 279. 
20 Van den Bergh Geleerd recht 29. 
21 See 6.2. 1 above. 
22 Feenstra 1986 AJ 269 275. 
23 Grotius De iure belli ac pacis 11.3.19.3. See also Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 271; Van der Walt 
1992 SAPL 1 2; Schlatter Private property 130. 
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his later works, however, this was not mentioned. Grotius recognised that 
ownership could be limited by law in general, 24 by secularised natural law25 
and by the ius eminens of the nation.26 Because limitations by public law 
were not yet a problem and because all other restrictions were made part of 
the conceptual system, Grotius' view was not absolute. However, Grotius' 
system contributed to the rise of the idea of ownership as exclusive and this 
made the introduction of an absolute concept possible. 
In much the same way as Grotius provided the basis for an absolute concept 
Of ownership in Roman-Dutch law, Locke laid the foundation in Anglo-
American law. In English law a further element to be taken into consideration 
was the feudal nature of its property law. Because all land was held in tenure 
from the King as ultimate owner,27 property could never be absolute. This 
was in fact recognised by Hobbes in his view that property was created by the 
sovereign28 and was, consequently, limited in principle by the sovereign's 
power. In this respect Hobbes' view was much closer to actual English 
property law than Locke's.29 
In fact Locke's views on property were developed, at least in part, to deny this 
power of the sovereign. 30 Locke thought that in the first phase of the state of 
nature, private property was limited.31 However, in the second phase, due to 
the invention of money, these limitations fell away32 so that natural property 
became absolute. 
24 See Grotius' definition in lnleidinge 11.3.4. 
25 Van der Walt 1992 SAPL 1 2; Tuck Natural rights 72, 76. 
26 Visser 1986 AJ 39 43. 
27 See Megarry and Wade Real property 13. 
28 Hobbes Leviathan II. 18. 7: " ... the whole power of prescribing the rules, whereby every man may 
know, what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, without being molested by any of 
his fellow-subjects; and this is it men call propriety." 
29 Milsom SFC The legal framework of English feudalism (Cambridge 1976) 39: "The dominium 
of this kind of dominus was always a relative thing. 
30 See Schwarzenbach 1988 Soc T & P 141 142; Van den Bergh Eigendom 21-22. 
31 On these limitations see Locke Two treatises 2.4, 2.31, 2.33, 2.27. 
32 Locke Two treatises 2.36, 2.37, 2.47, 2.28. 
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Two things are important here. In the first place the limitations were already 
done away with in the state of nature, so that unlimited property was regarded 
as natural. It is not the result of convention and should, therefore, be 
protected as a natural and inalienable right. In the second place this denies 
the sovereign's right to services on the basis of his/her/their ultimate property. 
This move away from feudalism meant that the very idea and system of tenure 
was under attack. Therefore Locke, like Grotius, was a pivot around which 
the movement from feudal to modem took place. 
6.2.3 Late modem developments 
6.2.3.1 German property law 
The move away from feudalism occurred in the eighteenth century as a result 
of the influence of Kant. For Kant ownership consisted of the directing of an 
individual's will on a certain object.33 Because ownership was basically 
voluntarist, it could only be limited through "legislative common will". 34 
Although the free will was, therefore, in principle unlimited, it could be limited 
by the common will. This meant that ownership could be limited by the state, 
but not by individual citizens. 35 The idea of ownership as the manifestation of 
the external freedom of morally autonomous entities, was therefore an 
expression of a basically unlimited right. 36 
On this Kantian basis, coupled with an abstract view of legal science, the 
Pandectists developed an absolute view of ownership. Von Savigny's view 
was that an owner could use his ownership " ... nach Wilkuhr ... ", which 
33 Kant Philosophy of law 63. 
34 Kant Philosophy of law 88. See also Vogel 1988 Pol S 102 108. 
35 Ryan Property 82-83. 
36 Van der Walt Houerskap 323; Kroeshell "Eigentumsbegriff' 34 39. 
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seems to imply an absolute power.37 Windscheid too, defined Eigentum in 
terms of the abstract and unlimited nature thereof.38 Puchta defined Eigentum 
as the " .. . volle rechtliche Unterwerfung .. . die volkommene rechtliche 
Herrschaft ... "39 This means that Windscheid used the moral basis that Kant 
provided to justify the absolute right of owners to disposition. In this 
explanation, then, all limitations become exceptional, unacceptable and even 
immoral, except if they are in accordance with the owner's will as manifested 
in contract or voting. 
This absolute view of ownership was included in the BGB as a typically roman 
idea. In section 903 of the BGB ownership is regarded as conferring a right to 
use the ownership " . . . nach Belieben ... " In this way the Pandectists' 
absolute view of ownership was included in the German codification. 40 
However, events in the twentieth century changed this somewhat. With the 
introduction of section 14 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz41 ), ownership could 
no longer be regarded as absolute, since this section limited ownership in 
principle and in respect of the exercise of police powers by the state. 42 This 
was the result of a complex set of circumstances that will be discussed later.43 
37 Von Savigny Das Recht aus Besitzes 27. 
38 Windscheid Lehrbuch 1.3.137.603, 1.3.167.756-757, 1.3.168.759. 
39 Puchta Pandecten 207 - translation: " ... full legal dominion ... the complete legal lordship . 
(my emphasis). See also Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 247. 
40 Baur Lehrbuch 24.212: "Das Eigentum sollte also ... als 'das umfassendste Herrschaftsrecht, 
das die Rechtsordnung an einer Sache zulasst', begriffen warden." (My emphasis.) See also 
Cohn Manual 175; Van Caenegem Introduction 157. 
41 Hereinafter referred to as GG. 
42 Cohn Manual 180.260. 
43 See 11.1 below. 
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6.2.3.2 Dutch property law 
The question whether or not the late modern Dutch view of ownership had 
been absolute, resulted in quite a debate. On the one hand there are those 
who regard the definitions in this period and that expressed in section 625 
BW as an absolute concept of ownership.44 Others reject this view and 
indicate that a number of limitations on ownership could and did exist in this 
period, resulting in a less absolute view of ownership. 45 In this view the 
eventual absolute concept of ownership was the result, not of the French 
revolution, but of late nineteenth century capitalism. 
However, as Van der Walt has pointed out, the question is not whether 
limitations could and did occur, but whether ownership was conceptually 
limited.46 Because most writers accepted Grotius' conceptual scheme, along 
with the Kantian moral basis and theoretical exposition of Windscheid, they 
also accepted an ownership concept that was conceptually unlimited. 
Although most writers mention that ownership can be limited for the common 
good by statute as well as by the rights of others, this does not affect the 
basically unlimited nature of ownership. Although it cannot be said that the 
concept of ownership in this period was completely absolute, the foundation 
for such a conception was laid on the basis of Grotius' restricted definition of 
ownership. 47 Similarly the fact that a closed system of real rights existed, 
indicate an absolute view of ownership. Since all other rights are seen as 
encroachments, the basic concept must be unlimited,48 except if the owner 
consents to them by either contract or ballot. 
44 See Van Maanen Eigendomsschijnbewegingen 28. 
45 Van Maanen Eigendomsschijnbewegingen 43-44; Visser 1985 AJ 39 43-46. 
46 Van der Walt "Eigentumsbegriff' 508. See chapter 2 above. 
47 Van der Walt "Eigentumsbegriff' 509. 
48 Chorus ea Introduction 63. 
Characteristics of ownership 115 
6.2.3.3 English property law 
As was mentioned previously, 49 this was a period of extreme conservatism in 
England. It was also, however, the period following the Glorious Revolution, 
the rise of early capitalism and the Industrial Revolution. These 
developments had a profound influence on law in general and property law in 
particular. 
While the practice of property law in this period still revolved around tenure 
and estate (albeit to a lesser degree), legal theory tended more and more to 
emphasise the absoluteness of ownership. Blackstone, for example, explicitly 
stated that ownership is an absolute right of individuals derived from natural 
law. 50 This right was to be enjoyed " ... without any control or diminution, save 
only by the laws of the land."51 This must be understood against the 
background of Blackstone's ambition to create a legal science similar to that 
of the continental lawyers. This ambition was then developed further by the 
utilitarians. 
As Kennedy has pointed out, Blackstone justified this move from limited use-
ownership to absolute dominion on the basis of policy or convenience. It was 
to prevent disorder and to encourage industriousness that ownership needed 
to be absolute. Thus tenure should make way for modern, absolute 
ownership.52 It was only by destroying feudalism (an ambition that Blackstone 
shared with continental lawyers) that absolute ownership could emerge to be 
the basis for capitalism. The idea of estates was now a way in which relations 
between persons and things could be explained and did not constitute 
limitations on property.53 
49 See 3.4.1.1 above. 
50 Blackstone Commentaries 1.1.124. 
51 Blackstone Commentaries 1.1.138. 
52 Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 205 332. 
53 Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 205 336. 
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Bentham continued this trend in his view of private ownership as " .. . the 
ownership of the land, the estate of the land ... "54 No infringement of this right 
could take place, and, where such infringements did occur they were " ... such 
slight exceptions [that they] are not in common speech considered as 
derogating from the general rule.'.ss Ownership could, therefore, be limited, 
but this was temporary and not considered an essential part of its nature. On 
the other hand, Bentham thought that the law functions exactly by placing 
limits on liberty. Even if the law (as in the case of ownership) had freedom as 
its goal, it would still limit freedom. 56 For this reason Bentham's view was not 
entirely absolute. 
Smith, too, saw ownership as an absolute (or perfect) right. Ownership for 
him implied complete freedom of choice, including the owner's freedom to 
abuse his ownership.57 However, the unproductive use of land was not a 
legitimate exercise of freedom of choice. 58 This development of ownership as 
absolute was seen by Smith as a healthy one because, historically, it had led 
to capitalism. 
From the above the connection between an absolute concept of ownership 
and both capitalism and liberalism becomes clear. Capitalism required 
unlimited ownership in order for the free-market idea to work. 59 Liberalism 
required an interference-free sphere in order to emphasise individualism.60 
This move away from feudalism toward individualism and absolutism was for 
the sake of commerce, as was the case in civil law. In this way the ownership 
54 Bentham Limits 62. 
55 Bentham Limits 62. 
56 Ryan Property 97. 
57 Smith Lectures 10: " ... the sole claim to a subject ... if he pleases [to] abuse or destroy ii." 
58 Smith Wealth of nations Vol I 386 n 16. This applies only to land - see Vogel 1988 Pol S 102 
120. 
59 Macpherson "Natural rights" 11; Van Maanen Eigendomsschijnbewegingen 104-105. 
60 See Gill 1983 J of Pol 675 679; Van der Walt AJ "The fragmentation of land rights" 1992 SAJHR 
431-450 447; Levy 1983 Rev of Pol 576 577: "Ownership as a defined sphere of private right has 
always been understood in all varieties of liberal thinking as a barrier to state power and as a 
secure realm for individual human actions and freedom." 
Characteristics of ownership 117 
concept is changed to accommodate historical, philosophical, economic and 
social changes. 
6.2.3.4 American property law 
As was the case with English ownership law, American law was somewhat 
ambiguous on this point. On the one hand American property law (at least in 
the English colonies) grew out of the basic feudal arrangement of English 
property law. 61 As a result all land was held in tenure and, as such, was 
essentially limited. Even before the Revolution, however, feudal services 
connected with tenure were exceptional and most land was held free from 
feudal restrictions.62 After the Revolution, land was held in tenure from the 
state. At this stage, however, some states began to abolish tenure and land 
was held allodially. 
The various types of estates still existed, however. An exception was the 
estate fee tail. This was never popular in America because it was associated 
with primogeniture and the holding of land as a power base. Both were 
regarded as un-American.63 It was consequently abolished by all but four 
states in the nineteenth century. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, private property was regarded as an important tool in fighting 
feudal and monarchical restrictions. 64 
This feudal basis with later capitalist development is the reason for the 
ambiguity in American property law. On the one hand Anglo-American 
property was contrasted with the "complete, exclusive, unqualified and 
absolute" civil-law view of ownership.65 On this basis of an essentially limited 
right to private property two types of restrictions were recognised. In the first 
61 Browder. Cunningham and Julin Basic property law 7. 
62 Moynihan Introduction 26. 
63 Moynihan Introduction 41. 
64 Ryder "Private property" 16 20. 
65 Browder, Cunningham and Julin Basic property law 6. 
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place restrictions resulting from shared ownership as in the case of (for 
example) estates, and, in the second place, restrictions resulting from 
neighbour law, self-imposed restrictions and state intervention were 
recognised.66 However, all of these restrictions were based on either contract 
or the ballot, therefore it could be stated that "(o)wnership ... is not inherently 
fragmented nor liable to involuntary fragmentation ... "67 This seems to indicate 
that property (at least in the form of an estate fee simple absolute) was 
conceptually absolute. 
In this respect it seems· that American property law developed in the same 
direction as the continental systems. The rise of capitalism encouraged the 
development of an absolute concept of property, even if the concept had, 
historically, been limited. 
6.3 The uniformity of ownership 
6.3.1 Roman and medieval roots 
One of the most pervasive ideas about ownership is that there is only one 
kind of ownership possible and that this one kind is private ownership. It is 
furthermore assumed that this was also the case in roman and medieval law. 
Recently, however, this assumption has been proven wrong. In pre-classical 
law, a distinction was made between Quiritary ownership68 and bonitary 
ownership.69 
It is sometimes also argued that dominium of res mancipi and res nee mancipi 
differed (resulting in two more kinds of ownership), primarily because res 
66 Browder, Cunningham and Julin Basic property law 12. 
67 Browder, Cunningham and Julin Basic property law 12. 
68 G.2.40; G.1.54. See also Van Zyl Geskiedenis 79. 128 n25; Kaser Private law 333; Jolowicz 
Introduction 366, 384; Buckland Manual 113. 
69 Ankum and Pool "Double ownership" 5 32, 41; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 128 n25; Van Warmelo 
lnleiding 122 par 352. 
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mancipi could only be transferred by mancipatio or in iure cessio.70 This 
shows how different rights were created for different objects, but the 
distinction had already disappeared in classical law71 and was explicitly 
abolished by Justinian.72 
In classical law the concept of bonitary dominium was developed further.73 
Various other kinds of property also existed.74 In fact, at least five different 
kinds of ownership could be distinguished.75 These were all types of 
ownership and not, for instance, possession and each were governed by 
unique and typical legal rules. When common Roman citizenship was 
introduced, the type of ownership unique to peregrini and citizens in the 
provinces disappeared, but the rest remained. 76 
In post-classical law, largely due to the disappearance of the different 
actiones, the distinction between the dominus and the quitrent-holder,77 on the 
one hand, and between bonitary and Quiritary dominium, 78 on the other hand, 
disappeared. It seems that only one kind of ownership called dominium 
existed.79 This probably included possessio and other rights such as 
ususfructus.80 Therefore it was still not a really uniform right. 
70 G.2.14a-16; Van Zyl Geskiedenls 123; Van Warmelo lnleiding 114 par328-330. 
71 Birks 1985 AJ 1 9; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 124. 
72 c. 7.31.5. 
73 For instance, the case where a res mancipi was not or could not be transferred by mancipatio or in 
iure cessio or where the owner lacked the ius commercii. See Buckland Manual 113, 114; Kaser 
Private law 94; Ankum and Pool "Double ownership" 33, 41; Van Warmelo lnleiding 122 par 
353-354. 
74 Jolowicz Introduction 280-281; Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 269; Buckland Manual 113, 114; Birks 
1985 AJ 1 9, 22; Lene! O Das Editum Perpetuum 3rd ed (Leipzig 1927) 189; Van Warmelo 
lnleiding 115 par 332; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 101. 
75 These were Quiritary dominium, bonitary ownership, ownership by peregrini, ownership of 
provincial land and ownership of the dos. See Van der Walt 1986 JCRDL 305 307; Van der Walt 
1988 DJ 16 311. 
76 Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 260. 
77 C.11.62.12. See also Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 261. 
78 Van Warmelo lnleiding 123 par 355. 
79 Buckland Manual 114, 116; Kaser Private law 95. 
80 Van der Walt 1986 JCRDL 305 308. 
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In the Justinian codification a resurrection of the classical distinction was 
attempted. That the effort was not entirely successful is clear from the 
inconsistent application of the actiones in rem. 81 However, Justinian did 
abolish the distinction between dominium of Italic and non-Italic land82 and 
probably also the distinction between Quiritary and bonitary dominium. 83 
One of the most important characteristics of medieval society was the feudal 
system.84 The glossators attempted to explain this feudal system in terms of 
the existing roman law. In this way the feudal relations were explained as 
instances of the roman dominium.85 In this tradition the glossators' 
interpretation of the praescriptio longi temporis acquired by usucapio was that 
it could lead to dominium utile, but not to dominium directum.86 Therefore 
they distinguished between at least two kinds of dominium. 87 This distinction 
was also accepted by Jacques de Revigny (123011240-1296), although he 
regarded one (dominium utile) as being the true dominium. 88 In much the 
same way Bartolus distinguished between two kinds of dominium, namely 
dominium directum and dominium utile.89 In this regard he relied on the 
glossators' exposition on emphyteusis and the actio utilis. 90 However, the 
distinction was rejected by late post-glossators such as Jason de Mayno. 91 In 
81 Van der Walt 1986 JCRDL 305 308. 
82 C.7.31; 1.2.1.40. 
83 Kaser Private law 95. 
84 See Van den Bergh Geleerd recht 17-21 for a thorough exposttion on the feudal system. This 
system probably developed as a result of the mixture between Roman and Germanic law that 
occurred during this time - see Van der Walt 1992 DJ 446 450. 
85 This was the division between dominium directum and dominium utile - see Van Maanen 
Eigendomsschijnbewegingen 21. See also Tuck Natural rights 17: " ... the complexity of 
feudal relationships had reached such a point by the mid-thirteenth century that either all lords 
had dominium of some kind or the notion ceased to have much sense."(Footnote omitted). 
86 D.39.3. 1.23. The same distinction was made based on the ius hereditatis - Coing 1953 ZSS 348 
357. 
87 Van der Walt Houerskap 152. 
88 Van der Walt Houerskap 183-185. 
89 The distinction is based on an interpretation of G.11.62.12.1 and is therefore probably a synthesis 
of classical and Justinian law - Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 237. See also Going 
1953 ZSS 348 356; Van der Walt Houerskap 201-204. 
90 Going 1953 ZSS 348 358; Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 237. 
91 De Mayne on D.41.2.3.4 n 16: "Dominium utile non estverum et proprium dominium." 
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this the influence of humanism (a return to roman sources) and the movement 
away from feudalism can be seen. 
In general, therefore, the medieval jurists utilised the roman distinction 
between full and naked dominium, but this distinction acquired a new 
meaning. Because use was also recognised as dominium, it became a way of 
explaining feudal relationships. This picture began to change in the later 
middle ages. The emphasis of the late scholastics on dominium as facultas 
humana precluded the idea of a functionally divided dominium.92 De Vitoria 
still distinguished between three forms of dominium,93 while De Molina 
distinguished between dominium perfectum and dominium imperfectum, both 
being regarded as dominium utilis. 94 However, because the idea of a duplex 
dominium had been developed to fit the feudal society of the middle ages, the 
destruction of that system also signified the beginning of the end for the idea 
of duplex dominium. This was achieved by recognising the vassal as the 
dominus utilis or owner, while the landlord (dominus directum) was regarded 
as a political authority. Consequently only one type of dominium remained. 
This process was accelerated and facilitated by the work of the humanists. 
Because they wanted to restore classical roman law, they disregarded all 
legal developments since that time. On the basis of this point of departure, 
they argued that there could be only one kind of dominium, because 
dominium utile was of post-classical origin.95 The exception to this is Hatman, 
who accepted the idea of a duplex dominium, in the Bartolist tradition, based 
on the ius gentium.96 
92 Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 247. 
93 Feenstra "Eigentumsbegriff' 219. 
94 Van der Walt Houerskap 276. These themes would resurface, albeit in another guise, in Grotius' 
work. 
95 Tuck Natural rights 40. 
96 Tuck Natural rights 41. 
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6.3.2 Early modern developments 
The idea of a duplex dominium began to lose its appeal and support near the 
end of the medieval period, as was indicated above.97 This process was 
accelerated in the early modern period. Grotius dealt with the divided 
concept of ownership in a very specific way. In the De iure belli ac pacis98 
and the Mare liberum he mentions the distinction, but does not discuss it. In 
the lnleidinge99 he reiterates the basic Bartolist distinction between two types 
of direct ownership, namely ownership either with or without use, and he still 
refers to the medieval terms dominium directum and dominium utile, but he 
changes the direction of the debate. 
First, being a humanist, he places the main emphasis on the roman distinction 
between dominium plenum and dominium minus plenum, both of which refer 
to dominium directum (with or without use). Thereby the importance of the 
distinction (which is central to medieval law) between dominium directum and 
dominium utile (which is roughly the same as use) is reduced. Then he 
focuses on dominium minus plenum/imperfect ownership, and says that that 
can refer to either empty property without use (that is dominium directum in 
the form of minus plenum, imperfectum, nuda proprietas) or use (dominium 
utile), and point out (in line with medieval law) that either could be called 
dominium. 
However, to avoid confusion, he proposes that the former be called ownership 
and the second a use right (gerechtigheid). Both full ownership (volle 
eigendom) and imperfect ownership (gebreckelicke eigendom) are regarded 
as ownership, but use (dominium utile) is not. The Grotian revolution 
therefore inverted the late medieval solution to the problem of duplex 
97 See 6.2.3 above. 
98 Grotius De iure belli ac pacis 1.2.3.19.2. 
99 Grotius lnleidinge 11.3.9-11.3.11. See also Feenstra "Eigentumsbegriff' 231; Van der Walt 
Houerskap 402. 
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dominium, by effectively removing dominium utile from the category of 
ownership. 
English ownership law in this period knew a wide variety of interests that 
could be classified as ownership. Different kinds of tenure and estates could 
lead to different kinds of ownership with different powers, entitlements and 
duties.100 Any attempt to establish a uniform concept of ownership was, 
therefore, going to be very difficult. 
Locke never dealt with the uniformity of ownership explicitly, probably 
because it was not an issue in English law. Because feudal law survived here 
longer, the timing and structure of the debate differed from the continental 
one. The upcoming liberalism did, however, necessitate the removal of 
feudalism, but this did not necessitate the same conceptual moves that had 
been necessary in continental systems. The end-result of the rise of 
humanism (on the continent) and liberalism (in England) did, however, have 
the same result, namely the destruction of feudalism. 
6.3.3 Late modem developments 
6.3.3.1 German property law 
After the reception of roman law, German law also operated with at least two 
types of ownership. 101 The usus modernus pandectarum still distinguished 
between dominium directum (Obereigentum) and dominium utile 
(Untereigentumlnutzbares Eigentum). This distinction was also included in 
the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht, but was eventually abandoned in the 
100 See, in general, 3.4.1.1 above and sources quoted there. 
101 Van den Bergh Eigendom 31; Kroeschell "Eigentumsbegriff' 36. 
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eighteenth century. 102 This was due, in part, because of the influence of 
Grotius and Thibaut.103 
The abandonment of the idea of a functionally divided ownership was the 
result of the emphasis on autonomy in Kantian liberalism, the increasingly 
abstract nature of legal science and the economic effort of getting rid of feudal 
relations. 
The emphasis on autonomy tended to exclude simultaneous rights to the 
same object. 104 This led to the view of ownership as the totality of possible 
rights.105 The abstract nature of legal science was even more influential. Law 
was increasingly seen as a system of a-historical and a-political terms and 
definitions.106 Because legal science required general or abstract concepts, 
ownership had to be defined in an abstract way as a general term. 107 This 
meant that there could be only one term/definition for ownership and, 
consequently, only one kind of ownership. 108 Because of the emphasis on 
individual autonomy, it became a typically private right. 
Because of these factors, the Pandectists accepted the idea of uniform 
ownership and the concept of double ownership was abandoned. 109 In the 
BGB ownership is dealt with in Book Ill as part of the section on Sachenrecht. 
There is no distinction between various types of Eigentum and only one kind 
is recognised. There are, however, tentative developments in German law 
that indicate a possible return to a more pluriform approach, both in private 
law110 and in public law. In the last-mentioned case the introduction of section 
102 Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 247. 
103 See Van derWalt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 247-248. 
104 Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 247. 
105 Puchta lnstitutionen 579-581; Puchta Pandecten 207; Van der Walt 1986 JCRDL 305 315. 
106 Kop Legisme 12. 
107 Van Caenegem Introduction 140. 
108 Cohn Manual 57. 
109 Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 248. 
110 Cohn Manual 175: these refer to the "ownership" of a holder on behalf of someone else and the 
Siecherungseigentum. 
Characteristics of ownership 125 
14GG has prompted writers to distinguish between private-law ownership and 
public-law property.111 
6.3.3.2 Dutch property law 
Some writers still mention the distinction between dominium directum and 
dominium utile,112 but this does not amount to much. This was the result of 
the fact that they followed Grotius' scheme and accepted his distinctions. 
This means that, for Dutch property law, the idea of a divided ownership died 
with Grotius' lnleidinge. This was also the position at the time of codification. 
6.3.3.3 English property law 
Developments in English law tended to differ from those in civil-law systems. 
Much of the discussion centred on the ancient tenures. Blackstone, for 
instance, criticised them as "(a) slavery so complicated, and so extensive ... " 
and this cried out for" ... a remedy in a nation that boasted of her freedom. "113 
The same was true for the modern tenures, except for the tenure of socage, 
which is depicted as " ... relics of Saxon liberty ... "114 Tenure is therefore 
associated with Normans and with servitude. 
This indicates that English property law was not concerned with conceptual 
issues, but with the practical struggle to abolish feudalism. For this reason 
the abolition of feudal distinctions and pluriformity in favour of a uniform 
concept was advocated. Pluriformity was associated with feudal servitude 
and uniformity with progress and commerce.115 The end result was that "(a) 
'thing' (the land) was controlled, for the purposes of occupancy and 
111 Van der Walt AJ "The impact of a bill of rights on property law" 1993 SAPL 296-319 303. See 
also 11.1.3 below. 
112 Huber Jurisprudence 2.2.11 distinguished between full and bare ownership and Van Leeuwen S 
Commentaries on Roman-Dutch law (London 1881-1886 Tr JG Kotze) 2.2.1 between full and 
defective ownership. 
113 Blackstone Commentaries 11.5.76. 
114 Blackstone Commentaries 11.6.81. 
115 Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 205 328. 
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production, by a single person, the private owner."116 This single, private 
owner could now exercise the absolute power as required by capitalism and 
liberalism. 
Bentham too emphasised the role of the sole owner, the proprietor. 117 The 
strong criticism levelled at the variety of tenure by Bentham and Humphreys, 
eventually resulted in the formation of a real ownership commission. They 
retained tenure, but expressed themselves in favour of one kind of 
ownership.118 The abolition of tenure would finally come to pass in 1967.119 
6.3.3.4 American property law 
Developments in civil-law systems in the late modem era tended to 
emphasise that there could be only one kind of ownership and that this was 
typically a private right. Developments in the common-law systems tended to 
agree with the last but not with the first. Because of the system of estates, a 
variety of property rights could exist at the same time in respect of the same 
object. Property was seen as a " ... conceptual entity which can be carved up 
in various useful and convenient ways."12° Consequently, Property was not a 
relation between persons in respect of a thing, but a legal concept, " . . . a 
bundle of legal relations ... "121 
This means that, at least in principle, property in American law was not 
uniform. Undivided property could, however, exist in the case of an estate fee 
116 Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 205 333. 
117 Bentham Limits 61: " ... it makes you sole owner, the proprietor of the land .. 
118 Manchester History 304. 
119 Leasehold Reform Act, 1967. See decision of the European commission on human rights in 
James & others v UK (application no 8793179) in Yearbook of the European convention on 
human rights (The Hague 1983) at 65. 
120 Browder, Cunningham and Julin Basic property law 8. 
121 Moynihan Introduction 88. 
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simple absolute. 122 In the view of property as a private right, however, the 
American view corresponded with the continental one. 123 
This was also a result of the public/private split that was the basis of the 
liberal definition of private property.124 The liberal definition required an 
emphasis on the private sphere of free development and private property was 
the means by which individuals could be insulated from state interference. 125 
Therefore, although American law did not operate with a basic distinction 
between private law and public law as was the case with continental systems, 
the characterisation of property as a private right was well established. 
6.4 The exclusivity of ownership 
6.4.1 Roman and medieval roots 
The idea of the exclusivity of ownership is one that is closely aligned with the 
uniformity and absoluteness of ownership and it comprises two aspects. In 
the first place exclusivity means that only one person can be owner of an 
object at a specific time (individuality). This is, of course, dependent on the 
idea that there is only one kind of ownership. As long as it is assumed that 
more than one kind of ownership exists, it is also possible for two or more 
persons to be owners of the same object at the same time. In this respect, 
therefore, the history of this characteristic follows that of the uniformity of 
ownership. In the second place, exclusivity refers to the idea that the right to 
exclude others from one's property is somehow central to the concept of 
ownership (excludability). Of course the first and second aspects are 
connected. It makes no sense to speak of excludability if more than one 
122 Browder, Cunningham and Julin Basic property law 8. 
123 Cribbet JE Principles of the law of property (Brooklyn 1962) 5: " ... property automatically 
translates as private property." 
124 See 5.4.2 above. 
125 See Gill 1983 J of Pol 675 679; Levy 1983 Rev of Pol 576 577; Underkuffler 1990 Yale Ll 127 
139; Reich CA ''The new property" 1964 Yale LJ 733-787 733. 
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person can be owners at the same time. Consequently the individuality of 
ownership and the excludability are different sides of the same coin. 
As was stated above, the individuality of ownership is impossible in a legal 
system where ownership could be functionally divided. In effect this meant 
that, in certain cases, two people could have different entitlements to the 
same object, both being the result of ownership. This was especially true in 
the case of the dos (where one spouse had the entitlement to use the 
property and the other the right to alienate it)126 and in the case of pignus. 127 
It therefore seems clear that, as long as the idea of duplex dominium 
persisted, ownership was not conceptually individualistic. 
Of more importance is the idea of excludability. It is sometimes stated that 
this right to exclude others is somehow typical of ownership128 and that it is 
this excludability that characterises ownership as an absolute right. 129 The 
result of this is that the rei vindicatio played a major role in characterising 
ownership. It is the right to vindicate one's property with the rei vindicatio that 
implies the absolute control that characterises ownership. 130 
However, the right to exclude others was not limited to Quiritary dominium, 
but was also applicable to bonilary dominium. While Quiritary dominium 
could be vindicated with the rei vindicatio, " ... the bonitary owner had the actio 
Publiciana and the exceptio rei verditae et traditae or the exceptio doli at his 
disposal."131 There was no reason to emphasise the rei vindicatio rather than 
126 G.2.62-63; D.23.3. 75; Van Zyl Geskledenis 101; Birks 1985 AJ 1 22. See also 6.2.2 above. 
127 C.8.33.3. See also Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 227. 
128 Kaser Private law 29 sees Roman dominium as an absolute right and is of the opinion that this 
absoluteness is the result of the right to exclude others. See also Birks 1985 AJ 11; Gray 1991 
Cambridge LJ 252 269. 
129 Kaser Private law 255 therefore sees the wife's ownership of the dos as the "natural" or "full" 
ownership, since she had the rei vindicatio. See also, regarding the dos, Van Warmelo lnleiding 
80 par230. 
130 Jolowicz Introduction 142-144. 
131 Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 352-353. Donahue "Property" 35 claims that Roman 
law "never developed a remedy whereby an individual could, upon proof of ownership, specifically 
recover the thing." This statement is clearly not supported by historical facts. 
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any other remedy, what was important was that the non-owners could be 
excluded by some proprietal remedy. 
The individuality of ownership was also unthinkable in the medieval period. 
Since more than one kind of ownership existed, more than one person could 
be owner of property at a given time. As a matter of fact, the overlord usually 
had the dominium eminens, the landlord the dominium directum and the 
vassal the dominium utile, while any number of people could also have rights 
of use at the same time with regard to the same property. 132 It therefore 
seems that dominium was not regarded as individualistic in the medieval 
period. 
Regarding excludability, the medieval debate centred on the relative 
importance of certain entitlements to ownership in the context of the poverty 
debate.133 Some writers emphasised the entitlement of disposal/alienation, 
while others emphasised the entitlement of use. Bartolus, for example, 
emphasised the owner's right to dispose of his property in order to distinguish 
dominium from possession, which was characterised by factual control. 134 In 
this respect he was followed by Baldus, while Jason de Mayne chose to 
emphasise the entitlement to use.135 The writers of the mos italicus and the 
usus modernus pandectarum continued the trend to emphasise the 
entitlement of use. 136 However, as long as each had a remedy, each form 
was regarded as exclusive. 
It should, however, be noted that, where the entitlement of disposal is 
emphasised, this is done in respect of both dominium directum and dominium 
132 Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 235-243; Van der Walt 1992 DJ 446 451. 
133 See 4.2 and 5.2 above. 
134 Van der Walt "Medieval legal theory" 31. 
135 Van der Walt 1986 JCRDL 305 311-312; Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 251. 
136 Van derWalt 1986 JCRDL 305 311-312. 
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utile. In the case of dominium utile, however, this right could be limited by the 
landlord.137 
The exclusivity of dominium was one of the central issues in the poverty 
debate. The Franciscans tended to emphasise the right of alienation and 
disposition as the essence of ownership precisely because that would enable 
them to use things without acquiring ownership. That meant that they could 
exercise entitlements of use without acquiring ownership, since use was not 
the essence of ownership. 138 On the other hand, the Dominicans placed 
emphasis on the entitlements of use in order to be able to argue that use of 
ownership also established ownership. 139 It is in response to this argument 
that William Occam once again tied dominium to the rei vindicatio, thereby to 
indicate that alienation was the essence of ownership. Since the Franciscans 
never alienated their belongings, they could not be said to have acquired 
ownership. 140 
"The end result of this debate was that the conservative 
theorists had been led to say that men, considered 
purely as isolated individuals, had a control over their 
lives which could correctly be described as dominium or 
ownership ..... (This) led pretty directly to a strong 
individualistic political theory which had to undergo only 
a few modifications to emerge as something very close 
to the classic rights theories of the seventeenth 
century."141 
137 Coing 1963 ZSS 348 358. 
138 Tuck Natural rights 21-22. 
139 In John XXll's Bull Quia virreprobus (1329)- see Tuck Natural rights 22. 
140 Tuck Natural rights 23. 
141 Tuck Natural rights 24. 
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The emergence of a voluntarist theory of ownership and the deterioration of 
feudalism signalled the end of the concept of duplex dominium. 142 William 
Occam, for instance, was concerned with the individual potestas over 
property143, which would, eventually, tend to emphasise the individuality of 
ownership. This line of thinking was continued by the late scholastics in their 
emphasis on the individual owner's freedom to use the property.144 In the end 
De Molina's transformation of Bartolus' definition resulted in individuality and 
excludability becoming the essence of the concept of ownership which would 
later lead to the absolute view of ownership. 145 
In effect, the work of the late scholastics provided the basis for the 
transformation of the ownership concept. They emphasised the individuality 
and excludability of ownership and this would become the basis for the 
absolute view of ownership. This phenomenon, combined with the rise of 
subjectivist theories of ownership, as developed by Grotius in particular, 
would shape the concept of ownership in the modern era. 146 
6.4.2 Early modem developments 
As with the other characteristics, this period saw the beginning of an 
exclusionist view of ownership. The idea that only one person could be the 
owner at a certain time was the direct result of a more uniform view. The 
emphasis on the right to exclude, already present in the medieval period, 
tended to encourage this development. 
Grotius' characterisation of dominium in the Mare liberum as privatum 
plenumque dominium147 already pointed toward a more exclusive view of 
142 See Tuck Natural rights 48. See also 6.2.2 above. 
143 Coleman 1985 Pol S 73 93-94. 
144 Van derWalt 1986 JCRDL 305 313; Van derWalt Houerskap 274-275. 
145 Van der Walt 1986 JCRDL 305 313; Van der Walt Houerskap 279. 
146 Tuck Natural rights 50. 
147 Feenstra "Eigentumsbegriff' 229. 
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ownership. 148 In his definitive lnleidinge, however, it is mentioned explicitly. 
Ownership is defined in terms of the right to restore lost possession.149 In 
roman law the rei vindicatio was available for the protection of dominium ex 
iure Quiritium. Because Grotius reserved the Bartolist definition (and the rei 
vindicatio) for owners, this meant that only owners had the right to vindicate 
their property. In this way the right to exclude those who were not owners 
became the essence of ownership.150 This right to vindicate therefore implied 
an exclusive view of ownership. 
This view of Grotius represented a natural progression from the medieval idea 
of ownership as facultas humana.151 If ownership was the expression of 
individual power, the next logical step in an individualist approach was to 
make that power as exclusive as possible. It was, in fact, the logical result of 
the importance attached to individuality, rationality and moral freedom. 152 
This idea would, however, only reach maturity in the works of the humanists 
and especially after Kant. 
In English law, it should be mentioned once again, the idea that only one 
owner could and did exist, was foreign. Even in the early law, however, the 
right to restore lost possession was regarded as typical of real rights.153 This 
statement can, however, not be left unqualified. All kinds of tenure 
presupposed certain persons or classes of persons who could not be 
excluded in one way or another, for example in the case of estates entail.154 
This was, in fact, exactly what the Benthamites had against the system.155 In 
this case, too, the new and typically modern idea of individualism and 
148 Van der Walt "Eigentumsbegriff' 488. 
149 Grotius lnleidinge 11.3.4: "(H)et toebehooren van een zaeck ... "(My emphasis). 
150 Grotius lnleidinge 11.33.1. See also Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 271; Van der Walt Houerskap 404. 
151 Van der Walt "Eigentumsbegriff' 489. 
152 Van der Walt 1992 DJ 446 452; Van den Bergh Geleerd recht 44. 
153 Megarry and Wade Real property 10. 
154 Megarry and Wade Real property 14-30. 
155 See 6.4.3.3 below. 
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exclusivity would result in new problems regarding the relationship between 
state and individual. 
Hobbes reflected this position. Because ownership was granted by the 
sovereign, it could also be invaded by the sovereign as in the case of taxes, 
confiscation/expropriation or services. 156 Locke disagreed. Because 
ownership was based on man's labour, he acquired a title that excluded the 
common ownership of others or the claims of other persons. 157 Locke's view 
therefore was that ownership was exclusive, in order to deny the sovereign 
(or anyone else) any right to it. Moreover, whereas "lives" and "liberties" 
could never be alienated, "estates" could be alienated. In this way the right to 
alienation became the criterion for distinguishing between ownership and 
other rights.158 
Both Grotius' and Locke's views were enormously influential.159 Not only 
would Locke's ideas form the basis for American property law, but it 
influenced English law as well. This exclusive view would eventually lead to 
the enclosure of the commons, with the attendant social and economic 
consequences. 160 The difference between the two influences lie in the areas 
of law they influenced. Locke's exclusivism had a political nature and this 
influenced public law in particular. Grotius, on the hand, used the exclusivism 
in a private-law conceptual scheme and, in this way, influenced private law. 
In this way the exclusivism became part of both private and public law. 
156 Hobbes Leviathan 11.18.7. 
157 Locke Two treatises 11.27: " ... it hath by this labour something annexed to i~ that excludes the 
common right of other Men.", 11.32: "He by his Labour does, as it were, inclose it from the 
Common." 
158 Ryan Property 29. 
159 See Haakonssen 1985 Pol T 239 239; Haakonssen "From natural law" 44 n55. 
160 On the enclosures and clearances, see 4.4.3.3 above. 
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6.4.3 Late modem developments 
6.4.3.1 German property law 
One of the most enduring legacies of German jurisprudence (and Kantian 
liberalism in particular) is the emphasis on individualism in law. German 
thinking, in general, placed great emphasis on ownership as the external 
sphere of individual autonomy. 161 This is the logical result of the Medieval 
idea of ownership as facultaslpotestas that was developed by Kant. Kant 
emphasised the owner as individual, whose will established ownership. 162 
The same emphasis is placed by Hegel, although he acknowledged 
limitations through the common will. 163 This idea is also found in Von 
Savigny, 164and Windscheid. 165 The exclusive view of ownership meant that it 
could never be regarded as a "bundle of powers" (as in Anglo-American law), 
since it represented the completeness of the owner's powers.166 Moreover, 
the German view was based on a Kantian morality, whilst the English opted 
for utilitarianism. 
Apart from this, Hegel's important contribution lies in his views on negation. 
In order to realise freedom (that is the realisation that the world can be what it 
is not) man must be able to negate certain things. Things can only be 
property if they can be negated, that is alienated. 167 In this way the ability to 
negate was translated as the right to alienate and this provided the distinction 
between what could and what could not be owned. 168 For this reason lives 
and liberties could not be owned, but material, external things could. 169 
161 Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 247. 
162 See Smith 1985 Rev of Pol 253 255-256; Scheltens 1980 R & R 67 67. 
163 Hegel Philosophy of right 41-44. 
164 Van der Walt Houerskap 323; Kroeschell "'Eigentumsbegriff' 39. 
165 Windscheid Lehrbuch 1.3.137.603, 1.3.167.756-757, 1.3.168.759. 
166 Van derWalt 1993 JCRDL 569 582. 
167 Hegel Philsophy of right 53. 
168 See Ryan Property 125, 129. 
169 This might have provided the philosophical justification for the German idea that incorporeals 
cannot be owned. 
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Moreover, the Kantian emphasis on freedom and will implied the exclusion of 
other wills in order to preserve a sphere of moral autonomy. 
This basic exclusive and individualist view of ownership was included in the 
BGB. 170 Ownership is described in terms of the owner's right to exclude 
others (" ... ander von jeder Einwirkung ausschliessen.") and section 985 
emphasised the importance of the rei vindicatio. In this . way German law 
developed in the direction of ownership as an individualist and exclusive right. 
In this process the systematic and abstract thinking of Grotius and 
Windscheid played a major role. 
6.4.3.2 Dutch property law 
As in the case of the other characteristics the exclusivity of Roman-Dutch 
ownership is derived from Grotius. His individualist concept of ownership, 
expressed as the proprium-aspect thereof, was accepted by most writers. 171 
This, coupled with the emphasis on human facultas, resulted in an exclusive 
concept of ownership. Huber, for instance, emphasised ownership as a 
private right belonging to one person.172 Van Leeuwen also explicitly 
mentioned exclusivity as a characteristic of ownership. 173 Van der Linden is 
the most explicit of all in his definition.174 
Although exclusivity is not mentioned explicitly in section 625 BW, section 647 
BW mandated the enclosing of common land. As in the case of Britain, this 
indicates a move towards exclusivity.175 It is the characteristic that seems to 
be the least ambiguous and problematic. 
170 Van Caenegem Introduction 157. 
171 Van der Walt "Eigentumsbegriff' 509. 
172 Huber Jurisprudence 2.2.1. 
173 Van Leeuwen Commentaries 2.2.1. 
174 Van der Linden Koopmans handboek 1.7.1. 
175 Gilissen J Historische inleiding tot het recht (Antwerp 1984) 613. 
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6.4.3.3 English property law 
The development of English property law regarding seisin indicates the 
development in this system. The gradual development from a variety of 
persons who had seisin to a single person who was seised, was accelerated 
by the theorists and by attempts to side-step the limitations on estates 
entail.176 Blackstone throughout emphasised the exclusivity of ownership 
whether in the guise of the right to restore lost possession or in terms of the 
right to alienate ownership. Both required that the owner have the right to 
exclude others. Consequently, modern property law needed to abolish both 
the restraints on alienation and the whole idea of entailed estates.177 
Restraints of either kind limited the exclusivity necessary for commerce. 
Bentham also declared himself in this regard. He stated explicitly that 
common ownership was not exclusive and private ownership exclusive. 178 
Therefore the very thing that characterises ownership as a private right is the 
idea of exclusivity. Smith too stated that "(p)roperty is to be considered an 
exclusive right."179 For him the essence of a real right was that it could be 
vindicare potest a quocunque possessore. 180 Entails had to be criticised, both 
because they infringed on exclusivity and because they were a strain on 
development.181 
It seems clear that there is a connection between exclusivity and the 
enclosures and clearances. At this stage the arguments regarding exclusivity 
serve to justify these actions. This is therefore a continuation of the public-
law exclusivism that characterises Locke's thinking. 
176 See Kempin Introduction 123ff. 
177 Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 205 330-331. 
178 Bentham Limits 61-62. 
179 Smith Lectures 10. 
180 Smith Lectures 9. 
181 Smith Lectures 469. 
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6.4..&.4 American property law 
Closely aligned with the idea of uniformity is the idea of exclusivity. In 
American law, in particular, this is associated with the protection of liberty. 
Once the connection had been made between property and liberty, it was 
necessary to make that individual liberty (and consequently ownership) as 
exclusive as possible. The rise of individualism therefore strengthened the 
connection between owner~hip and liberty.182 
For this reason ownership was characterised as a relation in rem, which 
meant that " . . . his right is against anyone or everyone ... " and as a negative 
right. 183 Consequently the right to exclude others became a primary 
characteristic of ownership. This idea was strengthened by the constitutional 
protection afforded property in the American system. Property was conceived 
as a barrier between state and individual. Already in the metaphor used the 
exclusivity is clear - it is meant as an instrument to exclude others in order to 
establish a sphere of moral autonomy. 
6.5 The objects of ownership 
6.5.1 Roman and medieval roots 
One of the characteristics of roman law was that it defined dominium in terms 
of the objects thereof. 184 Basically a distinction was made, on the basis of the 
nature of the object, between res extra commercium (things which could not 
182 Cribbet Principles 7: "Only as the individual has specific, and to a limlted extent exclusive, rights 
over a thing, does he have that liberty of action which is vitally necessary to the preservation of a 
free society. 
183 Browder, Cunningham and Julin Basic property law 5-6. 
184 See 3.2 above. See also Birks 1985 AJ 1 27: " ... Roman law distinguishes between different 
objects of meum esse rather than between different relationships to or interests in the material 
world." 
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be owned) and res in commercio (things which could be owned). 185 A further 
distinction was made between res corpora/es and res incorporales. 186 This 
objective approach characterised the roman approach to dominium as a real 
right. Where the objects of dominium were mentioned, they were discussed 
as if the question was settled and required little or no explanation. However, 
the nature of the right was often determined by the object, as in the case of 
res mancipi and res nee mancipi for example. 
This was also, basically, the approach in medieval law, although the 
development of the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal ownership 
was interesting. This development took place as a result of the poverty 
debate referred to earlier. In the fourteenth century Aegidius Romanus 
argued, in the context of the conflict between church and state, that there 
were two powers in the state - one spiritual and general (which he labelled 
incorporale) and one particular (corporale). 187 The corporale power referred 
to material things and was based on contract. In this way incorporeal 
ownership came to be identified with power (or potestas) and corporeal 
ownership with dominium. Towards the end of the medieval period, the feudal 
relations typical of that period began to disappear. Because of the rise of 
early capitalism, new property relations arose. Through the work of John of 
Paris the distinction between incorporeals/power and corporeals/ownership 
took on a new meaning. The power of the overlord was transformed into 
jurisdiction, which included the right to tax, while corporeal dominium came to 
mean individual dominium. 188 
185 G.2.1; 1.2.1 pr. See also Kleyn DG and Boraine A Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of 
ownership 2nd ed (Durban 1983) 22; Van Zyl Geskiedenis 122; Van Warrnelo Introduction 63 
par152. 
186 G.2.12-14; D.1.8.1.1; l.2.2pr. See also Birks 1985AJ 1 8. 
187 Coleman J "Medieval discussions of ownership: ratio and dominium according to John of Paris 
and Marsilius of Padua" 1983 Hist Pol T 209-228 215. 
188 Coleman 1983 Hist Pol T 209 224-225. 
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Bartolus, in typical romanist fashion on the other hand, used the term 
dominium in two different meanings. He distinguished between a wider 
concept of dominium, which included dominium of both corporeal and 
incorporeal objects (for instance ususfructus), and a narrower concept that 
referred to dominium of corporeal objects only. 189 It is in this narrower sense 
that he defines dominium by using, amongst others, the phrase de re 
corporali. This meant that dominium in the narrower sense was only possible 
with reference to corporeal objects190 and that dominium was defined in terms 
of its object. 191 
The distinction between movable and immovable objects became very 
important in the medieval period due to the importance of land in the feudal 
system and the influence of germanic law. 192 The importance given to land 
resulted in a stricter distinction between the two classes and, of the two, 
dominium of immovable objects was the more important. 193 During the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries writers were more concerned with this 
distinction. It was complicated further by other, feudal divisions. 194 
Roman and medieval approaches to dominium was, therefore, basically 
objective. Although distinctions were made and these sometimes acted as 
precursors to later developments, the basic approach remained the same. 
189 Bartolus on D.41.1; Coing 1953 ZSS 348 349. 
190 Coing 1953 ZSS 348 349; Van der Walt Houerskap 193. 
191 Coing 1953 ZSS 348 352. 
192 Van der Merwe CG "Things" in Joubert WA, Scott TJ and Van Oosten FFW (eds) The law of 
South Africa vol 27 (Durban 1987) 1-195 24; Van der Merwe Sakereg 30; Negro Eigentum 18-
21. 
193 Gilissen Historische inleidlng 590 quotes a saying of the glossators (mobilium rerum vi/is est 
possessio) to illustrate the undervaluation of movable ownership. 
194 Gilissen Historische inleiding 591. 
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6.5.2 Early modern developments 
The early modern law in Europe continued the development of learned 
Roman law. Categories of objects of legal rights were maintained and 
explained further. 195 Grotius stated that things were everything external to 
man which were of use to him. Things could be classified according to their 
nature or according to their relation with persons. In terms of their nature they 
could be classified as collections of things or particular things. Particular 
things could be either corporeal or incorporeal (such as a right of way). 196 In 
terms of their relation to persons, the well-known distinction between divini 
juris and humani juris was maintained. However, the divine things were really 
owned by man, but they had a different purpose from human things. 197 
Grotius also distinguished between alienable and inalienable objects. For 
instance a man's life, body, freedom and reputation were inalienable things. 198 
It seems clear that the various objects of ownership to a large extent still 
played an important role for Grotius. The various kinds of ownership had 
different powers and duties attached to them. However, in Grotius' system of 
rights, ownership was not classified in terms of the objects thereof, but in 
terms of its place in the conceptual system. The objects played a role in 
determining the rights and duties of property holders, but not in determining 
its nature because that nature was by definition abstract. 
English property law has always distinguished between movables and 
immovables and between real and personal property. Real property could be 
divided further into corporeal realty/hereditaments and incorporeal 
195 See Van Caenegem Introduction 45-85 and Van den Bergh Geleerd recht 37 on the reception "Of 
Roman law in this period. 
196 Grotius lnleidinge 11.1.5-14. 
197 Grotius lnleidinge 11.1.15. 
198 Grotius lnleidinge 11.1.42. 
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realtylhereditaments, such as easements, profits and rentcharges. 199 The 
main distinction had, however, always been based on types of tenure, rather 
than on the objects of the right. Therefore the objects of property played a 
smaller role in determining the scope of rights and duties. 
With Locke, however, this began to change. The shift to a subjective 
definition of ownership200 would, necessarily, tend to shift the emphasis from 
the objects of the rights to the subject of the owner.201 These subjective 
approaches were, however, not necessarily egalitarian. Tuck states that" ... 
most strong rights theories have in fact been explicitly authoritarian rather 
than libera1.•.i02 This was probably the case because it still relied on a moral 
order that tended to maintain the status quo. 
6.5.3 Late modem developments 
6.5.3.1 German property law 
In the feudal period, certain distinctions were made, for instance between 
inherited and bought objects.203 However, this last distinction was abandoned 
once feudalism ceased to play a role. What was established early was the 
distinction between ownership of corporeals and rights to incorporeals. 204 
Since the eighteenth century ownership of Sachen only was possible and this 
included only those things that could be regarded as corporeals. 205 
199 Megarry and Wade Real property 11; James Introduction 421. 
200 See 3.3 above. 
201 See Haakonssen "From natural law" 47-52 for an illustration of how this process worked in 
America. 
202 Tuck Natural rights 3. 
203 Van Maanen Eigendomsschijnbewegingen 22; Feenstra 1976 RMT 263. 
204 Van der Walt 1993 SAPL 296 303. 
205 See. eg, Puchta Pandecten 207: " ... Herrschaft Ober eigenen korperlichen Gegenstand." (My 
emphasis). 
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In Book Ill of the BGB ownership is dealt with as part of Sachenrecht, but 
what is known as intellectual ownership in other systems, is excluded. This is 
because ownership of corporeal things only is possible in terms of section 
903. 206 The German constitutional court has, however, interpreted section 14 
of the constitution wider, so that ownership of incorporeals is also protected 
constitutionally. This difference between private-law ownership and public-
law property in German law is dealt with elsewhere. 207 
6.5.3.2 Dutch property law 
The distinction between corporeals and incorporeals and between movables 
and immovables seem to have been well established by the eighteenth 
century. 208 Apart from this the usual distinction between kinds of objects is 
found. Eigendom is sometimes restricted to corporeal things, although Huber 
recognised that this is only true in the narrow sense of the word. 209 In the BW 
the same distinction can be found. 210 Ownership of incorporeals is 
recognised, although some writers insist that ownership in the strict, technical 
sense of the word is limited to corporeals only.211 
6.5.3.3 English property law 
In this respect a very interesting development occurred. English property law 
had always known objects called incorporeal hereditaments. These were real 
rights to rights in respect of land, such as easements. 212 The late modern 
period saw a process that Kennedy calls the "reification of incorporeal 
206 Cohn Manual 170, 174. 
207 See 11.1 below. 
208 Van Leeuwen Commentaries 2.1.4-2.1.15; Huber Jurisprudence 2.1.1-2.1.28. 
209 Huber Jurisprudence 2.2.5. 
210 Chorus ea Introduction 66. 
211 See Beekhuis and Mijnssen Mr C Asser's Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlandse 
burgerlijk recht. Zakenrecht Algemeen deel 1 (Zwolle 1980) 48; Van Maanen 
Eigendomsschijnbewegingen 13. 
212 Megarry and Wade Real property 12; James Introduction 421. 
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hereditaments".213 Blackstone basically organised property law according to 
the objects of ownership and the categories they belong to.214 For Blackstone 
the distinction between things reaf15 and things personaf16 corresponded to 
the distinction between immovables and movables.217 However, Blackstone 
was at pains to show that these incorporeal hereditaments were all closely 
connected with land or other real property in order to deny their unphysical 
nature.218 
In this way Blackstone reduced the intricate social relations underlying the 
incorporeal hereditaments to real relations so that they became simply rights 
to things.219 This reification is probably the result of two factors. In the first 
place, since incorporeal hereditaments had a feudal origin, its demise was 
probably the result of Blackstone's antipathy toward feudalism.220 In the 
second place it is probably the result of the rising legal formalism, which 
attempted to represent law as an abstract, neutral set of determinate, 
consistent rules. In this scheme ownership of things was seen as "a domain 
of abstract individual freedom" unconnected to the hierarchy of relations 
between persons.221 
These two factors combined to ensure the continuation of the view of property 
law as a more-or-less technical field of abstract rules that had little or nothing 
213 Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 205 432. 
214 Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 205 327. 
215 Things real could be either corporea/hereditaments (real, existing, physical objects) or incorporeal 
hereditaments (advowsons, tithes, commons, ways, offices, dignities, franchises, corodies or 
pensions, annuities and rents). See Blackstone Commentaries 11.2.21. 
216 Personal things were subdivided into things in possession (a right plus actual possession) and 
choses in action or things in action (bare right without any possession). See Blackstone 
Commentaries 11.2.383. 
217 Blackstone Commentaries 11.2.16. 
218 Blackstone Commentaries 11.2.201. 
219 Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 205 346-347. 
220 Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 205 348: " ... reification allowed him to assimilate both the remnants of 
the feudal mode of organisation and the emerging elements of the liberal mode to the model of 
the landowner controlling his land. This in turn allowed him to maintain the illusion that the long 
process of abolishing the feudal "servitudes" had been, in essence, one of social decontrol, of the 
growth and institutionalisation of freedom." 
221 Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 205 349-350. On legalism/formalism see Kop Legisme 58. 
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to do with power. In fact it legitimated the status quo.222 This would be 
continued by other writers. Bentham, for instance, saw the objects of 
ownership as being either corporeal or incorporeal. lncorporeals were, 
however, simply corporeals considered from a specific point of view because " 
... ownership must always relate to some really existent objects ... "223 In this 
way the reification was continued. Corporeal things could be either rational (a 
person) or irrational (a thing) and irrational things could be either animate 
(animals) or inanimate. Inanimate objects were either movable or 
immovable. 224 Bentham's definition therefore continued the tradition of basing 
the rules relating to ownership on the types of objects. The tradition was also 
continued by Smith, especially since he never even mentioned 
incorporeals.225 To a large extent this was the result of the negative attitude 
towards everything that had to do with feudalism, in this case the services 
associated with that system. 
6.5.3.4 American property law 
It is in respect of the objects of property that American law developed in a 
unique way. During the eighteenth century Blackstone's reified view of 
ownership226 was prevalent in positive law. Property was seen as an absolute 
right that could only exist in respect of corporeal or tangible objects.227 
Because private property was protected so absolutely, it quickly became the 
paradigm for the way in which all rights should be protected. In order, 
therefore, to protect other rights in the same absolute way and, based on 
Hohfeld's theory of rights, more things were classified specifically as property. 
222 Kennedy 1979 Buffalo LR 205 350: "His structure suggested that the human universe could be 
divided into two parts·. a world of hierarchically ordered relations of people to one another, and an 
egalitarian world in which people dominated objects. The function of this odd procedure was to 
legitimate the status quo." 
223 Bentham Limits 326. 
224 Bentham Limits 326. 
225 For his classification see Smith Lectures 459. 
226 See 6.4. 1. 5 above. 
227 Vandevelde 1980 Buffalo LR 325 330. 
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Business goodwill, accession, trademarks and trade names were all regarded 
as property and protected in the same absolute way.228 What was already 
implicit outside constitutional law was now made explicit in the realm of public 
law. In this process the realists played a major role because of their 
insistence on a focus away from objects and towards social function and 
relations. 
This process of dephysicalization resulted in the view that every contract 
created a property right and that these had to be protected in the same way 
as private property of corporeal things.229 Consequently, even the breach of a 
contractual obligation was seen as a violation of property rights and intangible 
property was protected like private property of tangibles. 230 
The problem with this view of property surfaced near the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. It became apparent 
that the absolute protection of contracts was detrimental to the competition 
required by a free-market, capitalist economy. 231 The courts were faced with 
the dilemma of reconciling " ... their desire to protect contractual property from 
interference with their reluctance to immunise individuals from the rigors of 
competition."232 By the beginning of the twentieth century the real question 
was whether courts should encourage competition or protect property rights in 
the form of contracts. 
Early twentieth-century American law distinguished between real property/real 
estate (immovables/land) and personal property. Personal property (or 
chattels) could be either tangible or intangible (for example shares). 233 This 
did not, however, mean that property was to be identified with the object. 
228 Vandevelde 1980 Buffalo LR 325 335-340. 
229 Frug 1980 Harvard LR 1510 1511. 
230 Frug 1980 Harvard LR 1510 1524. 
231 Frug 1980 Harvard LR 1510 1529. 
232 Frug 1980 Harvard LR 1510 1532. 
233 Browder, Cunningham and Julin Basic property law 3; Cribbet Principles 9. 
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"(Y)ou must distinguish between the thing (res) and the estates, interests or 
claims which people may own in a thing. . .. property is a concept, separate 
and apart from the thing. Property consists, in fact, of the legal relations 
among people in regard to a thing."234 In this respect, then, developments in 
American ownership law turned Blackstone on his head. The reification of 
incorporeal property attempted by Blackstone became the dephysicalization 
of property instead. 
6.6 Conclusion 
It now seems very clear that the view that ownership has certain 
characteristics and has always had them, is extremely far-fetched. In fact, 
given the societal basis of ownership, it would be difficult to imagine that it 
could be the same in legal and political cultures as diverse as that of the 
roman republic, medieval feudal society and nineteenth century capitalism. 
What is undeniable is that the concept of ownership at the beginning of the 
twentieth century in most legal systems was an absolute, individual, exclusive 
and abstract one. The reasons why this should be the case is the interesting 
aspect of this development. Three factors played a role in this. 
In the first place the rise of liberalism, with its emphasis on individualism and 
autonomy, played an important role. As was the case in the justificatory 
debate, the increasing emphasis on the liberal subject tended to make 
ownership more and more absolute. While medieval society and law tended 
to see the individual as part of a community, liberalism tended to abstract the 
individual from that communal context. The rights that this individual had 
could only be limited by the individual himself, either through contract or 
through voting. Either way, the individual will is crucial for the justification of 
234 Cribbet Principles 2. 
Characteristics of ownership 147 
limitations. In this scheme, ownership became the boundary between private 
and public. 
In the second place liberalism worked with a basic public/private split. The 
private relationships between people were seen as the most important and as 
a sphere outside government control. This had the effect of emphasising 
private legal relations and private law. In this way private law became 
paradigmatic for all law so that even the relationship between state and 
citizen was privatised. (Think of the social contract.) If ownership was the 
perfect private right and private law the paradigm, ownership was to become 
the perfect right. To this end all fundamental rights were measured against 
ownership. 
In the third place the "scientification" of law, modo geometrico, also 
influenced this process. The idea, which originated from Grotius and Kant 
and was continued by the utilitarians, Blackstone and the Pandectists, of an 
abstract system of law (divorced from morality and religion) resulted in an 
abstract view of ownership. Ownership could no longer be defined in terms of 
its objects or the specific relation between persons, it had to be abstracted 
from this context. In this way uniformity and abstractness became 
characteristic of ownership. 

CHAPTER 7: ALTERNATIVE HISTORIES 
(HOW TO DO THINGS WITH FACTS) 
''The fact is that we live in a profoundly anti-female 
society, ... Within this society it is men who rape, who 
sap women's energy, who deny women economic and 
political power. To allow oneself to know and name 
these facts is to commit anti-gynocidal acts.''1 
''Truth is the daughter of Time, not of Authority"2 
7.1 Summary: the story thus far 
Two things have become clear from the historical study. In the first place it is 
obvious that the assumptions referred to in chapter 2 are typically modern 
ones that could only have been created after the rejection of feudalism and 
the rise of the modern state. In all cases it appears that it would be absurd to 
expect to find these assumptions in previous periods, due to the nature of law 
and of society in these periods. Once again this illustrates the contextual 
nature of property. 
For instance, in the creation of the conceptualist model and the scientific ideal 
for law (which implied a rational method on a moral base) the work of Kant, 
Grotius and Windscheid played a pivotal role. However, the pretension of an 
abstract concept only became possible within the context of the modern 
period once the idea of law as a system of rights was postulated. This would 
have been unthinkable in an earlier period. Furthermore, because the idea of 
a hierarchy of rights only became possible within the conceptual framework, it 
was also only in the modern period that the importance of property became an 
issue. In this way it becomes clear that the central role that property plays 
within liberalism is inextricably tied to conceptualism. 
1 Daly Gyn/Ecology 29. 
2 Francis Bacon, as quoted by Miles R The women's history of the world (New York 1988) 225. 
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Because the justificatory theories of property had been based on natural law, 
the demise of natural law also meant the end of the debate on justification. 
Once property is based on the rights of the autonomous subject, it needs no 
further justification. The rise of individualism thus gave rise to subjectivism in 
property law. This development was only possible once natural law had been 
rejected and this only became possible in the modern era. Thus the rejection 
of natural law and feudalism made individualism possible and this could only 
occur in the modern world. 
In the second place it has become clear that, although there are obvious 
differences, there are also striking similarities between the civil-law and 
common-law approaches to property. Of these the most obvious is the strong 
aversion to feudalism that marks these legal systems. Underlying this 
obvious similarity, is the fact that the developments in the legal systems that 
were studied were naturally the result of the same philosophical Zeitgeist. 
Because these systems were influenced by the same philosophical, political 
and economic ideas, it comes as no surprise that they have a lot in common. 
An example of this is the scientification of law. Based on the successes of the 
natural sciences and under the influence of early positivism, this effort to 
make law (as with all humanities) more like the natural sciences led to the rise 
of conceptualism in law. This development can be found in the work of such 
diverse figures as Grotius, Windscheid, Langdell, Hohfeld, and, to a lesser 
extent, Blackstone and Bentham. This conceptualism is the single most 
important factor in the view of property as the paradigm right in the hierarchy 
of rights. 
7.2 The alternative storylines 
It has become clear that, in Western, liberal thinking, property is mostly 
portrayed as a neutral or abstract concept that has remained essentially the 
same throughout history and which is not influenced by political, social, 
economic or ideological ideas and practices. This concept is the concept of 
property that, when applied formally, will have equitable results. Thus 
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property is property is property, and has always been that. To strengthen this 
view, the history of property is represented as either a struggle of an 
essentially unchanging concept to free itself from exterior constraints (such as 
feudalism) or as the unfolding of essentially the same concept that just 
revealed its liberal nature progressively in the course of history. Either way, 
the result is the abstract, neutral view of property as the perfect sphere of 
freedom, non-interference and privacy. In this way property is linked to liberty 
as a necessary prerequisite. Property therefore embodies cherished human 
values. But, it is only the scientific, technocratic, private-law view of private 
property that embodies these values, and, in this way, the public/private split 
so vital to liberalism is also maintained. 
"Property is, in this vision, something 'apart' from social 
forces and collective power. It is self-evident, self-
executing, and self-justifying."3 
Of course this view did not fall from the sky. In particular the renaissance, 
reformation and (political and scientific) revolutions of the sixteenth to 
eighteenth century paved the way for the conceptualism, individualism and 
exclusivity that eventually shaped the property concept. The picture 
presented by the traditional history paints a rosy picture. This period of 
history is represented as the emergence from the "dark" middle ages, the 
attainment of freedom in every way, the movement from status to contract, 
from feudalism to capitalism, from stagnation to progression. And in this 
movement property played a central role as both medium and goal. Closure 
is achieved through the codification and constitutional protection of this 
property concept. 4 
3 Underkuffler-Freund LS "Takings and the nature of property" 1996 Can JLJ 161-205 201. 
4 This will be dealt w~h in the next section. 
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Of course this way of looking at property is only half the picture. What it 
represents is basically a male, bourgeois story and as such it is also basically 
incomplete. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to make this picture 
more complete. It will, therefore, concentrate on the alternative storylines that 
indicate the consequences of conceptualism. 
7.2.1 History and herstory 
''The key to understanding women's 
history is in accepting - painful though it 
may be - that it is the history of the 
majority of the human race.''5 
Apart from the fact that the history presented in the previous chapters 
indicates that the property concept is a fundamentally modern one, this 
history is also a fundamentally masculinist one. In a very literal way, it is his-
story. The masculinist story is one in which nature is increasingly subjected 
to the will and control of men by rational methodology. This is made possible 
by the increasing freedom provided by private property.6 The property 
concept is represented as neutral, abstract and inherently just and this tends 
to blind one to the patriarchal foreground. A history that concentrates on 
women's experience, however, paints a picture that is in stark contrast to the 
one set out previously. 
The alternative storyline set out below will concentrate on two aspects. In the 
first place it will provide her-stories that indicate the different background 
narratives against which property needs to be understood. In the second 
place a more theoretical question needs to be raised. This deals not with the 
history, but with the feminist reaction to and modification of the property 
concept itself. 
5 Lerner G, as quoted by Miles Women's history 1. 
6 Of course, this story starts much earlier than the modern period. The voluntarist definitions, 
scientific method and natural law assumptions about man and nature underpin this story. 
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7.2.1.1 Her-stories 
When providing alternatives for male history, feminist historians are at pains 
to indicate that her-story can never be just one story. There are different 
stories to be told, simply because there is no "generic woman", nor any 
monolithic "woman's point of view".7 Therefore this story needs to be read in · 
conjunction with the other equality stories told below. What follows is then an 
alternative to the rosy picture of the liberal Enlightenment era presented 
above. 
The reformation that is presented as the achievement of freedom from roman 
catholicism in the case of women only meant a re-formation of patriarchy. For 
instance, the witch-hunts of the medieval period continued unabated. 
Zealous catholic torturers were replaced by equally zealous protestant 
torturers. Even the textbook (the Malleus Maleficiarum) remained the same. 8 
Conservative estimates are that about 9 million women died in these witch-
hunts. That this was not a mere chance happening is illustrated by the 
militarism and hatred of women that was part and parcel of protestant 
language and metaphor. 
This period is also represented as a renaissance of learning and culture, but, 
in the case of women, it was a re-birth of an even more oppressive patriarchy. 
The nunneries that had provided the only opportunity for learning to women 
were closed due to the rise of protestantism. At the same time universities 
and professions remained reserved for men. Moreover, medical knowledge 
that had been passed from mother to daughter since time immemorial was 
lost because these women were accused of witchcraft and inevitably killed. 
7 Elam D Feminism and deconstru.ction - Ms en Abyme (London 1994) 37ff; Rhode DL ''The 
politics of paradigms: gender difference and gender disadvantage" in Bock G and James S (ed) 
Beyond equality and difference (London 1992) 149-163 158. 
8 Daly Gyn/ecology 185: "Thus also protestants, though bitterly opposed to catholicism. vied with 
and even may have surpassed their catholic counterparts in their fanaticism and cruelty during 
the witchcraze. Typically, each used the orthodoxy of the other to entrap women under the witch 
label." 
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The political revolutions, too, turned out to be fraud on women. Women had 
been active in all these revolutions, only to discover that liberte and egalite 
were inextricably and literally tied to fraternite in a literal sense. The political 
discourses of Grotius, Kant, Locke and Windscheid " . . . were not meant to 
include women, and their coherence depend(ed) partially on (women's) 
continuing exclusion".9 It was, therefore, a re-volution of a male view of public 
life. 
On a larger scale the subjection of women seemed to be a logical part of the 
project of the Enlightenment, precisely because women were associated with 
nature. 10 If nature was to be subjected to man's control, that subjection had 
to apply to women as well. Consequently, while for men this is a narrative of 
freedom, for women it is a narrative of subjection. Men had property and 
could acquire freedom. Women were denied property and thus had no 
freedom. That is why the male pronoun has been used throughout this study 
so far, for when writers speak of owners as he it is not meant generically. It is 
meant to indicate men as owners and women as property. Therefore it should 
also come as no surprise that the end of female control over resources and 
the beginning of the idea of man the owner coincided with the rise of 
patriarchy and monotheistic religions. 11 
The net result of this was the birth of the idea of man the owner/master. Men 
became owners and holders of everything, including women and children, so 
that, by the eighteenth century women could but rarely be owners. 12 The 
industrial revolution only confirmed this state of affairs, and Blackstone was 
able to proclaim: "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: 
9 Flax J "Beyond equality: gender justice and difference" in Bock G and James S {ed} Beyond 
equality and difference {London 1992) 193-210 195. 
10 See Miles Women's history 192 on the manipulation of this perception in the ea~y sciences of 
craniology and psychology. 
11 See Miles Women's history 48. 
12 Consequently, property was held by either the lather or the husband - see Miles Women's history 
88, 122. See also Watkins SA, Rueda M and Rodriguez M Feminism for beginners (Cambridge 
1992) 41, 56. 
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that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during 
the marriage."13 This meant that when women got married (the only 
"profession" open to them apart from prostitution) their property was 
transferred to their husbands who had complete control over its disposition. 
In the so-called "new world" too the granting of land to single women was 
prohibited and women who became owners of land through inheritance, had 
to marry within seven years or forfeit the land.14 Philosophically speaking the 
idea of women as owners did not make sense. A prerequisite for ownership 
was ownership of the self, and, since women did not own their own bodies, 
they could not become owners through labour. 15 
Since women could also not vote, it is not farfetched to say that they were not 
only civilly dead, but also publicly dead. As far as the law was concerned, 
women simply did not exist. Because they rarely owned property, they also 
had no access to power, freedom and economic wealth. Privately and 
publicly she had no rights, no freedom, no power. This is the reality of 
women's lives that is masked by the law and property concept with its 
pretensions of neutrality and equality. 
7.2.1.2 The theoretical question 
The economic effect of this history of subjection is that, by the end of the 
twentieth century, women perform 75% of all work, receive 10% of the world's 
wages and own 1 % of all property. 16 The question arises whether this state 
of affairs is an unfortunate legacy of historical oddities or an implicit part of 
the property concept. 
13 Blackstone Commentaries I.XV.iii. 
14 Miles Women's history 167, 241; Watkins ea Feminism 163. 
15 Davidoff"Public and private" 236, 237. 
16 See Leghorn Land Parker K Woman's worth: sexual economics and the world of women 
(Boston Mass 1981 ). See also Miles Women's history 241; Watkins ea Feminism 163. 
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In the first place it must be emphasised that, as the historical study has 
shown, there are no neutral theories or concept. In the same way as the 
property concept is not economically or politically neutral, it can be shown 
that it is not sexually neutral either. 17 In fact, some of the most central tenets 
of the property concept are masculinist and therefore imply discrimination. A 
few examples will be discussed here. 
In the first place the rise of individualism led to the appearance of dichotomies 
in the new legal science. The construction of the morally autonomous 
individual subject required the simultaneous construction of "the other". This 
basic dichotomy (self/other) served as the basis for others, such as 
subject/object, man/woman, and public/private. These all have an element of 
power, since the first element is always privileged over the second. This kind 
of hierarchical thinking is also apparent in the property concept that operates 
with dichotomies like real righUpersonal right, ownership/limited real right, 
private ownership/public property. Once again the first is privileged over the 
second. Seen from this perspective, the property concept is a reflection of the 
power structures in society. 
In the second place the property concept serves to keep the power 
imbalances in place through its emphasis on exclusivity. Minow has proven 
that exclusion nearly always indicates discrimination. 18 The notion that a 
right to exclude is central raises, for Radin too, a " . . . disquieting inference 
about discrimination . . . "19 This hostility toward exclusion may also have a 
psychological basis in the female development of attachment.20 In the third 
place property as a right within rights talk (or a rights-based language) is 
17 Gilligan C In a different voice: psychological theory and women's development (Cambridge 
Mass 1982) 6: " ... theories formerly considered to be sexually neutral in their scientific objectivity 
are found instead to reflect a consistent observational and evaluative bias." 
18 See Minow Making all the difference 146ff. 
19 Radin MJ "The consequences of conceptualism" 1986 U Miami LR 239-244 241. 
20 Gilligan In a different voice 8: "Since masculinity is defined through separation while femininity 
is defined through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by intimacy while female gender 
identity is threatened by separation." 
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often seen as a male-created idiolect that is " . . . inimical to feminist 
ambitions. "21 Psychologically speaking, rights talk seems to be typical of male 
responses to ethical dilemmas in that these dilemmas are recast as a morality 
Of rights based on separation and individuation.22 Moreover, such rights talk 
also serves to isolate and disempower the disadvantaged.23 
There is a temptation at this point to advocate a "feminist" property concept 
that is, in all respects, the exact opposite of the concept discussed above. If 
the patriarchal property concept is abstract, individualist and exclusionary, it 
is assumed that the feminist concept must be concrete, communitarian and 
inclusive. Many new theories in fact depart from exactly this perspective. 
However, such an approach is merely a continuation of the accepted 
dichotomies. There is no rule that states that property must be either 
inclusive or exclusive - it can be both or neither. One should not, therefore, 
.get caught in a P/-P scheme which limits the imagination. Moreover, just as 
there is no "generic woman", there is also no single conceptual feminist 
framework to solve these problems. 24 A feminist approach therefore needs to 
be open to various theories. 
Property is, therefore, a social construct that seeks to reward "men's work" but 
which, consistently, undervalues "women's work". It is a basically pro-male 
view of the relationship between individuals and exterior things. It has been 
consistently changed to accommodate men's notions of what is to be called 
"property". Hence, slavery was criticised as the unacceptable "property" of 
people, while very few male jurists had trouble in accepting women as the 
property of men. It has been shaped by very basic ideas on the nature of 
male-female relationships. 
21 Hutchinson AC "Part of an essay on power and interpretation (with suggestions on how to make 
bouillabaisse)" 1985 NYULR 850-886 87611. 
22 Gilligan In a different voice 17-19. See 13.4 below for a detailed discussion of this difference. 
23 Rose CM "Property as the keystone right?" 1996 Notre Dame LR 329-365 350. 
24 Rhode "Politics of paradigms" 149 158. 
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In essence then, the liberal concept of property could be linked to cherished 
values of liberty and equality, but only in the case of men. Liberty and 
equality (like property) were the prerogative of males, and a very specific 
class of males at that. Even with the removal of barriers to women's 
participation, very little has changed in respect of property. The liberal 
concept, with its ideological baggage and abstract pretensions, cannot meet 
the challenge of this kind of equality. 
7.2.2 And liberty for all? 
One of the oldest dilemmas in the theory of property has been how to justify a 
free and unlimited property based on control and an absolute right of 
disposition, without at the same time justifying slavery. This problem of 
slavery has plagued the debate for many centuries and is still, today, at the 
heart of many debates. 25 
The idea of slavery has always been slightly distasteful to philosophers. It 
was sometimes justified as natural (if the man is born into slavery) and 
sometimes as conventional (as in the case of captives of war). 26 Christianity 
justified it on the basis of man's sinfulness, so that liberty was only applicable 
to men before sin.27 This justification, coupled with Aquinas' Aristotelianism, 
justified the church's own extensive slaveholding.28 The Medieval emphasis 
on the right of disposition, as the characteristic of property, and the view of 
liberty as a kind of property, resulted in the view that liberty must also be 
alienable. If property was a natural right (based on alienability)29 and one had 
25 It must be noted here that these philosophers were worried about the property rights of men and 
not about the property rights of women in marriage. 
26 See Aristotle Politica (New York 1943 Tr by B Jowett) 2.3, 5; 1.4-6. 
27 See Kelly History 106. 
28 Kelly History 148-149. 
29 See 5.2 above on the poverty debate. 
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property of one's liberty (as a kind of dominium), then slavery could also be 
natural.30 Liberty could be alienated and this made slavery justifiable. 
Of course, this view was not held universally. Several writers denied the 
naturalness of slavery,31 while others denied that liberty was a kind of 
dominium and so denied that liberty could be alienated.32 By the end of the 
renaissance, slavery had been abolished in most parts of Europe, only to 
become a problem anew with the colonisation of the Americas and Africa. It 
was only with the advent of the idea of inalienable rights that the institution of 
slavery was finally abolished.33 Still, it could be pointed out that, in a truly 
conventional definition of property, the objects of property are also 
determined by the convention. Consequently, there is nothing "natural" that 
prohibits slavery - it is conventionally determined. 
The debate about slavery and property in a paradoxical way illustrates that 
property is not neutral. If property were truly an abstract concept that was 
characterised by autonomy, the question of human beings as objects would 
simply never have arisen. As it was, the rejection of slavery points toward a 
much more limited view of property. Property was essentially determined by 
the views on the nature of humanity and of rights in a particular period. It is, 
and has always been, part and parcel of the political, social, philosophical 
and economic structure of a society. It must be understood, and will only 
make sense, as part of that context. This implies that there have always been 
limitations that were not based on either contract or ballot, but which existed 
outside the owner's will. It implies that property has always been an 
inherently limited concept, it was just represented as essentially unlimited. 
30 Tuck Natural rights 29. 
31 Kelly History 194. 
32 Notable among these was De Vitoria - see Tuck Natural rights 49. 
33 Tuck Natural rights 53-54, 147. 
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7.2.3 Property and equality 
The conflict between property and liberty is not the only one worrying 
liberalism. The liberal concept of property also has to deal with the conflict 
between property and equality. This has already been indicated in the 
discussion on property and feminism. But there is an even more fundamental, 
conceptual difficulty. There are many views as to what would constitute a 
liberal concept of property,34 but such a concept should, as a minimum, 
include the basic ideals of liberalism. The basic goal of liberalism is the 
development of individual capabilities on the basis of equality. To achieve 
this the individual needs a sphere that is guaranteed to be free from state 
intervention. Private property is the institution that guarantees this state-free 
zone.35 Therefore, private property provides the freedom for individuals to 
develop on a basis of equality without state intervention.36 
The problem with the link between property and equality is that, if property is 
not equally distributed, some will lack this prerequisite for freedom either 
completely or in part. 37 The dilemma for liberals is therefore to either justify 
the unequal distribution of property or accept government intervention to 
distribute property equally. Both alternatives are equally in conflict with the 
fundamental ideas of liberalism.38 In this regard then the liberal concept of 
property, as enshrined in the constitutions of most liberal democracies, is a 
conceptually contradictory view. It is only comprehensible within the value 
structure of contemporary liberalism that elevates property above both liberty 
and equality. 
34 See, for instance, Nozick R Anarchy, state and utopia (Oxford 1974) 172 and Nock CJ "Equal 
freedom and unequal property: a critique of Nozick's libertarian case" 1992 Can J Pol S 677-695 
677-680. 
35 See Gill 1983 J of Pol 675 679; Van derWalt 1992 SAJHR 431 447. 
36 See Levy 1983 Rev of Pol 576 577; Underkuffier 1990 Yale lJ 127 139; Reich 1964 Yale LJ 733 
733. 
37 Waldron Private property 412 states: "Freedom requires private property, and freedom for all 
requires private property for all. Nothing less will do." 
38 See Gill 1983 J of Pol 675 676-678. 
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Moreover, as Flax has pointed out, "(e)quality seems to require some uniform 
way to answer the question, equal in regard to what?"39 If all were to be 
placed in a position equal to that of a white male, that would reinforce this 
position as the "normal" one. In a word, it would ensure that this be the 
standard for property and would stabilise the conceptual dichotomies.40 
7 .3 A conclusion midway 
The purpose of this section was to attempt to destabilise a number of 
assumptions about the history of property. In the course of this investigation 
it has become apparent that property has always meant exactly what a certain 
group at a certain point in time decided it should mean - nothing more and 
nothing less. Consequently, property is not always property. There is nothing 
eternal about private property and certainly not about the liberal idea of 
property so prevalent in the late twentieth century. While it is true that human 
beings have always appropriated things for their own or their group's use, this 
should not be taken to mean that private property is a natural attribute or 
characteristic of humanity. That would be, as Simone de Beauvoir said, " ... 
to equate significance with necessity. "41 Private property is a human, societal 
construct. It has been used and abused to order human society on the basis 
of widely divergent views on its origin, justification and importance. 
It has, moreover, also been shown that the formalist application of the private-
law property concept does not necessarily guarantee either equality or liberty. 
In fact, the very concept itself may make equality and liberty unattainable 
goals. This inevitably leads to the question whether the constitutional 
protection of property can make these goals attainable. That will be the focus 
of the next section of this study. 
39 Flax "Beyond equality'' 193 194. 
40 Rhode "Politics of paradigms" 149 155. 
41 De Beauvoir S The second sex (London 1953 Tr HM Parshley) 38. This was her reaction to 
Hegel's view on the relationship between male and female. 

PART II: CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
CHAPTER 8: INTRODUCTION 
"Relying on early nineteenth century ideas to tackle and 
resolve late twentieth century problems, is like trying to 
repair a computer with a hammer and chisel: it will do 
much more harm than good. "1 
8.1 The problem restated 
In part I of this study, the historical development of the private-law property 
concept was examined. Although property is often represented as an 
unchanging, abstract and, above all, private right, the study proved that this 
was a typically modern idea. The modern idea was that property was an 
abstract concept, which could not therefore be influenced by social factors. 
The historical study also showed that property is not, nor has it ever been, a 
static, neutral or abstract concept. In fact, it has always been profoundly 
influenced by social, philosophical and political factors. 2 The history of the 
property concept is one of a constantly shifting concept determined by its 
context. However, this notion never found acceptance in private law, because 
it is dominated by the modernist idea of abstract and absolute property rights. 
Whatever its historic roots, however, it was the modern private-law concept of 
property (as neutral, abstract and private) that was incorporated into the 
French Declaration des droits du /'homme et du citoyen (1789) and American 
constitution of 1787. These constitutions became the paradigm, at least 
conceptually, for most twentieth century constitutions. 
Hutchinson AC and Petter A "Private rights/public wrongs: the liberal lie of the Charter" 1988 U 
Toronto U 278-296 289. 
2 Philbrick 1938 U Penn LR 691 696. 
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The result of this was that the private-law concept of property became part of 
twentieth-century constitutional theory and practice. In the constitutional 
context the private-law property concept is accepted as a necessary part of 
and precondition for liberalism. Therefore the private-law property concept is 
transformed into a liberal property concept. 
The liberal property concept is based on three theses. The first is the 
justificatory thesis, that states that the concept is justified by and based on the 
essential nature and needs of the individual. Thus property is an individual 
(or private) right. This is the constitutional restatement of the idea of 
individuality in the private-law property concept. The second is the systematic 
thesis, namely that property is a right, and more specifically an abstract right. 
Once again this is a restatement of the idea of abstractness in the private-law 
concept. The third is the political thesis, namely that the state creates and 
enforces individual property rights. 3 Especially in the case of the third thesis, 
the underlying assumption is that a pre-political boundary exists between the 
collective (the state) and the individual, which boundary needs to be 
defended and patrolled by means of the law. In constitutional terms, this 
translates into the idea that a constitution polices the boundary between state 
and individual.4 To a large extent, the property concept determines where 
that boundary should be drawn. 
This liberal property concept also implies a liberal political theory, namely that 
of the minimum state.5 Because the individual needs a protected, pre-political 
sphere to attain true liberty,6 the state should interfere as little as possible in 
this sphere. In this night-watchman state, any intervention by the state is 
regarded as temporary and exceptional. Property serves to maintain this 
3 See Longo JP ''The concept of property and the concept of compensation on compulsory 
acquisition of land" 1983 U Tasmania LR 279-294 289. 
4 Hutchinson and Petter 1988 U Toronto LJ 278 284. 
5 Most recently defended by Nozick Anarchy, state and utopia, but already present in the theories 
of Locke, Blackstone, Bentham, Hume and Langdell. 
6 See Gill 1983 J of Pol 675 679; Van der Walt 1992 SAJHR 431 447. 
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state-free sphere.7 Thus the liberal concept of property and liberal political 
theory are inter-dependent. 
This liberal concept, both of the state and of property, was incorporated into 
some constitutions. Others used the liberal property concept but within the 
context of a socialist political theory. Whatever the case the subsequent 
conflict over property provides insight into how the conflict between state and 
individual in general is viewed and resolved. Moreover, in the second half of 
the twentieth century, many of the liberalist ideas and values are no longer 
appropriate. State intervention into what used to be regarded as "private" 
matters, is no longer merely tolerated as exceptional, but is regarded as a 
necessary precondition for justice and equality. It is against this background 
that the constitutional property concept needs to be evaluated. 
When confronted by a constitutional property clause, judges seem to have 
two alternatives. On the one hand they can regard the property concept in 
the constitution as basically the same as the one found in private law. In 
other words, what the constitution protects as property is exactly the same as 
that protected by private law. This approach means that the private-law 
paradigm is used for constitutional analysis. Apart from the fact that this 
enhances the position of the private-law paradigm in law generally, it, more 
importantly, disguises the political assumptions imbedded in that paradigm. 
On the other hand, courts can acknowledge that something called 
constitutional property exists side-by-side with private property. The problem 
with this approach is that, if a constitutional property concept is 
acknowledged, the traditional elements/characteristics of private property 
cannot necessarily be attributed to it. If this constitutional property concept is 
not the same as the abstract, seemingly a-political private property concept, 
7 levy 1983 Rev of Pol 576 577: "Property as a defined sphere of private right has been 
understood in all varieties of liberal thinking as a barrier to state power and as a secure realm for 
individual human actions and freedom." See also Underkuffler 1990 Yale lJ 127 139; Reich 
1964 Yale lJ 733 733. 
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what then is its content? How is constitutional property to be defined? What 
kinds of rights will be included therein? And, above all, can the court maintain 
its stance of being a-political if the private-property paradigm is abandoned? 
Of course, this kind of differentiation, on another level, also exacerbates the 
private/public split. 
The courts are therefore confronted with something that has a very settled 
and unquestioned meaning and force in private law, but which they have to 
deal with/interpret/apply in a different, constitutional context. This not only 
confronts them with the two choices outlined above, but also goes to the heart 
of liberal political theory. Thus. for instance, the American court in Lochner v 
New Yori! opted for the traditional private-law concept in settling a labour 
dispute, based on a political choice in favour of the minimum state. On the 
other hand, the German court, in the Warenzeichen case, 9 decided that the 
constitutional property concept needed to be determined by the constitution 
itself, based on a political choice that moved away from laissez-faire 
liberalism. In a post-modern setting, judges need to make these kinds of 
decisions in the context of the post-modern state in their judgements about 
the property clause. The irony is that the liberal property clause is based on 
nineteenth-century liberalism and judges need to deal with that clause within 
a constitutional context quite different from the nineteenth-century one. 
Some analyses of the constitutional property concept tend to focus on the 
relevant section of the constitution in terms of certain categories. Attention is 
given to the various clauses making up the property clause and the case law 
dealing with this. 10 In this way the type of problems that all or most systems 
need to deal with, are highlighted. Typically, the focus has been on the 
difference between expropriation/takings and regulation/police powers and on 
8 Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905). 
9 BVetfGE 51, 193 (1979]. 
10 See, for example, Van der Walt AJ "Comparative notes on the constitutional protection of property 
rights" 1993 R & K 263-297. 
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the question of compensation. This study will not deal with these questions, 
at least not directly or exhaustively. The focus will be on the property 
concept, and the impact, if any, of a constitution on this concept. This 
particular focus does not, however, mean that the other questions can be 
ignored. In particular, the question of how "public purpose" is to be 
understood and how compensation is to be calculated may provide important 
clues to the content of the concept.11 It might, for instance, indicate whether 
property is regarded as absolute or as essentially limited. What would 
constitute "public purpose" would normally indicate the accepted level of 
interference by the state in private property. In this way all the various issues 
are inter-connected. 
The focus of this study furthermore assumes that the debate on property and 
the property clause takes place against the background of, and is determined 
by, a much larger debate. This larger debate is about the issues that every 
constitution needs to address and tries to resolve, namely the conflicts 
between democracy and judicial review; between interference and protection; 
between individual and state; and, ultimately, between freedom and equality. 
{To a very large degree the property concept accepted in a particular system 
is indicative of the resolution that system accepts for these conflicts. In this 
regard the property concept may be both example and paradigm/model. For 
this reason the political and constitutional backgrounds against which the 
property concept functions, need to be studied. 
8.2 Comparing notes 
There is a tendency among interpreters of constitutions, especially in the case 
of fairly young constitutions, to be reluctant to use and even to be wary of 
foreign case law. This is also true in the case of the interpretation of a 
11 It is exactly this connection indicated by Longo 1983 U Tasmania LR 279-294. 
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property clause and perhaps even more so.12 This reluctance is justified as 
an attempt to develop the law within the unique, organic system of law of that 
particular community. Of course this justification may well signify nothing 
more than a genuine need to be responsive to the needs of a specific people. 
It might, however, also indicate methodological and structural underpinnings 
that pre-determine answers. 
In particular, remnants of eighteenth century idealism might account for a 
preoccupation with what is perceived as national, "organic" and unique 
issues. The belief in the structural integrity and self-sufficiency of a legal 
system (derived from nineteenth-century rationalism and pandectism) tends to 
strengthen this. Combined, they tend to make comparative analysis not only 
unnecessary, but also almost sacrilegious. If, therefore, the pandectist view 
of law is maintained, comparative case law will be regarded as (possibly) 
interesting, but rarely convincing. This problem is aggravated by an 
insistence on the fundamental difference between common-law and civil-law 
systems. There are three reasons for not following this approach. 
In the first place, as was the case with the private/public split so typical of 
liberalism, this type of approach tends to make one think in terms of us/them 
(or P/-P). In this way the inter-connectedness and inter-dependence of not 
only people,13 but also legal systems, are denied.14 The recognition of 
fundamental rights as more or less universal seems to indicate a need for a 
less particularised approach. This is not meant to indicate that fundamental 
rights are natural or derived from natural law, but to indicate the impossibility 
of a legal system existing in "splendid isolation". Thus, neglecting 
comparative analysis seems like trying to reinvent the wheel with plenty of 
12 In particular, there seems to be almost a knee-jerk reaction to anything American, while most 
acknowledge the American Bill of Rights as foundational to their own. 
13 Hutchinson and Petter 1988 U Toronto LJ 278 296. 
14 See, for instance, chapter 7 on the surprising similar~ies between disparate systems of law. 
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very nice wheels lying around. On the other hand it could also indicate a 
number of square wheels that don't work and therefore shouldn't be copied. 
In the second place comparative analysis has, traditionally, been limited to 
comparable legal systems. This would mean that a civil-law system can only 
be compared to other civil-law systems and the same would be true (mutatis 
mutandis) for common-law systems. In this case, however, such an approach 
will be impoverishing for two reasons. In the first place, courts seem to find 
connections between different legal families almost despite their reluctance to 
do so. For example, in both the Oavies-case15 and the Kameshwar Singh-
case, 16 the Zimbabwean and Indian courts respectively held that the doctrine 
of eminent domain is derived from Grotius. In this way the doctrine, which is 
characterised in the Davies-case as American, 17 becomes acceptable to 
roman-clutch law. These kinds of correspondences should not be regarded 
as unusual given the communality of the medieval ius commune. In the 
second place the problems that countries face in the twentieth century, and 
especially developing countries, seem remarkably similar. Problems like land 
reform, environmental conservation and development are global problems. It 
would be shortsighted to ignore the experiences of other systems, even if they 
appear to differ fundamentally from the own. 
In the third place, a reluctance to use comparative analysis or an emphasis on 
comparable systems might hide the universality/pervasiveness of certain 
problems. When Virginia Woolf wrote: "As a woman, I have no country", this 
was what she meant. Discrimination (or unequal distribution of resources) on 
whatever grounds, might be described as simply a national problem due to 
particular, national circumstances or cultures. 
15 Davies and others v The Minister of Land, Agricutture and Water Development 1995 1 BCLR 83 
(Z) 87H-J, 88A. 
16 State of Bihar v Kameshwar Singh AIR 1952 SC 252 271. 
17 Davies and others v The Minister of Land, Agricutture and Water Development 1995 1 BCLR 83 
(Z) 85G-J. 
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It assumes a different meaning when it is revealed as a global problem. It 
confronts courts with the pervasive nature of inequality and discrimination. It 
is for that reason that property also needs to be studied in the context of 
colonialism, capitalism and chauvinism. For these reasons then, comparative 
constitutional analysis should have a broader base than would ordinarily be 
the case. 18 
8.3 A question of method 
There are various ways in which the relevant case law may be studied and 
analysed. Traditional analyses of the property concept do so within a private-
law paradigm.19 This means that the property concept is described in terms of 
the (traditional) entitlements of the owner, whether in roman-dutch or anglo-
american terminology. While this approach has its obvious advantages (not 
the least of which is accessibility and clarity), it also has certain drawbacks. 
In the first place it tends to perpetuate the private/public dichotomy with the 
emphasis on the protection of private, individual rights and the entitlements of 
the private, individual owner. This tends to ignore or obscure the social 
context and political considerations. In the second place it tends to 
categorise case law in terms of pre-conceived categories. The very real role 
that the particular facts and the circumstances play tend to be left 
unaccounted for. Moreover, certain considerations are never taken into 
account, simply because they do not make it to court, or, if they do, they are 
judged against the background of the courts' private-law preference for the 
conceptualist method. 
For these reasons, this study will be contextual. It is envisaged that case law 
should be seen as multi-coloured, many-faceted and probably flawed pieces 
18 Longo 1983 U Tasmania LR 279 292. 
19 See, for instance. Allen T "Commonwealth constitutions and the right not to be deprived of 
property'' 1993 ICLQ 523-552. where the property concept is analysed in terms of traditional 
private law entitlements. 
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in the patchwork of law. Because interpretation, whether constitutional or 
otherwise, is always contextual, the context of the decision can never be 
ignored.20 The approach will therefore be to analyse the case law against the 
background of both the particular legal system within which the judgement is 
delivered and the specific political theory and socio-economic context that 
gave rise to the case in the first place. The broader approach alluded to 
earlier therefore does not mean that the specific context can be ignored. For 
this reason a brief introduction to each set of case law will be given. 
20 See Cardozo BN The nature of the judicial process (New Haven 1949) 171: " ... the chief 
lawmakers ... may be, and often are, the judges .... Every time they interpret contract, property, 
vested rights, due process of law, liberty, they necessarily enact into law parts of a system of 
social philosophy." 

CHAPTER 9: AN AMERICAN TALE (OR lWO) 
9.1 Introduction 
"Our concept of property has shifted; 
incorporeal rights have become property. 
And, finally, 'property' has ceased to 
describe any res, or object of sense, at 
all, and has become merely a bundle of 
legal relations - rights, powers, privileges, 
immunities."1 
"Indeed, in the final analysis the Bill of 
Rights depends upon the existence of 
property .... Civil liberties must have a 
basis in property or bills of rights will not 
preserve them."2 
In most comparative analyses of property clauses, a definite distinction is 
made between the situation in the United States of America (the 'classic 
property clause') and in Canada ('no property clause'). 3 It is the purpose of 
this section to determine whether this perceived difference is not more 
apparent than real. To be able to achieve this goal, a specific approach 
becomes necessary. A basic historical background to the developments in 
American property law has already been provided. 4 In this section the 
emphasis will be on the property concept used by the various Supreme 
Courts in America. However, the part on the Canadian situation requires that 
some historical background be given. For this reason a brief introduction to 
the Canadian constitutional context is provided. 
Horwitz MJ The transformation of American law 1870-1960: the crisis of legal orthodoxy 
(New York 1992) 156, quoting Arthur L Corbin. 
2 Reich 1964 Yale LJ 733 771. 
3 Van der Walt 1993 R&K 263 267, 275; Bauman RW "Property rights in the Canadian 
constitutional context" 1992 SAJHR 344-361 355-359. 
4 See Part II of this study, in particular 3.4.4; 4.4.2; 5.4.2; 6. 
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9.2 The classic property clause: the United States of America 
9.2.1 Introduction 
The American constitutional property clause is regarded as the "classic" 
clause for three reasons. In the first place it indicates the popular acceptance 
of the American property clause as one of the oldest and most effective of its 
kind. In the second place it refers to the idea that it is the foundation or origin 
of property clauses in various national and international documents.5 In the 
third place it indicates that the American provision is regarded as the 
exemplary embodiment of the liberal view of private property in a 
constitution. 6 
The American "property clause" is actually contained in the Fifth7 and 
Fourteenth Amendments8 to the Constitution. These provisions, coupled with 
the "dual federalism" of commerce clause, provided the basis for the Supreme 
Court's protection of private property.9 In this section the history of this 
protection will be described in terms of a number of phases of historical 
development. The nineteenth-century development, as the first phase, 
provided the basis for later developments. 10 
The next phase, popularly known as the Lochner period, began in 1897 with 
the decision in Allgeyer v Louisiana, 11 reached its apogee in the famous case 
of Lochner v New York12 and was finally ended by the Parrish case.13 This 
5 See 10.3; 10.4 below on India, for example. 
6 Van der Walt 1993 R&K 267. 
7 "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 
8 "(~)or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
9 McCann 1987 Pol & Soc 143 146. 
10 Tribe LH American constitutional law (New York 1978) 434 characterizes this period as the 
"model of implied limitations". 
11 Al/geyervLouisiana 165 US 578 (1897). 
12 Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905). 
13 West Coast Hotel v Parrish 300 US 397 (1937). 
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period was characterised by the development of the doctrine of substantive 
due process. Partly as a result of the critique of the so-called progressives, 
the New Deal era, which was precipitated by the constitutional crisis following 
President Roosevelt's re-election, 14 was characterised by the court's retreat 
from its previous position. The next phase was largely a result of the partial 
acceptance by the courts of the influential article by Charles Reich, 15 and the 
new property era was launched, which was characterised by the recognition 
by the courts of new kinds of property for the purposes of due process. There 
are some indications that the present court favours a more conservative 
approach, but this trend is not yet completely clear. 
It has become almost fashionable for commentators to decry the "high level of 
arbitrariness" in the Supreme Court's decisions on property, especially in the 
case of so-called takings law. 16 However, it would be a mistake to 
concentrate on the questions surrounding takings law, since these do not 
answer the threshold question of what property is. As Underkuffler states: 
'Whatever one's theory of compensation might be, it is apparent that the 
threshold question - what 'property' is, for constitutional purposes - is most 
crucial."17 Therefore the focus of this study will be on the property concept 
employed by the Court and a deeper analysis of this concept reveals a 
surprising coherence and lack of ambiguity. 
14 After the Supreme Court had, in the Lochner era, invalidated much of the New Deal legislation as 
unconsmutional, the President threatened to "pack" the court. This had the desired effect and 
resulted in a retreat by the Court from its previous position. See Ely JW The guardian of every 
other right - a constitutional history of property rights (Oxford 1992) 120-127; Beckton CF 
''The impact on women of entrenchment of property rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms" 1985 Dalhousie LJ 288-312. 
15 Reich 1964 Yale LJ 733-787. 
16 See Chaskalson M ''The problem with property: thoughts on the constitutional protection of 
property in the United States and the Commonwealth" 1993 SAJHR 388-411 395; Ackerman B 
Private property and the constitution (New Haven Conn 1977) 168: "(T)akings law is 
incoherent, its principles altogether mysterious." 
17 Underkuffler-Freund LS "Takings and the nature of property" 1996 Can JLJ 161-205 165. 
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9.2.2 The history of constitutional property 
9.2.2.1 Nineteenth century: implied limitations 
The common-law tradition never knew the strict distinction between tangibles 
and intangibles so familiar to civil-law systems. This was also the case in the 
United States. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries land had been 
the primary source of wealth and the English system of tenure had been 
"largely drained of any substance".18 This led to a basically physicalist 
definition of property with an emphasis on real property. 19 Even so, and in 
conformity with the common-law tradition, other forms of wealth were also 
recognised as property. The most obvious of these were slaves, who were 
classified as chattels personal. 20 Apart from this very thorny issue, however, 
American courts also protected a wide variety of intangible interests as 
property. Almost from the start, for instance, intellectual property was 
protected and even included in the Constitution. 21 Business goodwill was also 
recognised as property and monopolies were regarded as an infringement on 
"the property rights of others to engage in business".22 
A number of decisions of the Supreme Court delivered near the end of the 
nineteenth century precipitated twentieth-century developments. In the 
Slaughterhouse cases the Court rejected the argument that the creation of a 
monopoly amounted to a deprivation of a property right to pursue a trade, 
since limitations were accepted as in the public interest.23 In the important 
dissenting judgement of Justice Field, however, the statute was seen as an 
18 Ely Constitutional history 12. 
19 Horwitz Transformation 145. See also Ely Constitutional history 25: "The widespread 
ownership of land made the colonists especially sensitive to any interference with their property . 
... Significantly, the cry 'Liberty and Property' became the motto of the revolutionary movement." 
20 Ely Constitutional history 15. 
21 Article II, section 8 of the US Constitution. See also Ely Constitutional history 32; Epstein RA 
"No new property" 1990 Brooklyn LR 747-775 753. 
22 Ely Constitutional history 53-55; Horwitz Transformation 154. 
23 Slaughterhouse cases, 83 US 36 (1873). 
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invasion of the right to acquire property as this " . . . does deprive them of 
liberty as well as property without due process of law."24 This was echoed in 
Munn v Illinois where the court refused to regard price regulation as an 
invasion of property. Since it was " ... devoted to a public use, (it) is subject to 
public regulation."25 Once again the court accepted the implied limitations 
and once again Justice Field dissented and on the same grounds. In Mug/er 
v Kansas, 26 the legislation was upheld but the court warned that the purpose 
behind legislation could be scrutinised. In Holden v Hardf7 the legislation 
was also upheld and freedom of contract was rejected because the parties 
had been unequal. 
These cases illustrate two points. In the first place the majority judgements 
accepted that regulation of property for "public use" could and did occur. The 
minority judgements indicate the beginning of a move toward a more absolute 
property concept. In the second place the laissez-faire attitude was gradually 
being replaced by a more activist view of the role of the judiciary. 
The property concept in this period indicated the changes to come. In the first 
place indications were already present of the due process requirement that 
characterised the next period.28 In the second place a wide variety of 
intangible, symbolic forms of wealth were increasingly recognised as property. 
Examples include contracts, credit and money. 29 In fact, property in the late 
24 Slaughterhouse cases, 83 US 36, 122 (1873). 
25 Munn v Illinois 94 US 113130 (1877). 
26 Mug/er v Kansas 123 US 623 (1887) - brewers challenged prohibition laws as deprivations of 
property without due process. See also Andersen JL "Takings and expectations: toward a 
'broader vision' of property rights" 1989 U Kansas LR 529-562 537. 
27 Holden v Hardy 169 US 366 (1898) - act stating mnimum hours for minors challenged. 
28 Philbrick 1938 U Penn LR 691 719 states that this was the result of the extreme individualism of 
Justices Field and Harlan. 
29 See Georgia v Braflsford 2 Oall 403 (1794); Calder v Bu/13 Dall 394 (1798); Dartmouth College v 
Woodward 4 Wheat 518 (1819). 
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nineteenth century was increasingly defined as everything with exchange 
value or an investment-backed expectation.30 
In the third place the dephysicalization also contributed to the conceptualism 
that characterised the approach of the courts in the nineteenth century. In 
this regard the influence of Hohfeld cannot be ignored. His conceptualism 
accelerated the dephysicalization of property, since property was no longer a 
thing, but a relation between people.31 
9.2.2.2 Lochner and the rise of due process 
The so-called Lochner era actually began in the late nineteenth century. The 
court adopted the attitude of the dissenting judges in the Slaughterhouse 
cases and in Munn v Illinois to "restrain progressive and redistributive social 
and economic legislation."32 To achieve this the court required not only 
procedural due process but also scrutinised the substance of legislation to 
determine its purpose.33 In protecting property through the development of the 
"substantive due process" test, the court provided the paradigm for the 
protection of all rights concerning the private sphere. 34 
Lochner v New Yor/<35 dealt with a statute that prescribed minimum working 
hours for bakers. This was challenged on the ground that it violated freedom 
of contract. The court invalidated the act on the basis that the real object had 
30 Powen v Pennsylvania 127 US 678 (1889). Horwitz Transformation 145-146, 151 ascribes this to 
the decisions in the Slaughterhouse and Minnesota rate cases: "(T)he very conception of property 
became infinitely expandable. The result was that during the 1880s and 1890s a variety of new 
property interests for the first time received recognition by American courts. These property 
interests were endowed with what, by traditional standards, can only be called extravagantly 
expanded prerogatives. During this period, American courts came as close as they ever had to 
saying that one had a property right to an unchanging world." 
31 Horwitz Transformation 152-156. See also Singer 1982 Wis LR 975 986-989 on Hohfeld"s 
system in the context of analytical jurisprudence. 
32 Tribe Constitutional law 435. See 9.2.2.1 above on these cases. 
33 Ely Constitutional history 87; Horwitz Transformation 147. 
34 See Michelman Fl "Possession vs distribution in the constitutional idea of property" 1987 Iowa LR 
1319-1350 on the reasons for this. See also Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 388 402; Philbrick 1938 U 
Penn LR 691 721. 
35 Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905). 
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been the regulation of labour relations and not safeguarding health.36 
Consequently the statute had exceeded the police powers of the state. The 
results of this judgement were many and varied. It established the 
substantive due process test, which meant that courts could and did scrutinise 
the reasonableness of statutes.37 In this way it became symbolic of the 
court's commitment to private rights.38 However, Sunstein has pointed out 
that the court's activism was of a very specific kind. It imposed a 
constitutional requirement of neutrality, that is, preserving the existing 
distribution of wealth and entitlements "under the baseline of the common 
law."39 This meant that constitutional protection was based on what was 
regarded as property in common law. 
"The Lochner Court required government neutrality and 
was sceptical of government 'intervention', it defined 
both notions in terms of whether the state had 
threatened to alter the common law distribution of 
entitlements and wealth, which was taken to be part of 
nature rather than a legal construct. . . . If the Lochner era 
is thought to embody less an active judicial role and 
more particular conceptions of baseline, neutrality and 
action, it has not been entirely overruled."40 
The effect of Lochner was that property was increasingly seen as a bundle of 
more or less absolute common-law rights that was to be accorded the highest 
protection. Courts used a strict means-ends analysis to invalidate laws that 
they found" ... violate(d) natural rights of property and contract, rights lying at 
36 Lochner v New York 198 US 45, 61 (1905). 
37 Ely Constitutional history 103; Horwi1z Transformation 161. 
38 This was sustained by academic writings on property, such as CG Tieman's work A treatise on 
the limitations of police power in the United States which was published in 1886 and J Lewis' 
Treatise on the law of eminent domain in the United States which appeared in 1888. Both 
were enormously influential - see Ely Constitutional history 87; Horwitz Transformation 147. 
39 Sunstein CR "Lochner's legacy" 1987 Col LR 873-919 875. 
40 Sunstein 1987 Col LR 873 917-918. 
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the very core of the private domain.'"'1 Consequently property was 
increasingly protected against state interference. 
A second development occurred with the decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co v 
Mahon. 42 In this case a mining company sold land while contractually 
reserving the right to undermine the land and placing the risk on the 
purchaser. Thereafter the state passed an act that prohibited undermining in 
such a way as to cause collapse of the surface. The mining company alleged 
that this was a taking without compensation, and the court agreed.43 This was 
the start of the court's takings doctrine44 which represented a move towards a 
multifactor balancing test. 45 
The activist attitude of the court was also developed further. For instance, the 
court upheld a statute setting maximum work hours for miners on the ground 
that their contracts were "unilaterally imposed by their employers'.46 and held 
protective legislation for female employees to be valid because it dealt with 
the special health needs of women and their dependent status. 47 The trend to 
recognise "dephysicalized" property also continued. In Adams v Tanner48 the 
right to engage in a useful business was held to be property and this was 
confirmed in New State Ice Co v Leibmann.49 This trend toward 
dephysicalization was encouraged by the view of property as a bundle of 
rights that, based on market value, tended to regard all vested interests as 
property. Interestingly, licences were not regarded as property, because they 
41 Tribe Constitutional law 439. Emphasis added. 
42 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922). 
43 See Ely Constitutional history 112. 
44 Michelman 1987 Iowa LR 1319 1338. 
45 Radin MJ "The liberal conception of property: cross currents in the jurisprudence of takings" 1988 
Col LR 1667 -1696 1672. 
46 Holden v Hardy 166 US 366, 393, 397 (1897). 
47 MuHer v Oregon 208 US 412 (1908). See also Tribe Constitutional law 440. Needless to say, 
this kind of paternalistic protection also made the employment of women more expensive and 
consequently limited their options. This increased their dependency and would later spill over 
from employment to welfare - see Ely Constitutional history 105; Rhode 'Politics of paradigms" 
149151. 
48 Adams v Tanner 244 US 590, 37 SCt 662 (1917). 
49 New State Ice Co v Leibmann 285 US 262, 52 SCt 371 (1932). 
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were susceptible to unilateral revocation, 50 but war risk insurance policies 
were contracts {and therefore property) because of the payment of premiums, 
which meant that they could not be revoked unilaterally.s1 
9.2.2.3 The new deal: procedural due process 
The Lochner period came to an end after the constitutional crisis with the 
Parrish decision in which legislation regarding minimum wages was upheld.s2 
The court abandoned the substantive scrutiny of legislation and henceforth 
required only that a procedural due process test be met. Since legislation 
was no longer scrutinised in the same way, the question of whether an 
interest was property or not became the threshold issue. s3 What was 
regarded as property was increasingly determined by the abstract, 
dephysicalized concept that was a result of the influence of Hohfeld. 
Hohfeld's analysis of traditional concepts in law was aimed at destabilising 
the traditional position of "rights" in the legal system. His abstract view had 
the effect of radically dephysicalizing the system of property so that property 
consisted of legal relations, not of physical things.54 
However, the court refused to regard social-security expectations and the 
expectation of a leasehold renewal as property_ss In Flemming v Nestol'6 the 
court refused to hold that the termination of old-age benefits was a taking of 
50 Taft v Bridgeton Worsted Co 246 Mass 444, 141NE119 (1923). 
51 Lynch v United States 292 US 571 (1934). 
52 West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish 300 US 379 399 (1937). This was a challenge to a statute that 
prescribed minimum wages in which the liberty of contract doctrine was repudiated. This meant 
the end of economic due process - since 1937 not one statute has been overturned on the basis 
of due process. See Ely Constitutional history 127. 
53 Alexander 1982 Col LR 15451549. 
54 Horwitz Transformation 156: "Our concept of property has shifted; incorporeal rights have 
become property. And finally, 'property' has ceased to describe any res, or object of sense, at all, 
and has become merely a bundle of legal relations - rights, powers, privileges, immunities." 
55 Flemming v Nestor 363 US 603 (1960); United States v Petty Motor Co 327 US 372 ( 1946). 
56 Flemming v Nestor 363 US 603 (1960). 
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property, on the basis that it was not an "accrued property right", because of 
its "noncontractual" nature.57 The court did recognise goodwill as property.58 
In the second place the property concept was influenced by the progressives, 
who criticised the exclusionary model used by the court. Their contention was 
that property is power and that to protect it substantially is to deny the 
unpropertied their democratic rights.59 The effect of this criticism and the 
constitutional crisis was a move away from substantive due process that 
resulted in a situation where personal {or civil) rights and property rights were 
no longer treated the same by the courts. While interference with civil rights 
received "searching judicial scrutiny" based on substantive due process, 
interference with property rights was subject only to a "rationality" test. 60 
Consequently, the new constitutional direction was based on a dichotomy 
between property rights and personal liberties.61 For instance, in US v 
Carolene Products Co62 the court upheld a statute prohibiting so-called ''filled 
milk". This was not the important point. What was important was the famous 
footnote 4 in Justice Stone's decision stating that the presumption of 
constitutionality had a narrower application if legislation impinged on specific 
rights in the bill of rights. The result was that a distinction was made between 
personal rights and economic rights, with economic rights receiving 
secondary constitutional status. This gave the state latitude to fashion 
economic policy. 
57 Aemming v Nestor 363 US 603 608-609 (1960). 
58 KimbaH Laundry Co v United States 338 US 1 (1948). 
59 Michelman 1987 Iowa LR 1319 1335, 1336: "The critique's progressivm lies in its insistent focus 
on the wide distribution of the prime constitutional goods of materially based pol~ical competence 
or independence." 
60 McCann 1987 Pol & Soc 143 148-149; Ely Constitutional history 127. 
61 Ely Constitutional history 132. 
62 US v Caro/ene Products Co 304 US 144 (1938). 
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9.2.2.4 The new property 
Charles Reich's influential article starts out from the basic liberalist contention 
that property is the guardian of the "troubled boundary" between individual 
and state.63 This basic liberalist assumption is maintained throughout the 
article.64 However, Reich contends that the rise of the "public interest state" 
has led to a situation where government acts as a major source of wealth, 
which takes the place of traditional forms of wealth.65 These new forms of 
wealth include income and benefits (derived from, for example, social 
security, unemployment benefits and veterans benefits), government jobs, 
occupational licences, franchises, contracts, subsidies, use of public 
resources and services. 66 The result is that the new forms of wealth create 
dependence, 67 because they are based on "government largess" and is seen 
as being subject to the public interest.68 Consequently, they can be revoked 
at will. 
This results in what Reich called the new feudalism: 
"Wealth is not 'owned', or 'vested' in the holder. Instead, 
it is held conditionally, the conditions being ones which 
seek to ensure the fulfilment of obligations imposed by 
the state. "69 
63 Reich 1964 Yale LJ 733 733. 
64 Reich 1964 Yale LJ 733 773: " ... the basic importance of individual private property" for liberty is 
recognised. 
65 Reich 1964 Yale U 733 733. See also Van Alstyne W "Cracks in the 'new property': adjudicative 
due process in the administrative state" 1977 Cornell LR 445-498 453. 
66 Reich 1964 Yale LJ 733 734-736. 
67 Reich 1964 Yale W 733 738: " ... today more and more of our wealth takes the form of rights or 
status rather than of tangible goods." 
68 Reich 1964 Yale W 733 745. 
69 Reich 1964 Yale LJ 733 768-768. 
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Thus the new feudalism represents the triumph of society over private 
property and puts pressure on the protection of constitutional rights. Largess 
is doing the work of private property, but it is not as well protected as 
property. Consequently, Reich thinks that the problem will only be solved if a 
new property is created.70 If these new forms of wealth could be protected as 
well as traditional property, that would create independence and thus liberty. 
This represents a move away from the old liberal private-property concept 
based on personality toward a new concept based on status. 
Reich's contention that state benefits are the new form of wealth and 
therefore ought to be protected as property was widely influential. Due to this 
influence, the courts, in the course of the ?O's and 80's, continued the trend to 
recognise more and more intangible interests as property. 71 
"In sum, the 'new property' doctrine extends due process 
protections to intangible property; however, it must be 
established that a property interest exists in order for 
such protection to be applied."72 
The courts therefore needed, first of all, to address the threshold question of 
whether an interest should be classified as property or nonproperty.73 In this 
process a wide variety of interests were recognised as property. As early as 
1969 wages were held to be property,74 and in 1970 the decision in Goldberg 
v Kelly held that welfare benefits were property, and that a termination of such 
70 Reich 1964 Yale LJ 733 787: 'We must create a new property." This new property can be briefly 
described as status. See Van Alstyne 1977 Cornell LR 445 454. 
71 The influence of Reich is apparent in the court's extensive quotation from his article in Goldberg v 
Kelly 397 US 254 (1970). See also Alexander 1982 Col LR 1545 1545. 
72 Davis S "Federalism and property rights: an examination of Justice Rehnquist's legal positivism" 
1986 W Pol Q 250-264 256. 
73 The term 'nonproperty' is derived from Alexander 1982 Col LR 1545 1570. 
74 Sniadach v Family Rnance Corp 395 US 337 342 (1969): "The 'property' of which petitioner has 
been deprived is the use of the garnished portion of her wages ... " 
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benefits without a prior hearing violated due process.75 However, it did not 
amount to a taking. 76 Thereafter a wide variety of interests were recognised 
as property, n but only for the purpose of due process. 78 In cases dealing with 
new property, it was seldom, if ever, a question of whether there had been a 
taking.79 If new property was taken, the only question was whether due 
process had been complied with. 
By the early 1980's the court could on the one hand declare that property 
included "the whole domain of social and economic fact. "80 On the other 
hand, there were also indications that not all economic interests were 
regarded as property. In three cases the court refused to regard employment 
(both private employment and employment as civil servants) as a form of new 
property for the purpose of both due process and takings.81 Some writers 
attribute this to a conservative backlash, and it does tend to substantiate the 
claim that the Supreme Court decisions were arbitrary. 
75 Goldberg v Kelly 397 US 254 (1970). 
76 See Ely Constitutional history 150. 
77 Bell v Burson 402 US 535 (1970) - drive(s license; Morrissey v Brewer 408 US 471 (1972) -
conditional freedom following parole; Perry v Sinderman 408 US 593 (1972)- teache(s continued 
employment; Wolff v McDonnell 418 US 539 (1974) - "good time" credits of prisoner; Goss v 
Lopez 419 US 565 (1975) - high school education; Mathews v Eldridge 424 US 319 (1976) -
medical benefits; Memphis Ught, Gas and Water v Craft 436 US 1 (1977)-continued service by a 
public utility; Barry v Barchi 443 US 55 (1979)- horse traine(s license. 
78 See Van Alstyne 1977 Cornell LR 445 457. 
79 Andersen 1989 U Kansas LR 529 549. 
80 Logan v Zimmerman Brush Co 455 US 422 (1981 ). 
81 In Board of Regents v Roth 408 US 564 (1972) the non-renewal of the defendant's contract to 
teach was held not to be a taking based on a distinction between status and property. In Arnett v 
Kennedy 416 US 134 (1974) the employment of a nonprobationary civil servant was terminated, 
based on the fact that if property was vested in him, it was contingent and extremely limited. In 
Bishop v Wood 426 US 341 (1976) the termination of the employment of a police officer was also 
not regarded as property because he held it at the pleasure of the city manager. See Van Alstyne 
1977 Cornell LR 445 457-469 for an analysis of these cases. 
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9.2.2.5 The rise of takings 
The "cracks in the new property"82 began to appear in the early seventies. 
Whereas the previous era had focused on due process, this period saw the 
emergence of the importance of the takings doctrine. Already in Lynch v 
Household Finance Corp the court had re-established the fundamental 
connection between liberty and property,83 and the election of Reagan saw 
the re-emergence of the emphasis on traditional, exclusive property rights.84 
The exclusionary view of property resulted in court decisions that focused on 
the question whether there had been a taking (as a denial of exclusivity) in 
which case compensation had to be paid. A number of judgements illustrate 
this. 
In Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp a New York law requiring 
the installation of cable-TV facilities on property was challenged. 85 The court 
stated that property consisted of possession, use and disposition, but that the 
power to exclude was central. 86 Although the actual physical intrusion would 
be minimal, the court held that any "permanent physical occupation" 
effectively destroys each of the strands in the bundle of rights. Consequently, 
this constituted a taking for which compensation had to be paid. In Nol/an v 
California Coastal Commission the court agreed that the precondition of the 
Commission, that the owner should grant an easement across his property in 
exchange for a permit, constituted a taking. 87 The court found that there was 
no legitimate public interest involved and that the "permanent physical 
82 A term borrowed from Van Alstyne 1977 Cornell LR 445. 
83 Lynch v Household Finance Corp 405 US 538 552 ( 1972): .. fundamental interdependence 
exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Nerther could have 
meaning without the other." 
84 Ely Constitutional history 143. 
85 Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp 458 US 419 (1982). 
86 Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp 458 US 419 435 (1982). 
87 Nol/an v Ca/ifornia Coastal Commission 107 US 3141 (1987). However, the minority judgement, 
delivered by Justice Brennan, found for the defendent on the ground that state law defines 
property rights and that the right to exclude others from the beach is not a strand in the bundle of 
rights. Seep 3159 of the report. 
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invasion" made this a taking. 88 In Kaiser Aetna v US a private marina was 
connected to the Pacific Ocean through the dredging of a pond and the 
removal of a barrier beach. The government regarded this private marina as 
now subject to public access based on the navigational servitude of the 
United States. The court regarded this as a taking.89 Once again the 
destruction of the right to exclude was emphasised.90 
On the other hand the court in Keystone Bitumous Coal Association v 
DeBenedictis, in dealing with legislation similar to the one in Pennsylvania 
Coal held that this was a regulation and not a taking. 91 The basis for the 
decision was that it was a denial of economically viable use and not 
permanent physical occupation. 92 The restriction placed in building in the 
case of Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City was, similarly, not 
regarded as a taking, since it only affected economic use and not physical 
invasion.93 
The difficult, and interesting, question in this regard is what made the 
difference in these cases? In general, property is seen as a bundle of rights, 
but the question is whether the destruction of one of the strands of the bundle 
constitutes a taking. In none of these cases was the property as a whole 
taken. There are some cases where the emphasis is placed on the bundle as 
a totality. 94 In other cases the right to use is regarded as property. 95 In most 
88 The court, in this instance, explic~ly followed Loretto - see NoHan v California Coastal Commission 
107 US 3141 3148-3150 (1987). See also Michelman F ''Takings" 1988 Col LR 1600-1629 1607. 
89 Kaiser Aetna v US 444 US 164 (1979). 
90 Judgement of Justice Rehnquist - Kaiser Aetna v US 444 US 164 179-180 (1979). 
91 Keystone Bitumous Coal Association v DeBenedictis 107 US 1232 (1987). 
92 Keystone Bitumous Coal Association v DeBenedictis 107 US 1232 1247 (1987). 
93 Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City 438 US 104 (1978). 
94 Andrus v AHard 444 US 51 (1979); Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City 438 US 104 
(1978). 
95 Dolan v Cfty of Tigard 114 US 2309 2316-2317 (1994). 
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cases, however, deprivation of the right to exclude is regarded as the central 
or core strand in the bundle. 96 
This emphasis on the right to exclude has resulted in "physical invasion" 
becoming the determining factor in takings law. 97 It is almost always in cases 
of physical intrusion or occupation, no matter how minuscule, that a taking is 
said to have occurred.98 This conceptual severance of exclusion from the 
bundle of rights99 indicates a return to the idea of negative liberty and 
classical liberalism. 100 It also indicates a move away from the prevailing 
multifactor balancing test in takings law101 toward takings based on per se 
categories. 102 
A secondary debate in this period concerns the nature and definition of 
property. Some definitions tend to define property in terms of "standing law". 
This means that property is that which is created by statute and its limits and 
destruction are also determined by that same law. 103 Therefore, if the 
standing law (state or federal legislation or common law) has not been 
breached, neither is there a constitutional breach. On the other hand, some 
justices insist that property is not dependent on statute, but must have an 
96 Hodel v Irving 107 SCt 2076 (1987); Lechmere Inc v NLRB 112 SCt 841 (1992). See, in general, 
Michelman 1988 Col LR 1600-1629; Underkuffier-Freund 1996 Can JLJ 161 165. 
97 Kaiser Aetna v United States 444 US 164 (1979); Nol/an v California Coastal Commission 107 SCt 
3141 (1987); Pruneyard Shopping Centre v Robins 447 US 74 (1980); Loretto v Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp 458 US 419 (1982). 
98 Michelman 1988 Col LR 1600 1604: "Permanent physical occupation by strangers, or by the 
property of strangers is a taking per se ... " See also Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp 458 US 419 434-435 (1982); Keystone Bitumous Coal Association v DeBenedictis 107 US 
1232 1244 n 18 (1987). 
99 Radin 1988 Col LR 1667 1677. 
100 See Radin 1988 Col LR 1667 1679 on the connection between a liberal view of humanity, a 
liberal conception of property and the rule of law. See also Singer JW "Re-reading property" 1992 
New England LR 711-729. 
101 Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City 438 US 104 (1978). See also Radin 1988 Col 
LR 1667 1672 
102 Michelman 1988 Col LR 1600 1625; Radin 1988 Col LR 1667 1682. 
103 McCann 1987 Pol & Soc 143 167; Van Alstyne 1977 Cornell LR 445 463ff; Davis 1986 W Pol Q 
250 257-258; Michelman Fl "Property as a constitutional righf' 1981 Washington and Lee LR 
1097-1114 1099. 
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essential "nature". 104 This essentialist approach is strengthened by the 
conceptual severance. 
Apart from the rise in takings law, this period has also seen the demise of new 
property. New property had been introduced into law in that some welfare 
benefits were recognised as property for the purpose of due process. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the due process required was minimal 
and that any substantive judgement was excluded. 105 Moreover, new properly 
was not recognised for the purpose of takings. The new emphasis on takings 
thus precluded the survival of new properly. 
9.2.3 The property concept 
There can be little doubt that property is, above all else, a paradigmatic right 
in American law. 106 However, that in itself says very little. It is property of a 
very specific kind that is regarded as paradigmatic. This kind of property is 
perceived as a "bundle of rights" but, once again, of a very specific kind. The 
property concept revolves around questions concerning the nature and origin 
of property. 
Property, in American law, can be regarded as defined by either the 
constitution itself or with reference to "standing law''. The latter approach 
means that the meaning of property in the constitution is to be determined by 
either common law or statute. If property is defined by standing law, its 
104 See judgement of Justice Scalia in No/Ian v California Coastal Commission 107 SCI 3141 (1987 
105 Mccann 1987 Pol & Soc 143 151. Tribe Constitutional law 524: ''The practical impact of the 
Court's adoption of a positivist approach to the definition of 'property' in Bishop v Wood is that a 
public employee can count on procedural due process protection only if the law or contract 
defining the employee's job expressly provides that the emplyee can be discharged only for 
cause." 
106 Michelman 1987 Iowa LR 1327. 
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contents and limitations will also be defined in the same way. This is the 
approach mostly used by the courts, 107 and it has had two consequences. 
In the first place the private-law concept of property has been used by 
constitutional law so that property is viewed as basically private and 
exclusionary. 108 This emphasis on the exclusive nature of property resulted 
in the conceptual severance that sees deprivation of exclusive control as a 
taking. As such the conceptual severance is only concerned with exclusion. 109 
This is regarded as a continuation of the idea in common law that, if an 
interest is recognised as property, no one else has the power to intrude on 
that interest. Thus it is the "total vulnerability to another person's unrestricted 
discretion to terminate" that prevents certain interests from being recognised 
as property. 110 The continuation of this idea explains why some kinds of 
interests were regarded as property and some not. 111 In this view the level of 
outside control therefore determines whether an interest is property or not. 
In the second place the acceptance of the standing-law definition has resulted 
in what Underkuffler calls the difference between the apparent model and the 
operative model in the property concept. The apparent model sees property 
as a barrier to state power guarding an individual, autonomous sphere. In 
this model property is primary. 112 Moreover, according to this model, there is 
a need to define individual rights in order for property to have meaning. This 
concept-based approach has pretensions of abstractness and, in effect, 
107 Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905); Arnett v Kennedy416 US 134 (1974). See also Sunstein 
1987 Col LR 873 875 n 40; Van Alstyne 1977 Cornell LR 464; Michelman 1981 Washington 
and Lee LR 1097 1099 
108 Alexander 1982 Col LR 1545 1585. 
109 Radin 1988 Col LR 1678. 
110 Alexander 1982 Col LR 1545 1582. 
111 For example, in the Sinderman case the court found that a contract had existed between employer 
and employee and that this limited the employer's power to terminate the employment - see Perry 
v Sinderman 408 US 593 (1972). On the other hand, inhere is no contract, the employer has an 
unrestricted power and, consequently, there is no property - see Board of Regents v Roth 408 US 
564 (1972); Bishop v Wood 426 US 341 (1976). 
112 Underkuffler-Freund 1996 Can JLJ 161167. This corresponds to what Andersen 1989 U Kansas 
LR 529 533 calls the federalist view. 
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''freezes" property, so that any change is regarded as a taking.113 In reality, 
Underkuffler says, the courts work with an operative model that assumes that 
all property is " . . . not held with the same intensity and are not protected 
equally."114 The difference lies in the degree of excludability. 
The upshot of this is that claims regarding the arbitrariness of the court's 
treatment of property is, at least, overstated. Such claims usually find a high 
level of arbitrariness in the decisions115 and attribute the discontinuity to either 
the recognition of the new property116 with its attendant dephysicalization of 
property117 or the various political influences that motivated various courts. 118 
However, the analysis of the property concept shows a remarkable continuity 
in the property concept. 119 Ely120 and Epstein121 both indicate the historical 
continuity between older forms of intangible property and the new property. 
But the deeper continuity has to do with the underlying liberalist property 
concept with its emphasis on exclusion and individualism. In this way the new 
property represents a way in which liberalism could be perpetuated in a 
modern welfare or regulatory state. 122 Of course, that was precisely what 
Reich had intended. 123 
113 Underkuffler-Freund 1996 Can JLJ 161180. 
114 Underkuffler-Freund 1996 Can JLJ 161 185. 
115 Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 388 395. 
116 Davis 1986 W Pol Q 250 256. 
117 Michelman 1988 Col LR 1600 1627; Horwitz Transformation 156; Van der Walt 1993 R&K 263 
267. 
118 See eg Davis 1986 W Pol Q 250ff on the nee-conservative Rehnquist-court. See also Ely 
Constitutional history 152: "Yet, as throughout its history, the Court was simply moving in 
conformity with the changing political climate." 
119 Mccann 1987 Pol & Soc 143 147:"(T)his history of judicial action on behalf of private rights 
reflects a complex doctrinal development less arbitrary, irrational, and inconsistent than 
sometimes is portrayed ... " 
120 Ely Constitutional history 141. 
121 Epstein 1990 Brooklyn LR 747 753-754. 
122 Michelman 1987 Iowa LR 1319 1331; Radin 1988 Col LR 1667 1682-1683; Van Alstyne 1977 
Cornell LR 445-493; Alexander 1982 Col LR 1545 1591, 1598. Of course, that was precisely 
what Reich intended - see 9.2.2.4 above. 
123 See 9.2.2.4 above. 
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9.2.4 Conclusion 
The American tale about the constitutional protection of property is a complex 
and multi-layered one. The most diverse interpretations have been attached 
to it. Some see it as a patchwork of mismatched decisions that betray 
arbitrary and ad hoc attitudes. Others see a continuous golden thread 
(usually called liberalism) that shows a way into and out of the maze. Still 
others speak in metaphors that indicate growth (or the lack thereof) from 
substantive to procedural due process, from direct to derivative right, from 
thing-ownership to a bundle of property rights. 
However one interprets this history, its influence on other systems is not to be 
denied. Most constitutions in the world today to some degree derive their 
inspiration from the American model. This is not without its problems. Along 
with the ideological baggage of liberalism, importation of the bundle of rights 
idea means importation of the problems that idea implies, specifically 
regarding conceptual severance in terms of exclusion. Like American authors 
and courts, lawyers and courts in other systems will have to struggle with the 
questions raised here. In particular the questions on the difference, or lack 
thereof, between private and constitutional property, the problem of 
conceptual severance regarding exclusion and the liberalist substructure of 
the constitutional protection of property will have to be addressed. 
The two most important aspects of the American development are the shift 
away from the substantive due process test towards a definitional test and the 
emphasis on standing law to provide the definition. Because the American 
constitution does not contain a general limitations clause, a way had to be 
devised to make it possible to limit rights, and property in particular. The shift 
away from Lochner was an attempt (probably as a result of the influence of 
the realists) to make limitations on property both possible and justifiable. The 
substantive due process test had, however, failed and a new test was 
required. The solution was to use the definition of property as a screening 
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device. In other words, limitations are justified by excluding the particular 
entitlement from the definition of property provided by standing law. 
9.3 No property clause: Canada 
9.3.1 Introduction 
Canada, before confederation, consisted of a number of territories and 
colonies mostly under the authority of either the French or the English. The 
last-mentioned eventually managed to acquire the French areas as well. The 
basic rule was that civil law remained in force in those provinces ceded by or 
won from other imperial powers until amended by the new authority. In the 
rest of the colonies common law prevailed. 124 In most cases, therefore, the 
English property law formed the basis for Canadian law. 125 
This meant that, before confederation, in both the French and English 
colonies, the legislative authority regulated the body of legal rules governing 
relationships between individuals. For this reason the Constitution Act, 1867 
in section 92(13) declared "property and civil rights" to be within the 
legislative authority of the provinces. 126 The term "property and civil rights" 
does not, in this context, have the meaning usually associated with it. "Civil 
rights" refer to what is usually known as private law, that is property, contract 
and tort and not to civil liberties. 127 Consequently, all legislative authority 
pertaining to real and personal property fell within the provincial power. 128 
124 Ziff B Principles of property law (Toronto 1993) 43. 
125 Alvaro A 'Why property rights were excluded from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" 
1991 Can J Pol Sc 309-329 311. 
126 Hogg PW Constitutional law of Canada (Toronto 1992) 537; Augustine PW "Protection of the 
right to property under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" 1986 Ottawa LR 55-81 56; 
Alvaro 1991 Can J Pol Sc 309 313. 
127 Hogg Constitutional law 540. 
128 Hogg Constitutional law 561. 
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Although some exceptions to the rule stated above can be found in section 
91,129 this meant not only that property fell within the legislative prerogative of 
the provinces, but also that there was no constitutional guarantee of private 
property. 130 
Both federal and provincial authorities had the power to interfere with these 
rights, on the basis of the British model of parliamentary sovereignty without a 
written guarantee of individual rights. 131 The result of this is stated succinctly 
by Alvaro: 
"The only major restriction on legislative activity 
regarding property was the division of powers. 
Legislation by one level of government which, in 'pith 
and substance', encroached upon the jurisdiction of 
another level of government was ultra vires."132 
This meant that provinces could and did introduce sweeping and aggressive 
economic programmes that infringed on property rights, such as social-
welfare programmes, the establishment of monopolies through crown 
corporations and limitations on how much land non-residents could own.133 
Against this background prime minister Diefenbaker introduced a bill of rights 
for Canada in 1960. Although the bill of rights contained a property clause in 
section 1(a), 134 this did not have much of an effect. The bill of rights was an 
ordinary statute of federal parliament that therefore applied only to the federal 
field. Since property was a provincial matter, it could not be effective. 
Coupled with a poorly drafted enforcement section, extremely conservative 
129 Hogg Constitutional law 539. 
130 Augustine 1986 Ottawa LR 55 56. 
131 Augustine 1986 Ottawa LR 55 56. 
132 Alvaro 1991 Can J Pol Sc 309 315. See also Bauman 1992 SAJHR 344 348; Augustine 1986 
Ottawa LR 55 57. 
133 Alvaro 1991 Can J Pol Sc 309 316, 319. 
134 Section 1(a)" ... the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of 
property and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law." 
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judicial interpretation and the fact that it only applied to individuals, this 
resulted in an almost completely ineffective clause. 135 Despite its defects, the 
bill of rights remains in force. 
9.3.2 The 1982 Constitution 
In the late 1970's talks were held in preparation of the drafting of a new 
constitution for Canada. 136 One of the most controversial questions was 
whether a right to property should be included in the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms that would form part of the new constitution. 
Since this Charter would not be an ordinary statute like the Bill of Rights but, 
instead, would be part of the supreme law of the land in terms of section 52(1) 
of the constitution, this placed the whole issue in a different light. There were 
a number of reasons why the inclusion of a right to property was resisted. 137 
In the first place it was felt that property was sufficiently protected by 
provincial and federal legislation and the common law. In addition to this 
there was some controversy over whether property is such a fundamental 
right as to require constitutional protection. 138 In the second place there was 
some concern over the range of rights that might be included in the protection 
afforded property. In the light of the American experience, especially of the 
development of the substantive due process requirement, it was felt that 
inclusion of property might result in " ... an excessively wide definition of the 
term 'property' . .. " and that this might result in judicial interventionism.139 
135 See Hogg Constitutional law 779; Bauman 1992 SAJHR 344 349-350; Augustine 1986 Ottawa 
LR 55 62, 65: "The right to property, like the Canadian 8111 of Rights generally, has been given a 
conservative, non-interventionist interpretation." 
136 For an illuminating history of these talks, and especially Prime Minister Troudeau's role in them, 
see Alvaro 1991 Can J Pol Sc 309 31911. 
137 For some very good examples of this, see Nedelsky Private property and Nedelsky J "Should 
property be constitutionalized? A relational and comparative approach" in Van Maanen GE and 
Van der Walt AJ (eds) Property law on the threshold of the 21st century (Antwerp 1997) 417-
432. 
138 Bauman 1992 SAJHR 344 345. 
139 Augustine 1986 Ottawa LR 55 67. See also Bauman 1992 SAJHR 344 345. 
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However, the resistance of the provinces proved to be the major stumbling 
block in the inclusion of the property clause. It would mean, in their view, that 
provincial powers (granted by the previous constitution) would be abridged. 140 
The result of this was that property was not included in the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, there was no protection against expropriation and no right to 
compensation. 141 This was not, however, the end of the controversy. There 
were several attempts to read a protection of property into other sections of 
the Charter. There was, first of all, an attempt to make the right to property an 
implicit part of the right to security of the person protected by section 7. 142 In 
two cases this approach was followed, 143 but this was widely criticised by 
academics 144 and specifically rejected by the Court of Appeal. 145 
In the second place an attempt was made to find a right to property implicit in 
the right to liberty guaranteed by section 7. 146 No support for this is to be 
found in the case law, however, and it was later specifically rejected. 147 A 
third attempt, to use the term ''fundamental justice" in section 7 to construct a 
property clause, has also met with failure. This term was read rather narrowly 
and it is " ... unlikely that the Canadian judiciary will utilise their expanded 
right of judicial intervention to provide constitutional protection for ... the right 
to property ... "148 A fourth attempt to read a right to property into the search 
and seizure provision in section 8 was not successful either. 149 Because this 
140 Bauman 1992 SAJHR 344 345; Alvaro 1991 Can J Pol Sc 309 309. 
141 Hogg Constitutional law 1030. 
142 Section 7 reads as follows: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and 
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice." (My emphasis). 
143 See The Queen v Rsherman's Wharf Umited 11982) 135 DLR (3d) 307; Re Estabrooks Pontiac 
Buick Ltd 7 CRR 46 (QB). 
144 See, eg Brandt GJ "Notes of cases" 1983 Can BR 398-406. 
145 Augustine 1986 Ottawa LR 55 69; Bauman 1992 SAJHR 344 353. 
146 For full text of section 7, see note 141 above. See also Augustine 1986 Ottawa LR 55 69. 
147 The court in Irwin Toy v Quebec [1989) 1 SCR 927 1003 found that that would be to allow in the 
back door that which had been denied the front door. See also Augustine 1986 Ottawa LR 55 69; 
Hogg Constitutional law 1031. 
148 Augustine 1986 Ottawa LR 55 76. 
149 Section 8 reads: "Everyone has a right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure." See 
Becker v Alberta 45 AR 37, 7 CRR 232 (QB 1983) in which this was rejected. 
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section was interpreted as dealing with search and seizure for evidentiary 
purposes, it does not give rise to a right to property. 150 
Two further attempts to accord property constitutional protection need to be 
mentioned. Section 26 of the Charter provides that rights predating the 
Charter are not abolished or abridged. 151 This does not, however, mean that 
these rights are "constitutionalized" but simply that they continue to be in 
force insofar as they are not inconsistent with the Charter.152 This means that 
the right to property guaranteed by the Bill of Rights continue to be operative, 
but subject to the limitations imposed by the nature of that document. 153 
In the second place the presumptions of statutory interpretation have been 
used in property cases. In particular the presumption against interference 
with property rights and the presumption in favour of compensation have been 
employed.154 Of course, these presumptions do not necessarily apply in 
constitutional interpretation and, in any event, cannot be elevated to the 
status of constitutional right. Consequently this attempt must also fail. 
It is interesting to note the lengths to which the courts were prepared to go to 
read a right to property into the Charter. This attitude is indicative of a certain 
theoretical basis that will be discussed later. For now, however, the 
conclusion seems to be that property is not protected either explicitly or 
implicitly by the constitution. 
150 See Hogg Constitutional law 1031; Augustine 1986 Ottawa LR 55 76. 
151 Section 26 reads: "The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be 
construed as denying the existence of any other rights or freedoms that exist in Canada." 
152 Augustine 1986 Ottawa LR 55 77; Brandt 1983 Can BR 398 405. 
153 Hogg Constitutional law 1031. 
154 In The Queen in Righi of British Columbia v Tener et al [1985) 17 DLR (4th) 1 these presumptions, 
as enunciated in Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd [1920) AC 508 at 542, was 
relied on. See also Augustine 1986 Ottawa LR 55 58; Cohen D and Hutchinson AC "Of persons 
and property: the politics of legal taxonomy" 1990 Dalhousie LJ 20-54 32-36. 
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9.3.3 The property concept 
Despite the fact that property is not constitutionally protected in Canada, or 
perhaps because of it, it is still necessary to examine the Canadian property 
concept. There are two reasons for doing so. In the first place the traditional 
division between private and public law seems to have become increasingly 
unstable.155 This raises important questions as to what rights are to be 
regarded as property for the purpose of public law. In the second place this 
will indicate whether or not the constitutional protection of property has any 
effect on the property concept. 
The basic point of departure seems to be the traditional view of property as a 
bundle of rights. This means that property is not a thing, but a right or 
collection of rights over things enforceable against others. 156 This view is 
usually based on the analyses of Macpherson,157 Honore158 and Hohfeld.159 
This approach means that not all forms of property share the same 
characteristics and, for this reason, a right may be property for some 
purposes but not for others. For example, confidential information is property 
in private law but not in criminal law. 160 
The question therefore becomes whether there is one stick or strand in the 
bundle that is essential to ownership. If a test were devised, that would 
indicate whether a certain issue involves property or not. Although various 
155 Hogg Constitutional law 539: "Moreover, the original distinction between private and public law 
has tended to break down for constitutional purposes, as governments have increasingly 
intervened to regulate the economic life of the nation." 
156 Ziff Property law 1; Bauman 1992 SAJHR 344 346; Beckton 1985 Dalhousie LJ 288 289. 
157 Macpherson CB Property: mainstream and critical positions (Toronto 1978) 3. 
158 Honore AM "Ownership" in Guest AG (ed) Oxford essays in jurisprudence: first series (Oxford 
1961) 107-147. 
159 Hohfeld WN "Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in legal reasoning" 1913 Yale LJ 
16-59. 
160 R v Stewart (1988] 50 DLR (4th) 1. See also Ziff Property law 3 for further examples. 
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tests have been suggested, 161 none seem to be universally accepted. 162 In 
general, however, the property concept has expanded. 
In the most prominent case on the property concept, the Supreme Court found 
that goodwill was also property and, consequently, ordered the state to pay 
compensation for its taking. 163 Interestingly, the right to compensation was 
based on the presumptions of statutory interpretation mentioned above. 164 
This set the trend for more and more abstract rights to be recognised as 
property.165 In this way, for instance, university degrees have been 
recognised as property, at least for the purpose of matrimonial property law, 166 
as have pension rights. 167 
The basic assumption has been stated as follows: 
"There is no catalogue of what courts regard as property 
and no indisputably settled core of what must be 
contained within the bundle to make a right one of 
property. . ... (It) is not a static concept and is in a 
constant state of flux and realignment."168 
161 For example if the right is identifiable, permanent or stable; or if it is binding and transferrable or if 
~ is exclusive. 
162 Ziff Property law 4-5. 
163 Manitoba Fisheries Ltd v The Queen [1979] 1SCR101, 88 DLR (3d) 462 (1978) at 465-467. 
164 See also Augustine 1986 Ottawa LR 55 59-60. 
165 Ziff Property law 29. 
166 See Caratum v Caratum [1978] 43 DLR (4th) 398 (HC). 
167 See Rutherford v Rutherford [1981] 23 RFL 337 (BCCA) and Re Fischer and Fischer [1983] 31 
RFL (2d) 274 (SaskQB). 
168 Ziff Property law 27. 
200 Constitutional perspective 
9.3.4 Alternative tales 
There are three alternative storylines that tend to make this part of the 
American tale less obvious. The first of these storylines is the 
liberalisUpropertarian one, the second is the aboriginal one and the third is 
the constitutional one. 
There can be very little doubt that the Charter is, basically, a liberalist 
document based on the " .. . ideal that individuals should be autonomous 
moral creatures."169 In this vision the main enemy of freedom is the state and 
the purpose of the Charter is to " . . . police the boundary that separates the 
political and the collective from the pre-political and the individual ... "170 The 
basis on which this boundary is drawn is property: 
"The implication is obvious: property is the foundation 
upon which Charter rights are conferred, protected, and 
enhanced. The less property one has, the less one can 
exercise and enjoy one's rights."171 
On this basis picketing was regarded as being outside the scope of Charter 
scrutiny, as it involved common law issues. 172 The court did not regard 
common law protection of private property and contract as in itself a form of 
state activity, but preferred to delegate the freedom of expression and of 
peaceful assembly guaranteed in the Charter to a concern secondary to 
common law rights. In the same way the right to equality was regarded as 
secondary to a club's common law property rights. 173 These common law 
rights were also allowed to override legislation in order to provide 
169 Bauman 1992 SAJHR 344 353. See also Alvaro 1991 Can J Pol Sc 309 310. 
170 Hutchinson and Petter 1988 U Toronto LJ 278 283-284. 
171 Hutchinson and Petter 1988 U Toronto LJ 278 293. 
172 Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 et al v Dolphin Delivery Ltd [1986] 2 
SCR 573, dealing with the locking out of workers who picketed the company. 
173 Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association (1986] 26 DLR (4th) 728 (OntCA) dealing with the 
refusal of the OHA to allow a woman to play hockey. 
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compensation where none had been provided for in the case of real 
property, 174 but to deny compensation in the case of a tort. 175 
The second alternative tale is a highly ironic and anomalous one involving 
aboriginal title. Section 35(3) of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides that land 
claims agreements with aboriginal people concluded after 1982 is to be 
treated as "treaty rights" within the meaning of section 35(1). The effect of 
this is to constitutionalize such an agreement and in this way the rights 
contained in the agreement becomes constitutional rights.176 Rights 
extinguished before 17 April 1982 are not revived by section 35,m but new 
rights created by agreement" ... receive constitutional status ... (and) they are 
accorded more legal weight than simply legislative or contractual 
provisions. "178 
Even more surprising, these aboriginal and treaty rights supersede Charter 
rights, because they are not subject to the limitations imposed by section 1 of 
the Charter. 179 This has the unusual result that aboriginal title to land (as 
contained in the agreement) is constitutionally protected and other private 
property isn't. Moreover, these rights cannot be limited in terms of the usual 
grounds, because they are not subject to section 1. However this is to be 
interpreted, it shows at least that some property rights are constitutionally 
protected in Canada. 
The third alternative tale is one that proves both the inventiveness of the 
judiciary and the propertarian bias of the Charter. At least one writer is at 
174 The Queen in Right of British Columbia v Tener et al [1985] 17 DLR {4th) 1 {SCC} dealing with 
zoning and mining rights. 
175 Lapierre v Attorney-General of Quebec [1985] 16 DLR {4th) 554 {SCC) dealing with personal 
injury as a result of a government innoculation program. See also Hutchinson and Petter 1988 U 
Toronto LJ 278 32-38. 
176 Isaac T ''The Nunavut Agreement-in-principle and section 35 of the Constitution Act, 198Z' 1992 
Manitoba W 390-405 393-394. 
177 R v Sparrow 70 DLR {4th} 385. 
178 Isaac 1992 Manitoba LJ 390 396. 
179 Isaac 1992 Manitoba LJ 390 401. 
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pains to indicate that, although property is not protected, several of the 
strands that go to make up the bundle of rights are protected.180 This allows 
the right to freedom of expression to be interpreted as the right to use 
property as one sees fit. 181 This indicates both that property can get in the 
back door while being denied the front and that the absolute concept of 
property is still very much part of the Canadian context. 
Moreover, the development of the fairness doctrine in Canadian 
administrative law seems to have strengthened this trend. The courts have 
stated that a right to property can only be removed by clear statutory 
language or following a fair hearing.182 These natural justice and fairness 
cases often involve government grants or other forms of new property and 
require fairness before a benefit is terminated. 183 In this way the procedural 
due process required by the Charter serves to protect as property rights not 
usually recognised as such. 184 
There is an important difference between the Canadian and American law. 
While the American constitution contains a property clause, it does not 
contain a general limitations clause. The Canadian constitution, on the other 
hand, does have a limitations clause, but no property clause. The Canadian 
approach to limitations on property would therefore be different from the 
American one. 
Canadian courts. have developed a proportionality test regarding limitations. 
In order for a limitation on a fundamental right to be justifiable, it must 
(a) be designed to achieve the objective in question; 
180 Bauman 1992 SAJHR 344 360. 
181 Big M Drug Mart [1985] 2 SCR 295. 
182 Cooper v Board of Works for the Wandsworth District [1863] 14 CB(NS) 180; Knapman v Board 
of Health for Saltffeet Township [1954] 3 DLR 760 (OntHC). 
183 Re Webb and Ontario Housing Corporation [1978] 93 DLR (3d) 187 (OntCA). 
184 Beckton 1985 Dalhousie W 288 302. 
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(b) impair the fundamental right as little as possible; and 
(c) lead to a proportionality between the effect and the objectives 
sought to be achieved. 185 
This approach has been immensely influential in South African constitutional 
jurisprudence.186 However, since it differs substantially from the American 
approach in that it involves issues of fairness and equity, it will also have a 
different effect if applied to property. 
9.3.5 Conclusion 
The foregoing invites at least two conclusions. In the first place the 
unqualified statement that property is not protected constitutionally in Canada 
is, at best, lacking in nuance. Not only are some kinds of property protected 
constitutionally (as in the case of aboriginal title), but different strands of the 
bundle of rights that make up property are protected indirectly by the Charter. 
Apart from this the role that the rules of statutory interpretation play and the 
liberalist basis of the Charter make it impossible to ignore property in the 
constitutional context. Even if the Charter does not explicitly protect most 
property, it constitutes an important and irreducible part of the implicit 
Charter. 
More important, however, is the fact that Canadian lawyers' worst fears have 
been realised even without a property clause. Bauman states: 
"A simply worded 'right to property' in a bill of rights 
would amount to an apparently unqualified constitutional 
protection of an indefinite number of rights to the 
185 See R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200 at 227. 
186 See chapter 12 below. 
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ownership and use of an indeterminate number of 
tangible and intangible things."187 
This fear of an expanding property concept along American lines as a result 
of constitutional entrenchment has been realised through other means. Not 
only real property, but goodwill, confidential information, government grants 
and benefits, pensions and even university degrees have been recognised as 
property. This expansion was not the result of private-law developments, but 
usually inspired by state action, political change and pressure from 
business.188 This means that, at least in the case of Canada, the expansion 
of the property concept is not directly attributable to constitutional 
entrenchment. It suggests that such an expansion may have more to do with 
liberalism, the new property and judicial interpretation than with the 
constitution as such. 
9.4 Preliminary conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter has been to indicate the differences, if any, 
between the American and the Canadian property concepts. It is often 
argued, as it was during the Canadian constitutional debate on property, that 
constitutional protection of property inevitably results in an expanded property 
concept. This expansion into new property is directly attributed to 
constitutional protection. In fact, this was one of the reasons why a property 
clause was not included in the Canadian constitution. Closer examination of 
this North American story reveals, however, that this view is, at best, without 
nuance. Not only did the Canadian property concept expand almost despite 
its lack of constitutional protection, but commentators also agree that the 
property concept (and its underlying philosophy) invites expansion. 
187 Bauman 1992 SAJHR 344 347. 
188 Ziff Property law 33: "Generally, these changes have not been based on private law responses 
.. ., but instead have taken the form of regulatory regimes involving licensing and criminal . 
sanctions." 
An American tale 205 
The liberal philosophy (which underlies both systems), with its link between 
property and power, makes an ever-increasing exclusive control over 
resources (in whatever form) almost inevitable. If exclusive control over 
resources is necessary for the development of morally autonomous people, 
that control will be expanded to more and more things in search of the elusive 
goal of moral autonomy. In this way the liberal concept and new property are 
necessarily connected. Both serve to uphold the liberal dream. 
The main difference between the American and Canadian approaches lies in 
the way in which limitations on property is viewed. While the American 
constitution has a property clause but no limitations clause, the Canadian 
constitution has a limitations clause but no property clause. The Americans 
have therefore had to revert to a definitional test in order to justify limitations 
on property. This means that rather than balance the individual and public 
interest, they tend to exclude certain kinds of property from the definition. In 
this way the issue is avoided. The Canadian approach does give a guideline 
for the way in which individual and public interests can be balanced, but this 
has not been applied to property. 

CHAPTER 10: A TALE OF TWO (FORMER) COLONIES 
10.1 Introduction 
"The history of Indian constitutional 
change can be epitomised as largely a 
story of successive attempts on the part 
of Parliament to overrule judicial 
interpretation of the Constitution - a story 
in which the constitutional guarantees as 
to property rights played a dominant 
role.''1 
One of the privileges of a democracy of 
free men is the right to mismanage one's 
own affairs within the confines of the 
law."2 
A comparison between India and Malaysia regarding the property concept in 
constitutional law offers interesting possibilities. There are a number of fairly 
obvious similarities between the two systems. Both have a very old 
customary-law basis. Both underwent religious influences from Hinduism and 
Islam and influences due to colonisation (wholly or in part) by the Dutch, 
French, Portuguese and English. In both systems independence was 
achieved in the first half of this century and both have an entrenched 
constitution with a chapter on fundamental rights. In fact, Malaysia's property 
clause was modelled on the Indian one as it then stood and both property 
clauses are contained in typical English colonial constitutions with all the 
Narain J "Constitutional changes in India - an inquiry into the working of the constitution" 1968 
ICLQ 878-907 882. 
2 Bose J in Dwarkadas Shrlvinas v Sho/apur Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd and Others AIR 1954 
SC 119138. 
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irony this implies. In both cases too, at least up to a point, appeals had to be 
lodged with the Privy Council in England.3 
There are a number of fairly superficial differences between the two systems 
that can be mentioned briefly. In the first place Malaysia is a constitutional 
monarchy consisting of thirteen states, 4 while India has no monarch, but is 
also made up of a number of states and a number of union territories. 5 In the 
second place a drafting commission drafted the Malayan constitution, while 
the Indian constitution was drafted by a constituent assembly.6 In the third 
place both states went through a period when a state of emergency was 
declared. However, the Indian state of emergency was revoked in 1977,7 but 
the Malayan one has never been revoked. 8 
There are, interestingly, both similarities and dissimilarities between the 
Indian and Malayan approaches to the property concept. The differences are 
due, in no small part, to differences of opinion regarding the interpretation of 
the constitution and the role of the judiciary. In fact, many of the differences 
are directly attributable to differences in political theory, both on the part of 
the government and on the part of the judiciary. 
3 In Malaysia the Privy Council acted as final court of appeal until 1985 (1978 in constitutional 
cases): Harding AJ ''The 1988 constitutional crisis in Malaysia" 1990 ICLQ 57-81 72. In India 
appeals to the Privy Council were abolished in 1949 - see 31. 
4 Section 1(1) and 1(2) of the Federal Constitution. Malaysia originally consisted of tribal 
organisations that were united under Brttish rule, some ruled directly. others as protectorates. A 
constitution was originally drafted and modern Malaysia was formed. See, in general, Minattur J 
"Malaysia" in David R ea (eds) International encyclopedia of comparative law vol 1 L-M 
(Tubingen 1972) M-17 - M-29 M-17; Abrahim DA ''The legal system of Malaysia" in Redden KR 
(ed) Modern legal systems cyclopedia vol IX (Buffalo NY 1990) 9.200.1-9.200.143 9.200.7-
9.200.8; Ibrahim A and Jain MP "The constitution of Malaysia and the American constitutional 
influence" in Beer LW (ed) Constitutional systems in late twentieth century Asia (Seattle 
1992) 507-570. 
5 India was consecutively ruled by ancient kings. the Rajput, the Moguls and the British. 
Independence was achieved in 1950. See. in general, Irani PK "India" in Knapp V (ed) 
International encyclopedia of comparative law Vol I: National reports (Tubingen undated) 1-7 -
1-25 1-7; Young CC "The legal system of the Republic of India" in Redden KR and Schleuther LL 
(eds) Modern legal systems cyclopedia vol 9 (Buffalo 1990) 9.80-9.110.21 9.80.7. 
6 Seervai HM Constitutional law of India vol I (2nd ed Bombay 1975) 1ff; Young "India" 9.80.21. 
7 Polyviou PG "Constitutional law" in Wade HWR and Cryer HL (eds) Annual survey of 
Commonwealth law 1977 (London 1979) 1-72 43-44. 
8 Abrahim "Malaysia" 9.200.9. 
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There are, however, also a number of similarities, which, to some extent, are 
the result of the various religious influences. These similarities are most 
apparent in customary land law and a few will be mentioned here. Both 
Malaysia and India knew a wide variety of types of property. Common to both 
was the communal types of ownership where the tribe/community/village held 
and cultivated the land.9• However, in Malaysia land held from the community 
could be used as security for loans.10 Unique to India was the feudal 
structures known as zamindar, talukdar and ma/guzar. These were originally 
peasant-farmers, but they eventually became intermediaries between the 
farmers (not owners) of the land and the state for the purpose of revenue 
collection.11 Apart from these, land could also be held in janman-right,12 in 
shtanam,13 and in ryotwari pattadar. 14 
In Malaysia British rulers characterised the traditional adat rights as 
proprietary usufructs, with ownership of the land vested in the chief. 15 The 
only other change was the introduction of the Torrens system of land 
registration.16 This meant that only those rights created and defined by 
9 This is the adat-system in Malaysia (see Hiscock ME and Allan DE "Law modernisation in South-
East Asia: colonial and post-colonial land tenures in Indonesia and Malaysia" 1982 Rabels Z 
Privatrecht 509-529 511-512; Abrahim "Malaysia" 9.200.10) and the tarwad (family property -
see Kochuni v States of Madras and Kera/a AIR 1960 SC 1080 1099, 1100-1102) and village 
property (see Majumdar RC (ed) The history and culture of the Indian people Vol IX: British 
paramountcy and Indian renaissance (Bombay 1963) 1133) in India. In these cases individual or 
private property was not recognized. Interestingly, both the adat and tarwad systems were 
matrilineal but not matriarchal. 
10 This is called the jual janji - land was transferred, but ownership did not pass - see Abrahim 
"Malaysia" 9.200.31-34. 
11 Majumdar History and culture 360; Kameshwar Singh v Province of Bihar AIR 1950 Patna 392 
395; Atma Ram v State of Punjab AIR 1959 SC 519 524; State of Bihar v Kameshwar Singh AIR 
1952 SC 252 297. 
12 "Freehold interesf' or "absolute proprietorship" - see Kochuni v States of Madras and Kera/a AIR 
1960 SC 1080 1087, 1108. 
13 Head of a tarwad, but with separate property - see Kochuni v States of Madras and Kera/a AIR 
1960 SC 10801100-1102. 
14 Tenancy from the state - see Karimbil Kunhikoman and another v State of Kera/a AIR 1962 SC 
723 731-732. 
15 This meant, among other things, that the British could succeed the chiefs as absolute owners and 
natives could be given rights of use and occupation by grant - see Hiscock and Allan 1982 Rabels 
Z Privatrecht 509 517. 
16 Minattur "Malaysia" M-25. This system, based on the Australian model, was introduced by the 
British, but maintained in Malaysia by the National Land Code 56 of 1965 - see Sinnadurai V The 
sale and purchase of real property in Malaysia (Singapore 1984) 4. 
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statute were recognised and new rights could not be created by contract. 17 In 
India the semi-feudal system of zamindari was maintained by the British as 
this facilitated revenue collection. 18 The very high revenue charged and the 
absolute power of the zamindari over their raiyats19 changed a system that 
had been fairly popular2° into a target for revolution. By the end of the British 
era 43% of all land was held in terms of zamindarschemes.21 
10.2 The property clauses 
The Indian constitution that was adopted in 1950 was based, to a large 
extent, on the Government of India Act 1935,22 and was influenced by various 
constitutions and constitutional ideas.23 At the time of drafting it was clear 
that the constitution was aimed at social and economic reform. Part of this 
goal was the reform of the system of land tenure, revenue and rent, the relief 
of agricultural debt and nationalisation of key industries.24 
17 Hiscock and Allan 1982 Rabies Z Privatrecht 509 518, 525; Haji Abdul Rahman v Mohamed 
Hasan [1917] AC 209. On the recognized types of title to land, see Sinnadurai Real property 
168-172. When this system was combined with the jual janji, the result was that many "owners" 
lost their land to moneylenders. This also meant that equitable ownership could not be recognised 
in Malaysia law, although this decision was recently overturned by the Malayan Federal Court -
see Chin Choy v Collector of Stamp Duties (1981] 4 MLJ 47; Mosbert Bhd v Chatib bin Kani (1985] 
1MLJ162. 
18 Majumdar History and culture 361, 497; Murphy J "Insulating land reform from constitutional 
impugnment: an Indian case study'' 1992 SAJHR 362-388 378; Sarojini Reddy P Judicial review 
of fundamental rights (New Delhi 1976) 219. 
19 Majumdar History and culture 938, 1133. 
20 Kameshwar Singh v Province of Bihar AIR 1950 Patna 392 395: " ... the raiyats in Chota Nagpur 
were much attached to their zamindars and (that) in several instances serious disorders had 
occurred when the estate of a zamindar was sold for arrears of revenue and a purchaser, who 
was not known and esteemed in the locality, sought to take possession of it." 
21 Murphy 1992 SAJHR 362 378. 
22 In fact 250 of the 395 sections of the new constitution was based on the GI Act - see Seervai 
Constitutional law 1, 2; Young "India" 9.80.21. For this reason the GI Act became important for 
interpreting the new Constitution. 
23 The idea of parliamentary government, that is the cabinet system in which the executive is 
responsible to the legislature, was adopted from the British system. The ideas of fundamental 
rights and a Supreme Court were taken from the American system, while the Irish model of 
directive principles was also incorporated. The Canadian and Australian federal model was 
preferred over the American one. See Young "India" 9.80.21; Seervai Constitutional law 4; 
Narain 1968 ICLQ 878 879. 
24 Sarojini Reddy Judicial review 210. 
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Almost from the start, there were problems in the Constituent Assembly 
regarding the property clause.25 It was felt that in the new constitution other 
rights, beside ownership, needed protection. 26 There was also a conflict 
between two basic ideas or approaches in the Constituent Assembly. On the 
one hand there was a group who felt that expropriation should be limited to 
public purpose and subject to just and equitable compensation. On the other 
hand, the second group advocated that there should be no private property of 
certain industries and natural wealth and that acquisition of these should be 
on the government's own terms.27 As a compromise sections 19(1)(f), 19(5) 
and 31 were included in the Constitution. 
Section 19(1 )(f) protected the right of citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of 
property, subject to restrictions in the interests of the general public as set out 
in section 19(5). Section 31 stated that expropriation could take place by 
authority of law that provided for compensation.28 Section 31A provided that 
certain acts pertaining to expropriation were excluded from the protection 
offered by section 31(2). Acts listed under section 31A thus did not have to 
meet the requirements of public purpose and compensation. 
In the debates on the Constitution, Nehru made it clear that the government 
thought that these sections would provide very limited protection of property. 
He distinguished between petty acquisitions (for which compensation had to 
be paid) and large-scale acquisitions for the purpose of social reform (for 
which no compensation should be paid). There could be no judicial review of 
25 The GI Act, in sections 299 and 300, had contained provisions regarding property. 
26 These included "vested interests" such as grants or tenure of land held free from revenue or held 
subject to partial revenue, individual rights (known as taluk, inam, watan, jagi, muafi and sanad) 
and also zamindari rights. See Seervai Constitutional law 636-637. 
27 Sarojini Reddy Judicial review 211; Dhavan R ''The constitution as the situs of struggle: India's 
Constitution forty years on" in Beer LW (ed) Constitutional systems in late twentieth century 
Asia (Seattle 1992) 373-461 379. 
28 See Sarojini Reddy Judicial review 218 on the differences between the new constitutional 
provisions and section 299 of the GI Act. 
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these acquisitions and the legislative will would be supreme. 29 Subsequent 
events proved that the view that the judiciary would not be a problem was a 
serious miscalculation. The next twenty-five years of Indian constitutional 
history was dominated by the conflict between parliament and the courts over 
property.30 
The government attempted agrarian reform by means of legislation and, often, 
these were overturned as unconstitutional or their scope was limited by the 
courts.31 The upshot of this conflict was that in the late seventies the right to 
property was removed from the chapter on fundamental rights in the Indian 
Constitution. Today, the only protection for the right of property is to be found 
in Section 300-A, which states that '(n)o person shall be deprived of his 
property save by authority of law'.32 
Unlike in India, there was very little debate on the constitution in general and 
the property clause in particular in Malaysia. Malaysia retained the English 
idea of parliamentary sovereignty,33 although the Constitution shows a lot of 
American and Indian influences. 34 Section 13 of the Federal Constitution 
reads as follows: 
(1) No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance 
with law. 
29 Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 388 390; Murphy 1992 SAJHR 362 363; Seervai Constitutional law 
639-640. 
30 Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 388 390; Dhavan "The constitution" 379. See also Narain 1968 ICLQ 
878 882. 
31 It turned out that the zamindari had enormous political and economic clout and the abolition of 
that system eventually cost the government Rs 6700 million. On the other hand the re-allocation 
of land resulted in a 3, 1 % increase in agricultural output. See Murphy 1992 SAJHR 362 377, 
379. 
32 Sorabjee SJ "Equality in the United States and India" in Henkin L and Rosenthal AJ (eds) 
Constitutionalism and rights - the influence of the United States constitution abroad (New 
York 1990) 94-124 98. 
33 Hickling "Constitutional changes" 4. 
34 Ibrahim and Jain "Constitution of Malaysia" 510. It should, however, be pointed out that the 
Malayan constitution was not the result of a democratic process or approved by referendum. It 
was drafted by a committee and simply promulgated - see Hickling "Constitutional changes" 3: "At 
each step the emphasis was more on the authoritarian and the utilitarian, than upon the 
democratic and the cosmetic." 
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(2) No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of 
property without adequate compensation. 
Although the constitution provided for judicial review,35 the first very modest 
attempts at judicial activism precipitated a constitutional crisis. 36 The power of 
judicial review was scaled down even more at the insistence of the 
executive.37 This was exacerbated by the continuing state of emergency.38 
Although the Malayan courts have shown a reluctance to use foreign case 
law, a number of Indian cases were quoted, at least until the early sixties.39 
10.3 The property concept 
10.3.1 Malaysia 
In Selangor Pilots Association v Government of Malaysia40 the government, 
acting through the Port Authority, took over the function of piloting in the 
harbour in accordance with the law. The physical assets of the pilot 
association were also taken over and compensation was paid for this. The 
plaintiffs then claimed compensation for the loss of goodwill and future profits. 
The court a quo regarded goodwill as property and read the term property in 
section 13 broadly to include both corporeal and incorporeal property. 
Property was, therefore, regarded as a bundle of rights and goodwill was a 
strand of this bundle. Deprivation of goodwill therefore was a deprivation of 
35 Section 4 seemingly provides very clearly for judicial review, but this interpretation was not 
generally accepted - see Hickling "Constitutional changes" 16. 
36 The dispute revolved around the illegal procedures followed by the ruling party in its election of 
officials. It resulted in the dismissal of Suffian CJ, ostensibly because he had written a letter to 
the King. 
37 That this power of the executive over the judiciary was very effective is proved by the fact that not 
a single act was declared unconstitutional in the first thirty years after promulgation of the 
constitution. See Harding 1990 ICLQ 57 80-81; Ibrahim and Jain "Constitution of Malaysia" 528. 
38 Hickling "Constitutional changes" 7. 
39 See The Government of the State of Kelantan v The Government of the Federation of Malaya and 
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj [1963] MLJ 355; Hickling "Constitutional changes" 18. The 
attitude eventually changed because of India's perceived move toward socialism. 
40 Selangor Pilots Association v Government of Malaysia [1975] 2 MLJ 66. 
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property. The court also stated that a person could be deprived of property 
even if the property was not acquired by the state. Consequently the court 
followed the approach of the Indian courts before 1957 and ordered the 
government to pay compensation. 
On appeal to the Privy Council, however, the decision was overturned.41 The 
majority judgement, delivered by Viscount Dilhorne, stated that goodwill might 
have been a part of the business built up by the respondents, but that this 
was not the decisive point: 
"(The respondents) ... had acquired a goodwill, ... of 
which it was deprived by the amending Act. But . . . it 
does not follow that the goodwill was acquired by the 
Port Authority . . . and in the opinion of the majority . . . it 
was not.'.42 
The majority held that, what the respondents had lost and what the state had 
acquired, was the right to act as and employ pilots, "neither being property."43 
Lord Salmon, who delivered the dissenting judgement, agreed that a license 
was not property and neither was the right to employ pilots.44 On the basis of 
several Northern Irish decisions, however, he held that goodwill was property 
and, since it is "impossible to disentangle a business such as the 
respondents' from its goodwill, they acquired its goodwill with it."45 It is 
41 Government of Malaysia v Selangor Pilots Association [1978] AC 337 (PC); [1977] 2 WLR 901 
(PC); [1977] 1 MLJ 133. 
42 Per Dilhome J Government of Malaysia v Se/anger Pilots Association [1977] 1 MLJ 133 136 -
emphasis added. See also Lee KTY, Min YT and Seng LK Constitutional law of Malaysia and 
Singapore (Singapore 1991) 685. 
43 Government of Malaysia v Selangor PHots Association [1977] 1 MLJ 133 135. 
44 Government of Malaysia v Se/angor P11ots Association [1977] 1 MLJ 133 138. 
45 Government of Malaysia v Selangor Pilots Association [1977] 1 MLJ 133 140. The metaphor of 
entangling is one typical of this view of property and is understandable in the light of the metaphor 
of property as a bundle of rights. 
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interesting to note that Salmon based his decision, at least in part, on a 
political theory that opposed nationalisation without compensation.46 
Thus, both the Malayan court and the Privy Council held that goodwill is 
property or, at least, an important strand in the bundle of rights. They differed 
on the question whether the goodwill had been acquired. At the same time 
the right to a licence was held not to be property. 
In Station Hotels Berhad v Malayan Railway Administration41 the Malayan 
High Court had to deal with the question of the nature of property. In this 
case, too, it was held that, while the term was generally wide enough to 
include rights in terms of a lease or mortgage, section 13 only referred to " ... 
'proprietary rights in rem."' A case such as this one, where contractual rights 
were disputed, did not fall within the ambit of section 13, but had to be 
resolved with reference to the ordinary law of contract. "His contractual right 
under the lease is not 'property' within the meaning of Article 13. "48 The case 
went on appeal to the Federal Court, but the appeal was dismissed. As in the 
Selangor Pilots Association case, this is an indication of a refusal to read the 
constitution widely and an acceptance of the private-law paradigm, in which 
ownership plays a decisive role. 
In the case of Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian Wilayah Persekutuan v Sri 
Lempah Enterprise Sdn Bhct9 section 13 was not mentioned explicitly. This 
was a case in which an application was lodged with the Land Executive 
Committee (LEC) for sub-division and re-zoning of agricultural land. 
46 Government of Malaysia v Se/angor Pilots Association [1977] 1 MLJ 133 139: "In my opinion, this 
appeal raises constitutional issues of vital importance. I fear it will encourage and facilitate 
nationalisation without compensation throughout the Commonwealth." 
47 Station Hotels Berhad v Malayan Railway Administration [1977) 1 MLJ 112. 
48 Station Hotels Berhad v Malayan Railway Administration [1977) 1 MLJ 115. 
49 Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian, Wi/ayah Persekutuan v Sri Lempah Enterprise Sdn Bhd (1979] 1 
MLJ 135. The respondent in the High Court case and the appellant in the Federal Court case was 
actually the Land Executive Committee (LEC). 
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A part of the land was surrendered to the government, apparently in exchange 
for this approval. The Committee approved the application, subject to the 
exchange by the applicant of his "title in perpetuity" for a 99-year lease. 
Applicant objected to this and applied to the court for an order that the LEC 
approve the application on the usual terms and conditions. The application 
was granted on the basis that a 99-year lease is not property50 and that 
deprivation of property required a legislative and not merely an executive 
act_s1 
In general, the approach of the Malayan courts can be described as 
conservative. Although the courts have not allowed governmental organs, 
such as the Land Executive Committee, to exceed its powers, no expansion of 
the property concept took place. The protection offered by the Constitution 
was limited to rights in rem thus restricting the property concept. 
10.3.2 India 
At first glance, the conflict between the Indian legislature and the courts seem 
to have been, and has been represented as, a clash over land reform and 
compensation. 
At another level, however, this was a conflict about the property concept, 
specifically about what was or was not protected as "property" by the 
constitution. In its resistance against the legislature {for whatever reason) the 
property concept was one of the courts' most effective weapons, and it was all 
the more effective for being virtually unnoticed. 
The way in which this history unfolded, is illuminating. The court had, very 
early on, declared expropriation for the purpose of agrarian reform 
50 Pengarah Tanah Dan Gafian. Wilayah Persekutuan v Sn Lempah Enterprise Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 
MLJ 135 140. 
51 Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian, Wilayah Persekutuan v Sn Lempah Enterprise Sdn Bhd [1979] 1 
MLJ 135 141. 
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constitutional. 52 This principle was reiterated time and again by the courts. 53 
What was, ostensibly, in dispute was the compensation. While maintaining 
this position the court could simultaneously hold that expropriation for other 
purposes (such as slum clearance or nationalisation) was not saved by 
section 31A and was therefore subject to the twin tests of public purpose and 
compensation. 
While the legislature struggled to force the courts to give estates covered by 
section 31A as wide a meaning as possible, this enabled the courts to read 
property widely in other areas as well and thus expand the property concept. 
In this process, more and more rights were regarded as property and 
protected as such. Once the goal of land reform seemed secure, the 
government turned its attention to nationalisation and other forms of economic 
reform. These industries and services were, however, by this time well 
protected as a result of the expansion of the property concept. The upshot 
was that economic reform was severely hampered. 
As in most other systems with an English background, property in Indian law 
can mean either the objects of the right or the right itself. 54 It is this second 
meaning that is at stake here. Property is, in general, defined as "a bundle of 
rights".55 This means that property is not an abstract concept that can be 
defined out of context. In each case the strands making up the bundle differ, 
so that the content of the "bundle of rights" comprising property differ 
depending on the type of property under discussion. Thus, for example, the 
52 See State of Bihar v Kameshwar Singh AIR 1952 SC 252 295, 264. 
53 See eg Kochuni v States of Madras and Kera/a AIR 1960 SC 1080 1087-1089; State of Kera/a v 
GwaHor Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Weaving) Co AIR 1973 SC 2734. See also Yardley DCM 
"Fundamental rights and civil liberties" in Wade HWR and Cryer HL (eds) Annual survey of 
Commonwealth law 1974 (London 1975) 62-102 87. 
54 State of West Bengal v Subodh Gopa/ Bose and Others AIR 1954 SC 92 101. 
55 Kameshwar Singh v Province of Blhar AIR 1950 Patna 392 420, 427; State of Blhar v Kameshwar 
Singh AIR 1952 SC 252 313; Slate of West Bengal v Subodh Gopal Bose and Others AIR 1954 
SC 92 101, 118; Charan1il Lal Chowdry v Union of India and Others AIR 1951 SC 41 54, 61; RC 
Cooper v Union of India AIR 1970 SC 564. 
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property rights that shareholders have, will be different from those of 
landowners. 
This raises the question whether there is a single strand of this bundle that 
can be regarded as essential or typical of property. This question is usually 
asked in a different form, because it is assumed that certain strands of the 
bundle can be acquired without acquiring the property as such. The question 
then is when such an acquisition of a strand/s (even if the entire property is 
not appropriated) effectively amounts to an expropriation. Therefore, the 
recognition of a typical or essential strand in the bundle will determine 
whether acquisition of that strand amounts to expropriation. This, in turn, 
implies that such an individual strand is then regarded as property in itself. 
The Indian courts have answered this question in various ways, depending on 
the kind of property right concerned. What is important, though, is the various 
tests developed to answer this question. 
In Kameshwar Singh v Province of Bihar6 the property of zamindari was not 
expropriated, but the management was taken over by government agents and 
the owner was only entitled to a part of the profits. The question was whether 
this in fact constituted expropriation or not. The right to possession was 
regarded as "the most characteristic and essential of these rights" in the case 
of landownership. 
This was confirmed in the appeal case. Therefore, the right to manage the 
property and to benefit from the arrears of rent due to a landlord before 
passage of the act was also regarded as property. The court, however, 
excluded this kind of legislation from the protection of section 31A because it 
" ... does not seem to have even a remote connection with ... land reform."57 
Therefore the principle is acknowledged that strands of the bundle of rights 
56 Kameshwar Singh v Province of Bihar AIR 1950 Patna 392 427. 
57 State of Bihar v Kameshwar Singh AIR 1952 SC 252 295. 
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can be acquired without it amounting to expropriation, 58 but if the strand is 
recognised as property in itself, the acquisition of that strand will be 
expropriation. Only if that right has anything to do with agrarian reform, will it 
be saved by section 31A. 
In State of West Bengal v Subodh Gopal Bose and Others59 the state took 
away owners' rights to annul under-tenures and to evict under-tenants. The 
question was whether the destruction of this strand of the bundle of rights 
amounted to expropriation. There was some difference of opinion amongst 
the various judges on this issue. Sastri CJ held that this was not merely a 
strand, but constituted property in itself. Das J did not agree. Jagannadhadas 
J thought that section 31(2) applied to every strand separately, but section 
31 (1) did not. Two tests were suggested. 
On the one hand it was suggested that, if acquisition of a strandls resulted in 
withholding of possession and enjoyment, or seriously impaired this or 
reduced the property's value, it would amount to expropriation.60 On the other 
hand it was suggested that, if a strand can be acquired (in the technical 
sense) by itself, such a strand would be regarded as property in itself.61 On 
the first test, in this case, the deprivation was found not to be substantial 
enough. On the second test, too, it was found that the right to annul could not 
be acquired separately and, consequently, it was not in itself property. 
In the case of shareholders, and other holders of intangible property, other 
tests were devised. In Charanjit Lal Chowdry v Union of India and Others62 a 
share was defined as movable property implying the right to income, the right 
to alienate and the right to vote or take part in management as the strands in 
the bundle of rights. Once again two tests were proposed. Mukherjea J 
58 State of Bihar v Kameshwar Singh AIR 1952 SC 252 313. 
59 State of West Bengal v Subodh Gopal Bose and Others AIR 1954 SC 92 94. 
60 State of West Bengal v Subodh Gopal Bose and Others AIR 1954 SC 92 101. 
61 State of West Bengal v Subodh Gopal Bose and Others AIR 1954 SC 92 118. 
62 Charanjll Lal Chowdry v Union of India and Others AIR 1951 SC 41 55. 
218 Constitutional perspective 
suggested that the test be whether the whole property is taken or only "some 
minor ingredient".63 Based on this test the right to vote could not, in itself, be 
regarded as property. Das J, however, repeated the test laid down in the 
previous case. Property was that " . .. which can by itself be acquired, 
disposed of or taken possession of'.64 However, he reached the same 
conclusion as Mukherjea J. 
Das J once again relied on this test in Dwarkadas Shrivinas v Sholapur 
Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd and Others65 to hold that only strands that can 
be acquired separately can be regarded as property in itself. Mahajan J and 
Bose J attempted a more flexible approach in asking whether the acquisition 
had resulted in loss or injury and whether the acquisition had resulted in 
"paper ownership" or the "mere husk of title".66 The result would then depend 
on the bundle of rights and what was acquired in each case. 
In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc v State of Rajasthan and Others67 the 
state took over the management of a temple, without expropriating the 
property. The question was whether this amounted to expropriation. Based 
on the religious order (Firman) that had been issued to found the temple and 
on the Tilkayat's limited right to manage the property, the court found that the 
right to hold this particular office in this temple was not property.68 The 
question whether the right to supply electricity could be regarded as property 
was raised in Western Uttar Pradesh Electric Power and Supply Co Ltd v 
State of Uttar Pradesh and Others69 but not answered. The court did, 
63 Charanjit Lal Chowdry v Union of India and Others AIR 1951 SC 41 55 - relying on Minister of 
State for the Army v Dalziel 68 CLR 261. 
64 Charanjit Lal Chowdry v Union of India and Others AIR 1951 SC 41 62. 
65 Dwarkadas Shrivinas v Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd and Others AIR 1954 SC 119 136. 
66 Dwarkadas Shrivinas v Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd and Others AIR 1954 SC 119 125, 
138. 
67 Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc v State of Rajasthan and Others AIR 1963 SC 1638. 
68 Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc v State of Rajasthan and Others AIR 1963 SC 1638 1656, 
1658. 
69 Western Uttar Pradesh Bectric Power and Supply Co Ltd v State of Uttar Pradesh and Others 
AIR 1970 SC 21. 
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however, in an obiter dictum indicate that since this was not an exclusive 
right, it was probably not property.70 
In the important Bank Nationalisation case71 the banks were not expropriated, 
but their assets were transferred to other banks. Compensation was paid, but 
the question was whether goodwill and unexpired leases were also property 
that needed to be taken into consideration in calculating compensation. 
Based on the definition of property in Entry 42, List Ill of the Constitution,72 
Shah J found that both had substantial value and should, therefore, be taken 
into consideration.73 The term "undertaking" included all property, that is, 
assets, rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities.74 In this case, therefore, 
the strands of the bundle of rights could not be separated and had to be 
acquired in toto as an undertaking.75 In a number of other cases, various 
rights were regarded as property or not on the basis of either the extent of the 
holder's right or the value of such a right. Because the position of a 
hereditary trustee was regarded as basically the same as that of a manager or 
custodian, the office was not regarded as property.76 In other cases the value 
of the right apparently convinced the court to see it as property. In this way 
the pension of a civil servant was regarded as property, because the court 
considered it a "valuable right''. It is, consequently, not to be treated as" ... a 
70 Western Uttar Pradesh Electric Power and Supply Co Lid v State of Uttar Pradesh and Others 
AIR 1970 SC 21 26. 
71 RC Cooper v Union of India AIR 1970 SC 564. 
72 Entry 42, List 111 defines property as '1he highest right a man can have to anything, being that 
right which one has to lands or tenements, goods or chattels which does not depend on anothe~s 
courtesy: it includes ownership, estates and interests in corporeal things, and also rights such as 
trade-marks, copy-rights, patents and even rights in personam capable of transfer or 
transmission, such as debts; and signifies a beneficial right to a thing considered as having a 
money value, especially with reference to transfer or succession, and to their capacity of being 
injured." 
73 RC Cooper v Union of India AIR 1970 SC 564 611. See also Finnis JM "Constitutional law" in 
Wade HWR and Cryer HL (eds) Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law 1971 (London 1972) 1-
65 36. 
74 RC Cooper v Union of India AIR 1970 SC 564 610. 
75 RC Cooper v Union of India AIR 1970 SC 564 630. 
76 Kakinada Annadana Samajan v Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, 
Hyderabad and Others AIR 171 SC 891. Interestingly, the court states on 895 that "even 
females" can be hereditary trustees, indicating a certain attitude towards both property and 
women. 
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bounty payable on the sweet-will and pleasure of the Government..."77 In the 
same way the payment of a cash bonus to employees was regarded as 
property.78 
Property, in constitutional sense, then must be understood widely: 
"[It] comprises every form of property, tangible or 
intangible, including debts and choses in action, such as 
unpaid accumulation of wages, pension, cash grant and 
constitutionally protected Privy Purse. "79 
However, the right to life membership of the senate of a university, the right 
under a lease to work a mine on government property, the "passage benefits" 
of civil servants, the rights of members of the management committee of a 
private school and the right to obtain a mining lease were not regarded as 
property. 80 
In general the Indian courts have applied a wide range of tests to determine 
whether a certain right is property or not. These tests seem to revolve around 
the value of the right, whether it can be acquired in the technical sense and 
the level of control exercised by the holder of the right. All seem to 
emphasise the role of property as a valuable right that confers a certain 
amount of power on the proprietor. 
property and power was stressed. 
In this way the connection between 
To make that power as absolute as 
possible, a wide range of property rights were recognised. 
77 Deokinan Prasad v State of Bihar and Others AIR 1971 SC 1409 1419. 
78 Madan Mohan Pathak and others v Union of India and Others AIR 1978 SC 803 819. 
79 Madan Mohan Pathak and others v Union of India and Others AIR 1978 SC 803 821. 
80 Seervai Constitutional law 718. 
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10.4 Preliminary conclusions 
It seems strange that two legal systems with so much in common, could come 
to such diverging conclusions regarding property. In Malaysia, the 
introduction of a constitution had little or no effect on the property concept. 
Property was defined in terms of private law conceptions and ideas to limit it 
to "proprietary rights in rem." This was the result of a complex set of factors. 
One of these was the influence of the Privy Council on constitutional 
interpretation. The Privy Council opted for a literal, legalistic interpretation 
that confined concepts to their traditional ambit. This effect was reinforced by 
the various courts' reluctance to use foreign (especially American) case law.81 
In the case of India, on the other hand, the Privy Council never had any 
jurisdiction in constitutional matters and courts were, especially in the 
beginning, willing to use American constitutional theory. This is another one 
of the reasons for the differences. 
In the second place the narrow definition of property was the result of the role 
that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty played. It is difficult to see how 
a supreme constitution and parliamentary sovereignty can ever co-exist. 82 In 
fact, the constitutional crisis of 1988 in Malaysia and the repeated 
amendments to the Indian constitution suggest that they cannot. More 
important, however, is the difference in the way the judiciary viewed its role. 
The Malayan courts never sought to challenge the legislature,83 while the 
Indian courts did. 84 The result in India might not always have been positive, 
but it had a definite impact on the property concept. In the third place it 
81 See Hickling "Constitutional changes" 1 O and cases cited there. 
82 There is some dispute over whether section 4 actually guarantees a supreme constitution, 
indicating the extent of the problem. 
83 ComptroHer-General of Inland Revenue v NP [1973] 1 MLJ 165 166: "As to this there can be, 
prima facie, no doubt that the legislation was duly passed by Parliament in the exercise of its 
sovereign function ... and that there can be no resort to natural justice." 
84 Sarojini Reddy Judicial review 247 states that this activism was based on a constructionist (ie 
literal) interpretation of the constitution, at least in property cases. This view is supported by 
Narain 1968 ICLQ 878 882, 892 
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should be remembered that Malaysia apparently never had to deal with land 
reform on the scale that India did or at least it did not result in such direct 
confrontations with the property clause. Therefore there had not been the 
kind of pressure on the Malayan courts that had been brought to bear on the 
Indian courts. 
The impact of section 13 of the Malayan constitution on property law has 
been minimal. Property is mostly regarded as more or less absolute,85 except 
in the case of land within the Malay reservations. 86 There is very little 
indication of social control of or influence over the use of property. Where the 
term "public purpose" is used in legislation dealing with expropriation, it is 
simply equated with legislative will.87 In other words, the requirement of 
public purpose is met because the legislature says that it has been met. 
Compared to the Malayan courts, the Indian courts were activist, especially in 
the field of property law. This resulted in what has been termed the 
"unedifying squabble" between the courts and parliament. In this process the 
property concept was broadened so that, by the time the 25th Amendment 
was enacted, Indians enjoyed the same protection of property that Americans 
did.88 The result was an emphasis on individual rights that hampered social 
reform. 
In the main the land reform policy of the government worked. Millions were 
freed from the revenue burden. Unfortunately, recent years have seen the 
emergence of a new set of revenue farmers and corruption remains a 
85 See Sajan Singh v Sadara Ali [1960] 26 MLJ 52; [1960] 1 All ER 269: "And the transferee, having 
got the property, can assert his title against all the world ... " 
86 In these cases land may not be alienated to non-Malays. The land is held under a matrilineal 
system and the occupier has a life interest that cannot be attached or sold - see Minattur 
"Malaysia" M-26. 
87 S Kulasingham and Another v Commissioner of Lands Federal Territories and Others [1982] 1 
MW 204 208: " ... the declaration issued under the section shall be conclusive evidence that all 
the scheduled land is needed for the purpose specified therein." 
88 This was due, in part, to the reliance of Indian courts on American constitutional theory - see 
Murphy 1992 SAJHR 362 365, 373. 
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problem. Moreover, emphasis on agrarian reform has meant that other types 
of reform (such as upgrading of slums) received less attention.89 
The battle with parliament over property rights eventually cost the court the 
war over the constitution. The emphasis on property tended to strengthen the 
assumption that this battle had more to do with wealth and privilege, than with 
democracy. 90 The emerging constitutional ism was basically appropriated by 
the advantaged classes. This did much to discredit the constitution. 91 
The problem in both India and Malaysia was basically one of constitutional 
theory. The idea of a supreme constitution with entrenched rights is, at a very 
basic level, incompatible with the idea of legislative supremacy. In Malaysia 
the adherence to legislative supremacy resulted in a property concept that 
remained static. In India the very real conflict over resources was disguised 
by the clashes over land reform: 
"The land reform struggle made explicit the heresy 
already implanted in the Fundamental rights chapter 
that, by and large, fundamental rights flowed from 
legislative and government action and were not really 
antecedent to it. "92 
In the final analysis, this battle was about the contradiction inherent in 
liberalism. The Indian courts apparently accepted the basic liberalist 
doctrine,93 but the dichotomies inherent in that theory, such as private/public 
and state/individual became anomalous in a system committed to a form of 
socialism. This problem was aggravated by the definitional approach to 
property issues taken from the American example. The definition in terms of 
89 Murphy 1992 SAJHR 362 382-385. 
90 Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 388 392-393. 
91 Dhavan ''The constitution" 381. 
92 Dhavan "The constitution" 403. 
93 Kameshwar Singh v Province of Bihar AIR 1950 Patna 392 397, 399. 
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private law (or standing law) resulted in a failure to develop die property 
concept constitutionally. 
CHAPTER 11: THE GERMAN ALTERNATIVE 
11.1 Introduction 
"Eine GegenOberstellung von 'liberalem' 
und 'sozialistischen' Eigentum ist bereits 
historisch in solcher Allgemeinheit 
problematisch, rechtstheoretisch kaum 
zu begrunden. Doch wenn schon derart 
pointiert werden soll, so bedeutet 
'Eigentum als Menschenrechr den Sieg 
des liberalen Eigentums. "1 
The history of German property law until the twentieth century is dealt with 
elsewhere.2 The basic conclusion is, however, summarised here for the sake 
of continuity. German thinking about private ownership was strongly 
influenced by modernist philosophers like Kant and Hegel and jurists like Von 
Savigny and Windscheid. By the beginning of the twentieth century, German 
private law had been codified in the BGB. Ownership was incorporated into 
the BGB on the basis that it was an institution of private law that guaranteed 
freedom for morally autonomous individuals.3 Property was defined as 
absolute, uniform, exclusive and pertaining to corporeal objects only.4 This 
basically pandectist definition and its modernist philosophical basis also fit the 
requirements of capitalism and political liberalism prevalent at that stage.5 
Leisner W "Eigentum" in lsensee J and Kirchhof P (eds) Handbuch des Staatsrechts Vol VI: 
Freiheitsrechte (Heidelberg 1989) 1023-1098 1034. 
2 See 3.4.5; 4.4.3; 5.4.3 and 6.4.3 above. 
3 In this way the liberalist private/public split was incorporated into German law, whereby private 
law in general, and ownership in particular, served to guarantee a sphere of individual freedom or 
autonomy. This resulted in ownership being viewed as a typically private right closely associated 
with liberty. See Coing 1989 Am J Comp L 9 13; Van Caenegem Introduction 140; Zwalve 
Geschiedenis 22. 
4 See 6.4.3 above. 
5 Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex dominium" 248. 
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However, the introduction of the German Basic Law (GG) in 1949 as the 
supreme law meant that the strong distinction between private and public law 
could not be retained. Not only was private ownership no longer governed by 
rules of private law only, but the constitution also contained provisions that 
applied to what was formerly the domain of private law. The constitutional 
protection of ownership meant that ownership's dual function (both private 
and public) had to be acknowledged. 
The introduction of the GG in the early post-World War II period was the 
result of Allied (and particularly American) influences.6 However, there was 
also a strong German liberalist tradition to draw upon and, to a large extent, 
the GG reflected both the foreign influences and this liberal heritage,7 in 
particular a combination of German neoliberal thinking and Catholic social 
theory.8 The GG reflects all these influences. Its theoretical basis is the 
combination of the principles of the Rechtsstaat (with its liberal emphasis on 
the individual) and of the Sozialstaat (with the emphasis on establishing a just 
social order). 9 Most of the fundamental rights contained in sections 1-19 of 
the GG are therefore associated with liberal democracy10 and its emphasis on 
"negative rather than positive liberties". 11 However, these liberal rights were 
always supposed to be balanced by the social state principle that served to 
balance individual rights with social needs.12 
6 See Van der Walt 1993 SAPL 296 300. 
7 Wendt R "Art 14" in Sachs M (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar (Munich 1996) 482-528 485: "Der 
Eigentumsschutz des GG steht in der Tradition der Philosophie der Aufldarung sowie der 
vorangegangen rechtsstaatlichen deutschen Verfassungen, die die Garantie des Privateigentums 
als Menschenrecht begriffen und vom engen Zusammenhang zwischen Eigentum und Freiheit 
ausgingen." 
8 Kommers DP The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Durhan 
1989) 247. 
9 Kommers Jurisprudence 248. 
10 Leisner "Eigentum" 1023 1037 states that the period after 1945 represented an "Erneuerung 
liberal-grundrechtlicher Traditionen". 
11 See Currie DP The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago 1994) 14; 
Kommers Jurisprudence 248. 
12 Currie Constitution 16; Kommers Jurisprudence 248. However Leisner "Eigentum" 1038 states 
that this was only achieved, to a greater or lesser degree, since the 1970's. 
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Section 14 of the GG deals with property, inheritance and expropriation. It 
reads as follows: 
(1) Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed. Their 
content and limits shall be determined by the laws. 
(2) Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public 
weal. 
(3) Expropriation shall be permitted only in the public weal. It 
may be affected only by or pursuant to a law which shall 
provide for the nature and extent of the compensation. Such 
compensation shall be determined by establishing an 
equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interests of those affected. In case of dispute regarding the 
amount of compensation, recourse may be had to the ordinary 
courts.13 
The first thing that should be kept in mind is that various German courts have 
jurisdiction regarding various aspects of the property clause.14 The 
interpretative and philosophical differences in approach of these courts have 
resulted in differences regarding the property clause and property concept. 
13 This translation of the GG is the official one provided by the Press and Information Office of the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and was published c1974. 
14 The federal constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht - hereinafter referred to as BVerfG) 
has jurisdiction regarding the constitutionality of legislation, administrative acts and judgements of 
lower courts regarding property. The federal administrative court (BundesverwaJtungsgericht -
hereinafter referred to as BVerwG) deals with the validity (but not constitutionality) of 
administrative acts and decisions and the federal court of justice in civil matters 
(Bundesgerichtshof - hereinafter referred to as BGH) has jurisdiction to decide on the amount of 
compensation to be paid for expropriations, but not on the constitutionality of such expropriations. 
See See BVerfGE 58, 300 [1981]; Davis D, Chaskalson M and De Waal M "Democracy and 
constitutionalism: the role of constitutional interpretation" in Van Wyk DH ea (eds) Rights and 
constitutionalism: the new South African legal order (Cape Town 1994) 1-130 73-85. 
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In the second place the property clause is generally understood to include two 
guarantees, namely a substantive or individual guarantee, 15 which protects 
the individual against state interference16 and an institutional guarantee17 
which protects the institution of private property as such against abolition. 18 
11.2 Case law 
Section 14 GG has been the subject of a number of judgements by various 
German courts. These will not be canvassed in full, but the landmark 
decisions regarding the property concept will be discussed briefly. 
In one of the most important constitutional court cases, the so-called 
Deichordnung case, 19 the city of Hamburg, in reaction to extensive flooding, 
reclassified dyke land as public property. This measure was aimed at better 
management of the dyke system, but was attacked as unconstitutional by 
dispossessed landowners. 
The court explained the philosophical basis of section 14 with reference to the 
link between property and personal freedom. 20 The property clause is 
intended to guarantee a personal sphere of autonomy in patrimonial matters 
in order to ensure the freedom for individuals to take charge of their own 
15 Bestandsgarantie, lndividualgarantie or Rechtstellungsgarantie. 
16 BverfGE 24, 367 (1968] at 388 (the so-called Deichordnung case); BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981]; See 
also Wendt "Art 14" 486-487; Currie Constitution 291; Van derWalt 1993 R&K 263 271; Kleyn D 
''The constitutional protection of property: a comparison between the German and the South 
African approach" 1996 SAPL 402-445 41 O; Herzog R "Eigentum" in Evangelisches 
Staatslexikon Vol I 3rd ed (1987) 674. This is sometimes referred to as the subjective aspect, 
that is from the perspective of the subject - see Badura P Staatsrecht (Munich 1986) 139. 
17 Wesensgehalt-, lnstituts- or Einrichtungsgarantie. 
18 For this purpose section 14 must be read with section 19(2). See Leisner "Eigentum" 1029: 
"Diese Garantie sichert einen Grundbestand von Normen, die das Eigentum im Sinne dieser 
Grundrechtsbestimmung umschreiben." See also Van der Walt 1993 R&K 263 271; Herzog 
"Eigentum" 674. This then represents the objective working of the clause which prevents the state 
from removing whole categories of property from the sphere of private property - see Badura 
Staatsrecht 139; BVerfGE4, 7 (1954]; 8VerfGE21, 73 (1963]; BVetfGE24, 367 (1968]; BVerfGE 
42, 263 (1979]; 8VerfGE52, 1 (1979]; 8VerfGE58, 300 [1981]; BVerfGE79, 292 (1988]. 
19 8VerfGE24, 367 (1968]. 
20 BVerfGE 24, 367 (1968] at 389: "Das Eigentum is ein elementares Grundrecht, das im einer 
inneren Zusammenhang mit der Garantie der person lichen Freiheit steht." 
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lives.21 However, property which serves the public interest, can be removed 
from this private sphere without falling foul of section 14. 22 
This philosophical basis was reiterated in the Contergan case.23 In this case 
the private fund that had been set up to compensate Thalidomide victims was 
transformed into a public fund. Beneficiaries alleged that this constituted an 
infringement on section 14. The court stated that the meaning of properly had 
to be determined by the constitution itself,24 but that the purpose of the 
property clause had been to create and protect an individual sphere of 
personal freedom in the patrimonial field.25 The claims against the fund were 
recognised as property,26 but its social function made the change from private 
to public legitimate. 27 
In the Naf5auskiesung case28 certain uses of water was made subject to the 
granting of a permit. The applicant's permit for continued excavation of a 
gravel pit beneath the groundwater level was not renewed and he averred 
that the act in question was therefore an expropriation and, since it did not 
provide for compensation, also unconstitutional. The court stated as point of 
departure .that the meaning of properly is to be determined within the context 
21 BVerfGE 24, 367 [1968] at 389: " ... einen Freiheitsraum im vermiigenrechtlichen Bereich 
sicherzustellen und ihm damit eine eigenverantwortliche Gestaltung des Lebens zu ermiiglichen." 
22 BVerfGE 24, 367 [1968] at 396: "Gegenstand und Umfang der Eigentumsgarantie werden durch 
Art 14 Abs 1 Satz 2 end Abs 3 GG bestimmt. Zunachst ist es Aufgabe des Gesetzgebers, lnhalt 
und Schranken des Eigentums unter Beachtung der Grundsatzenscheidung des 
Verfassungsgebers festzulegen. Art 14 Abs 3 GG !asst die Entziehung des konkreten 
Eigentumsgegenstandes zu, wenn das Wohl der Allgemeinheit dies erfordert." 
23 BVerFGE 42, 263 [1976]. 
24 BVerFGE 42, 263 [1976] at 292: "Bei der Beantwortung der Frage, welche vermiigenswerten 
GOter als Eigentum im Sinne des Art 14 GG anzusehen sind, muss daher au! den Zweck und die 
Funktion der Eigentumsgarantie unter Berocksichtigung ihrer Bedeutung im Gesamtge!Oge der 
Verfassung zurockgegriffen werden." 
25 BVerFGE 42, 263 [1976] at 293: " ... muss in besonderem Masse tor schuldrechtliche AnsprOche 
gelten, die den Charakter eines Aquivalents !Or Einbussen an Lebenstochtigheit besitzen." 
26 BVerFGE 42, 263 [1976] at 293: "Von dieser grundlegenden Auffassung aus sind privatrechtliche 
Ansproche der vorligenden Art als Eigentum im Sinne des Grundgesetzes anzusehen." 
27 BVerFGE 42, 263 [1976] at 294: "Soweit das Eigentumsobjekt in einem 'sozialen Bezug und einer 
sozialen Funktion' steht, hat der Gesetzgeber ... einen relativ weiten Gestaltungsbereich; ... " and 
at 195: "Die Ersetzung der autonomen Regelungsbefugnis muss der unaufgebaren 
Spannungslage zwischen dem Freiheitsraum des Einzelnen und den Anforderungen der 
sozialstaatlichen Ordnung gerecht worden." 
28 BVerfGE5B, 300 [1981). 
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of the constitution. 29 The court stated explicitly that this property concept is 
different from the private-law concept. 30 When considering section 14, the 
private-law concept is not primary, but the content of the property is to be 
determined by all law in force at the time.31 In this context the social needs 
(or public interest) need to be taken into consideration.32 In this case the 
public interest in the case of water justifies the public control. 33 
In the Mitbestimmung case34 the question was whether laws, which provided 
for participation of employees in management, were constitutional. The court 
reiterated the philosophical basis of section 14,35 but also reiterated its social 
function. 36 Because of the strong connection between individual freedom and 
property, the own effort (Eigenleistung) of the owner is emphasised,37 but in 
cases of property with a definite social function, the regulatory power of 
government is expanded.38 The rights of shareholders are protected in terms 
29 BVerfGE 58, 300 11981] at 335: "Der Begriff des von der Verfassung gewahrleisten Eigentums 
muss aus der Verfassung selbst gewonnen werden." 
30 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981] at 335: " ... noch kann aus der privatrechtlichen Rechtsstellung der 
Umfang der Gewahrleistung des konkreten Eigentums bestimmt werden." and at 336: "Den 
privatrechtlichen Eigentumsvorschriften kommt im Rahmen des Art 14 GG auch kein Vorrang vor 
den offentlich-rechtlichen Vorschriften zu, die eigentumsrechtliche Regelungen treffen." 
31 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981] at 336: "Den privaterechtlichen Eigentumsvorschriften kommt im 
Rahmen des Art. 14 GG auch kein Vorrang vor den offentlich-rechtlichen Vorschriften zu, die 
eigentumsrechtliche Regelungen treffen." 
32 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981] at 338: "Der Gesetzgeber muss bei der Wahrnehmung des ihm in Art 14 
Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG erteilten Auftrages, lnhalt und Schranken des Eigentums zu bestimmen, sowohl 
die grundgesetzliche Anerkennung des Privateigentums ... als auch das Sozialgebot ... beachten." 
33 BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981] at 339: "Die Gewahrleistung des Rechtsinstituts wird nicht angetastet, 
wenn fur die Allgemeinheit lebensnotwendige gOter zur Sicherung Oberragender 
Gemeinwohlbelange und zur Abwehr von Gefahren nicht der Privatrechtsordnung, sondem einer 
Offentlich-rechtlichen Ordnung unterstellt werden." 
34 BVerfGE 50, 290 (1979]. 
35 BVerfGE 50, 290 (1979] at 339: "Geschichtlich und in ihrer heutigen Bedeutung ist diese ein 
elementares Grundrecht. das im engen inneren Zusammenhang mit der pers6nlichen Freiheit 
steht. lhr kommt im GesamtgefOge der Grundrechte die Aufgabe zu, dem Trager des 
Grundrechts einen Freiheitsraum im vermogensrechtlichen Bereich zu sichern und ihm dadurch 
eine eigenverantwortliche Gestaltung seines Lebens zu ermoglichen." 
36 BVerfGE 50, 290 (1979] at 340: "Die Bestandsgarantie . , der Regelungsauftrag . und die 
Sozialpftichtigkeit des Eigentums ... stehen in einem unlosbaren Zusammenhang." 
37 BVerfGE 50, 290 (1979] at 340: "Soweit es um die Funktion des Eigentums als Element der 
Sicherung der personlichen Freiheit des Einzelnen geht, geniesst dieses einen besonders 
ausgepragten Schutz." 
38 BVerfGE 50, 290 (1979] at 340: "Dagegen ist die Befugnis des Gesetzgebers zur lnhalts- und 
Schrankenbestimmung um so weiter, je mehr das Eigentumsobjekt in einem sozialen Bezug und 
einer sozialen Funktion steht ... " 
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of section 14, but, since it is not closely associated with personal freedom, it 
is subject to extensive statutory regulation.39 
The German courts have also had to deal with the question of what is known 
in American law as new property. In the Eigenleistung case40 the question 
was raised whether benefits in terms of a medical aid scheme could be 
regarded as property for the purposes of section 14. The benefits in terms of 
the scheme had been altered so that the complainants could no longer 
acquire these benefits. The courts summed up the position regarding social 
security claims. In the first place claims to payments from statutory pension 
schemes (Rentenanwartschaften) that can mature to full pension rights are 
protected in terms of section 14,41 but discretionary payments are not.42 Once 
again, the function of section 14 is repeated.43 Social security interests fall 
under section 14 if they establish a legally protected interest in the 
patrimonial sphere (vermogenswerte Rechtspositionen), if they serve the 
individual interests of the claimant, if they are based on the claimant's 
considerable own effort and if they secure the claimant's patrimonial 
existence. 44 
39 BVerfGE 50, 290 [1979) at 342: "Neben dem Sozialordnungsrecht ... bestimmt und begrenzt das 
Gesellschattsrecht die Rechte des Anteilseigners; nach diesem wird das Vermogensrecht durch 
das Mitgliedschaftsrecht 'vermittelt'; . " 
40 BVerfGE 69, 272 [1985). 
41 BVerfGE 53, 257 [1980). 
42 BVerfGE 42, 263 [1976). 
43 BVerfGE 69, 272 [1985) at 300: "lhr kommt die Aufgabe zu, dem Trager des Grundrechts einen 
Freiheitsraum im vermogensrechtlichen Bereich zu sichern und ihm damit eine 
eigenverantwortliche Gestaltung des Lebens zu ermaglichen ... " 
44 BVerfGE 69, 272 [1985) at 301: "Der sozialversicherungsrechtlichen Position muss weiterhin eine 
nicht unerhebliche Eigenleistung des Versicherten zugrunde liegen. Der Eigentumsschutz beruht 
dabei wesentlich darauf, dass die in Betracht kommende Rechtsposition durch die personliche 
Arbeitsleistung des Versicherten, wie diese vor allem in den einkommensbezogenen Eigenleistung 
Ausdruck findet, mitbestimmt ist. Dieser Zusammenhang mit der eigenen Leistung ist als 
besonderer Schutzgrund tor die Eigentomerposition anerkannt ... " and at 303: "Konstituierendes 
Merkmal tor den Eigentumsschutz einer sozialversicherungsrechtlichen Position isl scliesslich 
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11.3 The property concept 
One of the most outstanding characteristics of the German property case law, 
is the almost repetitive reiteration of the philosophical basis of section 14. 
Emphasis is placed on the basic nature of property as a guarantee of a 
sphere of individual liberty regarding patrimonial interests (vermogenswerte 
Rechte).45 This is a political right, which protects the individual,46 and it is 
therefore not a goal in itself, but an instrument that allows the individual to 
take part in society. Therefore, if a right or interest is closely associated with 
personal, patrimonial freedom, that right will be protected more widely than a 
right associated with investment purposes.47 
It should be kept in mind that German law does not recognise what is known 
in American law as regulatory takings. Any regulatory measure that goes too 
far is invalid. In terms of German law, to satisfy the requirements of the 
proportionality principle, a regulation, in order to be in the public interest, 
must be strictly necessary (erforder/ich), be suitable for the purpose it 
purports to serve (geeignet), must not impose disproportionate burdens 
(verhaltnismassig) and must be constitutional in a wide sense. 48 In this 
regard, however, there ensued a difference of opinion between the 
constitutional court and the civil courts. 
The civil courts seem to have followed the American example and allowed 
compensation for regulatory takings on the basis of the extraordinary sacrifice 
45 BGHZ 6, 270 [1952] at 278; BVerfGE 83, 201 (1991] at 209; BVerfGE 89, 1 [1993] at 6; BVerfGE 
24, 367 (1968], at 389: "Das Eigentum is ein elementares Grundrecht, das in einem inneren 
Zusammenhang mit der Garantie der personlichen Freiheit steht. ... einen Freiheitsraum im 
vermogensrechtlichen bereich sicherzustellen und ihm damit eine eigenverantwortliche 
Gestaltung des Lebens zu ermoglichen." 
46 BVerfGE 24, 367 [1968) at 400: "Die Eigentumsgarantie ist nicht zuniichst Sach-, sondern 
Rechtstriigergarantie." See also Herzog "Eigentum" 673. 
47 This means that, for instance, a family home is protected more fully against regulation than 
property held for investment purposes. See BVerfGE 89, 1 (1993]; BVerfGE 50, 290 (1979] and 
the Kleingarten cases-8VerfGE52, 1 [1979]; BVerfGE87, 114 (1992]. See also Wendt "Art 14" 
509. 
48 See Wendt "Art 14" 501, 503; Currie Constitution 309-310. 
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required of individual owners.49 The constitutional court, on the other hand, 
has consistently held such regulations that go too far as simply 
unconstitutional, based on the Junktim-KlausefO in section 14(3). This has 
resulted in a situation where the civil courts now award compensation, not on 
the basis of the constitution, but on the basis of private-law equalisation or 
compensation payments. 
Section 14( 1) allows the legislature to determine the content and limits of 
property. At the same time section 14(2) provides that property is subject to 
social limitations. This means that the Sozialgebundenheit of property 
determines how its contents and limits are to be determined.51 This is, in turn, 
limited by the individual function or basis of property. 52 The balance is 
achieved by reference to the proportionality principle (ObermaBverbot). 53 
In essence this means that the extent of the legislature's power to regulate 
property for social purposes is determined by the function of the property in 
question. Some kinds of property have a clear social function, others don't. 
Thus, the more distinct the social function, the greater the freedom to legislate 
and to regulate. 54 Therefore, in certain cases, the nature of property makes 
social control thereof important and individual control is regarded as 
49 See Wendt "Art 14" 521-524. This approach seems to be the result of the traditional private-law 
approach of the civil courts. 
50 The Junktim-Klause/ (or linking clause) in sec 14(3) which states that an expropriation can only be 
valid if it is authorized by law, and (and this is the important part) if it provides for the nature and 
extent of compensation. Since laws that seek to regulate property obviously do not provide for 
compensation, they can never meet this requirement. See Van der Walt AJ "Federal Republic of 
Germany" 9 (Unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
51 Van der Walt 1993 SAPL 296 301; Badura Staatsrecht 140; Leisner "Eigentum" 1039-1041, 
1075-1085; Herzog "Eigentum" 678; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 411, 414. 
52 Leisner "Eigentum" 1031 states that the institutional guarantee functions as the boundary for state 
interference and formulates the basic rule as : "Eigentum muf.I Eigentum bleiben." See also Van 
der Walt 1993 SAPL 296 302. 
53 BVerfGE. 58, 300 [1981] 334ff. See also Wendt "Art 14" 497. 
54 Schuppert GF "The right to property" in Karpen U ( ed) The constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Germany (Baden-Baden 1988) 107-119 110; Badura P "Eigentum" in Benda, Maihofer and 
Vogel (eds) Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts (Berlin 1984) 653ff; Leisner "Eigentum" 1087; 
Van der Walt 1993 SAPL 296 303. 
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potentially dangerous.55 For this reason the law of landlord and tenant, 
agriculture, planning, development, building and social security are subject to 
wider regulation because of their social importance.56 
One of the unique aspects of German property law is the existence of two 
property concepts or at least a distinction between private-law ownership and 
public-law property. The civil court has interpreted Eigentum in section 14 to 
mean the same as Eigentum in section 903 of the BGB. This basically 
pandectist codification restricts ownership to tangible, corporeal things. 57 
This concept of ownership was reinforced by an interpretative theory based 
on the pandectist theory of civil law. For this purpose a distinction was drawn 
between the essence of ownership (as essentially unlimited) and the practical 
substance or content (which could be restricted). That meant that ownership 
was conceptually unlimited but could be temporarily limited.58 
Originally, the constitutional court followed the approach of the civil court. 59 
However, this meant that the social dimension of property was frustrated by a 
conservative, nineteenth-century interpretative theory.60 It was eventually 
decided that the civil definition could not be equally authoritative for 
constitutional purposes61 and that the scope of the constitutional protection of 
property should be determined by the constitution itself. 62 
In fact, at least one commentator stresses that section 14 protects Rechts-
Eigentum and not Sacheigentum.63 Thus the civil-law understanding of 
55 See, for instance, the NaBauskiesung case - BVerfGE 58, 300 11981] at 339; the Deichordnung 
case - BVerfGE 24, 367 (1968] and the Contergan case - BVerfGE 42, 263 (1976]. See also 
Wendt "Art 14" 498-500. 
56 See Wendt "Art 14" 507-508, 510-516 for further examples. 
57 See Cohn Manual 170, 174; Van der Walt 1993 R&K 263 271. See also, in general, 6.4.3.4 
above. 
58 Van der Walt 1993 SAPL 296 302. 
59 Van der Walt 1993 R&K 263 271. 
60 Van der Walt 1993 SAPL 296 303. 
61 Schuppert "Property'' 107 108. 
62 BVerfGE 51, 19311979] at 218; BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981] at 388. See also Schuppert "Property" 
107 108: Leisner "Eigentum" 1050. 
63 See Leisner "Eigentum" 1023-1098 1027. 
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Eigentum was restricted to a basically pandectist thing-ownership, while the 
constitutional understanding was, conceptually, much wider. This meant that, 
in order to determine whether an interest could be regarded as property (in 
the constitutional sense) the court had to take the fundamental, constitutional 
purpose of the property clause into consideration. The basic question 
therefore is whether a particular interest serves to create an area of personal 
liberty in the patrimonial sphere to ensure self-determination.64 Therefore 
"Eigentum ist Freiheit ... "65 
The wider constitutional-law property concept means that the scope of the 
protection of section 14 necessarily comes into play. The basis on which 
courts determine whether a right should be protected as property or not, is the 
philosophical one referred to above. Thus the scope of property is 
determined by its personal, patrimonial nature. This means that the property 
concept is also necessarily limited. In the first place only concrete, individual 
rights are included, not the individual's whole estate.66 Future possibilities are 
not regarded as property,67 and the idea of property as a "bundle of rights" is 
wholly foreign to German thinking.68 This indicates that conceptual severance 
is impossible in German law.69 
64 This is referred to as the Nutzung requirement: See Leisner "Eigentum" 1054; Schuppert 
"Property'" 107 109; Badura Staatsrecht 139; Herzog "Eigentum" 673; 
65 Leisner "Eigentum" 1033. 
66 BVerfGE 4, 7 [1954] at 17. See also Wendt "Art 14" 493;. However, Leisner "Eigentum" 1071-
1075 states that the last few years have seen a new development in theoretical thinking which 
aims at recognising the whole estate as part of the property concept. 
67 BVerfGE 28, 119 [1970]; BVerfGE 45, 142 [1977]; BGHZ 83, 1 [1982]. See also Wendt "Art 14" 
494; Van derWalt 1993 R&K 263 271. 
68 Leisner "Eigentum" 1042, 1043: "Das Grundgesetz schOtzt nicht ein mehr oder weniger 
systematisch zusammengefasstes Bunde! van Property Rights ... Das Grundgesetz verbietet 
schliesslich eine Aufspaltung des einheitlichen Eigentumsrechts an einem bestimmten Gut in 
mehrere selbstandige Berechtigungen." 
69 See 9.2.4 above on conceptual severance. 
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Another interesting expansion of the constitutional property concept occurred 
in the sphere of so-called public-law rights. 70 Section 14 also protects what is 
known as offentlich-rechtliche Rechtspositionen, (or what Leisner calls 
Leistungseigentum71 ) that is, claims to rights arising from social securityn 
This corresponds to what is known in American law as new property, although 
it is more restricted. 73 These rights are protected as property if they serve to 
safeguard the person's existence,74 if they have been acquired by or have 
vested in the person in question, 75 and if the right was acquired through the 
person's own work, effort or expenditure.76 Leisner states: 
"Alie Werle, welche der Existenzsicherung dienen 
k6nnen, sind eigentumsfahig; sind sie appropriiert, so 
genissen sie Eigentumsschutz - und dies gilt ja auch tor 
alle Gegenstande des herkommlichen Eigentums, vom 
Grundstuck Ober das Patent bis zu jeder Mark im Beutel; 
sie alle sind geeignet, existenzsichernd zu wirken."77 
Therefore, social security rights based on "state largesse" are not protected.78 
Consequently, claims in terms of pension schemes and unemployment 
insurance are protected as property, but housing subsidies or family 
allowances are not.79 It should, however, be pointed out that some the rights 
70 Leisner "Eigentum" 1069: "Hier hat sich die wohl bedeutendste Veranderung des 
verfassungsrechtlichen Eigentumsgedankens seit 1949 vollzogen, ... " See also Kleyn 1996 SAPL 
402 412-413, 420. 
71 Leisner"Eigentum" 1069. 
72 See Badura Staatsrecht 139; Herzog "Eigentum" 675. 
73 Van der Walt 1993 SAPL 296 303. 
74 BVerfGE 69, 272 [1985] at 300; BVerfGE 53, 257 (1988] at 289. See also Schuppert "Property" 
107 110; Wendt "Art 14" 491. 
75 That is, if it is not a mere expectancy. See Wendt "Art 14" 491. 
76 This is known as the Eigen/eistung requirement. BVerfGE69, 272 (1985]; BVerfGE72, 9 (1986] at 
18-21; BVerfGE 53, 257 (1980]. See also Currie Constitution 297; Wendt "Art 14" 491; 
Schuppert "Property" 107 101; Van der Walt 1993 R&K 263 271; Leisner "Eigentum" 1070; Kleyn 
1996 SAPL 402 424-427. 
77 Leisner "Eigentum" 1058. 
78 Schupper"Property" 107110. 
79 BVerfGE 53, 275 (1980]; BVerfGE 69 272 (1985]; BVerfGE 55, 114 (1980]; BVerfGE 63, 152 
(1983]; BVerfGE 92, 9 (1986]; BVerfGE 78, 232 (1988]. 
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not recognised as property are specifically protected as separate rights in the 
GG.80 
11.4 Evaluation 
Academic wisdom has it that, although American and German approaches to 
property originally did not differ, due to shared interpretative practices, a 
divergence eventually occurred. 81 This divergence is said to be visible in the 
existence of a dual property concept in German law and in the role that the 
Sozia/staat-principle plays. In many respects, however, this divergence is 
more apparent than real. In the first place both courts and commentators 
recognise the liberal basis of both the private-law property concept and of the 
constitutional property concept. Both concepts explicitly recognise that 
property and liberty are linked. Moreover, property is still seen as the " ... 
wichtigste Rechtsinstitut zur Abgrenzung Privater Vermogensbereiche". 82 
This seems to indicate that property is still the paradigm right and the 
philosophical and theoretical basis of that right has not changed, although its 
field of application has been expanded. 
Furthermore, the requirements for the recognition of constitutional property 
reveal the capitalist underpinnings of the German approach. Although the 
GG is based on the harmonisation of Sozialstaat and Rechtstaat, it is only in 
the last twenty years that the social element has received adequate 
attention.83 This neglect was partly the result of the conflict between the 
BVerfG and the BGH. Like the constitutional court in India, the BGH 
undermined attempts at establishing social reconstruction because its 
decisions were based on a conceptual, pandectist approach with a strong 
liberalist basis. But it also indicates, on the one hand, the need for a strong 
80 Van der Walt 1993 SAPL 296 303. 
81 Van der Walt 1993 SAPL 296 302. 
82 Leisner "Eigentum" 1049. 
83 Leisner "Eigentum" 1038. 
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economy before social equality can be achieved and, on the other hand, that 
even then constitutional property is made subject to an own (monetary) 
contribution. In both cases the capitalist assumptions are clear. 
This also seems to indicate that the basic tension between Sozia/staat and 
Rechtstaat has not been resolved. Although German law seems to be more 
sensitive to social needs and goals than most other systems, the basic 
approach to property remains a liberalist, individualist one - what Leisner calls 
the Sieg des liberalen Eigentum. 
One of the most important differences between the German and the American 
approaches is that the German courts use a proportionality test to determine 
whether limitations on property are justifiable. Although the German 
constitution does not contain a general limitations clause, limitations on 
property are allowed if they meet the requirement of proportionality. 
Therefore the threshold question of whether an interest is property or not, is 
not nearly as important in German law as in, say, American or Indian law. 
Courts accept fairly easily that an interest is property, but then inquire 
whether the limitation is justifiable if they serve the public or social goods. 
CHAPTER 12: OUT OF (SOUTH) AFRICA 
12.1 Introduction 
"The very belief that Roman-Dutch 
private law is politically neutral has 
allowed property lawyers to tactfully tum 
their theoretical backs by occupying 
themselves with the fine distinctions that 
characterise 'pure' Roman-Dutch property 
law, while pretending not to notice how 
politicians shape land rights according to 
their ideological whims, ... "1 
To a very large extent the history of civil law described in Part II of this study, 
is also the history of the South African common law regarding ownership. 
South African property law is based on the rules in force in the province 
Holland in the seventeenth century and it was only marginally influenced by 
English law.2 This law was developed further and acquired a unique 
character due to the influence of typical South African circumstances and 
developments.3 Conceptually and systematically speaking, however, South 
African property law is basically Roman-Dutch law, insofar as it has not been 
amended by legislation. 
Most property lawyers and courts in South Africa accept that the basic 
principles of Roman-Dutch law are inherently not only just and equitable, but 
Van der Walt AJ "The future of common law land ownership" in Land reform and the future of 
land ownership in South Africa (Cape Town 1991) 21-35 24. 
2 See Van der Merwe Sakereg 6-9; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 7-10; Van der Merwe "Things" 
6; Schoeman J Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of property 2nd ed (Durban 1988) 8-9; 
Kleyn and Boraine Law of property (1992) 8; Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt Law of property 
(1992) 10-12 for the sources of South African property law. See also Milton JRL "Ownership" in 
Zimmerman Rand Visser D (eds) Southern cross: civil law and common law in South Africa 
(Gape Town 1996) 657-699 692-699 on the development of the South African property concept. 
3 These developments and circumstances usually refer to such things as mineral rights and water 
rights, where the situation differed markedly from that in Holland. See Milton "ownership" 657 
670-691. 
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also politically neutral.4 Although it is, somewhat grudgingly, acknowledged 
that apartheid legislation has had an effect on this perfect system, the 
assumption is that removal of such laws will "revive" the pure, neutral and just 
Roman-Dutch property law. As was shown in Part II, however, legal rules and 
systems are never neutral. The question then arises whether South African 
property law could have remained unaffected by the effects of apartheid. 
The introduction of (a) new constitution(s) raises other questions, namely if 
property law will remain unaffected by constitutional measures. If the rigid 
separation between public and private law is maintained, the assumption must 
be that such public-law measures will not affect the neutral private law.5 
However, the inclusion of a property clause in the conslitution(s) must at least 
make the rigid maintenance of this distinction problematic if not downright 
impossible to maintain. 
This chapter therefore addresses three aspects. In the first place the 
idealised version of the Roman-Dutch property concept in South African law 
needs to be studied. To this end the views of academic commentators and 
the courts will be studied to try to extract the much-vaunted principles of this 
ideal system. In the second place the effect of apartheid legislation on this 
system will be studied. The main question here is whether apartheid changed 
the basic structure of property law in South Africa or if its effect was at best 
peripheral. 
4 This perception is the result of the dichotomy between private and public law that is at the heart of 
South African law. See Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 169 180:" ... at least some supporters of the 
civil-law tradition think that the problem with apartheid was that politics was allowed to enter into 
what should be 'pure' private-law relations, and that the solution is to keep not only apartheid but 
all politics out of private law .... Consequently the civil-law method is characterised by a very clear 
division between private and public spheres." See also Van der Walt "Common law 
landownership" 23. 
5 Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 169 185: "Private law [is] restricted to the 'pure' principles of the civil-
law tradition, as they apply between private individuals, and [has] nothing to do with government 
actions or politics." This is Van der Walt's characterisation of the traditional view and does not 
represent his own view. 
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In the third place the effect of the new constitution(s) will have to be studied in 
some depth. Although this development is still in its infancy, the academic 
debate in particular provides interesting perspectives. The main question in 
this respect will be the reach of the public-law protection of private property 
and, incidentally, whether the rigid distinction between private and public law 
is still tenable. 
12.2 The Roman-Dutch ideal 
As was mentioned earlier, South African property law is basically Roman-
Dutch law. Some of the earliest commentators (at least until the end of the 
nineteenth century) accepted and used the definitions and descriptions of 
ownership of, in particular, Van der Linden and, to a lesser extent, those of 
Grotius and Voet.6 The point of departure of these early definitions seems to 
be the idea of ownership as absolute, exclusive and abstract.7 Some of the 
earliest case law depended on the definition of Von Savigny8 and defined 
dominium as follows: 
6 Van der Walt Houerskap 446; Milton "ownership" 657 659-664, 670-679. See 3.3, 3.4.3, 4.3, 
4.4.2, 5.3, 5.4.2, 6.2.2, 6.2.3.2, 6.3.2, 6.3.3.2, 6.4.2, 6.4.3.2, 6.5.2, 6.5.3.2 above on these 
Roman-Dutch writers. 
7 Van der Walt Houerskap 446-447. See Milton "ownership" on the absolute concept of 
ownership. 
8 See 3.4.2.2, 4.4.1, 5.4.1, 6.2.3.1 above on Von Savigny. 
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"Dominium is the unrestricted and exclusive control 
which a person has over a thing. Inasmuch as the 
owner has the full control, he also has the power to 
part with so much of his control as he pleases. 
Once the owner, however, he remains such until he 
has parted with all his rights of ownership over the 
thing."9 
Courts explicitly rejected the idea of double ownership in the early twentieth 
century.10 The conclusion seems inescapable that an abstract and absolute 
concept of ownership " ... formed the matrix for all real relations in the earliest 
South African law."11 
In modern South African law ownership is regarded, for purposes of 
classification and conceptualisation, as a subjective right and specifically as a 
real right.12 A real right can be defined as " ... a direct legal connection 
between a person and a thing, the holder of the right being entitled to control 
that thing within the limits of his right ... "13 Ownership is distinguished from 
other real rights in that it is the only real right in re sua. All other real rights 
are rights in re aliena. Consequently ownership is the only complete real 
right. 14 This indicates the importance of ownership. 
9 Johannesburg Municipal Council v Rand Townships Registrar 1910 TPD 1314 1319. It should be 
mentioned that Von Savigny (or any of the other pandectists) can not be regarded as Roman-
Dutch authority - see Visser 1986 AJ 39 47. On the other hand, this definttion does not differ that 
much from the ones supplied by Roman-Dutch wrtters - see Milton "Ownership" 695. 
10 Lucas' Trustee v Ismail and Amod 1905 TS 239 24711; Johannesburg Municipal Council v Rand 
Townships Registrar 1910 TPD 1314 1319. This (fairly late) rejection of the fragmented property 
concept was based on tts supposed English origin - see Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex 
dominium" 249. 
11 Van der Walt Houerskap 462. 
12 Van der Walt Houerskap 593. 
13 Klayn and Boraine Law of property 43. The classical South African definttion of a real right is 
provided by Van Zyl FJ and Van der Vyver JD lnleiding tot die regswetenskap 2nd ed (Durban 
1982) 422: "'n Saaklike reg is dus die juridiese aanspraak van 'n regsubjek op 'n saak ten opsigte 
van ander persone ... 11 
14 Van der Walt 1988 DJ 16 17; Schoeman Law of property 162; Van der Walt Houerskap 594; 
Sonnekus JC and Neels JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel 2nd ed (Durban 1994) 250. 
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Against this classification background, ownership is defined. 15 The definition 
of Van der Merwe has been influential and can be regarded as representative 
and authoritative. He defines ownership (eiendom) as: 
"(D)ie saaklike reg wat die mees volkome en 
omvangrykste heerskappy oor 'n saak verleen. 'n 
Eienaar kan binne die grense deur die publiek- en 
privaatreg gestel na geliewe met die saak 
handel."16 
This definition is basically repeated in the later edition of this work, 17 and in 
other works by the same author.18 With minor variations this definition is 
repeated and used by most South African property lawyers. 19 This is also the 
definition used in most case law.20 
On this basis commentators recognise that the South African law of 
ownership has a number of characteristics. In the first place ownership is an 
absolute right. Although it can be and is restricted, these restrictions are 
regarded as temporary and unusual. 21 In the second place ownership is an 
exclusive right that is held by an individual owner to the exclusion of all 
15 To avoid confusion, it should be noted that South African writers use various terms to indicate 
property. Most use eiendom or eiendomsreg in Afrikaans. This is translated into English as 
ownership. For the use of terminology in this study, see chapter 1. 
16 Van der Merwe Sakereg 110. Translation: "(Ownership is) the real right that gives the most 
complete and extensive sovereignty over a thing. An owner can, within the boundaries set by 
public and private law, do with the thing as he pleases." 
17 See Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 171. 
18 See eg. Van der Merwe ''Things" 98. 
19 See Schoeman Law of property 162: "(O)wnership potentially confers the most complete or 
comprehensive control over a thing."; Sonnekus and Neels Vonnisbundel 249: " ... verleen in 
beginsel aan die reghebbende die wyds moontlike bevoegdhede ten aansien van 'n saak." 
20 Gien v Gien 1976 2 SA 1113 (T) 1120C: " ... die mees volledige saaklike reg wat 'n persoon ten 
opsigte van 'n saak kan he."; Chatty v Naidoo 1974 3 SA 13 (A) 20A: " ... a right of exclusive 
possession." 
21 This is the traditional view on the nature of ownership. See discussion by Van der Walt 1992 DJ 
446-457 447; Van der Merwe Sakereg 11; Sonnekus and Neels Vonnisbundel 249; Van der Walt 
"Introduction" in Land reform and the future of landownership in South Africa (Cape Town 
1991) 1-7 1. However, a number of commentators have begun to criticise and reject this 
characteristic on historical and philosophical grounds. 
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others.22 In the third place ownership is an abstract right in that it is always 
more than the sum of its entitlements.23 This means, among other things, that 
ownership can never be a bundle of rights. Finally, ownership is limited to 
things, that is, objects that are impersonal, corporeal, independent, judicially 
controllable and of use and value.24 Regarding the aspect of corporeality, 
however, some development has taken place and most authors now 
recognise that things can also be incorporeal,25 but this is still regarded as the 
exception to the rule. Because of the view of ownership as absolute, 
restrictions are recognised but mentioned, as it were, in passing. Most 
textbooks mention public law restrictions (which include apartheid legislation), 
but this takes up a very small part of the discussion26 and much more 
emphasis is placed on private-law restrictions. 
The last few years have seen some innovation. In the first place there has 
been a move away from conceptual ism generally and the pandectist definition 
in particular. Some writers criticise the traditional definition, mainly on 
historical grounds, but provide no new definition.27 Others state that a 
definition would depend on extra-juridical factors that necessitate a move 
away from conceptualism.28 Ownership is then defined as: 
22 Van der Walt 1992 DJ 446 447; Van der Walt Houerskap 600; Van der Merwe Sakereg 113; Van 
der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 175. 
23 Van der Walt 1992 DJ 446 447; Van der Walt Houerskap 599; Van der Merwe Sakereg 14; 
Schoeman Law of property 162; Olivier NJJ, Pienaar GJ and Van der Walt AJ Sakereg 
studentehandboek (Cape Town 1989) 40; Sonnekus and Neels Vonnisbundel 249; Van der 
Walt "Introduction" 2. 
24 Van der Merwe Sakereg 19-22; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 23-27; Van der Merwe "Things" 
5, 12-15; Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt Law of property (1992) 13-16; Sonnekus and Neels 
Vonnisbundel 23-24. 
25 See eg. Schoeman Law of property 11-15; Kleyn and Boraine Law of property 8-19. However, 
Van derWalt AJ and Pienaar GJ lnleiding tot die sakereg (Cape Town 1996) 20 warns that this 
must be regarded as exceptions to the general rule that things must be corporeal. 
26 See eg. Van der Merwe Sakereg 115-119; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 177-183; Van der 
Merwe "Things" 100; Schoeman Law of property 163-171; Sonnekus and Neels Vonnisbundel 
250-251. 
27 See eg. Kleyn and Boraine Law of property 161-164. 
28 Van der Wait and Pienaar Sakereg (1996) 3, 37; Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Wait Law of 
property (1992) 28, 29. 
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"(A) legal relationship with an abstract nature which 
implies that there is a legal relationship between 
the owner and a thing (legal object) in terms of 
which the owner obtains certain rights 
(entitlements) to the thing and that there is a legal 
relationship between the owner and other legal 
subjects with regard to the thing. "29 
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This definition is, of course, still within the broad tradition. However, it leaves 
room to change the relationship depending on social circumstances. In the 
second place it is increasingly recognised that, although it is inconsistent with 
the theory of subjective rights, real rights to incorporeals can and do exist. 30 
In the third place the effect of apartheid legislation on property law is more 
widely discussed and studied. 
The effect of this abstract and very neat system has been that property law is 
seen as politically neutral and, because of that, basically just and equitable. 
There is very little, if any, discussion on the justification of private ownership 
and most authors simply state that it is an important social, economic and 
political institution. The result of this is that there is no South African tradition 
of discussing ownership in terms of freedom, nor is there (with a number of 
very notable exceptions) a tradition of critical thinking about private 
ownership. 31 As Van der Walt states: "(T)he debate is inhibited by the fact 
that the traditional liberalist perception of ownership and the theoretical 
system in which it is embodied are accepted uncritically. "32 
29 Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt Law of property ( 1992) 34. 
30 Van der Walt and Pienaar Sakereg (1996) 16-17; Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt Law of 
property (1992) 14. 
31 Van derWalt 1992 DJ 446 457:" ... the myth created by Grotius and the Pandectists according to 
which the traditional Western European system of land rights is a universal, timeless, scientific 
and superior product which should be accepted for the protection and promotion of human liberty 
and dignity has been so successful that most of us find it unthinkable to depart from that tradition 
32 Van der Walt 1992 DJ 446 456. 
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12.3 The apartheid reality 
The vision of South African property law as a perfectly just and equitable 
conceptual system seems slightly ridiculous once the effect of apartheid on 
this system is realised. Apartheid legislation regarding property covered a 
large subject field. Examples of this type of legislation include the Slums 
Act,33 the Trespass Act,34 the Health Act, 35 the Group Areas Act,36 the 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act,37 the Black Land Act,'JS the Development 
Trust and Land Acf9 and the Black Administration Act.40 The content, reach 
and consequences of these acts will not be discussed here, as they have 
been extensively covered elsewhere.41 This is not to deny the awful reality of 
this type of legislation, but the focus of this section will be on the effect of this 
type of legislation on South African property law. 
33 Slums Act 76 of 1979 that aimed at preventing the development of slums and that provided for the 
removal of people from such areas. The act also provided that lack of housing could not be a 
defence against actions taken In this regard. 
34 Trespass Act 6 of 1959 that prohibited trespass on property without the permission of the owner 
or legal occupier. 
35 Health Act 63 of 1977 which provided that an owner could be forced to clear up sttuations which 
created a health hazard and that, if he refused, that it may be cleared up at his expense. 
36 Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 which aimed at separating all people into segregated urban areas 
and which provided that people could be removed to implement the act. 
37 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 which gave the administration wide powers to 
forcibly and wtthout legal intervention remove squatters. This act also purported to oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts in these cases. 
38 Black Land Act 27 of 1913 which prevented blacks from acquiring land outside the so-called 
scheduled areas. 
39 Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 which created so-called Trust areas that were 
envisaged to be the basis for the later creation of homelands. 
40 Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 which created a separate administrative system for people in 
so-called black areas. 
41 See eg. Van der Walt 1990 Stell LR 26-48; Van der Walt AJ "Land law without the land acts -
predicaments and possibilities" 1991 JCRDL 738-752 739-742; Gutto SBO Property and land 
reform - constitutional and jurisprudential perspectives (Durban 1995) 25-34; Davenport 
THR "Some reflections on the history of land tenure in South Africa, seen in the light of attempts 
by the state to impose political and economic control" in land ownership - changing concepts 
(Cape Town 1986) 53-76; Schoombee JT "Group areas legislation - the political control of 
ownership and occupation of land" in Land ownership - changing concepts (Cape Town 1986) 
77-118. See, in particular, Van der Merwe D "Land tenure in South Africa: a brief history and 
some reform proposals" 1989 TSAR 663-692 678-685 on the far-reaching effects of the 
legislation dealing with land tenure. 
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There is little doubt that these types of legislation served as some of the most 
important cornerstones of apartheid.42 Moreover, they established " ... the 
property law context within which the government policy of racial segregation 
function(ed). In this way the social function of the law of property ... has been 
politicised fundamentally.•o43 What has, however, been even more important 
is the reaction of South African courts to these acts. On the one hand some 
judgements44 have used the abstract definition of ownership along with the 
intentionalist approach to interpretation to give effect to legislation without 
regard to their social (and personal) effect.45 
On the other hand the use of more "liberal" methods of interpretation (such as 
the mischief theory) and the willingness to take social consequences into 
consideration, have led to rather different judgements. 46 This difference of 
approach is particularly noticeable in the judgement in the Diepsloot-cases.47 
The inequitable results reached in the majority of cases dealing with apartheid 
legislation can be attributed to the abstract definition of property combined 
with the intentionalist approach to interpretation (both of which allow courts to 
apply legislation without regard to its social consequences). It is, furthermore, 
a result of an acceptance of the public/private split, which create the 
impression that property is immune to political influences. This has led to an 
approach where a lack of justice is masked by attention to technicalities, 
42 See Schoombee "Group areas legislation" 77. 
43 Van der Walt 1990 Stell LR 26 29. 
44 Minister of the Interior v Lockhat 1961 2 SA 587 (A); S v Adams; S v Werner 1981 1 SA 187 (A). 
45 Van der Walt 1990 Stell LR 26 43: " ... the abstract definrtion of ownership has the effect that 
ideologically inspired legislation ... is applied regardless of rts social consequences." On the 
intentionalist approach see Du Plessis LM Interpretation of statutes (Durban 1986) 31-39 and 
Devenish GE Interpretation of statutes (Cape Town 1992) 33-35. 
46 See eg S v Govender 1986 3 SA 969 (T); Vereenig/ng City Couna1 v Rhema Bible Church, 
Walkerville 1989 2 SA 142 (T); Vena v George Municipality 1987 4 SA 29 (C); S v Lulu 1989 2 SA 
279 (T) and the unreported cases of Munisipa/iteit van Port NoHoth v Xhalisa; Luma/a/a v The 
Municipality of Port NoHoth CPD 1989-01-12, cases no 8580/88 and 10458/88. 
47 Diepsloot Residents' and Landowners Association v Administrator, Transvaal 1993 1 SA 577 (T); 
Dieps/oot Residents' and Landowners Association v Administrator, Transvaal 1993 2 SA 49 (T); 
Diepsloot Residents' and Landowners Association v Administrator, Transvaal 1994 3 SA 336 (A). 
See also Van der Walt 1993 SAPL 263-297; Van der Walt 1994 JCRDL 181-203; Van der Walt 
1995 SAPL 1 2711. 
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based on professed neutrality regarding moral or social issues. Moreover, as 
an analysis of the approach of textbooks above illustrated, this approach is 
also taught to students: 
"We occupy our students' time with the fine 
distinction between commixtio and confusio, and 
then we would, perhaps, make a brief and rather 
apologetic reference to the so-called 'black land 
law' during the last period of the semester, 
hastening to add that the student need not break 
their heads over that mysterious topic for exam 
purposes - after all, it is not really private law, is 
it?"48 
However, it should be realised that such legislation is part of the very fibre of 
property law. It has affected property in a number of very fundamental ways. 
In the first place it has " ... all but destroyed the essential ... spirit of justice 
and equality ... "49 In the second place it has destroyed any hope for a natural 
set of land relations and the very belief in the neutrality of property law has 
allowed land rights and relations to be shaped by ideological whim. 50 
Moreover, this pretence of neutrality has resulted in blinding current and 
future generations of property lawyers to the moral and political dimensions of 
property. 51 Finally the preoccupation with "pure Roman-Dutch law" has 
resulted in the failure to develop customary land law.52 A thorough 
understanding of the customary-law property concept and the customary land-
48 Van der Walt 1990 Stell LR 26 47. 
49 Van der Walt "Common law landownership" 23. 
50 Van der Walt "Common law landownership" 24. 
51 See Barnard E "Blacks, their castles and the law of property: a bid for a new approach in 
education and practice" 1990 RM 450-461. 
52 Van der Walt "Common law landownership" 25; Dlamini CRM "Landownership and customary law 
reform" in Van der Walt AJ (ed) Land reform and the future of landownership in South Africa 
(Cape Town 1991) 37-44 37. 
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use ethic is essential for the development of a truly functional South African 
property concept. 
12.4 Enter the constitution(s) 
12.4.1 The 1993-constitution 
Even before the 1993-constitution came into force, academics were calling for 
changes to the existing paradigm of ownership and property rights. These 
proposals were mostly based on the idea that the theoretical framework no 
longer reflected the reality and therefore was in need of change.s3 The 
drafting of a constitution seemed like the perfect opportunity to effect these 
changes, and, although some writers expressed reservation about the 
inclusion of a "property clause",54 it was eventually included_ss 
The 1993-constitution in section 28 dealt with property. 56 This section read 
as follows: 
"28. Property 
(1) Every person shall have the right to acquire and hold 
rights in property and, to the extent that the nature of 
the rights permits, to dispose of such rights. 
(2) No deprivation of any rights in property shall be 
permitted otherwise than in accordance with a law. 
53 See, for instance, Van der Walt AJ (ed) Land reform and the future of landownership in South 
Africa (Cape Town 1991); Van der Walt 1992 SAPL 1-11; Van der Walt AJ 1990 Stell LR 26-48; 
Budlender G "The right to equitable access to land" 1992 SAJHR 295-304; Lewis 1992 SAJHR 
389-430; Van derWalt 1992 SAJHR 431-450; Kroeze IJ '"Eigendom morgen': nuwe ontwikkelings 
in die Nederlandse en Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsreg" 1993 DJ 42-58. 
54 See Van der Walt 1993 R & K 263 281-282 for a summary of these reservations. 
55 The process by which the property clause was drafted and accepted is described in Chaskalson M 
"Stumbling towards section 28: negotiations over the protection of property rights in the interim 
constitution" 1995 SAJHR 222-240. Chaskalson M "The property clause: section 28 of the 
constitution" 1994 SAJHR 131-139 131 also emphasises the fact that section 28 was a last 
minute agreement, which might account for some sloppy drafting. 
56 It should be remembered that this was an interim constitution, since section 73(1) provided that a 
new constitution had to be adopted within two years from the date of the first sitting of the 
National Assembly. 
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(3) Where any rights in property are expropriated 
pursuant to a law referred to in subsection (2), such 
expropriation shall be permissible for public purposes 
only and shall be subject to the payment of agreed 
compensation or, failing agreement, to the payment of 
such compensation and within such period as may be 
determined by a court of law as just and equitable, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including, in 
the case of the determination of compensation, the 
use to which the property is being put, the history of 
its acquisition, its market value, the value of the 
investments in it by those affected and the interests of 
those affected." 
The 1993 constitution also provided, (in sections 121-123) for the restitution 
of land rights. Both the history of section 2857 and its possible interpretation 
and application was extensively debated. 58 The debate centred around the 
meaning of the term "rights in property", the effect of the limitations in section 
28 and its relation to section 33, the meaning of and relationship between 
sections 28(2) and 28(3) and the application of the constitution to private law. 
These questions will be discussed briefly here. 
57 See Murphy J "A note on the SA Law Commission's interpretation of the property rights in article 
11 of the ANC bill of rights" 1992 SAPL 12-39; Van der Walt 1993 R&K 263 281-287; Chaskalson 
1995 SAJHR 222-240. 
58 See Van der Walt 1993 R&K 263 287-297; Van der Walt AJ "The future of private ownership of 
land" 1994 Codicillus 35:2 4-18; Chaskalson M 1994 SAJHR 131-139; Murphy J "Property rights 
in the new constitution: an analytical framework for constitutional review" 1993 CILSA 211-233; 
Van der Walt AJ "Notes on the interpretation of the property clause in the new constitution" 1994 
JCRDL 181-203; Murphy J "Interpreting the property clause in the Constitution Act of 1993" 1995 
SAPL 107-130; Van der Walt 1993 SAPL 296-319; Kroeze IJ "The impact of the bill of rights on 
property law" 1994 SAPL 322-332; Van der Walt AJ "Property rights, land rights and 
environmental rights" in Van Wyk DH ea (eds) Rights and constitutionalism - the new South 
African legal order (Cape Town 1994) 455-501. 
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The term "rights in property• 
The most innovative aspect of section 28 was the use of the term "rights in 
property". Section 28(1) contained a positive guarantee clause that protected 
the right to acquire, hold and dispose of rights in property.59 Therefore the 
constitution did not protect ownership, property, or even property rights. It 
protected rights in property. The question was how this term is to be 
understood. While various solutions were proposed, writers seemed to agree 
that the term had to be interpreted widely to include not only real rights, but 
also immaterial property rights, property rights in incorporeals and even 
personal rights in property.60 This did not mean that the distinction between 
real and personal rights would become redundant, but that it would affect the 
hierarchy of rights. It meant that ownership would lose its privileged position 
and that the protection of all rights in property was foreseen in section 28. 61 
Chaskalson argued that section 28 would also include species of "new 
property", based on the recognition of state employment as property for the 
purposes of the audi alteram partem-rule. 62 
59 Van der Walt AJ 1995 SAPL 298-345 302 states that this is comparable to the German 
institutional guarantee in that it protects a certain kind of property relationship. See also Murphy 
1995 SAPL 107 113 who states that: "Private property is accordingly a constituent of the 
normative legal order." 
60 See Kroeze 1994 SAPL 322 326; Murphy 1995 SAPL 107 113; Van der Watt 1994 JCRDL 181 
193; Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 169 189. Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 131 132 explains this in 
terms of the idea that property is a bundle of rights which, individually, make up property rights. 
61 See Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 314. 
62 Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 131 133 quoting Hoexter JA in Administrator, Natal v Sibiya 1992 4 SA 
532 (A) 539A-B. 
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Limitations 
The limitations on the right protected in section 28 were contained in the 
section itself and in section 33. 63 The main question revolved around the 
relationship between these two sections. On the one hand was argued that 
section 28(2) overrode section 33(1) in that 28(2) requires "a law'' ("'n wet") 
rather than simply "law'' ("reg").64 In this argument the specific provision was 
preferred rather than the general one. On the other hand Van der Walt 
argued that section 33 provided for limitations on the institutional guarantee of 
rights in property. If it is argued that section 28(1) provides an institutional 
guarantee of rights in property (that is that the state may not act in such a way 
as to make the acquisition, use and disposition of rights in property 
impossible) then section 33 would provide for those cases where it is 
necessary to limit the right in itself. 65 The wording of section 33 (1)(b) 
strengthened this view. The limitations provided for in section 28(2) would 
then refer to those circumstances where individual rights in property needed 
to be limited, either by deprivation or expropriation. 
A third view would be that section 33 provided the broad parameters within 
which limitations could occur. It stated the fundamental principle that no right 
was absolute, but that all rights could and would be limited. All these 
limitations then need to meet the criteria set out in section 33. Any specific 
limitation, such as the one found in section 28, must then meet these criteria 
in addition to those found in the specific section. 
63 The relevant part of section 33 reads as follows: "(1) The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be 
limited by law of general application, provided that such limitation-
( a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is-
(i) reasonable; and 
(ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; and 
(b) shall not negate the essential content of the right in question, .. " 
64 See Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 432. 
65 Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 304; Murphy 1995 SAPL 107 114. 
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That would imply that limitations on rights in property (whether in its 
institutional or individual form) must meet the requirements of both sections 
28 and 33. The implication would be that, for instance, an expropriation must 
not only be for public purposes and subject to payment of compensation, but 
also reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. 
The element that all interpretations have in common, however, is the 
assumption that rights in property can and will the limited. It represents a 
fundamental shift away from the absolute view of ownership in the traditional 
civil-law approach towards an inherently limited right that is placed firmly 
within the social and political context. 
Deprivation and expropriation 
Section 28(2) prohibited the deprivation of rights in property except in 
accordance with a law, while section 28(3) provided for expropriation of these 
rights in certain circumstances. The next question was what the relationship 
was between these two sections. Subsection (3) was a more or less standard 
formulation found in most constitutions and was, broadly speaking, in 
conformity with the provisions of the civil law. The only real difference lay in 
the fact that more factors needed to be taken into consideration when 
compensation is determined. 
injustices. 
This indicated sensitivity for historical 
It was more difficult to determine the meaning of deprivations. In terms of the 
normal rules of interpretation words must be understood in their ordinary 
meaning unless they have a special or specific meaning (in the sense of a 
technical-legal meaning). The term has no specific meaning in either private 
or public law and, in those cases where it is used, it refers to a total 
withdrawal of rights.ss This lead Murphy to suggest that "deprivation" should 
66 See Van der Merwe GC and De Waal MJ The law of things and servitudes ( 1993) 7 4, where 
'deprivation' is used in the context of the deprivation of possession and the mandament of spolie. 
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be accorded a wide or general meaning, while "expropriation" should be 
understood in its technical meaning.67 
The more probable solution is that subsection (2) referred to regulation of 
rights in property (as in the American due-process clause), while subsection 
(3) referred to expropriation.68 It is now generally accepted that this is the 
correct view. Therefore " ... compensation is not available for deprivations 
which are not expropriations. "69 
Horizontal application 
It is sometimes argued that the 1993-constitution had little or nothing to say 
about private law and that it was restricted to public law. This expresses the 
typically liberal view that fundamental rights only have vertical application, 
and that the constitution fulfils the function of protecting the private sphere of 
the individual against state interference.7° Consequently the constitution has 
only a marginal influence on private law.71 However, it must be emphasised 
that the 1993-constitution provided the normative and conceptual framework 
for all law, and that included private law.72 Furthermore, section 28 provided 
the normative paradigm for all property rights and private-law provisions 
relating to these would have to be interpreted in the light of section 28.73 
Because the constitutional provision was wider than traditional private-law 
67 Murphy 1995 SAPL 107 115-116. 
68 Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 308-310; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 427; Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 131 
134; Van derWalt 1994 JCRDL 181198-199; Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 169 188. 
69 Murphy 1995 SAPL 107117. See also Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 131134. 
70 Gill 1983 J of Pol 675 679; Van derWalt 1992 SAJHR 431 447; Kroeze 1994 SAPL 322 324. 
71 See the judgement of Van Dijkghorst J in De Klerk and another v Du Plessis and others 1995 2 
SA 40 (T) 501-J in which the influence of the constitution in the ''virile" (sic) private Jaw is restricted 
to" ... the unruly horse of public policy" and 491: "There was no need for insmutional invasion of 
the private Jaw." (My emphasis.) 
72 See, for instance, the provisions of sections 7(2), 35(3) and 33(2). See also discussion in Kroeze 
1994 SAPL 322 324. 
73 Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 301. 
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ownership, Kleyn warned, " ... the notion of property could swallow up the 
whole of private law."74 
Conclusion 
In general it can be stated that section 28(1) contained a positive institutional 
guarantee75 that was limited by the provisions of section 28(2), 28(3) and 33. 
The right enshrined in section 28 included the right to acquire, hold and 
dispose of rights in property. These are the traditional liberal entitlements of 
ownership that are now applied to rights in property. 
The negative individual guarantee against unwarranted interference by the 
state was contained in subsections (2) and (3). Once again these rights could 
be limited if the conditions stated in subsections (2) and (3) and 33 were met. 
It should, furthermore, be noted that section 28 distinguished between various 
kinds of rights in property by the use of the words "to the extent that the 
nature of the rights permits". This only applied to the entitlement of disposal, 
which indicates that certain rights could not be alienated.76 
The important point is, however, that section 28 represented a major 
paradigm shift from the civil-law preoccupation with ownership within a 
hierarchy of rights toward a constitutional idea of rights in property that tends 
to be non-hierarchical.77 While ownership will not disappear and will remain 
an important right, doctrinally speaking, it will lose its privileged position. 78 
74 Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 423. 
75 Murphy 1995 SAPL 107 112; Van der Walt 1994 JCRDL 181 194. However, Chaskalson 1994 
SAJHR 131 133 states that section 28(1) is of limited scope and simply protects certain 
entitlements. 
76 This was probably intended to refer to tribal land and necessitates a distinction between alienable 
and inalienable rights in property - see Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 306. 
77 Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 335 states that this is not a paradigm shift, but a scientific 
revolution in Kuhnian terms. 
78 Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 314; Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 169 189. 
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12.4.2 The 1996-constitution 
The final constitution79 also included a property clause. Section 25 of the 
1996-constitution reads as follows: 
"25. Property 
(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of 
law of general application, and no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of 
general application-
(a) for public purposes or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount, timing, and 
manner of payment, of which must be agreed, or 
decided or approved by a court. 
(3) The amount, timing, and manner of payment, of 
compensation must be just and equitable, reflecting an 
equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant 
factors, including -
(a) the current use of the property; 
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the 
property; 
(c) the market value of the property; 
(d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in 
the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement 
of the property; and 
(e) the purpose of the expropriation. 
(4) For the purposes of this section -
(a) the public interest includes the nation's 
commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring 
about equitable access to all South Africa's natural 
resources; and 
(b) property is not limited to land. 
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to foster 
conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land 
on an equitable basis. 
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally 
insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or 
practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure, or to 
comparable redress. 
79 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 - hereinafter referred to as the 1996-
constitution. 
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(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 
June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws 
or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act 
of Parliament, either to restitution of that property, or to 
equitable redress. 
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from 
taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, 
water and related reform, in order to redress the results 
of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure 
from the provisions of this section is in accordance with 
the provisions of section 36(1). 
(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in 
subsections (6). 
Structure and content 
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On the whole the 1996-constitution, and the Bill of rights in particular, differ 
from its predecessor in that it is generally worded more simply and clearly. 
Section 25 is an exception to this general observation. It is a long and fairly 
detailed section, partly as a result of the fact that it deals not only with 
property, but also with land and related reform. 80 
Unlike its predecessor, section 25 does not contain a positive, institutional 
guarantee. Neither ownership, property nor its entitlements are protected, but 
subsections (1) and (2) are reminiscent of the American property clause. 81 
There has been some debate on whether this negative guarantee is sufficient 
to protect property rights. 
This question was also raised in the First Certification Case, where it was 
argued that section 25 does not make explicit provision for the protection of 
property. 82 The court's reply was that there is" ... no universally recognised 
formulation of the right to property," which seems to indicate that a negative 
guarantee of property might be as effective in protecting property as a 
80 In the 1993-constitution these measures had not been part of the chapter on fundamental rights, 
but had been provided for in sections 121-123. These provisions are not directly relevant for 
present purposes and will only be referred to in passing. 
81 Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 416-418. 
82 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 1996 1996 10 BCLR 1253 
(CC). 
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positive one. Therefore the property clause should not be seen as conferring 
a purely negative right, but should be understood within the normative context 
of the constitution as a whole. 
What is protected is the owner's right not to be deprived of property except in 
terms of a general law and the right not to have property expropriated except 
in set circumstances and against compensation. Subsection (1) contains the 
regulation clause that provides that property may be regulated but only in 
terms of law of general application. A further departure from the previous 
section 28(2) is that 25(1) explicitly prohibits arbitrary deprivations. 
Subsection (2) contains the expropriation clause and provides that 
expropriation may only take place in terms of law of general application, for 
public purpose or in the public interest and if compensation is paid. The 
factors to be taken into consideration when calculating compensation are 
enumerated in subsection (3). 
Subsection (4) provides that "public interest" includes the nation's 
commitment to land reform and that "property" is not limited to land. 
Subsections (5) to (9) deal with land reform, redistribution and access to 
resources. It is sometimes argued that this should not form part of a property 
clause. However, these subsections provide important clues to the normative 
context of the property clause in that it makes the programmatic nature of this 
section clear. It is furthermore interesting to note that subsection (8) 
empowers the state to take steps to effect land, water and related reform, but 
it also provides that this must be done in accordance with the provisions of 
section 36(1 ). This indicates that these rights are also subject to the general 
limitations clause. 
Property 
It can be predicted with a fair amount of certainty that a large part of the 
debate around section 25 will, once again, revolve around the term property. 
Murphy warns that " .. . the primary question . . . is not whether the affected 
resource is 'property' or not.. .. but whether the government action in relation 
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to the resource is justified or not."83 The recognition that property is, in the 
constitutional sense, concerned with a power relationship, seems to make this 
question irrelevant. However, the conceptual approach and training of 
property lawyers make it unlikely that this will not, once again, be regarded as 
the crucial question. A new conceptual scheme, such as the one proposed by 
Van der Walt,84 may be needed. At any rate it will have to be a" ... system of 
a social-relations rather than an abstract right."85 
Whatever the outcome of the above-mentioned debate, it is fairly certain that 
property will be given a fairly wide meaning in the constitutional sense. In an 
obiter remark the court in Transkei Public Servants Association v Government 
of the Republic of South Africa and others86 stated: 
"It would seem, therefore, on the above somewhat 
cursory examination of certain of the authorities, 
that the meaning of 'property' in section 28 of the 
Constitution may well be sufficiently wide to 
encompass a State housing subsidy. In the view 
that I take of the matter, however, it is not 
necessary for me to decide the issue and therefore 
to deal with it in any greater depth." 
Such an approach would, indeed, be consistent with international trends and 
with the debate on section 28 discussed above. It is also fairly certain that 
this view will be extended to discussion on section 25 as well. The real 
question is, of course, how this is to be squared with the traditional concept of 
ownership. 
83 Murphy 1995 SAPL 107114. 
84 Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 33511. 
85 Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 343. 
86 Transkei Public Servants Association v Government of the Republic of South Africa and others 
1995 9 BCLR 1235 (Tk) 1246J. 
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An interesting development in this regard is the creation of statutory property 
rights that go far beyond traditional civil-law ownership. For instance, the 
Development Facilitation Acf7 creates a right known as initial ownership in 
section 62 which provides for a secure, registerable right to land that has not 
been surveyed.88 When such land is eventually surveyed and becomes 
registerable in the usual manner, the initial ownership is automatically 
converted into ownership.89 Furthermore, the Housing subsidy scheme 
extends subsidies to " ... persons who enjoy functional security of tenure ... " 
indicating a move away from formal ownership. It also contains special 
provisions for land held by communities. These rights are now protected by 
the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act.90 Apart from these 
statutory developments new property rights, customary property rights, labour 
rights, informal land rights as well as religious and social rights will probably 
be recognised as property.91 All of these developments serve to strengthen 
the assumption that the constitutional protection of property will extend 
beyond the limits of traditional civil-law ownership. 
Interpretation clause 
A number of other provisions have also been altered in the 1996-constitution 
and these affect the interpretation of section 2scsection 39, dealing with 
interpretation, resembles section 35 in the 1993-constitution, but no longer 
requires reference to ~able foreign case law, but simply allows courts to 
refer to foreign law. As was stated earlier, this makes it possible for courts to 
move beyond the restriction to civil-law system~'?_] 
87 Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995. 
88 This is in accordance with the provisions of section 25(6) of the 1996-constitution. 
89 Section 62(7) of the Development FacUitation Act 67 of 1995. 
90 Informal Protection of Land Rights Act 31 of 1996. 
91 Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 317-333. 
92 Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 402 also welcomes this as an opportunity to learn from "non-comparable" 
systems, especially in the African context. 
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Umitations 
One of the problems with the previous property clause dealt with the 
relationship between the limitations contained in the clause and section 33. It 
was then suggested that the limitation clause provided a basic set of rules 
that govern all limitations on rights. Specific limitations in other acts were 
then to be regarded as additional safeguards in the case of limitation of rights. 
It is suggested that this approach would also apply to the present section 25. 
Section 36, which replaces section 33, deals with limitations and is much 
simplified. In essence, section 39 is a codification of the proportionality 
principle.93 Section 25(8) specifically provides for legislative limitations on 
property, but also explicitly states that these need to conform to the 
requirements set out in section 36(1 ). The conclusion is that limitations on 
property need to be in accordance with the requirements of both sections 25 
and 36. More importantly, the limitations contained in section 25 indicate that 
property is never to be regarded as absolute, but as limited in principle. 
Horizontal application 
The horizontal application of the fundamental rights is taken further and made 
more explicit in the 1996-constitution. Apart from the fact that the constitution 
plays a vital role in that it " ... creates public meaning for private law ... ", 94 
explicit provisions tend to blur the traditional distinction between private and 
public law even more. Section 2 provides that " ... law or conduct inconsistent 
with (the constitution) is invalid ... " and section 8(1) makes it clear that 
chapter 2 applies to "all law".95 Furthermore, section 39(2) places an 
obligation on courts, when developing the common law, to promote the "spirit, 
93 Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 428. 
94 Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 335. 
95 Section 8(1) reads: "The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the executive, 
the judiciary, and all organs of state." This question will not be discussed further here, because 
the introduction of section 8(2), read with 8(1). makes it clear that the 1996 constitution will apply 
horizontally. Therefore it is no longer really an issue. 
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purport and objects of the Bill of Rights".96 The conclusion is that section 25 
provides a normative framework for property law, whether in the private-law or 
public-law contexts. It provides the paradigm for the normative discourse on 
property in South African law. 
12.4.3 Constitutional property concept 
While the traditional South African private-law property concept is a basically 
conceptualist one with the emphasis on ownership as the paradigm right, the 
constitutional property concept needs to be developed within the 
constitutional context. This implies at the very least that ownership can no 
longer provide the conceptual paradigm. In fact, the very wording of section 
25 makes it virtually impossible to maintain a hierarchy of property rights. All 
property rights are protected and all are subject to limitations in the public 
interest. Although the courts have not dealt with this issue yet, it is argued 
that the constitutional property concept will, at least, have a number of 
characteristics. 
In the first place, the constitutional property concept can never be an abstract 
or neutral concept. It is a profoundly contextual and political concept that 
must be understood in the normative context of the constitution as a political 
document. Consequently, it cannot be isolated from societal influences and 
demands. In the second place, the property concept is also conceptually 
limited. This becomes clear from the limitations in section 25, but also from 
the general limitations clause and section 7(3) that states explicitly that all the 
rights in chapter 2 are subject to limitations. 
More importantly, constitutional property will probably be much wider than 
traditional thing ownership. Indications are that it will include all or most 
96 Section 39(2) reads: 'When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of 
Rights." 
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private-law patrimonial rights as well as public-law property. This becomes 
clear from the interpretation of the constitution as a public-law document. 
However, if both the wide protection and the inherent limitations are kept in 
mind, it seems that, paradoxically, the constitutional property concept is, at 
the same time, both wide and limited. This paradox turns out to be the most 
interesting part of the property concept. 
In this respect, South African law is in a unique position. The American 
constitution contains a property clause, but no limitations clause, while the 
situation is reversed in the case of Canada. The German constitution also 
does not contain a limitations clause, and yet the German courts have 
developed a jurisprudence of limitations. The South African constitution has 
both a property clause and a limitations clause. This means that South 
African courts can avoid the American definitional approach (which is their 
way of dealing with limitations) with all its shortcomings. Instead the well-
developed constitutional jurisprudence regarding limitations used by the 
Canadian and German courts seem more appropriate. This means that 
courts might easily accept an interest as property and then focus on the 
question of whether a limitation is justifiable. Using the established two-stage 
approach, courts can then focus on the more important issue of 
proportionality of limitations rather than on the property vet non question. 
Moreover, the inclusion of sections 25(4)-(9) indicates that a balance needs 
to be struck between protection of property and land reform. This indicates 
that not only is property part of a social and political structure, but it is limited 
by that structure. An emphasis on property as an absolute right, in an attempt 
to block social reform, therefore seems impossible. This makes it possible to 
regard property as determined by social relations, rather than social relations 
determined by property. 
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12.5 Values and interpretation 
"We inhabit a nomos - a normative universe. We constantly 
create and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and 
unlawful, of valid and void."97 
These words of Robert Cover are particularly striking in the South African 
constitutional context. Cover states that the law can never be just a system of 
rules, but that every rule must be placed within a discourse, a narrative which 
provide it with meaning, history, beginning, end and purpose. And every 
discourse, every narrative, require a prescriptive point, a morality.98 Legal 
rules cannot escape their narrative and their morality. To establish meaning 
requires interpretative commitments and actions that can only be understood 
with reference to morality or values. 99 A legal tradition is more than a system 
(or hierarchy) of rules, it is also language, mythology and values. 
For Cover a constitution represents a moment of undivided understanding 
that serve as a sort of fleeting legal DNA of common understanding. It 
remains as a sort of matrix, which is expressed in belief and ritual, and a 
common understanding of what the values mean. 100 Therefore the 
constitution serves as a sacred text around which narratives are built up and 
these narratives create meaning based on shared commitments and shared 
values. 101 
97 Cover RM "Foreword: Nomos and narrative" 1983 Harvard LR 4-68. 
98 Cover 1983 Harvard LR 4 5: "And every narrative is insistent in ns demand for its prescriptive 
point, its moral. History and literature cannot escape their location in a normative universe ... " 
99 Cover 1983 Harvard LR 4 7: "The normative universe is held together by the force of interpretive 
commitments ... (which) determine what law means and what law shall be." 
100 Cover 1983 Harvard LR 4 15: "(T)o their common understanding of creed and ritual is added a 
common understanding of their relation to the primordial, imaginary, true unity ... " 
101 Cover 1983 Harvard LR 4 25: "Many of our necessarily uncanonical historical narratives treat the 
Constitution as foundational - a beginning - and generative of all that comes after." 
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This process of jurisgenesis takes place within communities that create their 
own meaning and therefore create law. 102 However, the meaning created by 
communities may differ substantially from that created by courts. In the 
moment that courts of final instance choose one meaning over another, they 
destroy meaning and therefore law. Courts, in distinction from communities, 
are jurispathic.103 By privileging one meaning over others, they destroy those 
meanings. 
Therefore, external, objective legal rules are created, based on a normative 
discourse.104 Making sense of constitutional provisions therefore require not 
only an understanding of the legal rules, but also of their normative discourse, 
their prescriptive point, their morals. Even more, it requires a commitment to 
shared values and understandings. It is no secret that the 1996-constitution 
contains values, some explicit, some implicit. Much of the debate on the new 
constitution centres on the identification, ordering and application of those 
values. It takes the form of either debating whether and to what extent the 
1993-constitution provided for a Rechtstaat (or constitutional state) and to 
what extent this has been maintained and expanded or not in the 1996-
constitution, 105 or to what extent a hierarchy of values can be constructed that 
would guide interpretation in concrete cases. 
102 Cover 1983 Harvard LR 4 28: "I am asserting that within the domain of constitutional meaning, 
the understanding of the Mennonites assumes a status equal (or superior) to that accorded to the 
understanding of the Justices of the Supreme Court. In this realm of meaning ... the Mennonite 
community creates law as fully as does the judge." 
103 Cover 1983 Harvard LR 4 40: "Courts, at least the courts of the state, are characteristically 
'jurispathic'." 
104 Cover 1983 Harvard LR 4 45: "Creation of legal meaning entails, then, subjective commitment to 
an objectified understanding of a demand." 
105 See Venter F "Aspects of the South African constitution of 1996: an African democratic and social 
federal Rechtstaat?" 1997 ZaoRV 51-82 and sources cited there. See also Erasmus G and De 
Waal J "Die finale grondwet legitimiteit en ontstaan" 1997 Stell LR 31-44 in which the idea of a 
constitutional state is equated with the doctrine of rule of law. This is, at best, a questionable 
assumption. 
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In this respect the preamble106 along with sections 1,107 i 08 and 7(1)109 are 
used. 
South African courts need to understand that their interpretation and 
application of section 25 will always take place within the normative discourse 
created by the constitution. A simple privileging of the civil-law hierarchy of 
property rights (even if couched in the language of the constitution) will result 
in jurispathic decisions. The text of section 25 and the implicit and explicit 
values in the constitution make another approach possible - that of 
recognition that communities create property rights and that it is the courts' 
task to make those rights secure. To this end there is no need to create a 
hierarchy of values. That would be to perpetuate in the public-law sphere the 
conceptualism and hierarchical thinking that has plagued private-law thinking 
on property for so long. 
106 "We, the people of South Africa, 
Recognise the injustices of our past; 
Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land; 
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our countty; and 
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who ive in it, united in our diversity. 
We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of 
the Republic so as to -
Heal the divisions of the past and establsh a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights; 
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of 
the people and evety citizen is equaRy protected by law; 
Improve the quality of ffe of all citizens and free the potential of each person; 
BuHd a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the 
family of nations. 
May God protect our people.• 
107 ''The Republic of South Africa is one sovereign democratic state founded on the following values 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and advancement of human rights and 
freedoms. 
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections, and a 
multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness." 
108 "This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, 
and the duties imposed by it must be performed." 
109 ''This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all 
people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equallty and freedom." 
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12.5 Conclusion 
South African property law is, without a doubt, experiencing a long-overdue 
fundamental overhaul. The use of the term property in the two constitutions 
has opened up a number of possibilities but has also, paradoxically, 
constrained those choices. That the term property will, in a constitutional 
sense, mean protection beyond the traditional thing-ownership seems 
reasonably certain. The more difficult question, however, is what difference 
this will make to traditional private-law ownership. If the German example is 
followed, this could mean that property would mean different things in the 
private- and public-law contexts respectively. That could, in turn, mean that 
private-law property would, once again, be insulated from political, social and 
moral scrutiny. If the onus is placed on a public-law property concept to 
ensure justice, this could have the detrimental effect that nothing will change 
in the traditional private law. Following the German example could, therefore, 
mean that private property could remain locked in its conceptual ivory tower. 
Or to use Mr Justice van Dijkhorst's metaphor - it would maintain the "virile 
private law" virtually unaffected by the wafting perfume of public law! 110 It 
would ensure that the dichotomist split of the law into private and public is 
perpetuated.111 
On the other hand, if it is assumed that the constitution is the supreme law of 
the land, also in so-called "pure" private-law areas, this could have a startling 
but beneficial effect. It cannot be assumed that, when apartheid legislation is 
abolished, private law will somehow, magically resume its just and equitable 
nature (if that had ever been its nature). 
110 De K/erk and another v Du Plessis and others 1995 2 SA 40 (T) 50!-J. 
111 Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 337 has indicated that there is no need for the German dual 
concept of property to be introduced into South African law, because there is no South African 
civil code and the interpretive theories differ. While this is true, the very real resistance to what is 
perceived as the "invasion" of private law by public law should not be discounted. 
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Using the basic egalitarian nature of the constitution to transform private law 
could, however, be the method to achieve just that. This would ensure that 
private property rules be subject to the scrutiny of the constitution and would 
force the law to confront the injustices toward, for instance, blacks and women 
inherent in the rules. It would ensure that private law is seen as embedded in 
the power structures and inequalities of society. 
Moreover, the emphasis on property instead of ownership could lead to what 
Van der Walt calls the "demythologisation of ownership."112 The effect of this 
would be a levelling out of rights in place of the old hierarchy of rights. 
Conceptually, at least, rights will have to be seen within a new normative 
discourse in which the privileged position of ownership is exchanged for a 
concern with values such as dignity and equality. The new constitution 
implies that everything, including property, be immersed in a normative 
discourse. 113 
Little attention has, so far, been given to the connection between property and 
power in the South African context. As in most constitutional systems, 
attention is focused on property as pre-requisite for liberty. However, to 
emphasise that only, tends to mask the detrimental effect of property on 
equality. 
Moreover, if there is little in South African textbooks on apartheid, there is 
even less on the impact of discrimination based on gender. The oppression 
of women (in both customary and civil-law systems) is rarely alluded to in any 
branch of private law. Consequently, it is treated as if it doesn't exist. For 
South African law, therefore, to focus on the property concept without placing 
it squarely within the patriarchal context would be to perpetuate the position of 
112 VanderWalt1995SAPL29B317. 
113 Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 344. 
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women. Property is not, nor can it ever be, an abstract concept. It impacts on 
and is shaped by basic assumptions about power, equality and liberty. 

13.1 Summary 
CHAPTER 13: CONCLUSION 
(DOING THINGS WITH CONSTITUTIONS) 
"Law is politics, not because law is subject to political 
value choice, but rather because law is a form that 
power sometimes take. "1 
"Property is, and probably always will be, a contested 
concept."2 
The purpose of this section was to study the property concept from a 
constitutional perspective regarding specific issues. The first of these issues 
was what the content of property within a constitutional context is and how 
this is to be determined. Is property in the constitutional sense the same as 
the private-law concept (ie property is property is property), or is there a 
difference? 
There are three basic approaches to this problem. In the first place, some 
systems use the private-law paradigm whereby the content of the 
constitutional property clause is determined by private-law views and 
definitions of property. In the American system, for instance, it is called the 
"standing law'' approach.3 This approach, while having the virtue of certainty, 
tends to enhance and promote the importance of the private-law paradigm in 
law in general and property law in particular. It also disguises the political 
assumptions inherent in that paradigm. Moreover, the absolute nature of the 
private-law property concept tends to disregard the general limitations clause 
that is so vital to constitutional jurisprudence in South Africa. 
1 Schlag P "Foreword: postmodernism and law" 1991 U Col LR 439-453 448. 
2 Radin 1986 U Miami LR 239 241. 
3 Michelman 1981 Washington and Lee LR 1097-1114. 
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In the second place, some systems (such as the German one) opt for a dual 
property concept. That means that the private- and public-law property 
concepts differ, yet exist side-by-side. Apart from the fact that this obviously 
makes for confusion and conflict between courts, it also serves to exacerbate 
the (artificial) private/public split. Moreover, it serves to immunise private law 
against constitutional influences. Once again the constitution is not allowed 
to function as a corrective for the inequalities inherent in the private-law 
concept. One solution for this problem would be to allow "horizontal 
seepage" from the constitution to private law, but this depends on courts' 
willingness to abandon the private-law paradigm. However, the content of 
sections 2, 7, 8 and 39 of the constitution ensures the horizontal application 
of the constitution. 
A third possibility is raised by writers like Michelman but this has not yet been 
adopted in law. He suggests that constitutionally protected property should 
be seen as an original and not as a derivative right. That would supposedly 
make constitutional/public law the paradigm for property in the private sphere 
too and ensure greater equality. But this section has shown that, as long as 
the public-law property concept is based on liberal points of departure, that 
equality will be more apparent than real. Put another way, the emphasis on 
liberty would mean that equality is sacrificed. If, however, the constitutional 
property concept can be relieved of its liberal burden, it can be used as an 
instrument to reform private law. 
The second question dealt with the expansion of the property concept. There 
is no doubt that the concept has expanded to include certain public-law or 
new property rights. This is sometimes attributed to constitutional 
entrenchment (as was the case in the Canadian constitutional debate). 
However, the study has shown that the expansion can also be observed in 
systems without a property clause and, consequently, constitutional 
entrenchment cannot be the cause. Instead it is suggested that the expansion 
is necessarily implied in the liberal property concept itself. When this general 
statement is applied to constitutional law, it means that maintaining the liberal 
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basis will almost certainly ensure the expansion of the property concept. 
Seen in this light, new property is just another way of ensuring the survival of 
liberalism in constitutional law. 
The third issue concerned the role of property as a boundary between private 
and public. It became clear that the question of where that boundary should 
be drawn was not a purely legal one, but involved a complex set of factors 
that included political theory, judicial theory and interpretative commitments. 
What remains clear, however, is that property is regarded, in most systems, 
as an important tool to mediate between public and private. 
The final question dealt with the value, if any, of comparative analysis. This 
study indicated a remarkable similarity regarding the types of problems legal 
systems have to face. Of course the specifics differ, but problems of land 
reform, regulation, expropriation, personal liberty and equality seem 
universal. As such they indicate that comparative analysis is not without 
value. 
13.2 Property and constitutional hermeneutics 
As was pointed out above, some of the differences regarding the property 
concept are attributable, at least in part, · to different hermeneutical 
approaches. An uncritical acceptance of government policy regarding 
property is usually masked by an intentionalisUliteralist approach to the 
interpretation of a constitution. Courts then rely on the intentions of real or 
mythical "founding fathers" (sic).4 On the other hand, once courts become 
critical of government policy, they enter the minefield of what is known in 
American law as the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Interpreting and applying 
constitutional provisions then seem to become a choice between the tyranny 
4 See Van Dijkhorst J in De Kier/< and another v Du Plessis and others 1995 2 SA 40 (T) 46G where 
he refers to the intention of '~he Founding Fathers of Kempton Park". Apart from the obvious 
sexism inherent in that remark, it is possible that quite a few of those "Fathers" might dispute 
paternity! 
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of the majority (represented by the elected legislature) and the tyranny of the 
minority (represented by an unelected judiciary). In a constitutional system 
that is dedicated to both liberalism and social goals, the problem is 
compounded. In the case of property the conflict centres on the individual 
property right (that is supposed to be a pre-political boundary between state 
and individual) and social justice (that must necessarily imply a crossing of 
that boundary). The resolution of that conflict will depend, to a large extent, 
on the interpretative commitment of the judiciary within the normative 
discourse. 
Avoiding the counter-majoritarian dilemma requires at least a basic 
examination of the hermeneutic approach of courts. The first step would be to 
recognise that the traditional approaches to interpretation are inappropriate in 
the case of constitutions. But, at the same time, seemingly abstract and 
conceptual "recipes" for constitutional interpretation are equally inappropriate. 
It must be recognised that constitutional interpretation is far more complex 
and involves narratives, values and conflict. 
13.3 The South African context 
It is not yet clear what the approach of the South African courts will be 
regarding the property clause. The existence of both a constitutional court 
(with final jurisdiction in constitutional matters)5 and a supreme court of 
appeal (with final jurisdiction in all other matters)6 could complicate the 
problem. As this division corresponds to the German model, it could mean 
that the German approach might be followed. This could result in a dual 
property concept in South African law as well. This possibility is strengthened 
by the constitutional court's reluctance to judge on private-law matters in 
5 See section 167 of the 1996-constffution. 
6 See section 168 of the 1996-constitution and in particular subsection (3). 
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terms of the 1993-constitution. 7 Such an approach would serve to strengthen 
the private/public split and to maintain the illusion of a politically neutral 
private law. Moreover, such a split concept could frustrate redistribution of 
property and the redressing of past injustices. 
However, the 1996-constitution would make this approach virtually 
impossible. Section 2 reads: 
"This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; 
law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the 
obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled." 
This is an extremely wide provision that makes the constitution applicable to 
all law and all juridically relevant acts.8 The effect of this is that the entire 
body of law, legal rules and legal acts in South Africa are now "constitutional 
matters" within the meaning of section 167. That means that it would be 
virtually impossible for the constitutional court not to have jurisdiction in any 
legal dispute. Of course the court could read section 2 more restrictively, but 
that would require a very creative interpretation indeed. The result is that a 
dual property concept in South African law is a highly unlikely occurrence. 
The supremacy of the constitution also means that the illusion cannot be 
maintained that private law is beyond the reach of constitutional provisions. If 
the property clause, as was argued earlier, implies that all property is to be 
protected, then the privileged position of ownership and the conceptual 
pyramid on which that position is based, can no longer be maintained. 
7 See eg Du Plessis end others v De Klerk and another 1996 4 SA 850 {CC) par [60]: "The fact that 
Courts are to do no more than have regard to the spirit, purport and objects of the chapter 
indicates that the requisite development of the common law and customary law is not to be 
pursued through the exercise of the powers of this Court ... " and Gardener v Whflaker 1996 4 SA 
337 {CC) par [13] in which the previous decision was confirmed. 
8 Note that it does not apply to acts by the state only, but to all acts, irrespective of who performs 
them. 
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Retaining a common-law rule that privileges ownership over other property 
rights would be unconstitutional and, consequently, invalid. The upshot of 
this is that there is very little doubt that the South African property concept will 
be expanded. Van der Walt has proposed that the previous hierarchical 
system of property rights should be "levelled out" so that the property vet non 
question becomes less important.9 This would imply that rights would be 
protected constitutionally as property as long as they fit within a broad range 
of minimum and maximum requirements. Such an approach would also 
ensure that rights developed within communities would be recognised as 
property instead of being destroyed by conceptual schemes. As such it would 
enable courts to be jurisgenerative rather than jurispathic. An added bonus of 
such an approach could be the avoidance of the new property problem in 
South Africa. If there is no need to fit new rights into a rigid conceptual 
scheme, the creation of a class of new property ceases to be a problem. The 
question becomes one of simply determining whether the threshold criteria 
are met. If they are, constitutional protection is afforded. The court can then 
move on to the real problem of balancing individual and societal interests by 
using the proportionality test. 
The crux of the problem, however, lies with the courts' philosophical and 
interpretative commitments. A commitment to liberalism and individualism 
would frustrate the goal of social democracy and/or a more communitarian 
approach. The expanded (or "levelled out") property then becomes a tool to 
frustrate reconstruction, because more and more rights are liberally protected 
against state interference. In this way a clause designed to liberate can be 
used to perpetuate inequality. On the other hand the very explicit provisions 
of sections 25(5) to (9) make it impossible to maintain the liberal fa9ade. 
These sections make it clear that the protection of property must be balanced 
by the reforms provided for. In this way the property clause becomes an 
9 Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 342-343. 
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instrument for undermining the conceptualist and liberalist private-law 
approach. 
Much the same needs to be said regarding the values in the constitution. If a 
hierarchy of values is constructed (as commentators seem to be doing) this 
will once again result in jurispathic judgements by the courts. The privileging 
of one value (such as human dignity) over others (such as equality) might 
mean a perpetuation of inequality. Moreover, even if the mere identification 
and classification seem harmless, giving it content is not. If these values (like 
human dignity) are given a typical male, Western meaning it would ensure the 
continuation of cultural and sexual domination in a much more refined and 
consequently more dangerous form. In this respect it is not enough to speak 
of a purposive or a generous approach - the basic assumptions and 
consequences of these approaches need to be examined. 
13.4 In a different voice 
In chapter 7 a number of feminist objections to or problems regarding the 
conceptualist private-law paradigm were raised. It was pointed out that this 
paradigm is a fundamentally male one that, in various aspects, tends to allow 
rather than prohibit discrimination. The question now arises whether the 
constitutional property concept can do what the private-law concept could not. 
The best way to answer this question is to contrast the constitutional ideas 
with feminist views. 
Contemporary theories on constitutional interpretation are often based on 
Cover's view of interpretation as based on narratives and, ultimately, on a 
moral point. 10 On the face of it, this seems to be in accordance with feminist 
ideas. But Violi warns that masculine narratives are of a very specific kind: 
10 See 12.5 above on Cover. 
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"Narrative is crucial to the establishment of male 
subjectivity because it enables men to objectivize 
themselves and their experiences in the stories that 
represent it."11 
Male narratives therefore tend to regard the subject as central and 
autonomous. In this process symbols serve as mediators between private 
experience and general forms. 12 There can be little doubt that one such (very 
powerful) symbol is property. Female narratives need to be told in a different 
voice - one that gives voice to the female experience. What follows is a 
suggestion of what a feminine theory of constitutional property might look 
like.13 
If it is true, as Cover suggests, that legal rules are imbedded in narratives 
which are, in turn, based on a moral point, then a feminist theory needs to 
start with the different ways in which men and women approach moral 
dilemmas, such as the one posed by property and equality. It seems that the 
male approach relies on instrumental abilities that recast such dilemmas in 
the language of a morality of rights. Such an approach is based on the ideas 
of separation and individuation. 14 The female approach, in contrast, relies on 
expressive capacities that translate dilemmas into a morality of responsibility. 
As such it is, psychologically, based on connection and relationship. 15 If it is 
correct that the moral approach differs, that must imply that the narrative and, 
ultimately, the theory will differ. Therefore feminist theory is quite distinct from 
the male one: 
11 Violi P "Gender, subjectivity and language" in Bock G and James S (eds) Beyond equality and 
difference (London 1992) 164-176 169. 
12 Violi "Gender, subjectivity and language" 164 168. 
13 Of course, this is not to suggest that there is only one feminist theory possible. That would be an 
expression of the ideal that there is a •generic woman" or a monolithic ·women's experience". 
14 Gilligan In a different voice 17. 
15 Gilligan In a different voice 19. 
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"Thus it becomes clear why a morality of rights and 
noninterference may appear frightening to women in its 
potential justification of indifference and unconcern. At 
the same time, it becomes clear why, from a male 
perspective, a morality of responsibility appear 
inconclusive and diffuse, given its insistent contextual 
relativism."16 
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When this general statement is applied to constitutional property, a number of 
interesting possibilities are opened up. In the first place it seems clear that a 
feminist constitutional property concept can never be based on a political 
theory of non-intervention or the minimum state. This implies that 
constitutional property cannot be seen as a negative right, but is, instead, 
viewed as a positive, allocative right. 17 In the second place its "insistent 
contextual relativism" means that property is not always property. 18 Property's 
relational role determines its content, function and protection for every 
situation. In the third place it means that the idea of a connection between 
property and personhood needs to be redefined. The person in this context is 
never the morally autonomous individual, but is the fully situated, related 
human being. The conflict between property and equality can, therefore, not 
be resolved through logical deduction, as the male pattern would have it. 
Instead such a conflict indicates " ... a fracture of human relationships that 
must be mended with its own [ie relational] thread."19 
Like post-modernists, feminists decenter the concept of a unitary or 
essentially rational self. In this process they reject the Lockean and Kantian 
16 Gilligan In a different voice 22. 
17 Underkuffler-Freund LS "Property: a special right" 1996 Notre Dame LR 1033-1047 1042. 
18 Radin 1986 U Miami LR 239 243ff. 
19 Gilligan In a different voice 31. 
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"rational man" theory of justice.20 However, feminists point towards locating 
the self in "concrete social relations, not only in fictive or purely textual 
conventions."21 What this implies is that a feminist theory of constitutional 
property is not merely the exact opposite of the masculinist one, but requires 
a completely different way of thinking. It does not require the exchanging of 
one conceptual scheme for another, or even a paradigm shift. It requires an 
understanding of law and reality that is based on a specific way of knowing 
and understanding. This will probably seem "inconclusive and diffuse" to 
many, but liberating and real to many others. 
In real terms this means that a feminist approach needs to focus on the 
apparent paradoxes in the property clause, because they point towards 
property's relational nature. The constitutional property clause is both wide 
and limited, making it impossible to maintain the masculinist characteristics of 
absoluteness, abstractness and exclusivity. More importantly, the balance 
that is implied between protection of property and social reform means that 
property does become a more allocative right rather than a negative, liberal 
right. The refusal to once again make property part of a conceptual hierarchy 
also offers interesting possibilities. By protecting all rights, section 25 
provides security to owners and non-owners alike, making it possible to 
emphasise its relational role. In this way the state's responsibility to maintain 
and protect relations is served. On the other hand, the limitations ensure that 
property's social function is emphasised which, in turn, undermines the public-
private dichotomy. 
20 Flax "Beyond equality" 193 196. 
21 Flax 'Beyond equality" 193 203. 
14.1 Summary 
CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER 14: CONCLUSION 
"My choice is to resist the temptations of theoretical 
- purity."1 
"I thought that everyone had a theory and my problem 
was that I didn't."2 
14.1.1 The consequences of conceptualism 
This study started out with the familiar statement that property and liberty (or 
equality) belongs to different branches of law and should not be confused with 
each other. It is highly ironic that this tongue-in-cheek remark should turn out 
to be true in an unforeseen way. To discover why this should be so we need 
to retrace our steps. The primary objective of this study was to examine the 
property concept from a private-law and constitutional-law perspective. The 
constitutional protection of private property makes the traditional distinction 
between private and public law problematic. Consequently the first step was 
to try to understand what the private law concept entails. Only then can it be 
compared to the constitutional one. 
The authoritative or accepted private-law concept of ownership is that it is a 
universal, timeless and abstract concept. This accepted view is based on a 
number of shared assumptions. Ownership is technically and conceptually 
defined and justified as the paradigmatic right, within a hierarchy of rights, 
and is characterised as an absolute, exclusive, uniform and real right. Not 
only is this the concept of ownership that, applied formally, will result in 
liberty, but the background assumption is that this has always been the case 
and will always be. This formalist and conceptualist view of ownership is the 
1 Rhode "Politics of paradigms" 149. 
2 Eco U Foucault's pendulum (San Diego 1989 Tr W Weaver) 34. 
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operative one in both civil and common law. The exception to this rule is 
American law, where criticism of conceptualism surfaced early trough the 
work of the realists. Their insistence on a more sociological approach had an 
impact on constitutional law in particular, but also had a marginal influence on 
private law. 
The first part of the study indicated that, not only is the background 
assumption without foundation, but this operative view has also had 
unacceptable consequences. Its conceptualist and formalist pretensions of 
abstractness, universality and neutrality made it possible to accept and justify 
slavery, discrimination and inequality. Moreover, the rhetorical assumptions 
have tended to elevate this property clause above criticism so that these 
inequities have gone largely unchallenged. In fact, it has become clear that 
the accepted view of property implies inequality and exclusion. The 
consequence of conceptualism in the private-law concept therefore has been 
to create, justify and maintain unequal property. This has not been a result of 
strange historical factors, but is an essential part of the property concept. 
Indeed, property and libertylequality seem to have very little in common. It 
would not be farfetched to suggest that they might indeed be mutually 
exclusive. 
14.1.2 The consequences of constitutionalism 
The purpose of the second part of this study was to investigate whether, and 
if so to what extent, constitutional protection of property can rectify or 
compensate for the consequences of conceptualism. Put another way, the 
question was whether constitutionalism can guarantee liberty and equality. 
The answer to this question has been an "it depends" kind of answer. It 
depends on whether the conceptualist model is utilised in constitutional 
adjudication; what the courts' views are on their role; what interpretative 
theory is used and (above all) what the operative political theory is. 
For example, if the conceptualist view of property is used in constitutional 
cases (ie when the courts argue that property is property is property), the 
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ideological baggage of this concept will also be introduced. This makes it 
virtually impossible for constitutional courts to avoid the consequences set out 
above. Moreover, if property (in its private law guise) becomes paradigmatic 
for public law too, the results will be essentially contradictory. Property, of all 
the fundamental rights, is the one that is virtually universally recognised as 
based on and resulting in inequality. Most of the others are concerned with 
maintaining or creating equality. But if the paradigm right is conceptually 
unequal, the paradigm will be unequal and inequality might become 
acceptable in other cases too. Therefore, using the private law paradigm is a 
mechanism for excluding political considerations and, in that way, of ensuring 
inequality. Developing a dual (private and public) property concept could be 
equally problematic. Apart from the fact that this virtually guarantees conflict 
between courts, it serves to perpetuate the public/private split. On the other 
hand, this paradoxical split might be utilised to undermine the private-law 
paradigm in line with the constitutional duty to develop the common law. 
Similarly, where judges see their role as that of merely applying the law, they 
will accept that property is whatever the legislature says it is. This will avoid 
landing them in the counter-majoritarian difficulty, but has little else to 
recommend it. 
On the other hand, if courts should use the idea of equality as a basis for 
interpreting the property clause, that might result in an approach where the 
constitutional property concept becomes paradigmatic for all law. Such an 
approach would be consistent with the 1996 constitution, as indicated above. 
Moreover, such an approach would satisfy a feminist approach provided that 
a number of conditions are met. These conditions are set out below. 
Of crucial importance is the interpretative theory employed by the courts. 
Courts that remain in the literalisUintentionalist mould can never play a 
transforming role, that is of transforming an essentially unequal property 
concept into a means of achieving equality. One should remember that 
constitutions, in Cover's words, provide a bridge between what is, what should 
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be and what might be. It therefore provides the opportunity for transforming 
distributive patterns and conceptual systems. 
Most importantly the success of constitutional property in ensuring equality 
depends on the underlying political theory. If this underlying theory is a 
typically liberal one, this will import all the theoretical and conceptual 
difficulties of liberalism into constitutional analysis. The comparative study 
has shown that, at the very least, using the liberal theory as point of departure 
will guarantee conflict between a conservative judiciary and a transforming 
legislature. It also imports the liberal dichotomies into constitutional law, so 
that private/public, man/woman, subject/object, rational/emotional, 
concrete/diffuse, abstract/relative become "natural" categories that force 
constitutional analysis into a P/-P mode of thinking. Therefore the answer 
seems to lie outside liberal thinking. 
14.2 Work in progress 
The public/private dilemma cannot be resolved, it needs to be transcended. 
The split into public and private is a false dichotomy, an artificial boundary. 
This becomes clear when the woman question is asked: does this make any 
difference to women? The answer is, of course, negative. Private law, like all 
forms of conceptualism, ignores women's position in property relations 
because it pretends to be neutral and abstract. The economic and social 
condition of women is none of its concern, because it is neutral regarding 
such "political" questions. The effect of this is the confirmation of the status 
quo. Public law, which is supposed to be about equality, similarly ignores 
women. Because it is imbedded in a patriarchal structure, it will always put 
male interests first. That is why both the 1993 constitution and the 1996 
constitution are concerned with restoring the property rights of men (or of 
patriarchal families/tribes) who have been dispossessed. There is no 
indication of an intention to provide restitution for women who were so 
discriminated against that they had no property that could be dispossessed. 
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In much the same way the "conflict" between courts and legislatures is 
shadowboxing. It changes little for women. Both the courts and legislatures 
are patriarchal structures based on hierarchical and confrontational 
principles. The disregard for women is apparent when the official paralysis 
regarding maintenance orders for women is exposed. The courts, legislatures 
and state officials, effectively ignore what would be vigorously enforced in 
cases of debts or fines. For women the choice between a private hell of 
abuse and the public lack of concern seems like a choice between directions 
for circling around the sacred tree of property. 
The lesson to be learned from radical feminist thought is that the erection of 
artificial boundaries is almost always a sign of hidden oppression. The 
"violation" of these artificial barriers is meant to distract and confuse. A 
feminist view would mean that one needs to see clearly beyond the 
patriarchal foreground and to spin out new tapestries and webs of 
understanding.3 There is, however, a temptation to construct a feminist 
theory of property that is, in all respects, the exact opposite of the existing, 
patriarchal one. Therefore, if the patriarchal concept is abstract, individualist 
and exclusive, the feminist concept must perforce be concrete, communitarian 
and inclusive. Although such a turnaround would serve to destabilise the 
traditional concept, it would also force one to remain caught in the traditional 
dichotomies. There is no law that states that a concept must be either private 
law or public law, either abstract or concrete, either individualist or 
communitarian, either inclusive or exclusive. The only thing that keeps one 
inside such a P/-P scheme is a lack of imagination. 
14.2.1 A feminist constitutionalism 
The "interpretive turn" in legal thinking provided the insight that everything in 
law is interpretation. In order, therefore, to begin the process of establishing 
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a feminist theory of constitutional property, one needs to think about a 
feminist approach to constitutional interpretation. In law interpretation is often 
nothing more than the privileging of one set of truths (or concepts) over 
others. Feminism, on the other hand, uses the contextuality of understanding 
as point of departure. In fact, interpretation is not only contextual, but also 
multi-contextual, since interpretation takes place within multiple, over-lapping 
and sometimes contradictory contexts. 
Feminist constitutional theory is, therefore, not primarily about the counter-
majoritarian dilemma, since this dilemma is also to an extent a-contextual. 
Instead, it is about the conflict between the feminist political agenda and the 
respect for contextuality. As with the conter-majoritarian dilemma, this conflict 
too is basically unresolvable. However, the creative tension between the two 
extremities provides an opening for possibilities. 
Feminist constitutional theory must necessarily start with an analysis of 
power. For feminists, the rule of law often means nothing more than the rule 
by men. The emphasis on legitimate uses of state power in constitutional law 
(such as in the case of limitations on rights) takes the emphasis away from 
private power and the interdependency of power and identity. This analysis 
of power then gives rise to a dominance analysis, which studies the role of 
law in reinforcing gender inequality. 
From these analyses then comes the insight that feminist constitutional theory 
can never advocate state neutrality. Such neutrality prevents rights from 
being allocative to redress imbalances. To attain gender equality state 
intervention is required. This represents part of the feminist political agenda. 
However, the respect for contexts means that there has to be a way to 
determine and constrain this power. The traditional answer, that this is to be 
achieved through democracy, is not acceptable to feminists. Democracy 
3 Daly Gyn/ecology 11. 
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implies free choice by individuals, and this is a myth that ignores the 
interdependency of identity, choice and power. 
The answer lies in the utilisation of a critical feminist theory that undermines 
certainties by indicating the power relations underlying it. This is an open-
ended approach that must be constantly revised as the contexts shift and 
interact. As such it is a political stance rather than a recipe or conceptual 
scheme for constitutional interpretation. However, it provides indications of 
how a feminist theory of constitutional property could look like. 
14.2.2A last word about property 
In the light of the above a number of points of departure can be suggested for 
a feminist theory of constitutional property. In the first place a feminist theory 
starts from the idea that property is relational. This means that the underlying 
relations determine the nature and content of property and not the other way 
around. The question then is not whether an interest is property or not, but 
what the effect of state interference or limitations is. If such interference will 
destroy relationships within which women flourish, it must be regarded as in 
conflict with the constitutional goal of non-sexism. On the other hand 
limitations which destroy relationships inimical to female flourishing, should 
be allowed as legitimate state action. This is the anti-subordination principle 
in action. It implies a functional approach to property and an approach where 
property is not used to perpetuate inequality. 
In the second place a feminist theory must necessarily imply the destruction 
of the idea of man the owner/master. This is achieved by accepting that all 
holders of property are to be protected equally. If the expanded property 
concept is determined by masculinist ideas, this will not advance the feminist 
agenda. Therefore attention needs to be given to types of property that 
advance female flourishing. An example would be to regard the right to 
maintenance for children after divorce as property to be protected 
constitutionally. Neglect by state institutions to implement this effectively 
would then be unconstitutional. 
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Finally a feminist theory of constitutional property must address the question 
of the private/public dichotomy. Countless feminist studies have indicated 
that this dichotomy is at the heart of the oppression of women. Moreover, 
property lawyers have shown that property is never "purely" private, but both 
public and private. In the South African context the options are to either 
advocate the abolition of the distinction between private law and public law or 
to allow constitutional ideas to undermine the conceptualism of private law. 
Both options present problems. The first is probably too radical and would 
meet with resistance from the traditional South African law community. The 
second places much faith in the willingness of the judiciary to allow such an 
undermining. The common thread is, however, the need for the (eventual) 
destruction of the artificial boundary between private and public. 
These suggestions are but signposts on the way to becoming the kind of 
society we would like to be. They may prove to be too circuitous for some 
and too radical for others. But if they stimulate the democratic conversation 
we should all be engaged in. that is enough. 
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